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Third Party Funding 3.0: Exploring Litigation Funding’s Correlation with the Broader Economy

By Gian Marco Solas |

Third Party Funding 3.0: Exploring Litigation Funding’s Correlation with the Broader Economy

The following article was contributed by Dr. Avv. Gian Marco Solas[1], founder of Sustainab-Law and author of Third Party Funding, New Technologies and the Interdisciplinary Methodology as Global Competition Litigation Driving Forces (Global Competition Litigation Review, 1/25).  Dr. Solas is also the author of Third Party Funding, Law Economics an Policy (Cambridge Press).

There is an inaccurate and counterproductive belief in the litigation funding market, that the asset class would be uncorrelated from the global economy. That was in fact due to a much bigger scientific legal problem, that the law itself was not considered as physical factor of correlation, as instrument to measure and determine cause and effects of economic events in legal systems.

This problem has been solved, in both theoretical and mathematical terms, and in fact – thanks to technology available to date such as AI and blockchain – it looks much better for litig … ehm … legal third-party funders. 

Third Party Funding 3.0© opens three new lines of opportunities:

  1. AI allows to detect and file claims that would otherwise not have been viable / brought forward, such as unlocked competition law claims[2], which represent the largest chunk of the market for competition claims. See funding proposal.
  2. Human law as factor of correlation allows to calculate the unexpressed value of the global economy. Everything that, in fact, can be unlocked with litigation, allowing then a public-private IPO type of process to optimize legal systems[3].
  3. Physical modeling of the law also allows to transform debt / liabilities into new investments, thus allowing to settle litigation earlier and with less legal costs, leaving more room to creativity to optimize the investments[4].

While it may be true that the outcome of one single judgement does not depend on the fluctuations of the financial economy, legal reality certainly determines the ups and downs of the litigation funding (and any other) market. Otherwise, we could not explain the rise of litigation funding in the post-financial crisis for instance, or the shockwaves propagated by judgements like PACCAR.

The flip side is that understanding and measuring legal reality, as well as leveraging on modern technologies and innovative legal instruments, the market for legal claims and legal assets is much bigger and sizeable than with the standard litigation financial model.

In order to test Litigation Funding 3.0, I am presenting the following proposal:

10 MILLION EUR in the form of a series A venture capital type of investment to cover one test case’s litigation costs, tech, book-building and expert costs aimed at targeting three already identified global or multi-jurisdictional mass anticompetitive claims in the scale of multi-billion dollars, whose details will be provided upon request.

Funder(s) get:

  • Percentage of claims’ return as per agreement with parties involved;
  • Property of the AI / blockchain algorithm;
  • License of TPF 3.0.

The funding does not cover: additional legal / litigation / expert / etc. costs.

Below is the full proposal:

THIRD PARTY FUNDING 3.0© & COMPETITION LAW CLAIMS Dr2. Avv. Gian Marco Solas gmsolas@sustainab-law.eu ; gianmarcosolas@gmail.com ; +393400966871 
AI: Artificial Intelligence                  ML: Machine Learning                    TPF: Third Party Funding
GENERAL SCENARIO FOR COMPETITION LAW DAMAGE CLAIMS – IN SHORT
Competition authorities around the globe are rapidly developing AI / ML tools to scan markets / economy and prosecute anti-competitive practices. This suggests a steep increase in competition claims in the coming years, in both volume and scope.  AI also reduces the costs and time of litigation and ML allows to better assess its risks and merit, prompting for a re-modelling of the TPF economic model in competition claims considering empirical evidence of the first wave(s) of funded litigation.
CODIFICATION© IN PHENOGRAPHY© AND TPF 3.0©
New technology and ‘mathematical-legal language’, a combination of digital & quantum where the IT code is the applicable law modelled as – and interrelated with – the law(s) of nature (‘codification©’ in ‘phenography©’). On this basis, an ML / AI legal-tech algorithm has been built in prototype to learn, build and enforce anticompetitive claims in scale, to be guided by lawyers / experts / managers, with a process tracked with and certified in blockchain. New investment thesis (TPF 3.0©) for an asset class correlated to the global real economy, including the mathematical basis for the development of a complex sciences-based / empirical damage calculation to be built by experts. 
LEGAL / LITIGATION TECH INVESTMENT, COMMITMENT AND PROSPECT RETURN
10 MILLION EUR in the form of a series A venture capital type of investment with real assets as collateral for funding to any competition litigation filed with and through this algorithm, that becomes proprietary also of the funder(s). It aims at covering a first test case (already identified), full-time IT engineer, quantum experts and book-building costs. The funder(s) is(are) expected to provide also global litigation management expertise and own the algorithm. Three global or anyway multi-jurisdictional mass anticompetitive claims in the scale of multi-billion in value have already been identified. Details will be provided upon request. Funder(s) also gets license of the TPF 3.0© thesis.

Below is the abstract and table of contents from my research:

Abstract

This article aims at fostering competition litigation and market analysis by integrating concepts borrowed from physics science from an historical legal and evolutionary perspective, taking the third party funding (TPF) market as benchmark. To do so, it first combines historical legal data and trends related to the legal and litigation markets, discussing three macro historical trends or “states”: Industrial revolution(s) and globalisation; enlargement of the legal world; digital revolution and liberalisation of the legal profession. It then proposes the multidisciplinary methodology to assess the market for TPF: mainstream economic models, historical “cyclical” data and concepts borrowed from physics, particularly from mechanics of fluids and thermodynamics. On this basis, it discusses the potential implication of such methodology on the global competition litigation practice, for instance in market analysis and damage theory, also by considering the impact of modern technologies. The article concludes that physics models and the interdisciplinary methodology seem to add value to market assessment and considers whether there should be a case for a wider adoption in (competition) litigation and asset management practices.  

Table of Contents

Introduction. I. Evolution of the legal services, litigation and third party funding market(s) 1.1. Industrial revolution(s) and globalisation 1.2. Enlargement of the legal world and privatisation of justice 1.3. Digital revolution and liberalisation of the legal profession II. Modelling the market(s) with economics, historical and physics models. Third Party Funding as benchmark 2.1. Economic models for legal services, legal claims and third party funding markets 2.2. Does history repeat itself? Litigation finance cycles 2.3. Mechanics of fluids and thermodynamics to model legal markets? III. Impact on global competition litigation 3.1. Market analysis and damage theory 3.2. Economics of competition litigation and new technologies. Conclusions. Third Party Funding 3.0© and competitiveness.

—
1. Italian / EU qualified lawyer and legal scientist. Leading Expert at BRICS Competition Law & Policy Centre (Higher School of Economics, Moscow). Ph.D.2 (Maastricht Law School, Economic Analysis of Law; University of Cagliari, Comparative Law) – LL.M. (College of Europe, EU competition Law). Visiting Fellow at Fordham Law School (US Antitrust), NYU (US Legal finance and civil procedure).

2. G. M. Solas, ‘Third Party Funding, new technologies and the interdisciplinary methodology as global competition litigation driving forces’ (2025) Global Competition Litigation Review, 1.

3. G. M. Solas, ‘Interrelation of Human Laws and Laws of Nature? Codification of Sustainable Legal Systems’ (2025) Journal of Law, Market & Innovation, 2.

4. ‘Law is Love’, at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5694423, par. 3.3.

About the author

Gian Marco Solas

Gian Marco Solas

Dr. Solas is the founder of Sustainab-Law and author of Third Party Funding, New Technologies and the Interdisciplinary Methodology as Global Competition Litigation Driving Forces (Global Competition Litigation Review, 1/25). Dr. Solas is also the author of Third Party Funding, Law Economics an Policy (Cambridge Press).

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ILFA Urges Government to Clarify Rather Than Rebuild the Opt-Out Collective Actions Regime

The International Legal Finance Association has filed its response to the UK Government's consultation on competition redress, arguing that reforms intended to speed up the opt-out collective actions regime must not add cost or complexity that makes meritorious claims harder to fund.

The submission responds to the Department for Business and Trade's consultation on "Swifter and Simpler Competition Redress, Regulatory Appeals and Competition Enforcement," which opened on 17 July and closed on 25 September. ILFA's central argument is that the Competition Appeal Tribunal and the appellate courts have already developed workable mechanisms for overseeing class representative suitability, and that the Government should deliver clarity through guidance and the formalisation of existing practice rather than new statutory or procedural requirements.

"Third-party litigation funding is the cornerstone of the opt-out collective actions regime," said Neil Purslow, Chairman of the Executive Committee of ILFA. "Without it, consumers and small businesses would have no realistic means of bringing meritorious claims against well-resourced defendants. In our response, we make it clear that any new reforms must not inadvertently introduce cost or complexity, which only serve to make valid claims harder to bring."

ILFA ties the Government's proposal to permit damages-based agreements in collective proceedings to the unresolved question of funder returns. "Crucially, the Government's proposal to permit damages-based agreements in collective proceedings underscores the urgent need to reverse the PACCAR ruling retrospectively," Purslow said. "To keep this regime viable and investable, we must give funders earlier certainty over returns and introduce better cost budgeting to rein in unpredictable, disproportionate costs."

On costs, the association supports mandatory costs budgeting for claimants and defendants alike from certification onwards, and greater use of alternative dispute resolution where it is required early and backed by real costs sanctions. It also backs a central CAT website for claims and settlements, while cautioning that efficiency measures such as reduced panel composition may yield only marginal savings.

"Maintaining a true equality of arms is essential," Purslow said. "Large defendants should not be allowed to weaponise structural hurdles to quash meritorious claims and ordinary businesses and consumers must remain empowered to hold the powerful to account."

Which AI Model Is Best for Legal Work? What 2026 Research Says About Accuracy

Law firms, funders and legal departments are being sold AI for contract review, legal research and citation checking, and the models change every few months. So we looked only at independent studies published in 2026 that tested the current generation of models from OpenAI, Anthropic and Google on real legal tasks. The short version: the best models are now genuinely good at reading and extracting from documents you give them, still unreliable at recalling law from memory, and the commercial legal research tools lag behind the best custom systems.

At a Glance

Best overall model for legal document work: Google's Gemini 3.1 Pro. It was at or near the top in every 2026 study that tested it, and it was usually the fastest and cheapest of the leaders. OpenAI's GPT-5.5 found slightly more errors in contract review, and Anthropic's Claude models were the most careful about not flagging problems that weren't there.

Best accuracy recorded on a full legal task: 92%, on a 50-state statutory research test run by Stanford, achieved by a purpose-built research tool. The lesson is that how the AI is set up matters as much as which model sits underneath it.

Range of accuracy: from under 7% (asking a model to recall exact case citations from memory) to 99–100% (catching a citation to the wrong case when the model can read the source). Most real-world document tasks landed between 60% and 85%.

Westlaw and Lexis AI: 58% and 64% accuracy on a Stanford statutory survey test, below a custom-built tool at 83–92%.

Biggest single improvement: giving the model the actual documents instead of asking it from memory cut fabricated citations from roughly 15–40% to about 4–15%, and to under 0.2% with a well-built retrieval system.

Key Takeaways

The model to use. For contract review and extraction, start with Gemini 3.1 Pro. It matched the top performer on catching contract errors (74% vs. 75%) at about one-seventh of the cost and in 90 seconds instead of nine minutes. If catching every possible issue matters more than time or cost, GPT-5.5 with reasoning turned on found the most. For checking citations in a brief, the best 2026 results came from GPT-5 running as an agent and from Claude Code with Claude Opus, which was the most precise.

How to Use It

  • Give it the documents. Never ask a model to supply case law or citations from memory.
  • Turn on the model's "reasoning" or "thinking" mode for review work. It improved error-catching by 9 to 11 points in contract review.
  • Use it as a first pass and a second reviewer, not the final reviewer.
  • For research, use a tool that pulls from a full, current database of the law, because weak retrieval, not the model, causes many of the errors.

What to Expect

  • Contract extraction (pulling out dates, parties, termination and liability terms): about 80–84% accuracy for the best models.
  • Final contract proofreading (defined terms, cross-references, inconsistent language): the best models catch about three-quarters of errors. On a 60-page agreement, expect it to miss some.
  • Citation checking: nearly all citations to the wrong case get caught, but wrong pinpoint pages slip through 20% to 60% of the time.
  • Research answers grounded in the right documents: roughly 6–11% of answers still contain an unsupported statement.

What to Look Out For

  • Citations from memory. When asked to recall exact citations without sources, even the best model scored under 7 out of 100, and 20 of 21 models gave confident, wrong answers more than 94% of the time.
  • Right case, wrong page. Models tend to approve a citation because the case is on the right topic, even when the cited page doesn't support the point.
  • Questions with a false premise. If your question assumes something that isn't true, models often go along with it.
  • Legal research tools' marketing. Westlaw AI and Lexis+ AI trailed a custom-built tool by 19 to 25 points on a Stanford test.
  • Studies funded by vendors. Some of the best-looking results come from companies selling legal AI. Check who ran the test.

Best Practices

  • Ground every task in source documents, and require the model to quote the passage it relied on.
  • Check every citation yourself at the pinpoint page before filing. Automated checkers help but don't replace this.
  • Turn on reasoning mode for review tasks and accept that it's slower.
  • Test a model on a few of your own documents before rolling it out. Rankings change by task.
  • Re-test when a new model version arrives; this field moves in months, not years.
  • Keep a human reviewer accountable for anything that goes to a court, a client or a counterparty.

What the Studies Found

Contract proofreading. In August 2026, researchers had experienced lawyers plant errors in contracts (misused defined terms, wrong cross-references, wrong party names, contradictions) and tested ten current models on catching them. GPT-5.5 caught 75% of errors, Gemini 3.1 Pro 74%, Claude Sonnet 4.6 69% and Claude Opus 4.7 62%. GPT-5.5 cost $1.38 per contract and took about nine minutes; Gemini 3.1 Pro cost $0.19 and took about 90 seconds. Turning on reasoning mode added 9 to 11 points. Every model was far cheaper than a lawyer, and none was close to perfect.

Contract extraction. A May 2026 study tested models on pulling 26 standard fields out of contracts. Among the major models, Gemini 3.1 Pro scored highest (82%), with Claude Opus 4.6 (82%) and Claude Sonnet 4.6 (80%) close behind and GPT-5.4 at 78%. A smaller legal-specific model built by the study's authors scored 84% at far lower cost. The authors work for Onit, which makes that model.

Made-up citations and facts. A January 2026 study had expert reviewers check 2,700 legal answers from 12 models. Asked without source documents, the best models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3.0 Pro) cited something false about 15–17% of the time, and the worst over 30%. Giving the models the relevant documents cut that to about 4–15%. A more carefully built retrieval system brought it below 0.2% for every model.

Research with sources. A March 2026 study found that when models answer from retrieved legal texts, Gemini 3.1 Pro produced unsupported statements 5.7% of the time versus 11.3% for GPT-5.2, and that the quality of the search step mattered more than the choice of model. Its authors sell the search component that performed best. An August 2026 study of eight research setups found unsupported answers ranging from under 10% for the best to nearly half for the worst, with the worst results on questions built on a false assumption.

Westlaw and Lexis. In a February 2026 Stanford study, researchers tested legal AI tools against a Department of Labor survey of state unemployment insurance laws. Westlaw AI scored 58% and Lexis+ AI 64%, while a custom statutory research tool scored 83%, rising to 92% after the researchers found that some of its "errors" were gaps in the government's own survey.

Citation checking. A June 2026 study found more than 1,000 court filings containing fabricated citations, a number growing every year, and tested AI checkers on catching them. GPT-5, working as an agent that looks up cases, caught 83% of planted errors; Claude Code running Claude Opus 4.8 was the most precise and scored best overall. No model reliably caught wrong pinpoint cites, partly because page numbers often sit behind Westlaw and Lexis paywalls. A separate August 2026 study found models catch 93–100% of citations to the wrong case but miss many citations to the wrong page, and even GPT-5.4 with full reasoning missed 40% of wrong pinpoints in court opinions.

Citations from memory. A May 2026 study built from 1,000 real U.S. judicial opinions asked 21 models to recall exact case citations without any sources. The best, Claude Sonnet 4.5, scored under 7 out of 100.

The Bottom Line

The 2026 research is consistent: today's best models, led by Gemini 3.1 Pro, GPT-5.5 and Claude, are useful and cheap for first-pass contract review and extraction when they work from the documents in front of them. They still invent law when asked from memory and still miss wrong pinpoint citations, so a lawyer has to verify anything that leaves the building.

Sources (All 2026)

  • Bang et al., "ContractScrub: A benchmark for final review of legal contracts" (Aug. 2026), arXiv:2608.20204
  • Lincoln et al., "A Few Good Clauses: Comparing LLMs vs Domain-Trained Small Language Models on Structured Contract Extraction" (May 2026), arXiv:2605.05532
  • Dantart, "Reliability by design: quantifying and eliminating fabrication risk in LLMs" (Jan. 2026), arXiv:2601.15476
  • Butler and Butler, "Legal RAG Bench: an end-to-end benchmark for legal RAG" (Mar. 2026), arXiv:2603.01710
  • Das et al., "How Much Do Legal RAG Systems Still Hallucinate?" (Aug. 2026), arXiv:2608.14210
  • Afane et al., "Benchmarking Legal RAG: The Promise and Limits of AI Statutory Surveys" (Feb. 2026), arXiv:2603.03300
  • Liu, Stammbach and Henderson, "Who Checks the Citations? Benchmarking Legal Hallucination Detection" (June 2026), arXiv:2606.21155
  • Verma, "Is this Citation on Point?" (Aug. 2026), arXiv:2608.12571
  • Chen et al., "LegalCiteBench: Evaluating Citation Reliability in Legal Language Models" (May 2026), arXiv:2605.10186

Second Circuit Affirms Fee Award That Treated Litigation Funding Costs as Firm Overhead

The Second Circuit has upheld a $4.8 million attorneys' fee award in a sex trafficking case, endorsing a district court's decision to strike time counsel spent communicating with its litigation funder.

In Moore v. Rubin, decided on September 4, a panel of Chief Judge Lohier and Judges Parker and Chin affirmed the award to six plaintiffs who won a $3.85 million jury verdict against former bond trader Howard Rubin under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. In rejecting the argument that too many timekeepers had been compensated, the panel noted approvingly that the district court had applied a 15% across-the-board reduction and excluded non-compensable tasks, "such as communications with counsel's litigation funder."

The more consequential ruling for funders came below. In February 2025, Judge Brian Cogan of the Eastern District of New York refused to shift roughly $1.84 million in principal and interest owed to a third-party funder, reasoning that how a lawyer finances a practice is irrelevant to the client and the defendant alike. "Whether it is a bank loan, family loan, personal assets, or a litigation funder," he wrote, "it is overhead."

Judge Cogan also declined to follow the English decision in Essar Oilfield Services v. Norscot Rig Management, which allowed recovery of funding costs, observing that neither the statute nor the local rule hints at such recovery.

The funding cost denial was not before the appellate panel, as Rubin appealed only the fee award. The funder, Pravati Investment Fund IV, later sought unsuccessfully to intervene to protect its interest in the fees after the plaintiffs' firm dissolved.