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Immunity from Lawyer Malpractice – Uniquely Australian

The following article was contributed by Valerie Blacker, a commercial litigator focusing on funded litigation, and John Speer, a lawyer in the Dispute Resolution and Litigation Team at Piper Alderman.

While large class actions receive the lion’s share of media attention, litigation financiers also regularly fund litigation involving a single plaintiff. Given that solicitors are required to maintain professional indemnity insurance, they can be, in instances of negligence, an attractive prospect for financiers: they are well-resourced and have the capacity to satisfy any judgment awarded against them.

The Brisbane Litigation team at Piper Alderman have brought successful professional negligence claims against our clients’ former solicitors involving both funded and unfunded arrangements.[1] This article discusses a common defense raised in these types of proceedings – the advocates’ immunity.

The immunity in brief

In Australia, the advocacy function is immune from a negligence claim.  The immunity applies to a lawyer’s work in the court room. The immunity is rooted in the public policy principle that there should be finality in litigation. It prevents unsuccessful parties from seeking to re-litigate disputes by way of a collateral attack on their lawyers’ performance in court.

A barrister mainly appears in court, and a solicitor mainly performs legal work outside of court.[2] But why does it matter? If a lawyer has been negligent, shouldn’t the client be able to seek relief?

Apparently not – in some jurisdictions. Despite having been abolished in the United Kingdom and even in New Zealand, advocates’ immunity remains firmly in place in Australia.

Indeed, there were at least eighteen court actions in 2022 that have made reference to the immunity as a defense.

Avenues for redress

The immunity is often called upon by solicitors performing ‘out-of-court’ work, but which (so the argument goes) is so ‘intimately connected to the conduct of the case in court’. In two recent examples, the immunity applied to shield a solicitor for failing to present evidence that should have been presented (Golden v Koffel [2022] NSWCA 8), and was extended to protect a solicitor who had given faulty advice (Jimenez v Watson [2021] NSWCA 55).

If a solicitor’s negligent work was actually done in court in the course of a hearing or was done out of court but which led to a decision affecting the conduct of the case in court, the alternative options for an aggrieved client are frankly inadequate.

For example, (1) an unsuccessful party may apply for an order that his or her solicitor be made personally liable for the successful party’s costs in the litigation; (2) an aggrieved client can challenge a solicitor’s bills through an application to the court for a costs assessment; and (3) disciplinary action can be taken which can result in a fine, a reprimand or in a solicitor being disqualified from practice.

At best these alternative options may reduce a client’s costs but none of them will truly compensate a client for the wrongs caused by a lousy solicitor.

Narrowing the scope of the immunity

In a more positive move, the Courts have now made it clear that the immunity does not extend to a solicitor’s work in bringing about a settlement agreement (as an agreement between parties to settle is not an exercise of judicial power).[3] It is also now possible to be compensated for the expense of engaging new lawyers.[4]

NT Pubco Pty Ltd v Strazdins is also notable. The Court there held that a failure to advise clients to seek independent legal advice was held to be likely outside the immunity.[5] The relevant wrong in that case concerned a failure by solicitors to relay to their client comments made by the court at several interlocutory hearings that the client should have been pursuing a particular kind of relief in its litigation. That would be akin to failing to commence proceedings in time. That too should fall outside of the immunity as the aggrieved client’s cause of action was complete and whole before the proceedings were started and the negligent conduct was completely separate from the litigation.

The primary justification for retaining the advocates’ immunity is to ensure the finality of judicial determinations. However, if a client brings a negligence suit against a former solicitor is that not also a separate proceeding that deals with a different issue?

As Kirby J warned, upholding the immunity not only reduces equality before the courts, but is capable of breeding contempt for the law. His Honour questioned ‘why an anomalous immunity is not only preserved in Australia but now actually enlarged by a binding legal rule that will include out-of-court advice and extend to protect solicitors as well as barristers’.[6]

In these circumstances, can the reasons traditionally given for the immunity still persuade, particularly when the rest of common law world has abolished it?

At the risk of offending the doctrine and re-litigating this issue, perhaps we should continue the debate.

About the Authors:

Valerie Blacker is a commercial litigator focusing on funded litigation. Valerie has been with Piper Alderman for over 12 years. With a background in class actions, Valerie also prosecutes funded commercial litigation claims.

John Speer is a lawyer in the Dispute Resolution and Litigation Team located in Brisbane, Prior to joining Piper Alderman John was an associate to the Honourable Justice B J Collier in the Federal Court of Australia, as well as to Deputy President B J McCabe in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. John has also worked as a ministerial adviser and chief of staff in the Parliament of Australia.

 

For queries or comments in relation to this article please contact John Speer | T: +61 7 3220 7765 | E:  jspeer@piperalderman.com.au

[1] These matters resulted in a confidential settlement.

[2] New South Wales and Queensland have a ‘split’ profession, meaning that the roles of barrister and solicitor are separated.

[3] Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd (2016) 259 CLR 1,  [5], [38], [39], [45], [46], [53].

[4] Legal Services Commissioner v Rowell [2013] QCAT OCR207-12.

[5] [2014] NTSC 8 at [134] and [137].

[6] D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1, 109 [346].

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CJC Publishes Final Report on Litigation Funding, Recommends ‘Light-Touch Regulation’

By Harry Moran |

In the six months since the Civil Justice Council published its Interim Report and Consultation on litigation funding, the industry has waited patiently to see what shape its final recommendations would take and what that would mean for  the future of legal funding in England and Wales.

The Civil Justice Council (CJC) has today released the Final Report that concludes its review of litigation funding. The 150-page document provides a detailed overview of the findings, and includes 58 recommendations. These recommended light-touch regulations include base-line rules for funders, the mandatory disclosure of funding in proceedings, a rejection of a cap on funder returns, and tailored requirements for commercial versus consumer litigation funding.

The report emphasises that the aim of its reforms is to ‘promote effective access to justice, the fair and proportionate regulation of third party litigation funding, and improvements to the provision and accessibility of other forms of litigation funding.’ Sir Geoffrey Vos, Chair of the Civil Justice Council, said that the report “epitomises the raison d’être of the CJC: promoting effective access to justice for all”, and that “the recommendations will improve the effectiveness and accessibility of the overall litigation funding landscape.”

Unsurprisingly, the first and most pressing recommendation put forward is for the legislative reversal of the effects of PACCAR, suggesting that it be made clear ‘that there is a categorical difference’ between litigation funding and contingency fee funding, and that ‘litigation funding is not a form of DBA’. The CJC’s report categorically states that these two forms of funding ‘are separate and should be subject to separate regulatory regimes.’ Therefore, the report also suggests that the ‘current CFA and DBA legislation should be replaced by a single, simplified legislative contingency fee regime.’

The report also makes distinctions between different modes of legal funding, recommending that the new rules should not apply to funded arbitration proceedings. It also suggests a tailored approach between commercial and consumer litigation funding, with a ‘minimal’ approach recommended for commercial proceedings, whereas a ‘greater, but still light-touch’ approach is preferred for the funding of consumer and collective proceedings. These additional measures for group actions include provisions such as court-approval for the terms of funding agreements and the funder’s return, as well ‘enhanced notice’ of that return to class members during the opt-out period.

However, the report does push forward with establishing a ‘minimum, base-line, set of regulatory requirements’ for litigation funding regardless of the type of proceedings being funded. Among the expected recommendations such as capital adequacy and conflict of interest provisions is a mandatory disclosure requirement which would include the existence of funding, the name of the funder and original source of the funds. An important aspect of the disclosure measures that will no doubt be welcomed by funders, is the caveat that ‘the terms of LFAs should not, generally, be subject to disclosure.’

Among the proposals rejected by the working group in the final report, the most notable are the idea of a cap on litigation funder’s returns and the presumption of security for costs, although the latter would be required if a funder breaches capital adequacy requirements. The report does suggest that portfolio funding should be ‘regulated as a form of loan’, with the government encouraged to review the effectiveness of third party funding on the legal profession.

As for the identity of the regulatory body sitting above this new light-touch regulation, the report does not recommend the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) as the appropriate body. However, the new status of portfolio funding as a form of loan would fall under the FCA’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, the report suggests that this decision regarding the overseeing regulatory body ‘should be revisited in five years’ following the introduction of the new rules.

As for the implementation of the recommendations laid out in the report, the CJC recommends ‘a twin-track approach’ with the first priority being the reversal of PACCAR, which it says ‘ought properly to be implemented as soon as possible.’ The second track would see the introduction of new legislation as a single statute: a Litigation Funding, Courts and Redress Act, that would cover the 56 recommendations outlined throughout the report. This single statute would see the repeal of existing legislation, providing a comprehensive alternative that would cover all necessary areas around civil litigation funding.

The Final Report builds on the work done in the CJC’s Interim Report that was published on 31 October 2024, which set out to provide the foundational background to the development of third party funding in England and Wales. The report’s foreword notes that the working group was assisted through 84 responses to its consultation, existing reports such as the European Commission’s mapping study, as well as discussions held at forums and consultation meetings.The CJC’s Review of Litigation Funding – Final Report can be read in full here.

Dejonghe & Morley Launches as Strategic Advisory for Law Firms and Investors

By Harry Moran |

Apart from the standard funding of individual cases and portfolio funding, recent years have demonstrated an increasing trend of more direct investment into law firms from third-party funds.

An article in The Global Legal Post covers the launch of Dejonghe & Morley, a new consultancy seeking to advise law firms on private equity investment. The new firm has been founded by Wim Dejonghe and David Morley, two former senior partners from Allen & Overy (A&O), who are looking to work primarily with small to medium-sized law firms on everything from identifying potential investment partners to deal-structuring.

Explaining the motivation to launch this new outfit, Dejonghe said that they identified “the influx of investment” into other areas of professional services and realised there was “a need in the legal sector for a consultancy that could bring together law firms and private capital.” On their strategy to target their services away from the larger law firms, Dejonghe explained that medium-sized firms have the greatest need as they’re “trying to be everything to everyone but don’t necessarily have the ability to compete with larger firms in terms of tech and talent.” 

Prior to this venture, Dejonghe had served as Global Managing Partner at A&O until 2016 before moving on to become the Senior Partner for A&O Shearman. Morley had previously held the role of Senior Partner at A&O until his departure in 2016 and in the years since has taken on a variety of roles including Chair of Vannin Capital prior to its acquisition by Fortress, and Managing Director and Head of Europe for Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec (CDPQ).

More information about Dejonghe & Morley can be found on its website.

$67m Settlement Reached in QSuper Class Action Funded by Woodsford

By Harry Moran |

Another busy week for class action funding in Australia, as a significant settlement in a class action brought against a superannuation fund has made headlines. 

Reporting by Financial Standard covers the announcement of a A$67 million settlement in the class action brought against QSuper over allegations that the super fund members were overcharged for their life insurance premiums. The class action was originally filed in the Federal Court of Australia in November 2021, with Shine Lawyers leading the claim and Woodsford providing litigation funding for the proceedings. The settlement, which has been reached without any admission of liability from QSuper, remains subject to court approval by the Federal Court of Australia.

In a separate media release, Craig Allsopp, joint head of class actions at Shine Lawyers, said that the settlement “brings long-awaited relief to affected fund members, the vast majority of which were Queensland Government employees and their spouses, including teachers, doctors, and other essential workers”. 

Alex Hickson, Director of Woodsford Australia, said that the funder is “delighted that we could assist past and current fund members of QSuper to achieve redress through this class action, by allowing the case to be run with no upfront costs to class members.”

A spokesperson for Australian Retirement Trust (ART), the new company formed as a result of the merger between QSuper and Sunsuper, said that “the settlement amount will come out of money that had already been set aside by QSuper to provide for the potential liability from the class action, which was put into a reserve at the time of the merger”.