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The 6th Anniversary of the Peter Thiel / Hulk Hogan / Gawker Case: What Have We Learned?

The 6th Anniversary of the Peter Thiel / Hulk Hogan / Gawker Case: What Have We Learned?

This week marks the sixth anniversary of Terry Bollea (AKA professional wrestler Hulk Hogan) suing Gawker media for publishing a sex tape of him with a married woman. The suit made national news not just for its salacious nature—but because of the questions it raised regarding privacy versus journalistic freedom. Once news emerged that billionaire and PayPal co-founder Peter Thiel was funding Hogan’s claim, the case became even more sensational. In this piece, we’ll take a look at exactly what happened in the case, and how it impacted (or hasn’t impacted) Litigation Finance. The Facts of the Case In 2007, Gawker, a website known for celebrity scandals and salacious content, published a piece with the headline: “Peter Thiel is totally gay, people.” Was this newsworthy? Did the piece have journalistic integrity? Reasonable people can disagree. Peter Thiel is in fact gay, which means the truth of the article protected Gawker from a libel suit. In 2009, an outed Thiel gave an interview in which he called Gawker ‘destructive,’ even as he acknowledged that the site wasn’t focused on ruining him personally. Thiel also speculated that Gawker maintained a disdainful attitude toward Big Tech, and may be focusing on punishing industry leaders as a result. Fast forward to 2012, when Gawker published a lewd video featuring wrestler Hulk Hogan (AKA Terry Bollea) having sex with Heather Clem—wife of radio personality “Bubba the Love Sponge.” This led to Bollea suing the media outlet for infringement of rights of publicity, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Bollea was represented by famed Los Angeles attorney Charles Harder. The published video, which Bollea claims was recorded without his knowledge or consent, contained a 2-minute section of a 30+ minute video—ten seconds of which included explicit sex acts. In 2016, Forbes magazine revealed that it was indeed Peter Thiel who was bankrolling Bollea’s case against Gawker. Speculation soared over what was viewed by many as Thiel’s revenge against Gawker for outing him. Did he want to ruin the media company, or purchase it, or simply malign the company that caused him personal and professional anguish? Thiel maintained that his involvement was philanthropic at heart, and meant to protect people from being bullied by unscrupulous media outlets. If anything, the lawsuit was meant to deter Gawker from intentionally releasing damaging content that lacked legitimate news value. Gawker founder Nick Denton, who was named personally in Bollea’s claim, made a statement about Thiel’s involvement in the case: “Just because Peter Thiel is a Silicon Valley Billionaire, his opinion does not trump our millions of readers who know us for routinely driving big news stories.” Also in 2016, a jury awarded Bollea compensatory damages of $115 million, plus punitive damages of $25 million—finding Gawker liable. A few months later, Gawker filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and began looking for a buyer. Several media outlets owned by Gawker were sold. By November 2016, Gawker and Bollea reached a settlement of $31 million. Today, Gawker’s flagship gossip site is still active. Gawker media sold off several of its prominent sites including Gizmodo, Jezebel, Deadspin, and io9. The LF Connection The case itself was of particular interest in and around the Litigation Finance community. Opponents of third-party legal funding asserted that Thiel’s actions in the case laid out an effective blueprint for the very wealthy to bankroll frivolous, but eye-catching cases. Billionaires could, some posited, use their wealth and legal connections to target specific companies, forcing them into bankruptcy. This speculation took place alongside the typical accusations that third-party litigation funding could clog court dockets with meritless actions meant to be quick paydays for funders and their clients. For example, Peter Sheer, a First Amendment expert, suggested that Thiel and others might abuse the power of third-party legal funding to intimidate media outlets. According to Sheer: “Winning is the ultimate chilling effect, but if you can’t win the case, you at least want the editors to think twice before writing another critical story about you.” To the keen-eyed observer though, it’s clear that Peter Thiel neither incited this case, nor had any real control over its outcome. Bollea initiated the case before Thiel’s involvement. At the time the case was decided, the jury was unaware that Bollea had a benefactor. And since the jury ruled in favor of Bollea, not Gawker, it’s clear that the case had merit. Thiel was always adamant that funding Bollea’s case (to the tune of $10 million) was about deterrence, not revenge. He explains that he wanted to “fight back” against Gawker’s practice of damaging reputations and bullying those with no means to pursue a claim to conclusion. As Thiel explains, “…even someone like Terry Bollea, who is a millionaire and famous and a successful person didn’t quite have the resources to do this alone.” While one could view Thiel’s actions as being contradictory to the principles of free speech—he disagrees. In fact, Thiel has donated to free speech defenders like the Committee to Protect Journalists. Thiel maintains that there is a profound difference between journalism in the public interest, and the type of media Gawker traffics in. That’s why he decided to take action. Thiel told the New York Times, “It’s less about revenge and more about specific deterrence. I saw Gawker pioneer a unique and incredibly damaging way of getting attention by bullying people even when there was no connection with the public interest.” Now, six years after the case has concluded—what have we learned? We haven’t seen a rash of billionaires funding cases, frivolous or not, with the intention of bringing down specific companies. That’s not to say billionaires aren’t financing claims the way Thiel did, only that they aren’t doing so publicly. Unlike traditional litigation funders, Thiel did not stand to make any money from Bollea’s lawsuit. Technically, Thiel should still be considered the litigation funder, though his term sheet wouldn’t be one most funders would want to imitate. The Gawker case has not led to a slew of frivolous, funded claim. Among other reasons, it simply doesn’t make financial sense to invest in a case lacking in merit. Bollea’s accusations against Gawker were affirmed by the jury, which resulted in a large award. So this claim was meritorious, even if Thiel’s motivation for funding the claim were not ROI-based. Media outlets are not cowering en masse over fears of punitive lawsuits from billionaires. That was much ado about nothing. Holding media outlets accountable for what they print (and occasionally, their motivations for doing so) is a vital and essential part of the free press. Free speech is not freedom to print anything—even something as personal as a sex tape—merely as an attention-getting device. Final Takeaways Can a lawsuit fall under the purview of Free Speech? Thiel believes so, and many others agree. This case addressed questions of privacy, free speech, and litigation funding. The end results demonstrated that we are all entitled to some element of privacy—even the celebrities among us. The Gawker case also affirmed that litigation funding still serves the interests of justice by enhancing the ability of claimants to bring lawsuits when they are wronged. The takeaway here should be that Peter Thiel afforded Hulk Hogan access to justice. Of course, when a billionaire backs a professional wrestler against a media company, sometimes the moral of the story can get lost beneath the headlines.
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Elite Colleges Challenge Lawyers’ Litigation Funding in Major Antitrust Case

By John Freund |

Elite U.S. universities embroiled in a high-stakes antitrust class action are now targeting the use of third‑party litigation funding by plaintiffs’ counsel in a bid to derail class certification. At issue is whether a lead firm’s reliance on external financing renders it “inadequate” under class action rules — a novel approach that raises fresh procedural and policy questions.

An article in Reuters notes the the suit alleges that Cornell, Penn, MIT, Georgetown, Notre Dame and others favored wealthy applicants over students needing financial aid, plaintiffs’ counsel (led by Gilbert Litigators & Counselors, or GLC) is facing attacks over transparency and risk allocation. The universities contend that GLC mischaracterized its financial exposure by not fully disclosing its funding arrangements. GLC responds that it only uses outside funding for a portion of its fees (covering 40% of its own, and under 16% of the aggregate) and that no court has previously held that use of funding makes class counsel inadequate. A judge has already found the funding documents “potentially relevant” to the certification motion, underscoring the stakes.

Legal commentators call this a new twist in class litigation — rather than questioning the merits or fairness of funding, defendants are now probing its procedural footprint. The case also dovetails with a broader trend: litigation funders are becoming more visible and controversial, particularly when their support is used by class‑action counsel. Reuters Meanwhile, in adjacent news, law firms are consolidating and AI‑driven tools for plaintiffs’ practices are attracting investor capital — further reshaping the economics of litigation.

This challenge could force courts nationwide to reinterpret adequacy standards in class actions, potentially chilling the use of external funding. It may also provoke funders, defense firms, and plaintiffs to recalibrate disclosure rules and risk-sharing norms across major litigation.

Bloomberg Law Cites Legal Funding Journal Podcast in Commentary on Funder Transparency

By John Freund |

A recent episode of the Legal Funding Journal podcast was quoted in a Bloomberg Law article on funder control of cases. In the episode, Stuart Hills and Guy Nielson, Co-Founders of RiverFleet, discussed the thorny topic this way: “What do funders care about? They certainly do care about settlements and that should be recognized. They do care about who is the legal counsel and that should be recognized. They care about the way the case is being run. They care about discontinuing the legal action and they care about wider matters affecting the funder.”

The provocative new commentary from Bloomberg Law reignites the longstanding debate over transparency in third-party litigation funding (TPLF), asserting that many funders exercise considerable control over litigation outcomes—despite public disavowals to the contrary.

In the article, Alex Dahl of Lawyers for Civil Justice argues that recent contract analyses expose mechanisms by which funders can shape or even override key litigation decisions, including settlement approval, counsel selection, and pursuit of injunctive relief. The piece singles out Burford Capital, the sector’s largest player, highlighting its 2022 bid to block a client’s settlement in the high-profile Sysco antitrust matter, even as it publicly claimed to be a passive investor. Such contradictions, Dahl contends, underscore a pressing need for mandatory disclosure of litigation funding arrangements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The analysis points to contracts that allegedly allow funders to halt cash flow mid-litigation, demand access to all documents—including sensitive or protected materials—and require plaintiffs to pay sanctions regardless of who caused the misconduct. Courts and opposing parties are typically blind to these provisions, as the agreements are often shielded from disclosure.

While funders like Burford maintain that control provisions are invoked only in “extraordinary circumstances,” Dahl’s article ends with a call for judicial mandates requiring transparency, likening funder involvement to insurers, who must disclose coverage under current civil rules.

For legal funders, the takeaway is clear: scrutiny is intensifying. As the industry matures and high-profile disputes mount, the push for standardized disclosure rules may accelerate. The central question ahead—how to balance transparency with funder confidentiality—remains a defining challenge for the sector.

Siltstone vs. Walia Dispute Moves to Arbitration

By John Freund |

Siltstone Capital and its former general counsel, Manmeet (“Mani”) Walia, have agreed to resolve their dispute via arbitration rather than through the Texas state court system—a move that transforms a high‑stakes conflict over trade secrets, opportunity diversion, and fund flow into a more opaque, confidential proceeding.

An article in Law360 notes that Siltstone had accused Walia of misusing proprietary information, diverting deal opportunities to his new venture, and broadly leveraging confidential data to compete unfairly. Walia, in turn, has denied wrongdoing and contended that Siltstone had consented—or even encouraged—his departure and new venture, pointing to a release executed upon his exit and a waiver of non‑compete obligations.

The agreement to arbitrate was reported on October 7, 2025. From a governance lens, this shift signals a preference for dispute resolution that may better preserve business continuity during fundraising cycles, especially in sectors like litigation finance where timing, investor confidence, and deal pipelines are critical.

However, arbitration also concentrates pressure into narrower scopes: document production, expert analyses (especially of trade secret scope, lost opportunity causation, and valuation), and the arbitrators’ evaluation. One point to watch is whether interim relief—protecting data, limiting competitive conduct, or preserving the status quo—will emerge in the arbitration or via court‑ordered relief prior to final proceedings.