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What Lloyd v. Google Means for UK Class Actions and Litigation Funders

The Lloyd v. Google claim has given rise to some thought-provoking questions:

  • Has Google breached its duties as a data controller? If so, have class members of the ensuing collective action suffered quantifiable damages?
  • How exactly should “same interest” be determined in a case regarding the misuse of data?
  • Do individual members of a class have to demonstrate material harm in order to receive recompense?

In the following article, we will explore the answers to these and other questions that have arisen from Case UKSC 2019/0213, otherwise known as Lloyd v. Google.

What Exactly Happened?

Richard Lloyd, sought to file a claim against tech giant Google, asking for compensation pursuant to section 13 of the Data Protection Act of 1998. The accusation involves the use of cookies in a ‘Safari workaround’ that ultimately collected, then disseminated, user data into metrics that were then used to employ targeted advertising to users.

This alleged misuse ostensibly impacted over four million iPhone users in England and Wales, whose data was unlawfully accessed by Google. Google’s use of the data was found to be a breach of DPA1998.

Lloyd sued not only on his own behalf, but on behalf of others whose data was treated similarly. Google fought the suit, saying that class members could not demonstrate material harm from the misuse of data. In a case like this one, ‘material harm’ could include monetary losses or mental anguish stemming from the illegal harvesting or dissemination of data.

Lloyd’s claim was backed by Therium, a prominent litigation funder specializing in tech-related cases. Lloyd’s legal team argued that the ‘same interest’ mandate had been satisfied, and that awarding all class members the same sum in damages is reasonable—without a need to delve into the personal circumstances of every individual claimant.

The Decision 

Initially, the High Court ruled in favor of Google. When the court of appeal reversed the ruling, Google appealed again to the Supreme Court. In the majority decision, Lord Leggatt determined the following:

  • The determination of “damage” must include verifiable, material damages such as financial or mental anguish. Mere illegality of an action is not enough to necessitate financial recompence.
  • Damages must be demonstrated.

Why are the Facts Here so Important?

Obviously, there is reason to be concerned when a tech company in control of an extremely large amount of user data is accused of illegally managing that data. In this instance, Google allegedly sold or used user data for commercial/money-making purposes. This was done without the knowledge or consent of its users. One could argue that any user who utilized Google on an Apple iPhone has reason to be dismayed (indeed, a similar case settled before going to trial).

The case also illustrates the importance of opt-in versus opt-out models, as well as what can happen when the majority of class members choose to abstain from involvement in the case proceedings. Under Lord Leggatt’s ruling, an opt-out model is not feasible in any instance requiring that class members be able to show tangible losses. Ultimately, tech giants like Google are required to abide by their own user agreements. However, users must prove suffering beyond the violation of their right to privacy.

Ironically, one area of doubt in such a case arises over how shares of a payout (to litigation funders, for example) can properly be calculated without consent of all class members. Just as many class members in an opt-out proceeding may not know the details of the case, they also may be totally unaware of the claim, or of how any proceeds are to be divided.

What Do These Developments Mean for Litigation Funders and Potential Claimants?

The idea that a claimant must demonstrate damages in order to receive compensation is neither new nor controversial. But it does put a damper on collective actions with high class member counts. Especially when looking at cases against huge companies like Visa/Mastercard, Apple, or Google. Many would argue that it’s simply not feasible to collect information about losses from millions of potential claimants.

So, while this line of thinking is reasonable under English law, it may well discourage litigation funders from taking on cases requiring that all class members demonstrate individual losses. This, in turn, will make the pursuit of justice more difficult for potential members of a wronged class.

For litigation funders, the difference between one potential claimant in a case and the millions who could have been class members in Lloyd v Google is significant. While we know that funders ultimately back cases to increase access to justice and give claimants a day in court—we also know that this relies on investors, whose motivation to invest is profit-driven. In short, litigation finance only works in the long term, when it’s financially advantageous to investors.

The question of privacy rights is a tricky one. Having one’s privacy violated is, as the phrase suggests, a violation. But as it typically has no financial component beyond the negative feelings associated, it is unlikely to serve as a demonstrable loss in a case involving user data (unless, of course, a further demonstrable loss can be proven).

At the same time, it is clear that Google misused user data, intentionally and without consent—with an eye toward financial gain. Surely it makes sense that Google should share some of that income with the users whose data was breached?

Not according to the UK Supreme Court, apparently.

A Missed Opportunity 

Had Lloyd vs. Google succeeded in the way Lloyd intended, it could have changed the way class actions in data cases were handled by the courts. Essentially, opt-out class actions could have flourished as individual class members wouldn’t be required to demonstrate financial damages.

This has particular relevance to data cases, because when data companies use information in ways that are not in keeping with their own TOS, users may not be damaged financially. But this lack of demonstrable damages doesn’t necessarily mean a) data companies don’t have a moral obligation to offer users recompense, or b) that users aren’t deserving of a payout when they are wronged.

Had Lloyd’s legal team instead used a bifurcated approach to the proceedings, a smaller opt-in class could perhaps have enabled a stronger case through the gathering of evidence—specifically evidence of damages. Similarly, a Group Litigation Order (GLO), which, despite what some see as high administrative costs, would have better determined eligibility for class members. This, in turn, would have allowed for a better test of the case’s merits.

In Conclusion

Lloyd vs. Google demonstrates the importance of several aspects of class action litigation, including how opt-in versus opt-out impacts the collection, as well as ability to bring evidence of damages. This promises to be a factor in future tech cases—not just in the UK, but globally.

Will the failure to secure damages for those whose data was misused embolden Big Tech? Will it serve as a warning? Could it discourage litigation funders from backing such cases?

We’ll have to wait and see. For now, it’s clear that Lloyd vs. Google has left its mark on the UK legal and litigation funding worlds—and on Big Tech as a whole.

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Announcements Commercial Regulatory Issues

More Than 100 Companies Sign Letter Urging Third-Party Litigation Funding Disclosure Rule for Federal Courts Ahead of October Judicial Rules Meeting

By Harry Moran |

In the most significant demonstration of concern for secretive third-party litigation funding (TPLF) to date, 124 companies, including industry leaders in healthcare, technology, financial services, insurance, energy, transportation, automotive and other sectors today sent a letter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules urging creation of a new rule that would require a uniform process for the disclosure of TPLF in federal cases nationwide. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules will meet on October 10 and plans to discuss whether to move ahead with the development of a new rule addressing TPLF.

The letter, organized by Lawyers for Civil Justice (LCJ), comes at a time when TPLF has grown into a 15 billion dollar industry and invests funding in an increasing number of cases which, in turn, has triggered a growing number of requests from litigants asking courts to order the disclosure of funding agreements in their cases. The letter contends that courts are responding to these requests with a “variety of approaches and inconsistent practices [that] is creating a fragmented and incoherent procedural landscape in the federal courts.” It states that a rule is “particularly needed to supersede the misplaced reliance on ex parte conversations; ex parte communications are strongly disfavored by the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges because they are both ineffective in educating courts and highly unfair to the parties who are excluded.”

Reflecting the growing concern with undisclosed TPLF and its impact on the justice system, LCJ and the Institute for Legal Reform (ILR) submitted a separate detailed comment letter to the Advisory Committee that also advocates for a “simple and predictable rule for TPLF disclosure.”

Alex Dahl, LCJ’s General Counsel said: “The Advisory Committee should propose a straightforward, uniform rule for TPLF disclosure. Absent such a rule, the continued uncertainty and court-endorsed secrecy of non-party funding will further unfairly skew federal civil litigation. The support from 124 companies reflects both the importance of a uniform disclosure rule and the urgent need for action.”

The corporate letter advances a number of additional reasons why TPLF disclosure is needed in federal courts:

Control: The letter argues that parties “cannot make informed decisions without knowing the stakeholders who control the litigation… and cannot understand the control features of a TPLF agreement without reading the agreement.” While many funding agreements state that the funder does not control the litigation strategy, companies are increasingly concerned that they use their growing financial leverage to exercise improper influence.

Procedural safeguards: The companies maintain that the safeguards embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) cannot work without disclosure of TPLF.  One example is that courts and parties today are largely unaware of and unable to address conflicts between witnesses, the court, and parties on the one hand, and non-parties on the other, when these funding agreements and the financial interests behind them remain largely secret.

Appraisal of the case: Finally, the letter reasons that the FRCP already require the disclosure of corporate insurance policies which the Advisory Committee explained in 1970 “will enable counsel for both sides to make the same realistic appraisal of the case, so that settlement and litigation strategy are based on knowledge and not speculation.” The companies maintain that this very same logic should also require the disclosure of TPLF given its growing role and impact on federal civil litigation.

Besides the corporate letter and joint comment, LCJ is intensifying its efforts to rally companies and practitioners to Ask About TPLF in their cases, and to press for a uniform federal rule to require disclosure. LCJ will be launching a new Ask About TPLF website that will serve as a hub for its new campaign later this month.

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Commercial People Moves

Mesh Capital Hires Augusto Delarco to Bolster Litigation Finance Practice

By Harry Moran |

In a post on LinkedIn, Mesh Capital announced the hiring of Augusto Delarco who has joined the Brazilian firm as a Senior Associate, bringing a “solid and distinguished track record in complex litigation and innovative financial solutions” to help develop Mesh Capital’s Litigation Finance and Special Situations practices. 

The announcement highlighted the experience Delarco would bring to the team, noting that throughout his career “he has advised clients, investors, and asset managers on strategic cases and the structuring of investments involving judicial assets.”

Delarco joins Mesh Capital from Padis Mattars Lawyers where he served as an associate lawyer, having previously spent six years at Tepedino, Migliore, Berezowski and Poppa Laywers.

Mesh Capital is based out of São Paulo and specialises in special situations, legal claims and distressed assets. Within litigation finance, Mesh Capital focuses on “the acquisition, sale and structuring of legal claims, covering private, public and court-ordered credit rights.”

Case Developments Commercial

Delaware Court Denies Target’s Discovery Request for Funding Documents in Copyright Infringement Case

By Harry Moran |

A recent court opinion in a copyright infringement cases has once again demonstrated that judges are hesitant to force plaintiffs and their funders to hand over information that is not relevant to the claim at hand, as the judge denied the defendant’s discovery request for documents sent by the plaintiff to its litigation funder.

In an article on E-Discovery LLC, Michael Berman analyses a ruling handed down by Judge Stephanos Bibas in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, in the case of Design With Friends, Inc. v. Target Corporation. Design has brought a claim of copyright infringement and breach of contract, and received funding to pursue the case from Validity Finance. As part of its defense, Target had sought documents from the funder relating to its involvement in the case, but Judge Bibas ruled that Target’s request was both “too burdensome to disclose” and was seeking “information that is attorney work product”.

Target’s broad subpoena contained five requests for information including Validity’s valuations of the lawsuit, communications between the funder and plaintiff prior to the funding agreement being signed, and information about the relationship between the two parties.

With regards to the valuations, Judge Bibas wrote that “while those documents informed an investment decision, they did so by evaluating whether a lawsuit had merit and what damages it might recover,” which in the court’s opinion constitutes “legal analysis done for a legal purpose”. He went on to say that “if the work-product doctrine did not protect these records,” then the forced disclosure of these documents “would chill lawyers from discussing a pending case frankly.”

Regarding the requests for information about the relationship between Design and Validity, Judge Bibas was clear in his opinion that these requests were disproportionately burdensome. The opinion lays out clear the clear reasoning that “Target already knows that Validity is funding the suit and that it does not need to approve a settlement”, and with this information already available “Further minutiae about Validity are hardly relevant to whether Target infringed a copyright or breached a contract years before Validity entered the picture.”The full opinion from Judge Bibas can be read here.