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Probate Funding: A Useful Option for So Many (Part 2 of 4)

June 4, 2018

Probate Funding: A Useful Option for So Many (Part 2 of 4)

The following is Part 2 of our 4-Part series on Probate Funding by Steven D. Schroeder, Esq., General Counsel/Sr. Vice President at Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. since 2004. Part 1 can be found here. Comparing Assignments with Loans: Apples Are Not Oranges As previously stated, there has been some recent criticism of the companies engaged in Probate funding.[1] An Article entitled: “Probate Lending” started and ended with the premise that Probate Assignments are in fact disguised loans and should be regulated as such. Despite the predetermined conclusion by one author, in fact, the law treats Assignments and Loans quite differently and those distinctions are significant.[2]
  1. What is an Assignment?
An Assignment is a term that may comprehensively cover the transfer of legal title to any kind of property. Commercial Discount Co. v. Cowen (1941) 18 Cal. 2d 601, 614; see also In re: Kling (1919) 44 Cal. App. 267, 270, 186 P. 152. When valid consideration is given, the Assignee acquires no greater rights or title than what is assigned. In other words, the Assignee steps in the shoes of the Assignor’s rights, subject to any defenses that an obligor may have against Assignor, prior to Notice of Assignment. See Parker v. Funk (1921) 185 Cal. 347, 352, 197 P. 83.  See also Cal. Civil Code §1459; Cal. Code of Civil Procedure §369. An Assignment may be oral or written and no special form is necessary provided that the transfer is clearly intended as a present assignment of interest by the Assignor. If only a part of the Assignor’s interest is transferred, it may nevertheless be enforced as an equitable Assignment. See McDaniel v. Maxwell, (1891) 21 Or. 202, 205, 27 P. 952. It has been held that any expectancy may be assigned or renounced. See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Broadhurst 157 Cal. App. 2d 375, 321 P. 2d 75. Similarly, a beneficiary may assign or otherwise transfer his or her interest in an Estate prior to distribution. See Gold et. al., Cal Civil Practice: Probate and Trust Proceedings (2005) §3:86, p. 3-78. Probate Assignments are those taken prior to the completion of probate administration for which an heir/beneficiary transfers a portion of his/her expected inheritance in the estate in consideration of a cash advance (i.e. the purchase price).
  1. What is a loan?
A loan agreement is a contract between a borrower and a lender which governs the mutual promises made by each party. There are many types of loan agreements, including but not limited to: “home loans”, “equity loans”, “car loans”, “mortgage loan facilities agreements”, “revolvers”, “term loans” and “working capital loans” just to name a few. In contrast to Assignments, loans do not transfer legal title and instead are contracts in which the borrower pays back money at a later date, together with accrued interest to the lender. A loan creates a debtor and creditor relationship that is not terminated until the sum borrowed plus the agreed upon interest is paid in full. Milana v. Credit Discount Co. (1945) 27 Cal. 2d 335, 163 P.2d.869. In order to constitute a loan, there must be a contract whereby the lender transfers a sum of money which the borrower agrees to repay absolutely; together with such additional sums as may be agreed upon for its use.[3] The nature of a loan transaction, can be inferred from its objective characteristics. Such indicia include: presence or absence of debt instruments, collateral, interest provisions, repayment schedules or deadlines, book entries recording loan balances or interest, payments and any other attributes indicative of an enforceable obligation to repay the sums advance. Id, citing Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States 398, F.2d 694, 696 (3d Circ. 1968). Also, unlike Assignments, lenders typically insist upon several credit worthy factors prior to funding. For example, the “borrower” makes representations about his/her character including creditworthiness, cash flow and any collateral that he/she may pledge as security for a loan. These creditworthy representations are taken into consideration because the lender needs to determine under what terms, if any, they are prepared to loan money and whether the borrower has the wherewithal to pay it back, generally within a certain time frame. In cases of Probate Assignments, an Advance Company rarely considers creditworthiness of the Assignee, because it is not he/she who is responsible to satisfy the obligation. That obligation falls upon the Estate or Trust fiduciary. In addition, Probate Assignments cannot be deemed to be a loan if the return is contingent on the happening of some future event, (i.e. Final Distribution). Altman v. Altman (Ch. 1950) 8 N.J. Super.301, 72 A.2d 536., Arneill Ranch v. Petit 64 Cal. App. 3d, 277, 134 Cal. Rptr. 456, 461-463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).  True Probate Assignments, executed in consideration of an advance, have no time limit for payment, nor do they accrue interest post-funding. Furthermore, an assignee is not required to make periodic interest payments and in the vast majority of cases no payment at all. Moreover, although loans are often secured against real property, Assignments in Probate should not be secured. Estate Property is generally not owned or distributed to the heir at the time the Assignment is executed. A critical distinction between Probate Assignments and loans, is that when an Assignment is executed, there is no unconditional obligation that the Assigned amount be paid and/or when it might be paid. Once assigned, the Assignor owes no further obligation to the Assignee over those rights sold/assigned. And, the Assignee has no recourse against the Assignee/Heir should the heir’s distributive share be less that what he/she assigns. In other words, to “constitute [a] true loan [] there must have been, at the time the funds were transferred, an unconditional obligation on the part of the transferee to repay the money, and an unconditional intention on the part of the transferor to secure repayment.”  Geftman v. Comm’r 154 F3rd 61, 68 (3d Cir. 1998) quoting Haag v. Comm’r 88.T.C. 604, 615-16, 1987 WL 49288 aff’d 855 F. 2d 855 (8th Cir. 1987). Many jurisdictions in addition to California, recognize that the absolute right to repayment or some form of security for the debt as the defining characteristics of loan.[4] While the structure and elements slightly vary, the following is a side by side comparison of some of the basic distinctions of loans and Assignments in Probate Funding:
LoansAssignments
Tenor: This is the time limit for repaying the loan as well as the interest rate charge.Tenor: No time limit for payment. No interest accrues.
Obligor on the Assignment: The Borrower is contractually obligated to repay.Assignee on the Assignment: Assignee/Heir does not pay anything.  A third party (i.e. administrator pays the Assignment.
Recourse: The Borrower is unconditionally obligated.Recourse: In absence of fraud, the Assignee has no recourse should his interest be less than what is assigned or even $0.00.
Interest Payment and Capitalization: The interest rate charge for the loan and time limit for interest payment. It also stipulates conditions under which unpaid Interest will be added to the outstanding loans.Interest Payment and Capitalization: Interest does not accrue post funding and the Assignment is fixed.
Penalties: Late payments are typically subject to penalties and/or trigger default.Penalties: No payments are due.  No Default deadlines for payment imposed on Assignee/Heir.
Creditworthiness: Essential for approvalCreditworthiness: Not essential
Default: Foreclosure is an option; a borrower could bear default.Default: No penalty no matter when Assignment is paid. Assignments are not secured. Foreclosure is not an option.
Moreover, given the uncertain time frame for recovery and absence of recourse against the Assignee/Heir, it would be impossible to assign an interest rate or make a Truth in Lending (“TILA”) disclosure, 15 U.S.C. §1601 (2012). Since the purpose of the TILA is to assure meaningful disclosure, the simplicity of an Assignment eliminates any necessity of making interest rate disclosures as required by interest bearing loans. When the Assignor sells a portion of his/her interest for a fixed sum Assignment, what additional disclosures are necessary? In short, there are many significant differences between Probate Assignments and Loans. Courts and Legislatures throughout the country have recognized these distinctions and have considered them when regulating or providing necessary review over either product. Stay tuned for Part 3 of our 4-Part series, where we discuss California’s regulation of Probate Funding, and how such regulation can serve as a model for other jurisdictions. Steven D. Schroeder has been General Counsel/Sr. Vice President at Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. since 2004. Active Attorney in good standing, licensed to practice before all Courts in the State of California since 1985 and a Registered Attorney with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  —- [1]  David Horton and Andrea Chandrasenkher, supra (2016) 126 Yale 105-107.  Professors Horton and Chandrasekher analogized Litigation Funding to the ancient doctrine of champerty even though acknowledging California has never recognized the doctrine, See e.g. Mathewson v. Fitch, 22 Cal. 86, 95 (1863). [2] The conclusions in Probate Lending were debunked, by Jeremy Kidd, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Law, Mercer, Probate Funding and the Litigation Funding Debate, See Wealth Strategies Journal, August 14, 2017. [3] 47 C.J.S. Interest and Usury; Consumer Credit Section 123 (1982). [4] See In re Nelson’s Estate (1930) 211, Iowa 168; Dobb v. Yari, (NJ 1996), 927 F. Supp 814; Turcotte v. Trevino (1976) 544, S.W. 2d 463; quoting.47 C.J,S. Interest and Usury; Consumer Credit Section 123 (1982); Turcotte v. Trevino 544 S.W.2d 463 (1976), Cherokee Funding, LLC v. Ruth (2017) A17A0132; “…New York recognizes the absolute right of repayment or some form of security for the debt as the defining characteristic of a loan.   Its courts have explicitly stated that ‘[f]or a true loan it is essential to provide for repayment absolutely and all events or principal in some way to be secured…’ MoneyForLawsuits VLP v. Row No. 4:10-CV-11537]. Thus, a transaction that neither guarantees the lender an absolute right to repayment nor provides it with security for the debt is not a loan, and as a result, cannot be subject to New York’s usury laws…”   (emphasis added). “…In Brewer v. Brewer, 386 Md. 183, 196-197 (2005), the Court of Appeals held that “redistribution agreements are permissible and, so long as they comply with the requirements of basis contract law, neither the personal representative nor the court has any authority to disapprove or veto them.  See also In re: Garcelon’s Estate 38 P. 414, 415 (Cal. 1894), Haydon v. Eldred, 21 S. W.457, 458 (Ky 1929). See Massey vs. Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. Court of Appeals, 7th Dist (TX), 07-16-00148-CV.

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Consumer

What Happens to Consumers When Consumer Legal Funding Disappears

By Eric Schuller |

The following was contributed by Eric K. Schuller, President, The Alliance for Responsible Consumer Legal Funding (ARC).

The Real-World Consequences of Over-Regulation and Misclassification

State lawmakers across the country are increasingly focused on how to regulate third-party financial activity connected to litigation. That attention is appropriate and necessary. However, when Consumer Legal Funding (CLF) is misclassified as a loan, conflicted with commercial litigation finance, or subjected to regulatory structures designed for fundamentally different financial products, the consequences fall not on providers, but on consumers who need it the most.

Consumer Legal Funding, Funding Lives, Not Litigation, exists to help individuals with pending legal claims meet basic household needs while their cases move through the legal system. These consumers are often recovering from serious injuries, unable to work, and facing mounting financial pressure. When CLF disappears due to over-regulation or misclassification, those consumers do not suddenly become financially secure. Instead, they are pushed into worse, more dangerous alternatives, or forced into decisions that undermine both their legal rights and their long-term financial stability.

Who Uses Consumer Legal Funding and Why

Consumers who turn to CLF are not seeking to finance their litigation. They are seeking financial stability. On average, CLF transactions range between $3,000 and $5,000. These monies are used for rent, mortgage payments, utilities, groceries, childcare, transportation, and medical co-pay. In many cases, it is differences between maintaining housing or facing eviction, between keeping a car or losing the ability to get to medical appointments or work.

CLF is non-recourse. If the consumer does not recover in their legal claim, they owe nothing. That structure places all financial risk on the provider, not the consumer. It is precisely this risk allocation that distinguishes CLF from loans and traditional credit products, and it is why courts and legislatures in numerous states have recognized that CLF is not a loan.

When lawmakers impose loan-based frameworks on CLF, including usury caps, amortization requirements, or repayment obligations disconnected from case outcomes, the product becomes economically impossible to offer. The result is not a cheaper product. The result is no product at all.

The Immediate Impact of CLF Disappearing

When CLF exits a state market, the effects are immediate and measurable.

First, consumer access disappears. Providers cannot operate under regulatory structures that ignore the non-recourse nature of the product. Capital exits the market, and consumers lose an option that previously helped them remain financially afloat during litigation.

Second, consumers are forced into inferior alternatives. Without CLF, injured individuals frequently turn to credit cards, payday lenders, installment loans, or borrowing from friends and family. These options often carry guaranteed repayment obligations, compounding interest, collection risk, and damage to credit. Unlike CLF, these products do not adjust based on whether the consumer recovers anything in their legal claim.

Third, financial pressure forces premature settlements. When consumers cannot meet basic living expenses, they are more likely to accept early, undervalued settlements simply to survive. This undermines the fairness of the civil justice system and benefits defendants and insurers, not injured parties or the courts.

Misclassification Harms the Most Vulnerable Consumers

The consumers most harmed by the elimination of CLF are those with the fewest alternatives. These are individuals with limited savings, limited access to traditional credit, and limited ability to absorb income disruption following an injury.

Ironically, regulations intended to protect consumers often end up harming precisely the consumers they sought to help. When CLF is treated as a loan, the regulatory burden drives responsible providers out of the market while doing nothing to improve consumer outcomes. Consumers do not gain safer options. They lose transparent, regulated, non-recourse funding and are pushed toward products with higher risk and fewer protections.

This is not hypothetical. States that have enacted overly restrictive frameworks or applied inappropriate rate caps have seen providers exit, access shrink, and consumer choice vanish. The lesson is clear. When regulation ignores economic reality, consumers pay the price.

CLF Does Not Drive Litigation or Verdict Inflation

A common concern raised in policy debates is whether CLF encourages litigation, prolongs cases, or contributes to so-called nuclear verdicts. The evidence does not support these claims.

CLF is accessed after a legal claim already exists. It does not finance attorneys’ fees, court costs, or litigation strategy. Providers have no control over legal decisions, settlement timing, or trial outcomes. Their only interest is whether a consumer recovers at all.

Moreover, the small size of typical CLF transactions makes it implausible that they influence case strategy or verdict size. A $3,000 to $5,000 transaction used to pay rent or utilities does not drive multi-million-dollar litigation outcomes. Conflating CLF with commercial litigation finance obscures these realities and leads to policy mistakes.

A Better Path Forward for Policymakers

Legislators can protect consumers without eliminating CLF. States that have enacted thoughtful CLF statutes have focused on disclosure, transparency, contract clarity, and consumer choice, rather than imposing loan-based rate structures that do not fit a non-recourse product.

Effective regulation acknowledges three core principles. First, CLF is not a loan and should not be regulated as one. Second, consumers benefit from access to a regulated, transparent product rather than being pushed into worse alternatives. Third, clear rules provide stability for both consumers and providers.

When policymakers get this balance right, consumers retain access to a product that helps them weather one of the most difficult periods of their lives without distorting the justice system or creating unintended harm.

Conclusion

The issue confronting lawmakers is not whether Consumer Legal Funding should be subject to oversight, but whether existing and future frameworks accurately reflect how the product operates and whom it serves. When CLF is swept into regulatory regimes designed for loans or commercial litigation finance, the result is not improved consumer protection. It is the quiet elimination of a non-recourse option that many injured consumers rely on to remain financially stable while their legal claims are resolved.

Careful, informed policymaking requires recognizing that Consumer Legal Funding is distinct, limited in size, non-recourse, and consumer-facing. Regulation that acknowledges those characteristics preserves transparency and accountability without stripping consumers of choice or forcing them into riskier financial alternatives. When rules are tailored to economic reality rather than broad assumptions, consumers are better protected, markets remain stable, and the civil justice system functions as intended.

Consumer

Consumer Legal Funding Is Not a Loan, Courts and Economists Agree

By John Freund |

The debate over whether consumer legal funding should be classified as a loan continues to surface in regulatory and policy circles, but legal doctrine and economic analysis consistently point in the opposite direction. Consumer legal funding is a non-recourse financial transaction tied to the outcome of a legal claim. If the consumer does not recover in their case, they owe nothing. This defining feature alone places the product outside the traditional boundaries of consumer lending, which requires repayment regardless of outcome and typically involves credit underwriting, collateral, and enforceable debt obligations.

An article in the National Law Review explains that courts and legislatures across the United States have repeatedly recognized this distinction. Rather than viewing consumer legal funding as borrowed money, courts have treated these arrangements as the purchase of a contingent interest in a future settlement or judgment. Because repayment is entirely dependent on case success, judges have found that the economic substance of the transaction does not resemble a loan, nor does it fit neatly within existing consumer credit frameworks.

Judicial decisions from multiple jurisdictions underscore this point. Courts have emphasized that consumers face no personal liability, no collection efforts, and no obligation to repay from their own assets. These factors are incompatible with the legal definition of a loan, which presumes a fixed obligation to repay principal and interest. As a result, attempts to recharacterize consumer legal funding as lending have largely failed when scrutinized under established legal standards.

From an economic perspective, consumer legal funding plays a distinct role in the civil justice system. It provides liquidity to plaintiffs who may be facing prolonged litigation and financial pressure, often helping them avoid accepting premature or undervalued settlements. Treating these transactions as loans could impose regulatory requirements that are poorly suited to non-recourse funding and risk limiting consumer access to a product designed to mitigate imbalance between individual plaintiffs and well-resourced defendants.

Consumer

Legal-Bay Hails New York Litigation Funding Act as Industry Milestone

By John Freund |

Legal Bay has praised New York Governor Kathy Hochul for signing the New York Litigation Funding Act into law, describing the legislation as a landmark step that finally provides a clear regulatory framework for consumer litigation funding in the state. The new law represents a significant development for an industry that has operated for years amid legal uncertainty in one of the country’s most active litigation markets.

A Legal Bay press release notes that the legislation establishes a comprehensive set of consumer protections and regulatory standards governing litigation funding transactions in New York. Legal Bay characterized the law as the product of more than two decades of policy development and sustained advocacy efforts by industry participants and consumer access to justice groups. The company emphasized that the statute provides long needed clarity by formally recognizing consumer litigation funding as a non recourse financial transaction rather than a traditional loan.

Under the new framework, funded plaintiffs are only required to repay advances if they obtain a recovery in their legal claims. Supporters of the law argue that this distinction is critical in protecting consumers from additional financial risk while ensuring that individuals with meritorious claims are able to cover basic living expenses during the often lengthy litigation process. Legal Bay highlighted that litigation funding can help plaintiffs avoid accepting early settlements driven by financial pressure rather than the merits of their cases.

Legal Bay also acknowledged the role played by New York lawmakers in advancing the legislation through the state legislature, noting that the law strikes a balance between consumer protection and preserving access to funding. According to the company, the statute promotes transparency, fairness, and stability in a market that continues to grow in both size and sophistication.