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Immunity from Lawyer Malpractice – Uniquely Australian

February 27, 2023

Immunity from Lawyer Malpractice – Uniquely Australian

The following article was contributed by Valerie Blacker, a commercial litigator focusing on funded litigation, and John Speer, a lawyer in the Dispute Resolution and Litigation Team at Piper Alderman. While large class actions receive the lion’s share of media attention, litigation financiers also regularly fund litigation involving a single plaintiff. Given that solicitors are required to maintain professional indemnity insurance, they can be, in instances of negligence, an attractive prospect for financiers: they are well-resourced and have the capacity to satisfy any judgment awarded against them. The Brisbane Litigation team at Piper Alderman have brought successful professional negligence claims against our clients’ former solicitors involving both funded and unfunded arrangements.[1] This article discusses a common defense raised in these types of proceedings – the advocates’ immunity. The immunity in brief In Australia, the advocacy function is immune from a negligence claim.  The immunity applies to a lawyer’s work in the court room. The immunity is rooted in the public policy principle that there should be finality in litigation. It prevents unsuccessful parties from seeking to re-litigate disputes by way of a collateral attack on their lawyers’ performance in court. A barrister mainly appears in court, and a solicitor mainly performs legal work outside of court.[2] But why does it matter? If a lawyer has been negligent, shouldn’t the client be able to seek relief? Apparently not – in some jurisdictions. Despite having been abolished in the United Kingdom and even in New Zealand, advocates’ immunity remains firmly in place in Australia. Indeed, there were at least eighteen court actions in 2022 that have made reference to the immunity as a defense. Avenues for redress The immunity is often called upon by solicitors performing ‘out-of-court’ work, but which (so the argument goes) is so ‘intimately connected to the conduct of the case in court’. In two recent examples, the immunity applied to shield a solicitor for failing to present evidence that should have been presented (Golden v Koffel [2022] NSWCA 8), and was extended to protect a solicitor who had given faulty advice (Jimenez v Watson [2021] NSWCA 55). If a solicitor’s negligent work was actually done in court in the course of a hearing or was done out of court but which led to a decision affecting the conduct of the case in court, the alternative options for an aggrieved client are frankly inadequate. For example, (1) an unsuccessful party may apply for an order that his or her solicitor be made personally liable for the successful party’s costs in the litigation; (2) an aggrieved client can challenge a solicitor’s bills through an application to the court for a costs assessment; and (3) disciplinary action can be taken which can result in a fine, a reprimand or in a solicitor being disqualified from practice. At best these alternative options may reduce a client’s costs but none of them will truly compensate a client for the wrongs caused by a lousy solicitor. Narrowing the scope of the immunity In a more positive move, the Courts have now made it clear that the immunity does not extend to a solicitor’s work in bringing about a settlement agreement (as an agreement between parties to settle is not an exercise of judicial power).[3] It is also now possible to be compensated for the expense of engaging new lawyers.[4] NT Pubco Pty Ltd v Strazdins is also notable. The Court there held that a failure to advise clients to seek independent legal advice was held to be likely outside the immunity.[5] The relevant wrong in that case concerned a failure by solicitors to relay to their client comments made by the court at several interlocutory hearings that the client should have been pursuing a particular kind of relief in its litigation. That would be akin to failing to commence proceedings in time. That too should fall outside of the immunity as the aggrieved client’s cause of action was complete and whole before the proceedings were started and the negligent conduct was completely separate from the litigation. The primary justification for retaining the advocates’ immunity is to ensure the finality of judicial determinations. However, if a client brings a negligence suit against a former solicitor is that not also a separate proceeding that deals with a different issue? As Kirby J warned, upholding the immunity not only reduces equality before the courts, but is capable of breeding contempt for the law. His Honour questioned ‘why an anomalous immunity is not only preserved in Australia but now actually enlarged by a binding legal rule that will include out-of-court advice and extend to protect solicitors as well as barristers’.[6] In these circumstances, can the reasons traditionally given for the immunity still persuade, particularly when the rest of common law world has abolished it? At the risk of offending the doctrine and re-litigating this issue, perhaps we should continue the debate. About the Authors: Valerie Blacker is a commercial litigator focusing on funded litigation. Valerie has been with Piper Alderman for over 12 years. With a background in class actions, Valerie also prosecutes funded commercial litigation claims. John Speer is a lawyer in the Dispute Resolution and Litigation Team located in Brisbane, Prior to joining Piper Alderman John was an associate to the Honourable Justice B J Collier in the Federal Court of Australia, as well as to Deputy President B J McCabe in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. John has also worked as a ministerial adviser and chief of staff in the Parliament of Australia.   For queries or comments in relation to this article please contact John Speer | T: +61 7 3220 7765 | E:  jspeer@piperalderman.com.au [1] These matters resulted in a confidential settlement. [2] New South Wales and Queensland have a ‘split’ profession, meaning that the roles of barrister and solicitor are separated. [3] Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd (2016) 259 CLR 1,  [5], [38], [39], [45], [46], [53]. [4] Legal Services Commissioner v Rowell [2013] QCAT OCR207-12. [5] [2014] NTSC 8 at [134] and [137]. [6] D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1, 109 [346].

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Litigation Funding Ethics: What Attorneys Must Weigh Before Saying Yes

By John Freund |

Third party litigation funding has evolved from a niche financing option into a mainstream tool for law firms seeking to manage risk and pursue complex or capital intensive cases. As funding becomes more accessible, attorneys are increasingly evaluating whether outside capital can support growth, extend runway, or enable representation of clients who might otherwise lack resources. However, the expansion of litigation finance has also brought renewed scrutiny to the ethical considerations lawyers must address before entering into funding arrangements.

An article in JD Supra outlines several critical issues attorneys should consider when evaluating third party funding. One of the most significant distinctions is between contingent funding arrangements and traditional non recourse loans. In contingent structures, funders receive a percentage of any recovery, which can raise concerns under long standing prohibitions against fee sharing with non lawyers and doctrines such as champerty. While a handful of jurisdictions have relaxed these rules, most states continue to prohibit arrangements that resemble equity participation in legal fees. Attorneys operating across jurisdictions must be particularly cautious to ensure compliance with applicable professional conduct rules.

Even traditional funding structures can present ethical challenges. Although non recourse loans are generally more widely accepted, conflicts can arise if a funder’s financial interests diverge from those of the client. For example, a lender may prefer an earlier settlement that ensures repayment, while a client may wish to pursue prolonged litigation in hopes of a larger recovery. The article emphasizes that lawyers must retain full independence in decision making and ensure that funding agreements do not give funders control over litigation strategy or settlement decisions.

Client consent and transparency are also central considerations. Attorneys should disclose funding arrangements where required, obtain informed client consent before sharing any information with funders, and remain mindful of evolving court disclosure requirements.

Announcements Case Developments Commercial

High Court Refuses BHP Permission to Appeal Landmark Mariana Liability Judgment 

By John Freund |

Pogust Goodhead welcomes the decision of Mrs Justice O’Farrell DBE refusing BHP’s application for permission to appeal the High Court’s judgment on liability in the Mariana disaster litigation. The ruling marks a major step forward in the pursuit of justice for over 620,000 Brazilian claimants affected by the worst environmental disaster in the country’s history. 

The refusal leaves the High Court’s findings undisturbed at first instance: that BHP is liable under Brazilian law for its role in the catastrophic collapse of the Fundão dam in 2015. In a landmark ruling handed down last November, the Court found the collapse was caused by BHP’s negligence, imprudence and/or lack of skill, confirmed that all claimants are in time and stated that municipalities can pursue their claims in England. 

In today’s ruling, following the consequentials hearing held last December, the court concluded that BHP’s proposed grounds of appeal have “no real prospect of success”. 

In her judgment, Mrs Justice O’Farrell stated:  “In summary, despite the clear and careful submissions of Ms Fatima KC, leading counsel for the defendants, the appeal has no real prospect of success. There is no other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard. Although the Judgment may be of interest to other parties in other jurisdictions, it is a decision on issues of Brazilian law established as fact in this jurisdiction, together with factual and expert evidence. For the above reasons, permission to appeal is refused”. 

At the December hearing, the claimants - represented by Pogust Goodhead - argued that BHP’s application was an attempt to overturn detailed findings of fact reached after an extensive five-month trial, by recasting its disagreement with the outcome as alleged procedural flaws. The claimants submitted that appellate courts do not re-try factual findings and that BHP’s approach was, in substance, an attempt to secure a retrial. 

Today’s judgment confirmed that the liability judgment involved findings of Brazilian law as fact, based on extensive expert and factual evidence, and rejected the defendants’ arguments, who now have 28 days to apply to the Court of Appeal.  

Jonathan Wheeler, Partner at Pogust Goodhead and lead of the Mariana litigation, said:  “This is a major step forward. Today’s decision reinforces the strength and robustness of the High Court’s findings and brings hundreds of thousands of claimants a step closer to redress for the immense harm they have suffered.” 

“BHP’s application for permission to appeal shows it continues to treat this as a case to be managed, not a humanitarian and environmental disaster that demands a just outcome. Every further procedural manoeuvre brings more delay, more cost and more harm for people who have already waited more than a decade for proper compensation.” 

Mônica dos Santos, a resident of Bento Rodrigues (a district in Mariana) whose house was buried by the avalanche of tailings, commented:  "This is an important victory. Ten years have passed since the crime, and more than 80 residents of Bento Rodrigues have died without receiving their new homes. Hundreds of us have not received fair compensation for what we have been through. It is unacceptable that, after so much suffering and so many lives interrupted, the company is still trying to delay the process to escape its responsibility." 

Legal costs 

The Court confirmed that the claimants were the successful party and ordered the defendants to pay 90% of the claimants’ Stage 1 Trial costs, subject to detailed assessment, and to make a £43 million payment on account. The Court also made clear that the order relates to Stage 1 Trial costs only; broader case costs will depend on the ultimate outcome of the proceedings. 

The costs award reflects the scale and complexity of the Mariana case and the way PG has conducted this litigation for more than seven years on a no-win, no-fee basis - funding an unprecedented claimant cohort and extensive client-facing infrastructure in Brazil without charging clients. This recovery is separate from any damages award and does not reduce, replace or affect the compensation clients may ultimately receive. 

Case Developments Commercial

Homebuyers Prepare Competition Claims Against Major UK Housebuilders

By John Freund |

A group of UK homebuyers is preparing to bring competition law claims against some of the country’s largest housebuilders, alleging anti competitive conduct that inflated new home prices. The prospective litigation represents another significant test of collective redress mechanisms in the UK and is expected to rely heavily on third party funding to move forward.

An announcement from Hausfeld outlines plans for claims alleging that leading residential developers exchanged commercially sensitive information and coordinated conduct in a way that restricted competition in the housing market. The proposed claims follow an investigation by the UK competition regulator, which raised concerns about how housebuilders may have shared data on pricing, sales rates, and incentives through industry platforms. According to the claimant lawyers, this conduct may have reduced competitive pressure and led to higher prices for consumers.

The claims are being framed as follow on damages actions, allowing homebuyers to rely on regulatory findings as a foundation for civil recovery. The litigation is expected to target multiple large developers and could involve tens of thousands of affected purchasers, given the scale of the UK new build market during the relevant period. While damages per claimant may be relatively modest, the aggregate exposure could be substantial.

From a procedural perspective, the case highlights the continued evolution of collective competition claims in the UK. Bringing complex, multi defendant actions on behalf of large consumer groups requires significant upfront investment, both financially and operationally. Litigation funding is therefore likely to be central, covering legal fees, expert economic analysis, and the administration required to manage large claimant cohorts.