
Joshua Coleman-Pecha is a senior international construction, infrastructure and technology dispute specialist working in the MENA region. He advises on construction and technology projects from inception to completion. Joshua is a qualified solicitor advocate, meaning he has rights of audience in the courts of England & Wales, and is a PRINCE 2 qualified project manager.
Joshua advises on all aspects of complex dispute avoidance and resolution. He has represented several clients in billion-dollar disputes before a variety of arbitral institutions including ICC, LCIA, UNCITRAL, DIAC, and SCCA. He has experience handling disputes under the governing laws of England & Wales, the UAE, Saudi, and Qatar.
Joshua’s recent significant work includes advising in relation to oil and gas processing facilities, drilling contracts (onshore and offshore), a water desalinisation plant, a battery energy storage park, the MENA region’s largest metro system, and a major railroad and metro project in the UAE and Saudi respectively. Joshua has experience of projects across the region having handled disputes in, for example, the UAE, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Turkey. His clients include international oil & gas companies, refining and petrochemical companies, EPC contractors, oil & gas service companies, EPC employers, and international technology providers. Finally, he acts in a hybrid role as general counsel to a billion dollar pharmaceutical company based in the UAE.
Joshua was recently recognized as a ‘Key Lawyer’ in Oil, Gas and Natural Resources by Legal 500 2024. He is also a member of various construction industry associations and a contributing member of the Legal Funding Journal.
Below is our LFJ Conversation with Joshua Coleman‑Pecha: The MENA region, and Saudi Arabia in particular, is a growing jurisdiction in the global legal funding market. What has hindered funders from embracing this market in the past, and why the change--what has prompted more funders to take an interest in this part of the world?I think there have been a few factors that have limited funders' interest in operating in the Saudi market, or, financing disputes that involve Saudi law and / or Saudi Courts.
First, the high-level point is that legal funding is not prohibited under Saudi law. However, until now, in Saudi and across the GCC, whilst the view has been that written laws do not prohibit legal funding, there has been a high degree of uncertainty as to how, in practice, the courts would treat parties backed by legal funders. Quite understandably, legal funders and litigants have been hesitant to be the 'test cases' on which this issue is examined. To some extent I think this hesitancy remains, though it is decreasing as GCC countries refine their laws and legal practice, and legal funders look to the growing markets across the GCC for new opportunities.
Second, for many years Sharia has been the dominant system of law in Saudi. Sharia law is a huge subject, and it is impossible to consider all the aspects of it here. However, in summary, it is a combination of several different texts and is subject to several schools of legal interpretation. As with other GCC countries, Saudi is a civil law system, and does not rely on binding precedent. It may be that legal funders have been hesitant to make investments in an environment that they don't feel they fully understand. However, in recent times, Saudi has taken significant strides towards codifying its laws. All GCC countries are on this path to a greater or lesser extent, which helps provide certainty. In addition, with better recording and proliferation of court judgments and legal knowledge across the entire market, my sense is that international investors are becoming more confident in these surroundings.
Third, all GCC countries have been signatories to the New York Convention for some time. However, recent years have seen an acceleration of arbitration across the GCC, as recognition of the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals and willingness to enforce arbitral awards increases. In Saudi, part of the country's 'Vision 2023' is to have the leading arbitral institution in the Middle East, and be considered one of the leading arbitral institutions worldwide. Saudi has implemented a new Arbitration Law, and the Saudi Center for Commercial Arbitration (SCCA) has received significant investment, allowing it to hire globally recognised practitioners to join its senior ranks. Its rules are based on UNCITRAL rules and were updated in 2023 to reflect the most modern sets of arbitral rules globally.
Fourth, through discussion with various funders, my understanding of their view is that investing in Saudi is outside their commercial risk parameters. Factors such as uncertainty over duration of legal proceedings, lack of knowledge of Sharia, and questions over enforcement have made it difficult to determine likely ROI. Certainty over enforcement of arbitral awards in Saudi is increasing and the reasons for this are discussed below / later.
Finally, from the perspective of a funded party, and bearing in mind a lot of these parties are contractors in the construction industry, I think there is hesitancy to use legal funding as it can wipe out profit margins.
You deal with the Saudi construction claims sector specifically. What is the TAM of this market, and why should litigation funders take an interest here?The market is huge. Focusing just on the projects sector alone, there are approximately USD 1.8trn of projects planned or underway in Saudi (USD 330bn of which are already underway), making it the largest market in the MENA region. Over the last five years, the Saudi projects sector has, on average, awarded USD 60bn of projects a year, which looks set to grow year-on-year to around USD 80bn by 2028.
It is impossible to accurately estimate the number or value of disputes emanating from these projects. Of course, arbitration is private, but also many issues or disputes will not come to light due to being settled through commercial negotiations. We do know that right now approximately 440 projects in Saudi are identified as being 'on hold' (which means there is almost certainly going to be some form of dispute arising) with a combined value of USD 231bn. As the number and value of projects approaching completion or achieving completion increases, I expect to see these figures grow.
How do claimants and litigators on the ground feel about litigation funding? How do they look at the practice from both an economic and cultural perspective?For the reasons discussed above, legal funding has yet to proliferate in GCC countries. My experience is that, at best, many legal advisors (both in private practice and in-house) and potential litigants have limited knowledge about legal funding and are therefore sceptical of its merits. At worst, these parties may not know anything about legal funding at all, or, have a misunderstanding of what it is about and how it can help. I believe that education is needed before legal funding can be considered 'mainstream' in this region.
Where legal funding may be better known is amongst international entities (like international contractors) operating in Saudi or the wider GCC. However, even where there more understanding as regards the concept and a willingness to consider it as an option, barriers remain. For example, contractors are often put off legal funding when the cost is revealed.
Construction disputes are often fact heavy, require a significant amount of analysis before funders can begin to assess the merits, and, if they go to trial, will require lengthy investment periods. All this means that funder risk goes up, so the required returns go up, which can seriously damage contractor profits. There's little point in a contractor taking funding if it's going to wipe out the contractor's profit margin on the underlying project.
My personal view is that discussion between contractors and funders can yield a solution. On the one hand contractors may be persuaded to take funding based on a holistic view of its financial benefits. Portfolio funding may make taking funding economically palatable to contractors. However, also in my view, the greatest opportunity for striking investment deals lies in the fact that both employers and contractors tend to want to settle disputes at the earliest opportunity. If legal funders are willing to take this into account, it may shift the investment metrics sufficiently to make legal funding attractive to all parties.
What about enforcement in Saudi Arabia? How much of a concern is this, and what steps should funders take to allay their concerns about enforcement over a specific claim?The laws
Saudi has been signatory to the New York convention since 1994. However, its arbitration friendliness has increased massively in the last few years, including the creation of the previously mentioned SCCA in 2016. In addition, two key rules have been promulgated:
In 2012, Saudi passed KSA Royal Decree M/34 concerning the approval of the Law of Arbitration (KSA Arbitration Law) (together with its Implementing Rules) and in 2013, Royal Decree M/53 (Enforcement Law). The KSA Arbitration law is modelled on the UNCITRAL model law, which is regarded as international best practice.
The KSA Arbitration Law curtailed the Saudi courts' interventionist powers in relation to arbitrations seated in Saudi Arabia by recognizing for the first time the parties' autonomy to tailor their arbitration procedure in certain important respects, including by explicitly recognizing the adoption of institutional arbitration rules. The KSA Arbitration Law also addressed a key concern under the old law – the power of the Saudi courts to reopen and effectively re-litigate awards on their merits.
The Enforcement Law has led to the creation of specialized enforcement courts, whose jurisdiction supersedes that of the Board of Grievances (the court previously competent to hear requests for enforcement of arbitral awards). This in turn has started to have a salutary effect on the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, which until 2017 was an uncertain prospect. The Enforcement Law contains provisions that affect all aspects of enforcement of judgments and arbitral awards, both domestic and foreign. In practice, the Enforcement Law has resulted in the unprecedented enforcement of several foreign arbitral awards, which is welcome development. It is hoped that the Rules supplementing the KSA Arbitration Law will help to provide more certainty around how the courts will apply the KSA Arbitration Law, including with respect to enforcement of arbitral awards.
Domestic Arbitral Awards
Domestic arbitral awards must comply with the KSA Arbitration Law. The Enforcement Courts have jurisdiction to enforce domestic arbitral awards under article 9(2) of the Enforcement Law. For a domestic arbitral award, it must be declared as enforceable by the appeal court with initial jurisdiction over the dispute. Therefore, an application is needed to the relevant appeal court for a declaration that the award is enforceable by the party seeking enforcement. The declaration is normally represented by a court stamp, after which the request for enforcement can be registered with the Enforcement Court.
Domestic arbitral awards that are enforceable include:
Article 55 of the KSA Arbitration Law outlines the procedural and substantive requirements of a valid arbitral award. Pursuant to this provision, the competent court must verify the following conditions to issue an order for enforcement:
Furthermore, the arbitral award must comply with the formality requirements of the KSA Arbitration Law and be compliant with Sharia principles. Article 49 of the KSA Arbitration Law states that an arbitral award is not subject to appeal. However, under article 50(1), a party may apply to annul an arbitral award issued on the following grounds:
Furthermore, under article 50(2) of the KSA Arbitration Law, the court may, on its own jurisdiction, nullify the arbitral award if:
The application for nullification of the arbitral award must be made 60 days after the nullifying party was notified of the award.
Foreign Arbitral Awards
Foreign awards must comply with the Enforcement Law as well as the New York Convention for enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. For a foreign arbitral award, a party does not need a declaration that it is enforceable from the relevant domestic appeal court. Instead, the party requesting enforcement can apply directly to the Enforcement Court, with no statute of limitations applicable.
For foreign arbitral awards to be enforceable they must meet the following criteria:
The Enforcement Court has jurisdiction to enforce foreign arbitral awards in accordance with the requirements of the Enforcement Law:
The New York Convention is considered the foundation for enforcing arbitral awards in a state other than where the arbitral award was issued (i.e., foreign arbitral awards). All arbitral awards not issued under the KSA Arbitration Law are considered foreign arbitral awards. Contracting states to the New York Convention must recognise foreign arbitral awards as binding and enforce them under their rules of procedure, and without imposing “substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges” for foreign arbitral awards than the State would impose on domestic arbitral awards.
Process for Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
To enforce an arbitration award the application for enforcement must include:
Article 6 of the Enforcement Law addressing all judgments and awards, states that all judgments issued by an Enforcement Court are subject to appeal and the court of the KSA Arbitration Law appeal's judgment would then be final. However, for arbitral awards issued under the KSA Arbitration Law, article 55(3) of the KSA Arbitration Law does not allow appeal of an order to enforce an arbitral award. By contrast, an order refusing enforcement is appealable.
The enforcement procedure is as follows:
The applicant must wait twenty days for the Enforcement Court to notify the relevant party of the Article 34 decision. If this is not done, the applicant may request for the notice to be served by publication in local press, by the Enforcement Court. Although the applicant will initially pay for the publication of the notice (three to five days are required for publication from payment), the costs are able to be reimbursed from the enforcement order.
If the Article 34 decision is not adhered to, within five days of notification, the enforcement judge may be requested to enforce sanctions against the non-complying party. Such measures, under Article 46 are issued up to ten days after the expiry of the Article 34 decision or from the date of applicant's request to issue an Article 46 decision, provided that the request is made at least five days after the Article 34 decision is notified. All decisions by an enforcement judge are final, unless they relate to certain procedures or costs.
Other Considerations on Enforcing Arbitration Awards
The public policy exception to enforcing foreign arbitral awards has traditionally been very broad. An award that contradicts Sharia law or public policy will not be enforced by the Enforcement Court. However, if the part that contradicts public policy can be separated from the rest of the award, only that part should not be enforced.
The Enforcement Law sets out that the enforcement judge cannot enforce a foreign arbitral award if it includes what is contradictory to public policy. The implementing regulations of the Enforcement Law defines "public policy" as the Islamic Sharia. Saudi Arabia Royal Decree No. 44682/1443 dated 28 August 2021 limits the definition of public policy to general rules of Islamic law based on the Quran and the Sunnah. Recently successful grounds were:
Public policy is not limited to procedural deficiencies. The Saudi court can, of its own volition, refuse to enforce an award that contradicts Sharia, including any of the evidence relied on by the tribunal that is not acceptable under Sharia (for example, if the tribunal relied on the testimony of a person with a mental impairment). The court could also refuse enforcement if the award itself contradicts Sharia (for example, an award of interest).
Other Enforcement Mechanisms
Saudi Arabia is also party to Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Co-operation and the GCC Agreement for the Enforcement of Judgments, Rogatory, and Judicial Publication.
One of the benefits of a more mature market is the presence of consultants, advisors and experts whom funders can rely on. How prevalent are such experts within the Saudi legal / litigation funding market? What can funders do to ensure they are receiving reliable, actionable advice?Until recently, to participate in the Saudi market, international firms had to enter an alliance with a local partner firm. With the change of laws in this area, several international firms have now opened their own Saudi office, and HFW (the firm I work at) is one of those. This divergence perhaps causes some difficulty for clients seeking joined-up legal advice. Naturally, high quality Saudi firms focus on work in the local courts, where they have rights of audience. International firms are more likely to focus on international clients, working with contracts under foreign laws, with arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. In both cases, the proliferation of work requires additional legal practitioners, and this growth potentially comes at the cost of quality legal advice or, at least, relevant experience.
Of course, it is tempting for me to say that HFW should be every funder's first call for Saudi related advice! The reality, as everyone knows, is that every dispute is different and requires different skill sets, sector knowledge, legal qualification(s), and price point. I'm sure it doesn't really need to be said, as legal funders know their jobs better than I do, but I would always suggest seeking advice from firms and individuals who have wide experience in the jurisdiction, have advised on disputes in the relevant sector in that jurisdiction previously, and understand what legal funders need and want to be able to make their investment decision.
Wieger Wielinga is responsible for Omni Bridgeway’s investment origination in (sovereign) awards and judgments globally and its litigation funding efforts both in EMEA and the UK.
Below is our LFJ Conversation with Wieger.
You have been working in the funding industry for over 25 years and are the president of ELFA. In that capacity you are at the forefront of discussion about regulating funding. Can you provide a short summary of the status of the regulatory discussion in the EU at this moment?
Perhaps the starting point here is to understand who wants regulation and why. It appears to Omni Bridgeway that a clear formulation of the perceived problems, and who would benefit from solving them, should take place before moving to the question of solutions and whether regulation is part of that.
Some of the more understandable concerns that were raised as our industry was developing and gaining spotlight over the past years concerned (i) potential conflicts of interest which could unintendedly occur if arbitrators are not aware who is funding one of the parties and perhaps to some extent (ii) the financial standing of funders and their ability to cover their financial obligations.
The issue of conflict of interest is solved by all institutions nowadays requiring disclosure of funders and the issue of financial standing has been tackled by funders associations obliging their members with respect to capital adequacy and audited accounts etcetera. See for istance https://elfassociation.eu/about/code-of-conduct.
Powerful industries like big tech, pharma, and tobacco have faced successful claims from parties who would never have succeeded without the backing of a funder. That rebalancing of powers appears to have triggered efforts to undermine the rise of the litigation funding industry. Arguments used in the EU regulatory discussion against funding include suggestions on the origin of the capital and principal aims of the funders, often referring to funders coming from the US or “Wall Street”. It is not a proper argument but opponents know a subset of the EU constituency is sensitive to the predatory undertone it represents.
So the suggestion that Litigation Funding is a phenomenon blowing over from the US or at least outside the EU is misleading?
Indeed. What many don’t realize is that litigation funding was well established as a practice for over a decade on the European continent without any issues before UK funders started to become established. Some funders, like Germany’s Foris AG, were publicly listed, while others emerged from the insurance sector, such as Roland Prozessfinanz and later Allianz Prozessfinanz. At Omni Bridgeway, we have been funding cases since the late 1980s, often supporting European governments with subrogation claims tied to national Export Credit Agencies and since the turn of the century arbitrations and collective redress cases. So it does not come “from” the US, or Australia or the UK. It has been already an established practice since the early 90s of the last century, with reputable clients, government entites, as well as multi nationals and clients from the insurance and banking industry.
Only later, as of around 2007, we witnessed the entry of more serious capital with the entry of US and UK litigation funders. Only as of that moment, questions came about champerty and maintenance issues and in its slipstream, a call for regulation and the abovementioned narrative started being pushed.
Another related misunderstanding is the size and growth of the litigation funding industry. It is in my view often overstated. In absolute terms, it remains small compared to other high-risk asset classes like private equity or venture capital. Sure, it is a growing industry and good funders have interesting absolute returns to provide its institutional LPs whilst doing societal good, especially in the growing ESG litigation space, but one should be suspicious of parties that speak of a “hedge fund mecca” or similar incorrect exaggerations.
So what about the actual risk for frivolous or abusive litigation by or due to litigation funders?
We are in the business of making a return on our investments. Because our financing is non-recourse (unlike a loan) we only make a return if the matters we invest in are won and paid out. Whether there is a win is determined by courts and arbitrators and as such out of our hands but you will understand we put in a lot of time and effort to review matters and determine their likelihood of success. Any matter that makes it through our rigorous underwriting process is objectively worth pursuing and is unlikely to be frivolous. That does not mean all matters we invest in are sure winners, but these are matters that deserve the opportunity to be heard and very often our funding is the only way in which that is possible.
So, in response to the argument of abusive litigation I would put the argument of access to justice. It is not uncommon for legal fees in relatively straightforward commercial matters to exceed EUR 1 million, let alone the adverse cost exposure. If we want a society where the size of your bank account isn’t the only determining factor for whether you can pursue your rights, we have to accept funding as a fact of life.
A related argument that continues to be recycled by the opponents of TPLF is that funded party’s need protection against the funders pricing and /or control over the litigation. This is also a misconception, for which there is zero empirical basis. After all these years of funding in the EU, thousands of funded cases, there are no cases where a court or tribunal has indeed decided a funder acted abusively, neither in general nor in this particular respect. This is partly because the interests between funder and funded party are typically well aligned. Off course there is always a slight potential for interests starting to deviate between client and funder with the passage of time, as in all business relationships. These deviations in interest are, however, almost never unforeseeable, and typically as “what ifs” addressed in advance in the funding agreements. Both parties voluntarily enter these agreements and accept their terms. Nobody is forced to sign a funding agreement.
That may be true, but how about consumers, who may be less sophisticated users of litigation funding?
A fair question. However, there are two other realities as well: First, there is already a plethora of consumer protecting rules codified in EU directives and national legislation of member states.[1] Second, consumers tend not to be the direct, individual, clients of third-party litigation funders, as they almost always end up being represented by professional consumer organizations, who in turn have ample legal representation and protect the interest of their claimant group.
Interestingly the European Consumer Organization BEUC has just published their view on litigation funding in a report “Justice unchained | BEUC’s view on third party litigation funding for collective redress”. The summary is crystal clear: “Third party litigation funding has emerged as a solution to bridge a funding gap” and “provides substantial benefits to claimant organisations”. Also: “Assessment of TPLF needs to be evidenced by specific cases.” And “The potential risks related to TPLF for collective redress are already addressed by the Representative Action Directive.” It concludes by saying “additional regulation of TPLF at EU level should be considered only if it is necessary.” See https://www.beuc.eu/position-papers/justice-unchained-beucs-view-third-party-litigation-funding-collective-redress.
So what do you think will be the ultimate outcome of the regulatory discussion in the EU and will this impact the Funding market in the EU?
So, in summary, when it comes to European regulation, Europe knows that it is crucial to focus on fostering a competitive environment where innovation thrives, accountability is upheld, and access to justice is ensured. This all requires financial equality between parties, ensuring a level playing field. The EC cannot make policies on the basis of an invented reality, of created misunderstandings. That is why the mapping exercise was a wise decision. We should expect regulation, if any, will not be of a prohibitive nature and hence we do not see an adverse impact to the funding market.
In the meantime, there is this patchwork of implementations of the EU Directive on Representative Actions for the Protection of Consumer Rights. Will funders and investors be hesitant to participate in the EU?
Indeed the EC has left implementation of the directive to the member states and that leads to differences. In some jurisdictions funders will have large reservations to fund a case under the collective regime and in other jurisdictions it will be fine. This is best illustrated by comparison of the implementation in The Netherlands and the one in Germany.
The Dutch opt out regime under the WAMCA rules allows a qualified entity to pursue a litigation on behalf of a defined group of consumers with court oversight on both what is a qualified entity, its management board, the way it is funded and how the procedure is conducted. Over 70 cases have been filed now in the WAMCA’s short history. The majority of those cases concern matters with an exclusively idealistic goal by the way. Although there is clearly an issue with duration, as it typically takes over 2 years before standing is addressed, the Dutch judiciary is really trying to facilitate and improve the process. Any initial suspicion of the litigation funders is also coming to an end now the industry has demonstrated that its capital comes from normal institutional investors, its staff from reputable law firms or institutions and IRRs sought are commensurate to the risk of non recourse funding. Once the delays are addressed with the first guiding jurisprudence, the process will probably be doing more or less what it is supposed to do. Almost all cases funded under the WAMCA have an ESG background by the way.
By contrast, Germany chose to “implement” the EU Representative action directive by adopting an opt-in system. It too is meant for qualified entities, but it is questionable whether it fulfills the purpose intended by the European Commission. The issue which makes it rather unsuitable for commercial cases is that the funder’s entitlement is capped at ten percent (sic!) of the proceeds from the class action at penalty of dismissal. Here it seems the lobby has been successful. No funder can fund a case under that regime on a non-recourse basis.
So does that mark the end of Germany as a market for funding collective actions and what does it hold for other member states?
No, in practice it means cases will not be financed under this regime. Funders will continue funding matters as they have in the past, avoiding the class action regime of 13 October 2023. It should serve as a warning though for other member states where discussions are ongoing concerning the implementation of the representative action directive, such as Spain. Indeed it would have been better if the EC would have given clear guidelines towards a more harmonized set of collective actions regimes throughout Europe.
[1] See, for instance, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, “Unfair Commercial practices (National Reports)” (November 2005), available at: https://www.biicl.org/files/883_national_reports_unfair_commercial_practices_new_member_states%5Bwi th_dir_table_and_new_logo%5D.pdf. See also, EY “Global Legal Commercial Terms Handbook 2020” (October 2020), available at: https://www.eylaw.be/wp-content/uploads/publications/EY-Global-Legal- Commercial-Terms-Handbook.pdf. Furter, the Belgian Code of Economic Law defines an “abusive clause” as "any term or condition in a contract between a company and a consumer which, either alone or in combination with one or more other terms or conditions, creates a manifest imbalance between the rights and obligations of the parties to the detriment of the consumer"; such clause is prohibited, null, and void (Article VI.84 Belgian Code of Economic Law). Article 36 of the Danish Contracts Act stipulates that agreement can be set aside if they are unreasonable or unfair. Article L.442-1 of the French Commercial Code (applicable to commercial contracts) prohibits significant imbalance provisions, such as a clause that results in one party being at an unfair disadvantage or disproportionately burdened as compared to the other party. Section 242 of the German Civil Code also obliges the parties to abide by the principle of good faith an
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Our guest today is Sam Dolce, an Attorney and Vice President at Milestone. Milestone is a settlement administrator that offers efficiency and transparency to law firms and their clients post-settlement. Sam discusses the settlement process in mass torts, what challenges law firms and funders face during settlement, how Milestone can help alleviate those headaches, and what trends are on the horizon in the mass torts sector.
I am often referred to as “The Mass Tort Whisperer®” which really means we are usually very early in hearing about early new torts, late-stage torts that may be settling soon, etc.This information can be traded on so it’s quite valuable as we can help our clients use much of this information to make capital deployment decisions. The value for mid stage is a combination of value we bring for early and some of the value propositions mentioned in late stage. Knowing the handling firms that have been really serious about the tort and in leadership is key. The modeling financials can get more detailed with projections and less guessing since the tort will have moved from early to mid-stage. Following the tort activity in the litigation is key to understanding the direction that leadership sees for each tort and how bullish they are is key to an investor deciding to deploy capital for the tort. Our value for the mid stage is key being the tort is mid-way thru the life cycle and so many variables need to be considered prior to investing. The value of late stage is knowing which law firms would be considered the best handling firm to work with that can maximize settlement values or which firms are in settlement negotiations and can still take more cases would be two good examples. Also, having the data to model out what fallout/attrition looks like with late-stage cases is key since it may be higher than the earlier stages. The late-stage torts are a great opportunity but financial modeling and picking the right partners are key. Also, the marketing/origination of cases needs to be handled very precise and almost scientific like to make sure cases can still be acquired at costs that make sense taking the criteria in mind of the possible handling firms. There’s quite a bit of value we bring to these late-stage campaigns for our clients. At which stage of the case life are you currently finding the most attention from litigation funders? Where is there the most room for growth? The most attention goes to late-stage torts due to the projected shorter time to settlement vs. the early and mid-stage torts. If there’s more capital to spend annually, we see more diversification with the heavy weight still on late stage and smaller percentages of total capital going to the mid and early stages. We educate our clients on costs and risk for each stage tort. The late stage is typically higher, but risk of a settlement is much lower since it’s a mature tort, there’s more history and analysis that can be done on how the tort has progressed. The early torts are just emerging or will have recently passed Daubert so being early the costs are much lower and risk a bit higher since the litigation will be early in starting. Mid stage gives you a bit of all with costs not as high as late stage and risks a bit lower than the torts just starting out.
There are a limited number of injured victims in each tort, and we always need to be careful not to put more capital than we project we can spend, or costs of a case will drive higher pretty fast.With larger capital clients we are moving into other torts whether late stage as well or mid and early stages to help diversify. One interesting note as we diversify clients is deploying capital into some torts that are closer to personal injury cases vs. traditional mass torts like Asbestos and Sex Abuse as two examples. The time to settlement in these are closer to what we see in auto accidents being around 18 months, these are interesting torts to diversity capital and see shorter settlement times that some of the longer mass torts. The answer to the question about where room for growth is would be from the early-stage torts in being that there typically has not been a large amount of marketing yet to acquire cases so the possible total cases available would be quite high and with costs being fairly low. This is usually where we can deploy the most capital vs. the other stages. When it comes to modeling out the expected costs, timeline and return, you look at a variety of factors here. Can you explain what those factors are, and how do you weight each of those from case to case (is there a standard algorithm, or is the weighting bespoke to each case?) When modeling out the expected costs, timeline, attrition and projected return, we consider a variety of factors to ensure a comprehensive analysis. These factors can include:
We are happy to collaborate with your existing law firm relationships, but we really try to stick to the requirements we think make for a great handling firm and we would want to see if the law firm you may want to use meets the standard.The key things we look for are the following:
Unlike commercial patent owners, universities are not unitary organizations with a hierarchically-defined command and control structure. Universities can comprise several constituencies and legal entities, not all of whom have completely aligned intellectual property interests. Successfully representing a university requires being actively aware of each facet of its make-up and serving as a facilitator between them. For example, a university’s president may not view patent litigation positively, whereas its research sponsor considers patent enforcement to be an essential right that must be exercised under its exclusive license. Successful counsel and funders of university patent owners patiently seek out all interested parties within the university umbrella to ensure a litigation strategy and funding arrangement satisfies as many interests as practicable.
How do you address the potential conflicts of interest that might arise when public institutions enter into litigation funding agreements? Are concerns here legitimate, or are they overblown?
Politics may require consideration when public universities are involved. For example, is approval from the state attorney general required? Can the litigation funder represent that no foreign investors are involved? Should the university be a party to a litigation funding agreement? If so, which part of the university should engage with a litigation funder? If not, how can the university’s public interests be protected in a law firm-facing litigation funding arrangement? These considerations are extraordinarily important and cannot be glossed over.
When it comes to IP enforcement, how do you balance the need for aggressive litigation with the broader mission and reputational considerations of public institutions?Protecting institutional reputation is always the primary concern. A university may have spent decades or even centuries building its academic reputation. But reputations are fragile. A university will not risk ruining its reputation by its trial lawyer’s misconduct or funder’s lack of transparency. Everyone working with a university, including its counsel and funders, are de facto arms of the university and must be willing to uphold its high standards of ethics.
What are the trends to watch out for when considering legal funding for public institutions? How will this sector of the market evolve over the coming years?I predict that more funders will become interested in acquiring university-originated patents rather than just funding litigation. This affords a university much-needed up-front monetization while simultaneously providing the funder more control over strategic decision-making. I also predict that a commercially-run version of the University Technology Licensing Program (UTLP) could be very successful in the funded patent litigation marketplace.
Joshua Coleman-Pecha is a senior international construction, infrastructure and technology dispute specialist working in the MENA region. He advises on construction and technology projects from inception to completion. Joshua is a qualified solicitor advocate, meaning he has rights of audience in the courts of England & Wales, and is a PRINCE 2 qualified project manager.
Joshua advises on all aspects of complex dispute avoidance and resolution. He has represented several clients in billion-dollar disputes before a variety of arbitral institutions including ICC, LCIA, UNCITRAL, DIAC, and SCCA. He has experience handling disputes under the governing laws of England & Wales, the UAE, Saudi, and Qatar.
Joshua’s recent significant work includes advising in relation to oil and gas processing facilities, drilling contracts (onshore and offshore), a water desalinisation plant, a battery energy storage park, the MENA region’s largest metro system, and a major railroad and metro project in the UAE and Saudi respectively. Joshua has experience of projects across the region having handled disputes in, for example, the UAE, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Turkey. His clients include international oil & gas companies, refining and petrochemical companies, EPC contractors, oil & gas service companies, EPC employers, and international technology providers. Finally, he acts in a hybrid role as general counsel to a billion dollar pharmaceutical company based in the UAE.
Joshua was recently recognized as a ‘Key Lawyer’ in Oil, Gas and Natural Resources by Legal 500 2024. He is also a member of various construction industry associations and a contributing member of the Legal Funding Journal.
Below is our LFJ Conversation with Joshua Coleman‑Pecha: The MENA region, and Saudi Arabia in particular, is a growing jurisdiction in the global legal funding market. What has hindered funders from embracing this market in the past, and why the change--what has prompted more funders to take an interest in this part of the world?I think there have been a few factors that have limited funders' interest in operating in the Saudi market, or, financing disputes that involve Saudi law and / or Saudi Courts.
First, the high-level point is that legal funding is not prohibited under Saudi law. However, until now, in Saudi and across the GCC, whilst the view has been that written laws do not prohibit legal funding, there has been a high degree of uncertainty as to how, in practice, the courts would treat parties backed by legal funders. Quite understandably, legal funders and litigants have been hesitant to be the 'test cases' on which this issue is examined. To some extent I think this hesitancy remains, though it is decreasing as GCC countries refine their laws and legal practice, and legal funders look to the growing markets across the GCC for new opportunities.
Second, for many years Sharia has been the dominant system of law in Saudi. Sharia law is a huge subject, and it is impossible to consider all the aspects of it here. However, in summary, it is a combination of several different texts and is subject to several schools of legal interpretation. As with other GCC countries, Saudi is a civil law system, and does not rely on binding precedent. It may be that legal funders have been hesitant to make investments in an environment that they don't feel they fully understand. However, in recent times, Saudi has taken significant strides towards codifying its laws. All GCC countries are on this path to a greater or lesser extent, which helps provide certainty. In addition, with better recording and proliferation of court judgments and legal knowledge across the entire market, my sense is that international investors are becoming more confident in these surroundings.
Third, all GCC countries have been signatories to the New York Convention for some time. However, recent years have seen an acceleration of arbitration across the GCC, as recognition of the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals and willingness to enforce arbitral awards increases. In Saudi, part of the country's 'Vision 2023' is to have the leading arbitral institution in the Middle East, and be considered one of the leading arbitral institutions worldwide. Saudi has implemented a new Arbitration Law, and the Saudi Center for Commercial Arbitration (SCCA) has received significant investment, allowing it to hire globally recognised practitioners to join its senior ranks. Its rules are based on UNCITRAL rules and were updated in 2023 to reflect the most modern sets of arbitral rules globally.
Fourth, through discussion with various funders, my understanding of their view is that investing in Saudi is outside their commercial risk parameters. Factors such as uncertainty over duration of legal proceedings, lack of knowledge of Sharia, and questions over enforcement have made it difficult to determine likely ROI. Certainty over enforcement of arbitral awards in Saudi is increasing and the reasons for this are discussed below / later.
Finally, from the perspective of a funded party, and bearing in mind a lot of these parties are contractors in the construction industry, I think there is hesitancy to use legal funding as it can wipe out profit margins.
You deal with the Saudi construction claims sector specifically. What is the TAM of this market, and why should litigation funders take an interest here?The market is huge. Focusing just on the projects sector alone, there are approximately USD 1.8trn of projects planned or underway in Saudi (USD 330bn of which are already underway), making it the largest market in the MENA region. Over the last five years, the Saudi projects sector has, on average, awarded USD 60bn of projects a year, which looks set to grow year-on-year to around USD 80bn by 2028.
It is impossible to accurately estimate the number or value of disputes emanating from these projects. Of course, arbitration is private, but also many issues or disputes will not come to light due to being settled through commercial negotiations. We do know that right now approximately 440 projects in Saudi are identified as being 'on hold' (which means there is almost certainly going to be some form of dispute arising) with a combined value of USD 231bn. As the number and value of projects approaching completion or achieving completion increases, I expect to see these figures grow.
How do claimants and litigators on the ground feel about litigation funding? How do they look at the practice from both an economic and cultural perspective?For the reasons discussed above, legal funding has yet to proliferate in GCC countries. My experience is that, at best, many legal advisors (both in private practice and in-house) and potential litigants have limited knowledge about legal funding and are therefore sceptical of its merits. At worst, these parties may not know anything about legal funding at all, or, have a misunderstanding of what it is about and how it can help. I believe that education is needed before legal funding can be considered 'mainstream' in this region.
Where legal funding may be better known is amongst international entities (like international contractors) operating in Saudi or the wider GCC. However, even where there more understanding as regards the concept and a willingness to consider it as an option, barriers remain. For example, contractors are often put off legal funding when the cost is revealed.
Construction disputes are often fact heavy, require a significant amount of analysis before funders can begin to assess the merits, and, if they go to trial, will require lengthy investment periods. All this means that funder risk goes up, so the required returns go up, which can seriously damage contractor profits. There's little point in a contractor taking funding if it's going to wipe out the contractor's profit margin on the underlying project.
My personal view is that discussion between contractors and funders can yield a solution. On the one hand contractors may be persuaded to take funding based on a holistic view of its financial benefits. Portfolio funding may make taking funding economically palatable to contractors. However, also in my view, the greatest opportunity for striking investment deals lies in the fact that both employers and contractors tend to want to settle disputes at the earliest opportunity. If legal funders are willing to take this into account, it may shift the investment metrics sufficiently to make legal funding attractive to all parties.
What about enforcement in Saudi Arabia? How much of a concern is this, and what steps should funders take to allay their concerns about enforcement over a specific claim?The laws
Saudi has been signatory to the New York convention since 1994. However, its arbitration friendliness has increased massively in the last few years, including the creation of the previously mentioned SCCA in 2016. In addition, two key rules have been promulgated:
In 2012, Saudi passed KSA Royal Decree M/34 concerning the approval of the Law of Arbitration (KSA Arbitration Law) (together with its Implementing Rules) and in 2013, Royal Decree M/53 (Enforcement Law). The KSA Arbitration law is modelled on the UNCITRAL model law, which is regarded as international best practice.
The KSA Arbitration Law curtailed the Saudi courts' interventionist powers in relation to arbitrations seated in Saudi Arabia by recognizing for the first time the parties' autonomy to tailor their arbitration procedure in certain important respects, including by explicitly recognizing the adoption of institutional arbitration rules. The KSA Arbitration Law also addressed a key concern under the old law – the power of the Saudi courts to reopen and effectively re-litigate awards on their merits.
The Enforcement Law has led to the creation of specialized enforcement courts, whose jurisdiction supersedes that of the Board of Grievances (the court previously competent to hear requests for enforcement of arbitral awards). This in turn has started to have a salutary effect on the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, which until 2017 was an uncertain prospect. The Enforcement Law contains provisions that affect all aspects of enforcement of judgments and arbitral awards, both domestic and foreign. In practice, the Enforcement Law has resulted in the unprecedented enforcement of several foreign arbitral awards, which is welcome development. It is hoped that the Rules supplementing the KSA Arbitration Law will help to provide more certainty around how the courts will apply the KSA Arbitration Law, including with respect to enforcement of arbitral awards.
Domestic Arbitral Awards
Domestic arbitral awards must comply with the KSA Arbitration Law. The Enforcement Courts have jurisdiction to enforce domestic arbitral awards under article 9(2) of the Enforcement Law. For a domestic arbitral award, it must be declared as enforceable by the appeal court with initial jurisdiction over the dispute. Therefore, an application is needed to the relevant appeal court for a declaration that the award is enforceable by the party seeking enforcement. The declaration is normally represented by a court stamp, after which the request for enforcement can be registered with the Enforcement Court.
Domestic arbitral awards that are enforceable include:
Article 55 of the KSA Arbitration Law outlines the procedural and substantive requirements of a valid arbitral award. Pursuant to this provision, the competent court must verify the following conditions to issue an order for enforcement:
Furthermore, the arbitral award must comply with the formality requirements of the KSA Arbitration Law and be compliant with Sharia principles. Article 49 of the KSA Arbitration Law states that an arbitral award is not subject to appeal. However, under article 50(1), a party may apply to annul an arbitral award issued on the following grounds:
Furthermore, under article 50(2) of the KSA Arbitration Law, the court may, on its own jurisdiction, nullify the arbitral award if:
The application for nullification of the arbitral award must be made 60 days after the nullifying party was notified of the award.
Foreign Arbitral Awards
Foreign awards must comply with the Enforcement Law as well as the New York Convention for enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. For a foreign arbitral award, a party does not need a declaration that it is enforceable from the relevant domestic appeal court. Instead, the party requesting enforcement can apply directly to the Enforcement Court, with no statute of limitations applicable.
For foreign arbitral awards to be enforceable they must meet the following criteria:
The Enforcement Court has jurisdiction to enforce foreign arbitral awards in accordance with the requirements of the Enforcement Law:
The New York Convention is considered the foundation for enforcing arbitral awards in a state other than where the arbitral award was issued (i.e., foreign arbitral awards). All arbitral awards not issued under the KSA Arbitration Law are considered foreign arbitral awards. Contracting states to the New York Convention must recognise foreign arbitral awards as binding and enforce them under their rules of procedure, and without imposing “substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges” for foreign arbitral awards than the State would impose on domestic arbitral awards.
Process for Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
To enforce an arbitration award the application for enforcement must include:
Article 6 of the Enforcement Law addressing all judgments and awards, states that all judgments issued by an Enforcement Court are subject to appeal and the court of the KSA Arbitration Law appeal's judgment would then be final. However, for arbitral awards issued under the KSA Arbitration Law, article 55(3) of the KSA Arbitration Law does not allow appeal of an order to enforce an arbitral award. By contrast, an order refusing enforcement is appealable.
The enforcement procedure is as follows:
The applicant must wait twenty days for the Enforcement Court to notify the relevant party of the Article 34 decision. If this is not done, the applicant may request for the notice to be served by publication in local press, by the Enforcement Court. Although the applicant will initially pay for the publication of the notice (three to five days are required for publication from payment), the costs are able to be reimbursed from the enforcement order.
If the Article 34 decision is not adhered to, within five days of notification, the enforcement judge may be requested to enforce sanctions against the non-complying party. Such measures, under Article 46 are issued up to ten days after the expiry of the Article 34 decision or from the date of applicant's request to issue an Article 46 decision, provided that the request is made at least five days after the Article 34 decision is notified. All decisions by an enforcement judge are final, unless they relate to certain procedures or costs.
Other Considerations on Enforcing Arbitration Awards
The public policy exception to enforcing foreign arbitral awards has traditionally been very broad. An award that contradicts Sharia law or public policy will not be enforced by the Enforcement Court. However, if the part that contradicts public policy can be separated from the rest of the award, only that part should not be enforced.
The Enforcement Law sets out that the enforcement judge cannot enforce a foreign arbitral award if it includes what is contradictory to public policy. The implementing regulations of the Enforcement Law defines "public policy" as the Islamic Sharia. Saudi Arabia Royal Decree No. 44682/1443 dated 28 August 2021 limits the definition of public policy to general rules of Islamic law based on the Quran and the Sunnah. Recently successful grounds were:
Public policy is not limited to procedural deficiencies. The Saudi court can, of its own volition, refuse to enforce an award that contradicts Sharia, including any of the evidence relied on by the tribunal that is not acceptable under Sharia (for example, if the tribunal relied on the testimony of a person with a mental impairment). The court could also refuse enforcement if the award itself contradicts Sharia (for example, an award of interest).
Other Enforcement Mechanisms
Saudi Arabia is also party to Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Co-operation and the GCC Agreement for the Enforcement of Judgments, Rogatory, and Judicial Publication.
One of the benefits of a more mature market is the presence of consultants, advisors and experts whom funders can rely on. How prevalent are such experts within the Saudi legal / litigation funding market? What can funders do to ensure they are receiving reliable, actionable advice?Until recently, to participate in the Saudi market, international firms had to enter an alliance with a local partner firm. With the change of laws in this area, several international firms have now opened their own Saudi office, and HFW (the firm I work at) is one of those. This divergence perhaps causes some difficulty for clients seeking joined-up legal advice. Naturally, high quality Saudi firms focus on work in the local courts, where they have rights of audience. International firms are more likely to focus on international clients, working with contracts under foreign laws, with arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. In both cases, the proliferation of work requires additional legal practitioners, and this growth potentially comes at the cost of quality legal advice or, at least, relevant experience.
Of course, it is tempting for me to say that HFW should be every funder's first call for Saudi related advice! The reality, as everyone knows, is that every dispute is different and requires different skill sets, sector knowledge, legal qualification(s), and price point. I'm sure it doesn't really need to be said, as legal funders know their jobs better than I do, but I would always suggest seeking advice from firms and individuals who have wide experience in the jurisdiction, have advised on disputes in the relevant sector in that jurisdiction previously, and understand what legal funders need and want to be able to make their investment decision.
Wieger Wielinga is responsible for Omni Bridgeway’s investment origination in (sovereign) awards and judgments globally and its litigation funding efforts both in EMEA and the UK.
Below is our LFJ Conversation with Wieger.
You have been working in the funding industry for over 25 years and are the president of ELFA. In that capacity you are at the forefront of discussion about regulating funding. Can you provide a short summary of the status of the regulatory discussion in the EU at this moment?
Perhaps the starting point here is to understand who wants regulation and why. It appears to Omni Bridgeway that a clear formulation of the perceived problems, and who would benefit from solving them, should take place before moving to the question of solutions and whether regulation is part of that.
Some of the more understandable concerns that were raised as our industry was developing and gaining spotlight over the past years concerned (i) potential conflicts of interest which could unintendedly occur if arbitrators are not aware who is funding one of the parties and perhaps to some extent (ii) the financial standing of funders and their ability to cover their financial obligations.
The issue of conflict of interest is solved by all institutions nowadays requiring disclosure of funders and the issue of financial standing has been tackled by funders associations obliging their members with respect to capital adequacy and audited accounts etcetera. See for istance https://elfassociation.eu/about/code-of-conduct.
Powerful industries like big tech, pharma, and tobacco have faced successful claims from parties who would never have succeeded without the backing of a funder. That rebalancing of powers appears to have triggered efforts to undermine the rise of the litigation funding industry. Arguments used in the EU regulatory discussion against funding include suggestions on the origin of the capital and principal aims of the funders, often referring to funders coming from the US or “Wall Street”. It is not a proper argument but opponents know a subset of the EU constituency is sensitive to the predatory undertone it represents.
So the suggestion that Litigation Funding is a phenomenon blowing over from the US or at least outside the EU is misleading?
Indeed. What many don’t realize is that litigation funding was well established as a practice for over a decade on the European continent without any issues before UK funders started to become established. Some funders, like Germany’s Foris AG, were publicly listed, while others emerged from the insurance sector, such as Roland Prozessfinanz and later Allianz Prozessfinanz. At Omni Bridgeway, we have been funding cases since the late 1980s, often supporting European governments with subrogation claims tied to national Export Credit Agencies and since the turn of the century arbitrations and collective redress cases. So it does not come “from” the US, or Australia or the UK. It has been already an established practice since the early 90s of the last century, with reputable clients, government entites, as well as multi nationals and clients from the insurance and banking industry.
Only later, as of around 2007, we witnessed the entry of more serious capital with the entry of US and UK litigation funders. Only as of that moment, questions came about champerty and maintenance issues and in its slipstream, a call for regulation and the abovementioned narrative started being pushed.
Another related misunderstanding is the size and growth of the litigation funding industry. It is in my view often overstated. In absolute terms, it remains small compared to other high-risk asset classes like private equity or venture capital. Sure, it is a growing industry and good funders have interesting absolute returns to provide its institutional LPs whilst doing societal good, especially in the growing ESG litigation space, but one should be suspicious of parties that speak of a “hedge fund mecca” or similar incorrect exaggerations.
So what about the actual risk for frivolous or abusive litigation by or due to litigation funders?
We are in the business of making a return on our investments. Because our financing is non-recourse (unlike a loan) we only make a return if the matters we invest in are won and paid out. Whether there is a win is determined by courts and arbitrators and as such out of our hands but you will understand we put in a lot of time and effort to review matters and determine their likelihood of success. Any matter that makes it through our rigorous underwriting process is objectively worth pursuing and is unlikely to be frivolous. That does not mean all matters we invest in are sure winners, but these are matters that deserve the opportunity to be heard and very often our funding is the only way in which that is possible.
So, in response to the argument of abusive litigation I would put the argument of access to justice. It is not uncommon for legal fees in relatively straightforward commercial matters to exceed EUR 1 million, let alone the adverse cost exposure. If we want a society where the size of your bank account isn’t the only determining factor for whether you can pursue your rights, we have to accept funding as a fact of life.
A related argument that continues to be recycled by the opponents of TPLF is that funded party’s need protection against the funders pricing and /or control over the litigation. This is also a misconception, for which there is zero empirical basis. After all these years of funding in the EU, thousands of funded cases, there are no cases where a court or tribunal has indeed decided a funder acted abusively, neither in general nor in this particular respect. This is partly because the interests between funder and funded party are typically well aligned. Off course there is always a slight potential for interests starting to deviate between client and funder with the passage of time, as in all business relationships. These deviations in interest are, however, almost never unforeseeable, and typically as “what ifs” addressed in advance in the funding agreements. Both parties voluntarily enter these agreements and accept their terms. Nobody is forced to sign a funding agreement.
That may be true, but how about consumers, who may be less sophisticated users of litigation funding?
A fair question. However, there are two other realities as well: First, there is already a plethora of consumer protecting rules codified in EU directives and national legislation of member states.[1] Second, consumers tend not to be the direct, individual, clients of third-party litigation funders, as they almost always end up being represented by professional consumer organizations, who in turn have ample legal representation and protect the interest of their claimant group.
Interestingly the European Consumer Organization BEUC has just published their view on litigation funding in a report “Justice unchained | BEUC’s view on third party litigation funding for collective redress”. The summary is crystal clear: “Third party litigation funding has emerged as a solution to bridge a funding gap” and “provides substantial benefits to claimant organisations”. Also: “Assessment of TPLF needs to be evidenced by specific cases.” And “The potential risks related to TPLF for collective redress are already addressed by the Representative Action Directive.” It concludes by saying “additional regulation of TPLF at EU level should be considered only if it is necessary.” See https://www.beuc.eu/position-papers/justice-unchained-beucs-view-third-party-litigation-funding-collective-redress.
So what do you think will be the ultimate outcome of the regulatory discussion in the EU and will this impact the Funding market in the EU?
So, in summary, when it comes to European regulation, Europe knows that it is crucial to focus on fostering a competitive environment where innovation thrives, accountability is upheld, and access to justice is ensured. This all requires financial equality between parties, ensuring a level playing field. The EC cannot make policies on the basis of an invented reality, of created misunderstandings. That is why the mapping exercise was a wise decision. We should expect regulation, if any, will not be of a prohibitive nature and hence we do not see an adverse impact to the funding market.
In the meantime, there is this patchwork of implementations of the EU Directive on Representative Actions for the Protection of Consumer Rights. Will funders and investors be hesitant to participate in the EU?
Indeed the EC has left implementation of the directive to the member states and that leads to differences. In some jurisdictions funders will have large reservations to fund a case under the collective regime and in other jurisdictions it will be fine. This is best illustrated by comparison of the implementation in The Netherlands and the one in Germany.
The Dutch opt out regime under the WAMCA rules allows a qualified entity to pursue a litigation on behalf of a defined group of consumers with court oversight on both what is a qualified entity, its management board, the way it is funded and how the procedure is conducted. Over 70 cases have been filed now in the WAMCA’s short history. The majority of those cases concern matters with an exclusively idealistic goal by the way. Although there is clearly an issue with duration, as it typically takes over 2 years before standing is addressed, the Dutch judiciary is really trying to facilitate and improve the process. Any initial suspicion of the litigation funders is also coming to an end now the industry has demonstrated that its capital comes from normal institutional investors, its staff from reputable law firms or institutions and IRRs sought are commensurate to the risk of non recourse funding. Once the delays are addressed with the first guiding jurisprudence, the process will probably be doing more or less what it is supposed to do. Almost all cases funded under the WAMCA have an ESG background by the way.
By contrast, Germany chose to “implement” the EU Representative action directive by adopting an opt-in system. It too is meant for qualified entities, but it is questionable whether it fulfills the purpose intended by the European Commission. The issue which makes it rather unsuitable for commercial cases is that the funder’s entitlement is capped at ten percent (sic!) of the proceeds from the class action at penalty of dismissal. Here it seems the lobby has been successful. No funder can fund a case under that regime on a non-recourse basis.
So does that mark the end of Germany as a market for funding collective actions and what does it hold for other member states?
No, in practice it means cases will not be financed under this regime. Funders will continue funding matters as they have in the past, avoiding the class action regime of 13 October 2023. It should serve as a warning though for other member states where discussions are ongoing concerning the implementation of the representative action directive, such as Spain. Indeed it would have been better if the EC would have given clear guidelines towards a more harmonized set of collective actions regimes throughout Europe.
[1] See, for instance, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, “Unfair Commercial practices (National Reports)” (November 2005), available at: https://www.biicl.org/files/883_national_reports_unfair_commercial_practices_new_member_states%5Bwi th_dir_table_and_new_logo%5D.pdf. See also, EY “Global Legal Commercial Terms Handbook 2020” (October 2020), available at: https://www.eylaw.be/wp-content/uploads/publications/EY-Global-Legal- Commercial-Terms-Handbook.pdf. Furter, the Belgian Code of Economic Law defines an “abusive clause” as "any term or condition in a contract between a company and a consumer which, either alone or in combination with one or more other terms or conditions, creates a manifest imbalance between the rights and obligations of the parties to the detriment of the consumer"; such clause is prohibited, null, and void (Article VI.84 Belgian Code of Economic Law). Article 36 of the Danish Contracts Act stipulates that agreement can be set aside if they are unreasonable or unfair. Article L.442-1 of the French Commercial Code (applicable to commercial contracts) prohibits significant imbalance provisions, such as a clause that results in one party being at an unfair disadvantage or disproportionately burdened as compared to the other party. Section 242 of the German Civil Code also obliges the parties to abide by the principle of good faith an
In this episode, we sit down with Richard Culberson, CEO of Moneypenny & VoiceNation North America. Richard discusses how Moneypenny can save costs and increase operational efficiency for law firms and litigation funders through enhanced client communication services.
In this episode, we sit down with Cormac Leech, CEO of UK litigation funding platform, AxiaFunder. AxiaFunder allows individuals to invest in a high volume of small claims in the UK. We discussed AxiaFunder's market strategy, housing disrepair and diesel emissions claims, the challenges of funding a large volume of small claims types, and how AxiaFunder is utilizing AI and automation in its processes.
In this episode, we sat down with Louisa Klouda, CEO of Fenchurch Legal. Fenchurch is a specialist litigation funder providing finance to UK law firms to fund small ticket claims which are insured by an ATE insurance policy.
Securities litigation in Sweden can be done in various ways, through class/group actions, derivative actions, or regulatory enforcement actions (by authorities). Case law in the sphere of private enforcement is historically scarce but will now hopefully start to emerge. A historic reason is probably that Sweden as a civil law country lacks statutory rules regulating civil liability in relation to improper securities activities.
In the Ericsson case, 37 institutions are claiming roughly $200 million from the issuer in the district court of Solna, Sweden. The claimants state they have suffered investment losses since Ericsson withheld information about potential bribes paid to the terrorist organisation ISIS in Iraq, that caused the share price to fall. The claimants are all large (non-Swedish) institutional investors, and the case is funded by a third-party funder (not Deminor). The case will be tried in the first instance court in 2025.
The legal community expects to see an increase in litigation related to securities in the coming years, to paint a picture in 2021 there where was one (1) initial public offering every second day (157 in total). In 2022-23 there were only a handful of initial public offerings each year. Sweden has a disproportionate number of listed companies compared to other EU countries and it is considered a national sport to invest in the stock market. A majority of listed shares are held by local and foreign sovereign wealth funds, they seldom engage in litigation locally but often participate in international cases in the US and elsewhere. The economy is currently in a recession which has historically always led to an increase in the number of disputes.
Deminor is the only international funder with a local presence that focuses on securities litigation. On paper there are plenty of opportunities in Scandinavia, but in practical terms cases are often too “small” meaning the quantum of the potential loss the investor has suffered is not sufficient to initiate the litigation. Or which is more often the situation, the investors that do hold a significant part of the shares (the loss) are not willing to engage in litigation for various reasons. The claimants that are willing to lead the way in terms of creating the much-needed case law is the types we see in the Ericsson case, foreign institutional investors.
We could summarize the situation with a phrase coined by the advertising industry for when there was a minute of silence before the next add was supposed to run - watch this space!
The following article was contributed by Anthony Johnson, CEO of the Johnson Firm and Stellium.
The ascent of AI in law firms has thrust the intricate web of complexities and legal issues surrounding their implementation into the spotlight. As law firms grapple with the delicate balance between innovation and ethical considerations, they are tasked with navigating the minefield of AI ethics, AI bias, and synthetic data. Nevertheless, within these formidable challenges, law firms are presented with a singular and unparalleled opportunity to shape the landscape of AI law, copyright ownership decisively, and AI human rights.
Law firms embarking on the integration of AI into their practices must commence with conducting comprehensive due diligence. This process entails a precise evaluation of the AI technology's origins, development process, and the integrity of the data utilized for training. Safeguarding that the AI systems adopted must be meticulously developed with legally sourced and unbiased data sets. This measure is the linchpin in averting potential ethical or legal repercussions. It is especially paramount to be acutely mindful of the perils posed by AI bias and AI hallucination, both of which have the potential to undermine the fairness and credibility of legal outcomes.
Guidelines must decisively address the responsible use of AI, encompassing critical issues related to AI ethics, AI law, and copyright ownership. Furthermore, defining the scope of AI's decision-making power within legal cases is essential to avert any over-reliance on automated processes. By setting these boundaries, law firms demonstrate compliance with existing legal standards and actively shape the development of new norms in the rapidly evolving realm of legal AI.
Implementing AI tech in law firms isn't just a technical challenge; it's also a cultural shift. Regular training and awareness programs must be conducted to ensure responsible and effective use. These programs should focus on legal tech training, providing lawyers and legal staff with a deep understanding of AI capabilities and limitations. Addressing ethical AI use and the implications of AI on human rights in daily legal tasks is also required. Empowering legal teams with knowledge and tools will enhance their technological competence and drive positive change.
The integration of AI within legal practices presents substantial risks concerning confidentiality and data privacy. Law firms entrusted with handling sensitive information must confront the stark reality that the deployment of AI technologies directly threatens client confidentiality if mishandled. AI systems' insatiable appetite for large datasets during training lays bare the potential for exposing personal client data to unauthorized access or breaches. Without question, unwaveringly robust data protection measures must be enacted to safeguard trust and uphold the legal standards of confidentiality.
The pivotal role of AI in content generation has ignited intricate debates surrounding intellectual property rights and copyright ownership. As AI systems craft documents and materials, determining rightful ownership—be it the AI, the developer, or the law firm—emerges as a fiercely contested matter. This not only presents legal hurdles but also engenders profound ethical deliberations concerning the attribution and commercialization of AI-generated content within the legal domain.
The critical risk looms large: the potential for AI to perpetuate or even exacerbate biases. AI systems, mere reflections of the data they are trained on, stand as monuments to the skewed training materials that breed discriminatory outcomes. This concern is especially poignant in legal practices, where the mandate for fair and impartial decisions reigns supreme. Addressing AI bias is not just important; it is imperative to prevent the unjust treatment of individuals based on flawed or biased AI assessments, thereby upholding the irrefutable principles of justice and equality in legal proceedings.
The most egregious risk lies in the potential violation of client confidentiality. Law firms that dare to integrate AI tools must guarantee that these systems are absolutely impervious to breaches that could compromise sensitive information. Without the most stringent security measures, AI dares to inadvertently leak client data, resulting in severe legal repercussions and the irrevocable loss of client trust. This scenario emphatically underscores the necessity for robust data protection protocols in all AI deployments.
The misuse of AI inevitably leads to intricate intellectual property disputes. As AI systems possess the capability to generate legal documents and other intellectual outputs, the question of copyright ownership—whether it pertains to the AI, the law firm, or the original data providers—becomes a source of contention. Mismanagement in this domain can precipitate costly litigation, thrusting law firms into the task of navigating a labyrinth of AI law and copyright ownership issues. It is important that firms assertively delineate ownership rights in their AI deployment strategies to circumvent these potential pitfalls preemptively.
The reckless application of AI in legal practices invites ethical breaches and professional misconduct. Unmonitored AI systems presume to make decisions, potentially flouting the ethical standards decreed by legal authorities. The specter of AI bias looms large, capable of distorting decision-making in an unjust and discriminatory manner. Law firms must enforce stringent guidelines and conduct routine audits of their AI tools to uphold ethical compliance, thereby averting any semblance of professional misconduct that could mar their esteemed reputation and credibility.
The legal industry has witnessed numerous triumphant AI integrations that have set the gold standard for technology adoption, unequivocally elevating efficiency and accuracy. Take, for example, a prominent U.S. law firm that fearlessly harnessed AI to automate document analysis for litigation cases, substantially reducing lawyers' document review time while magnifying the precision of findings. Not only did this optimization revolutionize the workflow, but it also empowered attorneys to concentrate on more strategic tasks, thereby enhancing client service and firm profitability. In another case, an international law firm adopted AI-driven predictive analytics to forecast litigation outcomes. This tool provided unprecedented precision in advising clients on the feasibility of pursuing or settling cases, strengthening client trust and firm reputation. These examples highlight the transformative potential of AI when integrated into legal frameworks.
Integrating AI within the legal sector is an urgent reality that law firms cannot ignore. While the ascent of AI presents complex challenges, it also offers an unparalleled opportunity to shape AI law, copyright ownership, and AI human rights. To successfully implement AI in legal practices, due diligence on AI technologies, training programs for lawyers, and establishing clear guidelines and ethical standards are crucial. However, risks and moral considerations must be carefully addressed, such as confidentiality and data privacy concerns, intellectual property and copyright issues, and bias and discrimination in AI outputs. Failure to do so can lead to violations of client confidentiality and costly intellectual property disputes. By navigating these risks and pitfalls, law firms can harness the transformative power of AI while upholding legal standards and ensuring a fair and just legal system.
As a former litigator who recently obtained his MBA, Andrew offers a unique perspective in his role of creating, developing, and maintaining business relationships with law firms and litigants as LF2 expands its commercial program.
Andrew is an Associate Director of Investments at LF2. In his role, Andrew works with the Underwriting and Investment team to both analyze and develop potential funding opportunities. Andrew received a Dean’s Merit Scholarship from Cardozo Law School and an MBA from Columbia Business School. Andrew practiced as a commercial litigator prior to entering the litigation finance industry.
Company Name and Description: Lex Ferenda Litigation Funding LLC. We specialize in funding single commercial cases starting at $1 million.
Company Website: www.lf-2.com
Year Founded: 2020
Headquarters: Rye, New York
Area of Focus: Business development and underwriting.
Member Quote: I’m grateful to be able to make an impact in such a dynamic industry, particularly as it continues to grow and enhance outcomes within and beyond the legal community.
Stuart Price is the Chief Executive Officer, Managing Director and co-founder of CASL. Mr Price worked in the United Kingdom, the Middle East and Australia during his 30+ year career in banking and investment banking, legal and litigation finance. Mr Price has held senior positions in litigation finance for over a decade with a career highlight being the resolution of a class action against the Queensland State Government for ‘Stolen Wages’ for $190m, on behalf of over 12,000 First Nations peoples.
Mr Price was instrumental in the establishment of The Association of Litigation Funders of Australia (ALFA), where he was the inaugural CEO and Managing Director from 2018. Mr Price continues as a Director of ALFA.
Mr Price has a 1st Class Honours Degree in Applied Mathematics from the University of St. Andrews, is a Fellow of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales, a member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia & New Zealand, a Fellow of the Governance Institute of Australia and a Fellow of FINSIA.
Company Name and Description: CASL was founded in 2020 by John Walker and Stuart Price with the objective of creating a level playing field and providing access to the legal system for claimants to prosecute meritorious claims.
CASL is a significant litigation funder in the Australian market, raising investment capital of $156m in 2022 that represents one of the largest dedicated pools of capital to this market.
Company Website: https://www.casl.com.au/
Year Founded: 2020
Headquarters: Sydney
Area of Focus: Litigation Finance
Member Quote: CASL has one of the most experienced litigation finance teams which when combined with substantial financial resources, enables it to be a leading provider of litigation finance with local decision making.
Sam Klatt is the Chief Investment Officer at 10 East, where he is responsible for sourcing and managing investment opportunities.
Mr. Klatt has +20 years of experience investing in public equities real estate, private credit, private equity, and venture capital. Prior to founding Portage Partners and then 10 East, Mr. Klatt was a vice president at M.D. Sass, a private investment manager that focused on traditional and alternative investment strategies.
Mr. Klatt received an M.S. in Real Estate Development from Columbia University in 2010 and earned a B.A. in Economics from Johns Hopkins University with a minor in Entrepreneurship and Management. Mr. Klatt is also a Chartered Financial Analyst.
Company Name and Description: 10 East, led by Michael Leffell, allows qualified individuals to invest alongside a seasoned team with a decade+ historical track record of strong performance in litigation finance, private credit, real estate, niche venture/private equity, and other one-off investments that aren’t typically available through traditional channels.
Benefits of 10 East membership include:
10 East is where founders, executives, and portfolio managers from industry-leading firms diversify their personal portfolios.
Company Website: 10east.co
Year Founded: 2011, as Portage Partners, rebranded as 10 East in 2022
Headquarters: New York
Area of Focus: Litigation finance, real estate, private credit, and niche venture/private equity. Emerging managers, independent sponsors, and one-off co-investments.
Member Quote: Our principals, partners and members have invested more than $100 million in litigation finance opportunities since inception—it’s a strategy where we often identify highly attractive risk/return asymmetry with the added benefit of being less correlated to the markets.
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