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Price Control to Ensure the Affordability of Litigation Finance?

The following post was contributed by Guido Demarco, Director & Head of Legal Assets of Stonward.

In March 2021, the European Parliamentary Research Service published a study on Responsible Private Funding of Litigation. This study was later supplemented by a draft report prepared by the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs in June 2021. Both documents, the study, and the draft report, contain certain recommendations to regulate litigation funding and criticize the economic costs that these funds impose on their clients by referring to them as “excessive”, “unfair” and “abusive”.

Specifically, on the issue of fees, the study suggests setting a 30% cap on funders’ rates of return, while the draft report recommends that LF agreements should be invalid if they foresee a benefit for the claimant equal to or less than 60% (unless exceptional circumstances apply). In other words, a cap of 40%.

While this might be viewed as a logical measure to make litigation finance more affordable, what needs to be considered is that the funders’ expected return is simply a consequence of the risks and costs that arise from litigation, not the other way round.

The costs

Let us take the case of a foreign national, ‘Citizen Kane,’ who makes an investment in the energy sector in Ruritania[1]. Let us imagine that a bilateral treaty between Mr. Kane’s country of nationality and Ruritania protects Citizen Kane’s investment. The Republic of Ruritania suddenly indirectly expropriates Mr. Kane’s business without due compensation. To claim damages, Mr. Kane will start an arbitration through the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The total cost of the dispute will depend on the complexity and the duration of the case, including the number of pleadings, experts, hearings, and the time incurred by the attorneys. Only the first advance to ICSID can be circa $150,000.

If Citizen Kane estimates damages of $30 million, the costs of such a dispute could easily amount to $3 million or more. In investor-state arbitration, the mean costs for investors are about $6.4m and the median figure is $3.8m. The mean tribunal costs in ICSID arbitrations is $958,000 and the median $745,000.[2]

Therefore, after years suffering arbitrary measures and pursuing fruitless disputes in local courts, Citizen Kane will now have to invest an additional circa $3 million to file a claim for damages with a completely uncertain outcome. Even if Citizen Kane wins, Ruritania may not be willing to follow the award voluntarily, and he will have to incur more expenses to enforce the judgment.

The risks

Aware of the prohibitive costs of litigation, Ruritania may play the long game, unnecessarily prolonging the dispute to financially drain the claimant while expecting a future administration will be in office to foot the bill down the road. This might be challenging even for a financially healthy company, as litigation costs are often considered an expense on the profit and loss statement and therefore CFOs are increasingly looking for alternatives to preserve working capital for the company’s main activity.

How long will the proceeding take? What will be the final amount of the damages awarded? Will the other party voluntarily follow the award? What if, in the end, I lose? These questions have no exact answers because the answers depend on third parties, including how a judge or tribunal interprets the law and the facts of case, as well as the performance of experts and lawyers in pursuing the claim.

The litigation budget and estimated damages will play a key role in the investment decision, together with the merits of the case, liquidity, and reputation of the respondent, as well as the reputation of the law firm chosen by the client. Analyzing the risk is not easy, considering the latest figures that show that investors prevail in only 47% of cases, and that the median amount of damages claimed vis a vis damages awarded is 36%.

However, the main factor in determining risk is the structure of non-recourse litigation finance loans. This is not just a typical loan, but a mechanism to transfer risk. It is normal that the greater the risk assumed by the funder, the higher the return expected.

Conclusion

Limiting a funder’s expected return will not reduce financing costs for clients, and therefore will fail to make litigation more affordable, which is the aim of the EU’s regulation proposal. Funders will not grant funding if they perceive the risk/reward of a case is not worth the given circumstances. However, a cap on the return could have a direct effect on the number of cases taken up by funders – which is already low – since there will be cases in which the combination of factors described above will not make the investment worthwhile, considering the risk tradeoff. Unfortunately, there is a cost floor shared by both large and small cases, and complex claims like Citizen Kane’s expropriation case would be made all the more challenging to finance. A cap could therefore limit Mr. Kane’s litigation options.

Should funders charge any profiteering fee? No, but a cap to the fees may not be the solution. In the end, the direct beneficiaries of the proposed regulation could end up being certain states such as Ruritania, which act as defendants in arbitration or judicial cases, rather than the individuals that the EU is attempting to protect. Ironically, states finance their legal firepower with taxes, the same taxes that Citizen Kane has paid for years to the Republic of Ruritania.

[1]  Ruritania is a fictional country used as a setting for novels by Anthony Hope, such as The Prisoner of Zenda (1894). Jurists specialising in international law and private international law use Ruritania when describing a hypothetical case illustrating some legal point.

[2] 2021 Empirical Study: Costs, Damages and Duration in Investor-State Arbitration, British Institute of International and Comparative Law and Allen & Overy, available at: Costs, damages and duration in investor-state arbitration – Allen & Overy.

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Burford Capital CEO: Government Inaction on PACCAR is Harming London Market

By Harry Moran |

As we approach the beginning of summer, the litigation funding industry is growing impatient in waiting for the outcome of the Civil Justice Council’s (CJC) review of litigation funding, with funders anxious to see the government provide a solution to the uncertainty created by the Supreme Court’s ruling in PACCAR.

An article in The Law Society Gazette provides an overview of an interview with Christopher Bogart, CEO of Burford Capital; who spoke at length about the ongoing impact of the UK government’s failure to introduce legislation to solve issues created by the PACCAR ruling. Bogart highlighted the key correlation between funders’ reluctance to allocate more capital to the London legal market and “the government non-response” to find a quick and effective solution to PACCAR.

Comparing the similarities in effect of the government inaction over funding legislation to the Trump administration’s tariff policy, Bogart said simply, “markets and businesses don’t like such uncertainty.” He went on to describe the London market as “not as healthy as you would like it to be”, pointing to statistics showing a decrease in capital allocation and the examples of major funders like Therium making job cuts.

One particular pain point that Bogart pointed to was Burford’s newfound hesitancy to name London as an arbitral seat and choose English law for international contracts, saying that the company has moved those contracts to jurisdictions including Singapore, Paris or New York. Bogart said that it was “unfortunate because this is one of the major global centres for litigation and arbitration”, but argued that the strategic jurisdictional shift was a result of having “a less predictable dynamic here in this market”.

As for what Bogart would like to see from the upcoming CJC’s review of litigation funding, the Burford CEO emphasised the longstanding view of the funding industry that there is “no need for a big regulatory apparatus here.” Instead, Bogart suggested that an ideal outcome would be for the CJC to encourage Westminster “to restore a degree of predictability and stability into the market.”

Insurance CEO Ceases Trading with Firms Linked to Litigation Finance

By Harry Moran |

The tensions between the insurance industry and litigation finance are well established, with insurance industry groups often at the forefront of lobbying efforts calling for tighter regulations of third-party funding. In one of the most significant examples of this tension, the CEO of a speciality insurance company has declared that his company will cease doing business with any firm that is linked to litigation funding activity.

An article in Insurance Business highlights recent comments made by Andrew Robinson, chairman and CEO of Skyward Specialty Insurance Group, where he said that the company would no longer do business with companies who have any ties to litigation finance. Citing the uptick in the use of third-party funding as one of the primary contributors to social inflation, increasing product costs and reduced availability; Robinson declared that Skyward are “not going to trade with anybody who's involved in this”.

According to the article, Robinson’s decision was triggered by the company’s discovery that an asset manager it worked with was involved in litigation funding. Skyward then “shut off” its business relationship with the asset manager and is in the process of redeeming any remaining assets with the firm. Robinson said that the idea of Skyward having ties to firms involved with litigation finance “is wrong at all levels”, saying that he told his executive leadership team that “we can’t have that anywhere near us”.

Aside from the asset manager, Skyward was trading with a company involved in contingent insurance whose work included litigation finance, but Robinson stated that the unnamed company is reducing its already minor presence in the funding space.

Despite targeting his ire primarily at litigation funding, Robinson suggested that the wider issue stems from a “broken” tort system and that “you have to get to the root cause and toward reform”.  

Bell Gully Report: New Zealand Courts are “Enablers of Litigation Funding”

By Harry Moran |

Following a 2022 report from New Zealand’s Law Commission, there has been a distinct lack of action by successive governments to introduce a Class Actions Act or any forms of oversight for the use of third-party funding in large group claims.

A new report released by Bell Gully looks at the current state of class actions in New Zealand, examining the rise of large group claims  and the role of litigation funding as a key driver. In ‘The Big Picture: Class Actions’, Bell Gully says that “in the past five years class actions have moved from being a threat on the horizon to a regular feature in New Zealand’s courts”. 

The introduction to the report appears to paint litigation funders as the prime moving force behind this trend, saying that the swell in class actions is “being driven by the availability of third-party litigation funding rather than a groundswell of consumer action.” Identifying the most prominent funders at work in New Zealand, Bell Gully points to LPF Group as the dominant local funder, Omni Bridgeway for its strong market reach from Australia, and Harbour for its global strength across litigation and arbitration funding. 

Without any legislative measures regulating funding and with no established industry association like Australia’s AALF, Bell Gully highlights the courts as the main mechanism of control over funding activity. The report goes further and suggests that “funder-friendly court decisions have contributed to the growing influence of litigation funders in New Zealand”, noting the admission of opt-out class actions and courts’ willingness to make common fund orders.

In its review of the need for a Class Actions Act in New Zealand, Bell Gully argues that the current lack of oversight on funding has led to a situation where the courts are acting as “enablers of litigation funding” rather than regulators of the practice.

The full report can be accessed here.