The following is a contributed article by Steven D. Schroeder, Esq., General Counsel/Sr. Vice President at Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. since 2004.  There have been a few recent articles written on the topic of Probate Advances.[i] Probate Advances are available because a handful of companies are willing to assume a risk and provide funding in return for a partial assignment of a beneficiary’s interest in an Estate, and to a lesser extent Trust Proceedings. One critic has conflated Assignments to Loans without a fair analysis of the many differences between the two legal maxims.[ii] This 4-part series expands upon those differences and provides a legal and practical perspective as to why Probate Advances are a useful option for so many. Why is Probate Funding Needed? Probate Funding is growing in importance due to the increasing percentage of the population (i.e. baby boomers) who die annually and have their Estates and/or Trusts go through probate administration. In theory, the process of distributing a Decedent’s estate should not be complicated. But in practice, administration is rarely quick and easy. Even simple or uncontested Probate administrations take no less than eight (8) months to a year to finalize, while the vast majority of administrations of Probate or Trust Estates take much longer. Due to funding and short staffing issues, many Courts set hearings months out even on uncontested petitions. Quite often, because of questions relating to the admissibility of a Will, the location of intestate heirs, and/or questions regarding those who may be an interested party, it can take a year just to have someone appointed personal representative.[iii] Moreover, once a Personal Representative is appointed, notice is required to be given to creditors which affords creditors anywhere from four (4) months to one (1) year to file a claim, depending upon the jurisdiction. Then, there is the tedious process of locating and marshalling bank accounts and investments, cleaning up and disposing a lifetime of possessions and/or marketing the Decedent’s real property. Rarely are homes sold within a year, even under the best market conditions. Some properties are occupied by holdover tenants or relatives. Even after the property is liquidated, the process of closing an estate through an accounting, setting a hearing and obtaining Court approval, can take many additional months even if the accounting is uncontested. Because of the inherent delays of administration, some heirs, who have pressing financial needs (i.e. debts, foreclosure, rent payments, et. al.), are relieved to know that there is a product provided by Probate Funding Companies which can solve their personal financial problems while probate is ongoing.[iv] Whether the purpose of the funds is to prevent foreclosure, pay rent, pay medical bills, pay household debts or pay for continuing education, it makes simple economic sense that individuals would choose to minimize their risks by obtaining an advance now by assigning a fraction of their future and undetermined interest in an estate, rather than waiting for months or years to receive a distribution. A Case for Probate Funding Vivian Doris Tanner died in Shasta County, California on April 22, 1997. Her May 10, 1992 Will was admitted to probate by Order of the Probate Court on June 16, 1997 and her named Executor, Earl C. Tanner, Jr. was issued Letters Testamentary with full authority under the Independent Administration and Estate’s Act.  Pursuant to the Will, the named beneficiaries were Helen L. Tanner (20%), Marsha L. Tanner (20%), Katherine L. Courtemanche (20%), Erla Tanner (20%) and Earl C. Tanner (20%). In February 2009, Robert Frey, an Attorney in Reno, Nevada contacted Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. (“IFC”) on behalf of his client Helen Tanner, a resident of Incline Village, because his client was experiencing hard times due to the crash of the real estate market. His client needed a significant influx of cash ($100,000.00 or more) in order to prevent the foreclosure of her properties while administration of her mother’s estate was pending. The only remaining assets of the Estate at that time were the Decedent’s interest in Tanner Construction, Inc. which owned a 20% interest in the Dublin Land Company.  IFC was informed that there was ongoing litigation with the Dublin Land Company, including a partnership dissolution suit and a partition action set for trial in the latter portion of 2009. After completing its due diligence, IFC approved funding a $100,000.00 advance for Helen Tanner in consideration of a fixed sum Assignment in the amount of $192,000.00.[v] Shortly thereafter, two (2) other heirs (Marsha Tanner and Katherine Courtemanche) contacted IFC and applied for smaller cash advances, which were also approved.[vi] During the course of administration, the Executor (Earl Tanner, Jr.) filed at least nine (9) annual status reports requesting continuances of administration until the litigation was resolved and the Dublin land was sold.  Finally, on or about November 23, 2017, the Third and Final Account and Report of the Executor was filed and set for hearing on December 11, 2017. The Account was approved, as were IFC’s three (3) Assignments, which were paid off in full on December 27, 2017, approximately nine (9) years after Ms. Tanner’s original $100,000.00 advance was funded.[vii] The Tanner case and others like it illustrate the inherent risk in Probate Funding. It took IFC nearly a decade to collect its Assignments in the Tanner case, while in many other cases the funder never collects. With that risk of non-repayment in mind, we now turn to the legal distinctions between Assignments and Loans. Comparing Assignments with Loans: Apples Are Not Oranges As previously stated, there has been some recent criticism of the companies engaged in Probate funding.[viii] An Article entitled: “Probate Lending” started and ended with the premise that Probate Assignments are in fact disguised loans and should be regulated as such. Despite the predetermined conclusion by one author, in fact, the law treats Assignments and Loans quite differently and those distinctions are significant.[ix]

1. What is an Assignment? 

An Assignment is a term that may comprehensively cover the transfer of legal title to any kind of property. Commercial Discount Co. v. Cowen (1941) 18 Cal. 2d 601, 614; see also In re: Kling (1919) 44 Cal. App. 267, 270, 186 P. 152. When valid consideration is given, the Assignee acquires no greater rights or title than what is assigned. In other words, the Assignee steps in the shoes of the Assignor’s rights, subject to any defenses that an obligor may have against Assignor, prior to Notice of Assignment. See Parker v. Funk (1921) 185 Cal. 347, 352, 197 P. 83.  See also Cal. Civil Code §1459; Cal. Code of Civil Procedure §369. An Assignment may be oral or written and no special form is necessary provided that the transfer is clearly intended as a present assignment of interest by the Assignor. If only a part of the Assignor’s interest is transferred, it may nevertheless be enforced as an equitable Assignment. See McDaniel v. Maxwell, (1891) 21 Or. 202, 205, 27 P. 952. It has been held that any expectancy may be assigned or renounced. SeePrudential Ins. Co. of America v. Broadhurst 157 Cal. App. 2d 375, 321 P. 2d 75. Similarly, a beneficiary may assign or otherwise transfer his or her interest in an Estate prior to distribution. See Gold et. al., Cal Civil Practice: Probate and Trust Proceedings (2005) §3:86, p. 3-78. Probate Assignments are those taken prior to the completion of probate administration for which an heir/beneficiary transfers a portion of his/her expected inheritance in the estate in consideration of a cash advance (i.e. the purchase price).

1. What is a loan? 

A loan agreement is a contract between a borrower and a lender which governs the mutual promises made by each party. There are many types of loan agreements, including but not limited to: “home loans”, “equity loans”, “car loans”, “mortgage loan facilities agreements”, “revolvers”, “term loans” and “working capital loans” just to name a few. In contrast to Assignments, loans do not transfer legal title and instead are contracts in which the borrower pays back money at a later date, together with accrued interest to the lender. A loan creates a debtor and creditor relationship that is not terminated until the sum borrowed plus the agreed upon interest is paid in full. Milana v. Credit Discount Co. (1945) 27 Cal. 2d 335, 163 P.2d.869. In order to constitute a loan, there must be a contract whereby the lender transfers a sum of money which the borrower agrees to repay absolutely; together with such additional sums as may be agreed upon for its use.[x] The nature of a loan transaction, can be inferred from its objective characteristics. Such indicia include: presence or absence of debt instruments, collateral, interest provisions, repayment schedules or deadlines, book entries recording loan balances or interest, payments and any other attributes indicative of an enforceable obligation to repay the sums advance. Id, citing Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States 398, F.2d 694, 696 (3d Circ. 1968). Also, unlike Assignments, lenders typically insist upon several credit worthy factors prior to funding. For example, the “borrower” makes representations about his/her character including creditworthiness, cash flow and any collateral that he/she may pledge as security for a loan. These creditworthy representations are taken into consideration because the lender needs to determine under what terms, if any, they are prepared to loan money and whether the borrower has the wherewithal to pay it back, generally within a certain time frame. In cases of Probate Assignments, an Advance Company rarely considers creditworthiness of the Assignee, because it is not he/she who is responsible to satisfy the obligation. That obligation falls upon the Estate or Trust fiduciary. In addition, Probate Assignments cannot be deemed to be a loan if the return is contingent on the happening of some future event, (i.e. Final Distribution). Altman v. Altman (Ch. 1950) 8 N.J. Super.301, 72 A.2d 536., Arneill Ranch v. Petit 64 Cal. App. 3d, 277, 134 Cal. Rptr. 456, 461-463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).  True Probate Assignments, executed in consideration of an advance, have no time limit for payment, nor do they accrue interest post-funding. Furthermore, an assignee is not required to make periodic interest payments and in the vast majority of cases no payment at all. Moreover, although loans are often secured against real property, Assignments in Probate should not be secured. Estate Property is generally not owned or distributed to the heir at the time the Assignment is executed. A critical distinction between Probate Assignments and loans, is that when an Assignment is executed, there is no unconditional obligation that the Assigned amount be paid and/or when it might be paid. Once assigned, the Assignor owes no further obligation to the Assignee over those rights sold/assigned. And, the Assignee has no recourse against the Assignee/Heir should the heir’s distributive share be less that what he/she assigns. In other words, to “constitute [a] true loan [] there must have been, at the time the funds were transferred, an unconditional obligation on the part of the transferee to repay the money, and an unconditional intention on the part of the transferor to secure repayment.”  Geftman v. Comm’r 154 F3rd 61, 68 (3d Cir. 1998) quotingHaag v. Comm’r 88.T.C. 604, 615-16, 1987 WL 49288 aff’d 855 F. 2d 855 (8thCir. 1987). Many jurisdictions in addition to California, recognize that the absolute right to repayment or some form of security for the debt as the defining characteristics of loan.[xi] While the structure and elements slightly vary, the following is a side by side comparison of some of the basic distinctions of loans and Assignments in Probate Funding:

Loans	Assignments
Tenor: This is the time limit for repaying the loan as well as the interest rate charge.	Tenor: No time limit for payment. No interest accrues.
Obligor on the Assignment: The Borrower is contractually obligated to repay.	Assignee on the Assignment: Assignee/Heir does not pay anything.  A third party (i.e. administrator pays the Assignment.
Recourse: The Borrower is unconditionally obligated.	Recourse: In absence of fraud, the Assignee has no recourse should his interest be less than what is assigned or even $0.00.
Interest Payment and Capitalization: The interest rate charge for the loan and time limit for interest payment. It also stipulates conditions under which unpaid Interest will be added to the outstanding loans.	Interest Payment and Capitalization: Interest does not accrue post funding and the Assignment is fixed.
Penalties: Late payments are typically subject to penalties and/or trigger default.	Penalties: No payments are due.  No Default deadlines for payment imposed on Assignee/Heir.
Creditworthiness: Essential for approval	Creditworthiness: Not essential
Default: Foreclosure is an option; a borrower could bear default.	Default: No penalty no matter when Assignment is paid. Assignments are not secured. Foreclosure is not an option.

Moreover, given the uncertain time frame for recovery and absence of recourse against the Assignee/Heir, it would be impossible to assign an interest rate or make a Truth in Lending (“TILA”) disclosure, 15 U.S.C. §1601 (2012). Since the purpose of the TILA is to assure meaningful disclosure, the simplicity of an Assignment eliminates any necessity of making interest rate disclosures as required by interest bearing loans. When the Assignor sells a portion of his/her interest for a fixed sum Assignment, what additional disclosures are necessary? In short, there are many significant differences between Probate Assignments and Loans. Courts and Legislatures throughout the country have recognized these distinctions and have considered them when regulating or providing necessary review over either product. Probate Assignments are Adequately Regulated in California In California, it is the exclusive jurisdiction of the Probate Court to determine entitlement for distribution, Cal. Probate Code §§11700-11705. Probate Courts may also apply equitable principles in fashioning remedies and granting relief in proceedings otherwise within its jurisdiction. Estate of Kraus(2010) 184 Cal. App 4th 103, 114, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 760, 768. Thus, even without a specific statute addressing assignments, Probate Courts in California, as well as other jurisdictions, have conducted oversight over the propriety of Assignments in Probate.  See In Re: Michels’s Estate 63 P. 2d 333, 334 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936). For decades, the California Legislature has also regulated Assignments or Transfers by a beneficiary of an estate, see Cal. Probate Code §11604 (formerly Cal. Probate Code §1021.1). The validity of those statutes was well established. Estate of Boyd (1979) 98 Cal. App. 3d 125, 159 Cal. Rptr. 298, and the Courts have recognized the Probate Judge is empowered to give much stricter scrutiny to the fairness of consideration than would be the case under ordinary contract principals. Estate of Freeman (1965) 238 Cal. App., 2d 486, 488-89; 48 Cal. Rptr. 1. The initial purpose of Probate Code Section 1021.1(followed by 11604), was to provide for judicial supervision of proportional assignments given by beneficiaries to so called “heir hunters” (Estate of Wright (2001) 90 Cal. App. 4th 228; Estate of Lund (1944) 65 Cal. App. 2d 151; 110 Cal Rptr. 183.  However, courts have since interpreted that these sections are not limited to that class and can also be applied to Assignees and Transferees generally. Estate of Peterson (1968) 259 Cal. App. 2d. 492, 506; 66 Cal Rptr. 629. Despite the broad interpretation, California adopted additional legislation specifically directed to Probate Advance Companies. In 2006, the California Legislature enacted Probate Code Section 11604.5,[xii] to regulate companies (Probate Advance Companies) who are in the business of making cash advances in consideration of a partial Assignment of the heir’s interest. With the enactment of Section 11605.4, the California Legislature also made it abundantly clear that the transactions under this section are not those made in conformity with the California Finance Lenders Law. Cal. Probate Code Section 11604.5 (a) This section applies when distribution from a decedent’s estate is made to a transferee for value who acquires any interest of a beneficiary in exchange for cash or other consideration. (b) For purposes of this section, a transferee for value is a person who satisfies both of the following criteria: (1) He or she purchases the interest from a beneficiary for consideration pursuant to a written agreement. (2) He or she, directly or indirectly, regularly engages in the purchase of beneficial interests in estates for consideration. (c) This section does not apply to any of the following: (1) A transferee who is a beneficiary of the estate or a person who has a claim to distribution from the estate under another instrument or by intestate succession. (2) A transferee who is either the registered domestic partner of the beneficiary, or is related by blood, marriage, or adoption to the beneficiary or the decedent. (3) A transaction made in conformity with the California Finance Lenders Law (Division 9 (commencing with Section 22000) of the Financial Code) and subject to regulation by the Department of Business Oversight. (4) A transferee who is engaged in the business of locating missing or unknown heirs and who acquires an interest from a beneficiary solely in exchange for providing information or services associated with locating the heir or beneficiary…(emphasis added). Although it is not specifically required under Probate Code Section 11604, the Legislature also imposed an affirmative obligation on Probate Assignees to promptly file and serve their Assignments, to ensure full disclosure to the representatives, the Courts and/or other interested parties.[xiii] Also, the legislature made it clear that unlike loans, Probate Assignments are non-recourse, meaning that the beneficiary faces no further obligation to the Assignee, absent fraud. As stated in 11604.5: (f)“…(4) A provision permitting the transferee for value to have recourse against the beneficiary if the distribution from the estate in satisfaction of the beneficial interest is less than the beneficial interest assigned to the transferee for value, other than recourse for any expense or damage arising out of the material breach of the agreement or fraud by the beneficiary…” …(*emphasis added). Moreover, in enacting PC 11604.5, the legislature specifically gave the Probate Court wide latitude in fashioning relief, when reviewing probate Assignments. “… (g) The court on its own motion, or on the motion of the personal representative or other interested person, may inquire into the circumstances surrounding the execution of, and the consideration for, the written agreement to determine that the requirements of this section have been satisfied. (h) The court may refuse to order distribution under the written agreement, or may order distribution on any terms that the court considers equitable, if the court finds that the transferee for value did not substantially comply with the requirements of this section, or if the court finds that any of the following conditions existed at the time of transfer: (1) The fees, charges, or consideration paid or agreed to be paid by the beneficiary were grossly unreasonable. (2) The transfer of the beneficial interest was obtained by duress, fraud, or undue influence. (i) In addition to any remedy specified in this section, for any willful violation of the requirements of this section found to be committed in bad faith, the court may require the transferee for value to pay to the beneficiary up to twice the value paid for the assignment. An Assignment under 11604.5 is Best Reviewed by the Local Probate Court  At present, it does not appear that there has been a reported case interpreting an Assignment under Probate Section 11604.5, including whether the consideration paid was grossly unreasonable. However, there have been a long list of cases interpreting precisely that under Probate Code Section 11604 and Probate Code Section 1021.1) See Estate of Boyd, supra, 159 Cal. Rptr. 301-302; Molino v. Boldt (2008) 165 Cal. App. 4th 913, 81 Cal Rptr 3d. 512. At the same time, it should be noted that there are distinct differences between Assignments given to Heir-Finders and those to Probate Advance Companies. One critical distinction is Probate Advance Companies, such as IFC, provide the Assignor with cash in consideration of a partial Assignment. On the other hand, Heir-Finders, take back a percentage of the Heir’s interest (typically 15% to 40%). Thus, the amount of fees incurred by the Assignee could vary widely depending on the amount the heir recovers. In most instances, the Assignment far exceeds the consideration given to a Probate Advance Company. Moreover, Heir-Finders often receive assignments from multiple heirs in one estate administration even though much of the work would be duplicated. On the other hand, Probate Funding Companies outlay cash consideration for every Assignment they receive. Thus, Probate Funding Companies take on an increased financial risk with every transaction. Also, as in any industry, there are also significant distinctions among the practices of individual Probate Funding Companies including the disclosures they make to the Assignor/Heir. For example, IFC’s contracts, are limited to less than three (3) pages with no hidden fees or other costs tacked on the Assignment post-funding.[xiv]  The Assignee simply agrees to assign a fixed portion of his/her inheritance for a fixed sum of money.  In other words, a simple $X for $Y purchase.  Thus, it would be a fatal mistake to make a broad-based analysis based on the assumption that one size fits all when it comes to Probate Funding Companies. [xv] Moreover, under Probate Code Section 11604.5, the Legislature has placed an affirmative burden on the Transferee (Probate Funding Companies) to file and serve their Assignments shortly after their execution. Hence, the terms are open reviewable by the Courts, Personal Representatives, Attorneys, other interested parties and/or to the public in general. Therefore, there is more than adequate opportunity for objections to be filed or for the Court to question the consideration given for an Assignment, sua sponte. In short, the Legislature left the determination of what amount of fees, charges and other consideration would be deemed “grossly unreasonable” up to the particular Court where administration is ongoing, and to do so on a case by case basis if deemed necessary.   In fact, it is in the best interest for all concerned for the local Court to conduct inquiry if legitimate objections are raised, or on the Court’s own motion. In fact, on many occasions, IFC has responded to questions raised by various courts with regard to the Assignments it has filed and served.[xvi] What are the Risks in Probate Funding?  Similar to California Probate Code 11604, (formerly Cal. Probate Code 1021.1), the Legislature, in enacting Probate Code 11604.5, has specifically indicated that Assignments relative to Probate Advances will not be set aside unless it is clear that the consideration paid is “grossly unreasonable”, at the time the transaction was executed. In fact, the Probate Court can presume the validity of an Assignment, in the absence of any objection raised or evidence submitted to the contrary. See Lynch v. Cox. (1978) 83 Cal. App. 3rd 296, 147 Cal. Rptr. 861. However, nothing in the Probate Code Sections 11604 or 11604.5 indicates a legislative intent to modify the law concerning the evaluation date to be utilized in appraising the fairness of a contract. In interpreting statutes, courts are required to do so in a manner which will produce a reasonable and not an absurd result. See Freedland v. Greco (1955) 45 Cal. 2d 462, 289 P.2d 463. Thus, in the absence of any evidence that the consideration received by the Assignor was grossly unreasonable, at the time received, the Assignee should be presumed to have had the benefit of all the protection the law provides. See Boyd v. Baker (1979) 98 Cal. App. 3rd 125, 159 Cal. Rptr. 298, 304. Moreover, given that the Probate Funding Company has no assurance of recovery at the time the Assignment is executed, nor any recourse against the Assignor/Heir, it is imperative that the Court consider the many risks a Probate Advance Company assumes during administration.    The following are just a few examples of those risks: *Mismanagement or conversion of Estate funds by the Personal Representative; *Unanticipated claims, such as Medical, Medicaid, Uninsured Medical Hospital or Nursing Bills; *Litigation, including but not limited to Will Contests, Property Disputes, Reimbursement Claims; *Inaction or Delays by the Personal Representative and/or Probate Attorney; *Previously unknown will discovered, disinheriting the Assignor; *Spousal/Domestic Partner Support Claims; *Tax Liability/Litigation; *Partnership Dissolution; *Foreclosure of Estate property; *Child Support Liens; *Unusually high extraordinary personal representative and/or Attorney Fee Claims; *Devaluation of Real Estate Market (i.e. 2008); *Bankruptcy by an heir; *Litigation against the heir. Alienation:  An Heir’s Right. Clearly, the Probate court has the jurisdiction to review an Assignment under Probate Code §11604.5 and consider whether the consideration paid was “grossly unreasonable” at the time it was executed. See Estate of Wright (2001) 90 Cal. App.4th 228, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572.  Yet, it must be remembered that an heir’s right to alienate his/her interest is an important one and should not be infringed upon in a random or desultory manner. See Gold, et. Cal Civil Practice: Probate and Trust Proceedings (2005) §3:86, p. 3-78. Conditions restraining alienation, when repugnant to the interest created are void. SeeCalifornia Civil Code §711. In this vein, Courts should also consider the fact that the lion’s share of heirs who have obtained probate advances have done so out of their own free will, without solicitation and/or direct marketing.[xvii] Many heirs who research probate advances find that it is a preferred option to loans or other sources of funding, which take substantial time to qualify, require credit checks and extensive documentation and create personal obligations. Therefore, as long as terms of the Assignment are simple, straightforward and unambiguous – and it appears on its face that the Heir was given full disclosure and consented to the transaction – Courts should be hesitant to interfere with the Heirs’ right of alienations. Conclusion It is intellectually dishonest to ignore the obvious legal distinctions between Probate Assignments and Loans. Probate Funding Companies like IFC provide a valuable option for many heirs who would not be able to qualify for a traditional loan and/or do not wish to personally obligate themselves. Probate Funding Companies assume a myriad of risks while administration is pending with no guaranty of absolute repayment. In California, the Legislature has enacted Probate Code Section 11604.5 which governs the transfer of a beneficial interest in the form of an Assignment, and clearly distinguishes these transactions from loans. Further, that section affords the Probate Court all the authority it needs to review Assignments and determine whether, at the time the Assignment was given, the consideration paid was grossly unreasonable. In reviewing its terms, Courts must always consider an Heir’s inherent right of alienability. If fair disclosure was given by the Probate Advance Company, and it is found that the heir understood and consented to the Assignment, the Court should be very cautious in modifying the terms of an Assignment, ex post facto. In part 1 of this series, we cited just one case of many which demonstrates why Probate Funding is a useful option for so many heirs, and a far better option than a recourse loan.  In that case, Ms. Tanner would have likely lost her house to foreclosure if it was not for the availability of the Probate Advance provided by IFC. In hindsight, Helen Tanner made a very good deal for herself – even if she had the ability to qualify for a loan, the cost to her over such a protracted period would have been significantly greater. On the other hand, the return for IFC, some nine (9) years later, was considerably less than ideal. That being said, the end-result in Tanner was far better for IFC than in the numerous other Estates in which it has incurred significant losses through the years. Heirs/beneficiaries are fortunate that there are Companies willing to take risk and pay heirs a sum of money for a fixed Assignment during Probate administration with zero personal recourse against the heir. Steven D. Schroeder has been General Counsel/Sr. Vice President at Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. since 2004. Active Attorney in good standing, licensed to practice before all Courts in the State of California since 1985 and a Registered Attorney with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  —- [i] Horton, David and Chandrasenkher, Andrea, Probate Lending (March 24, 2016). 126 Yale Law Journal. 102 (2016); Kidd, Jeremy, Clarifying the ‘Probate Lending’ Debate: A Response to Professors Horton and Chandrasekher(November 16, 2016). Available to SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2870615; Lloyd, Douglas B., Inheritance Funding: The Purchase of an Assignment From an Heir to a Probate or Trust, Litigation Finance Journal (October 31, 2017), http://litigationfinancejournal.com/inheritance-funding-purchase-assignment-her-probate-trust/. [ii] Probate Lending, supra. Professors Horton and Chandrasekher, supra.  Article entitled ‘Probate Lending’. [iii]  In many instances an executor or proposed administrator who is a family member cannot qualify for a bond. [iv] IFC has been providing cash advances in the field for over 25 years. [v] The Assignments included a negotiated provision for early payoff rebates which reduced the assigned amounts to $140,000.00 and $166,000.00 if paid off within 12 and 24 months respectively. [vi] Marsha Tanner and Katherine Tanner each received advances in consideration of a $41,000.00 assignment and a lesser amount with early payoff rebates. [vii] Helen Tanner’s net distributive share was $661,532.00, less IFC’s Assignment, and an unrelated promissory note she owed to estate. [viii]  David Horton and Andrea Chandrasenkher, supra (2016) 126 Yale 105-107.  Professors Horton and Chandrasekher analogized Litigation Funding to the ancient doctrine of champerty even though acknowledging California has never recognized the doctrine, See e.g. Mathewson v. Fitch, 22 Cal. 86, 95 (1863). [ix] The conclusions in Probate Lending were debunked, by Jeremy Kidd, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Law, Mercer, Probate Funding and the Litigation Funding Debate, See Wealth Strategies Journal, August 14, 2017. [x] 47 C.J.S. Interest and Usury; Consumer Credit Section 123 (1982). [xi] See In re Nelson’s Estate (1930) 211, Iowa 168; Dobb v. Yari, (NJ 1996), 927 F. Supp 814; Turcotte v. Trevino (1976) 544, S.W. 2d 463; quoting.47 C.J,S. Interest and Usury; Consumer Credit Section 123 (1982); Turcotte v. Trevino 544 S.W.2d 463 (1976), Cherokee Funding, LLC v. Ruth (2017) A17A0132; “…New York recognizes the absolute right of repayment or some form of security for the debt as the defining characteristic of a loan.   Its courts have explicitly stated that ‘[f]or a true loan it is essential to provide for repayment absolutely and all events or principal in some way to be secured…’ MoneyForLawsuits VLP v. Row No. 4:10-CV-11537]. Thus, a transaction that neither guarantees the lender an absolute right to repayment nor provides it with security for the debt is not a loan, and as a result, cannot be subject to New York’s usury laws…”   (emphasis added). “…In Brewer v. Brewer, 386 Md. 183, 196-197 (2005), the Court of Appeals held that “redistribution agreements are permissible and, so long as they comply with the requirements of basis contract law, neither the personal representative nor the court has any authority to disapprove or veto them.  See also In re: Garcelon’s Estate 38 P. 414, 415 (Cal. 1894), Haydon v. Eldred, 21 S. W.457, 458 (Ky 1929). See Massey vs. Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. Court of Appeals, 7th Dist (TX), 07-16-00148-CV. [xii] IFC provided substantial input, counsel and proposed legislative language in response to California Senate Bill 390 which was enacted into law as Probate Code Section 11604.5 on January 1, 2006 regulating the Probate Funding industry in California. SB 390.Section 1 2015, Ch. 190 (AB 1517) Section 71 [xiii] Probate Code 11604 does not have a time limitation filing period reflected. [xiv] Some Probate Advance Companies have charged interest or other fees post-funding. [xv] See Probate Lending, supra, page 130, in which the author makes questionable statistical findings from one county during a limited period of time, with the assumption that each Probate Advance Company has the same terms and business practices. [xvi] IFC has responded to multiple orders to show cause in California. [xvii] Over 90% of heirs seek funding through IFC’s website, by other heirs who have already contracted with IFC, by lawyers or personal representatives.

The following is Part 4 of our 4-Part series on Probate Funding by Steven D. Schroeder, Esq., General Counsel/Sr. Vice President at Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. since 2004. Parts 1, 2 & 3 can be found here, here and here. What are the Risks in Probate Funding? Similar to California Probate Code 11604, (formerly Cal. Probate Code 1021.1), the Legislature, in enacting Probate Code 11604.5, has specifically indicated that Assignments relative to Probate Advances will not be set aside unless it is clear that the consideration paid is “grossly unreasonable”, at the time the transaction was executed. In fact, the Probate Court can presume the validity of an Assignment, in the absence of any objection raised or evidence submitted to the contrary. See Lynch v. Cox. (1978) 83 Cal. App. 3^rd 296, 147 Cal. Rptr. 861. However, nothing in the Probate Code Sections 11604 or 11604.5 indicates a legislative intent to modify the law concerning the evaluation date to be utilized in appraising the fairness of a contract. In interpreting statutes, courts are required to do so in a manner which will produce a reasonable and not an absurd result. See Freedland v. Greco (1955) 45 Cal. 2d 462, 289 P.2d 463. Thus, in the absence of any evidence that the consideration received by the Assignor was grossly unreasonable, at the time received, the Assignee should be presumed to have had the benefit of all the protection the law provides. See Boyd v. Baker (1979) 98 Cal. App. 3^rd 125, 159 Cal. Rptr. 298, 304. Moreover, given that the Probate Funding Company has no assurance of recovery at the time the Assignment is executed, nor any recourse against the Assignor/Heir, it is imperative that the Court consider the many risks a Probate Advance Company assumes during administration.    The following are just a few examples of those risks: *Mismanagement or conversion of Estate funds by the Personal Representative; *Unanticipated claims, such as Medical, Medicaid, Uninsured Medical Hospital or Nursing Bills; *Litigation, including but not limited to Will Contests, Property Disputes, Reimbursement Claims; *Inaction or Delays by the Personal Representative and/or Probate Attorney; *Previously unknown will discovered, disinheriting the Assignor; *Spousal/Domestic Partner Support Claims; *Tax Liability/Litigation; *Partnership Dissolution; *Foreclosure of Estate property; *Child Support Liens; *Unusually high extraordinary personal representative and/or Attorney Fee Claims; *Devaluation of Real Estate Market (i.e. 2008); *Bankruptcy by an heir; *Litigation against the heir. Alienation:  An Heir’s Right. Clearly, the Probate court has the jurisdiction to review an Assignment under Probate Code §11604.5 and consider whether the consideration paid was “grossly unreasonable” at the time it was executed. See Estate of Wright (2001) 90 Cal. App.4^th 228, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572.  Yet, it must be remembered that an heir’s right to alienate his/her interest is an important one and should not be infringed upon in a random or desultory manner. See Gold, et. Cal Civil Practice: Probate and Trust Proceedings (2005) §3:86, p. 3-78. Conditions restraining alienation, when repugnant to the interest created are void. See California Civil Code §711. In this vein, Courts should also consider the fact that the lion’s share of heirs who have obtained probate advances have done so out of their own free will, without solicitation and/or direct marketing.[1] Many heirs who research probate advances find that it is a preferred option to loans or other sources of funding, which take substantial time to qualify, require credit checks and extensive documentation and create personal obligations. Therefore, as long as terms of the Assignment are simple, straightforward and unambiguous – and it appears on its face that the Heir was given full disclosure and consented to the transaction – Courts should be hesitant to interfere with the Heirs’ right of alienations. Conclusion It is intellectually dishonest to ignore the obvious legal distinctions between Probate Assignments and Loans. Probate Funding Companies like IFC provide a valuable option for many heirs who would not be able to qualify for a traditional loan and/or do not wish to personally obligate themselves. Probate Funding Companies assume a myriad of risks while administration is pending with no guaranty of absolute repayment. In California, the Legislature has enacted Probate Code Section 11604.5 which governs the transfer of a beneficial interest in the form of an Assignment, and clearly distinguishes these transactions from loans. Further, that section affords the Probate Court all the authority it needs to review Assignments and determine whether, at the time the Assignment was given, the consideration paid was grossly unreasonable. In reviewing its terms, Courts must always consider an Heir’s inherent right of alienability. If fair disclosure was given by the Probate Advance Company, and it is found that the heir understood and consented to the Assignment, the Court should be very cautious in modifying the terms of an Assignment, ex post facto. In part 1 of this series, we cited just one case of many which demonstrates why Probate Funding is a useful option for so many heirs, and a far better option than a recourse loan.  In that case, Ms. Tanner would have likely lost her house to foreclosure if it was not for the availability of the Probate Advance provided by IFC. In hindsight, Helen Tanner made a very good deal for herself – even if she had the ability to qualify for a loan, the cost to her over such a protracted period would have been significantly greater. On the other hand, the return for IFC, some nine (9) years later, was considerably less than ideal. That being said, the end-result in Tanner was far better for IFC than in the numerous other Estates in which it has incurred significant losses through the years. Heirs/beneficiaries are fortunate that there are Companies willing to take risk and pay heirs a sum of money for a fixed Assignment during Probate administration with zero personal recourse against the heir. Steven D. Schroeder has been General Counsel/Sr. Vice President at Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. since 2004. Active Attorney in good standing, licensed to practice before all Courts in the State of California since 1985 and a Registered Attorney with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  --- [1] Over 90% of heirs seek funding through IFC’s website, by other heirs who have already contracted with IFC, by lawyers or personal representatives.

The following is Part 3 of our 4-Part series on Probate Funding by Steven D. Schroeder, Esq., General Counsel/Sr. Vice President at Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. since 2004. You can find Parts 1 & 2 here and here. Probate Assignments are Adequately Regulated in California In California, it is the exclusive jurisdiction of the Probate Court to determine entitlement for distribution, Cal. Probate Code §§11700-11705. Probate Courts may also apply equitable principles in fashioning remedies and granting relief in proceedings otherwise within its jurisdiction. Estate of Kraus (2010) 184 Cal. App 4^th 103, 114, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 760, 768. Thus, even without a specific statute addressing assignments, Probate Courts in California, as well as other jurisdictions, have conducted oversight over the propriety of Assignments in Probate.  See In Re: Michels’s Estate 63 P. 2d 333, 334 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936). For decades, the California Legislature has also regulated Assignments or Transfers by a beneficiary of an estate, see Cal. Probate Code §11604 (formerly Cal. Probate Code §1021.1). The validity of those statutes was well established. Estate of Boyd (1979) 98 Cal. App. 3d 125, 159 Cal. Rptr. 298, and the Courts have recognized the Probate Judge is empowered to give much stricter scrutiny to the fairness of consideration than would be the case under ordinary contract principals. Estate of Freeman (1965) 238 Cal. App., 2d 486, 488-89; 48 Cal. Rptr. 1. The initial purpose of Probate Code Section 1021.1(followed by 11604), was to provide for judicial supervision of proportional assignments given by beneficiaries to so called “heir hunters” (Estate of Wright (2001) 90 Cal. App. 4^th 228; Estate of Lund (1944) 65 Cal. App. 2d 151; 110 Cal Rptr. 183.  However, courts have since interpreted that these sections are not limited to that class and can also be applied to Assignees and Transferees generally. Estate of Peterson (1968) 259 Cal. App. 2d. 492, 506; 66 Cal Rptr. 629. Despite the broad interpretation, California adopted additional legislation specifically directed to Probate Advance Companies. In 2006, the California Legislature enacted Probate Code Section 11604.5,[1] to regulate companies (Probate Advance Companies) who are in the business of making cash advances in consideration of a partial Assignment of the heir’s interest. With the enactment of Section 11605.4, the California Legislature also made it abundantly clear that the transactions under this section are not those made in conformity with the California Finance Lenders Law. Cal. Probate Code Section 11604.5 (a) This section applies when distribution from a decedent’s estate is made to a transferee for value who acquires any interest of a beneficiary in exchange for cash or other consideration. (b) For purposes of this section, a transferee for value is a person who satisfies both of the following criteria: (1) He or she purchases the interest from a beneficiary for consideration pursuant to a written agreement. (2) He or she, directly or indirectly, regularly engages in the purchase of beneficial interests in estates for consideration. (c) This section does not apply to any of the following: (1) A transferee who is a beneficiary of the estate or a person who has a claim to distribution from the estate under another instrument or by intestate succession. (2) A transferee who is either the registered domestic partner of the beneficiary, or is related by blood, marriage, or adoption to the beneficiary or the decedent. (3) A transaction made in conformity with the California Finance Lenders Law (Division 9 (commencing with Section 22000) of the Financial Code) and subject to regulation by the Department of Business Oversight. (4) A transferee who is engaged in the business of locating missing or unknown heirs and who acquires an interest from a beneficiary solely in exchange for providing information or services associated with locating the heir or beneficiary…(emphasis added). Although it is not specifically required under Probate Code Section 11604, the Legislature also imposed an affirmative obligation on Probate Assignees to promptly file and serve their Assignments, to ensure full disclosure to the representatives, the Courts and/or other interested parties.[2] Also, the legislature made it clear that unlike loans, Probate Assignments are non-recourse, meaning that the beneficiary faces no further obligation to the Assignee, absent fraud. As stated in 11604.5: (f)“…(4) A provision permitting the transferee for value to have recourse against the beneficiary if the distribution from the estate in satisfaction of the beneficial interest is less than the beneficial interest assigned to the transferee for value, other than recourse for any expense or damage arising out of the material breach of the agreement or fraud by the beneficiary…” …(*emphasis added). Moreover, in enacting PC 11604.5, the legislature specifically gave the Probate Court wide latitude in fashioning relief, when reviewing probate Assignments. “… (g) The court on its own motion, or on the motion of the personal representative or other interested person, may inquire into the circumstances surrounding the execution of, and the consideration for, the written agreement to determine that the requirements of this section have been satisfied. (h) The court may refuse to order distribution under the written agreement, or may order distribution on any terms that the court considers equitable, if the court finds that the transferee for value did not substantially comply with the requirements of this section, or if the court finds that any of the following conditions existed at the time of transfer: (1) The fees, charges, or consideration paid or agreed to be paid by the beneficiary were grossly unreasonable. (2) The transfer of the beneficial interest was obtained by duress, fraud, or undue influence. (i) In addition to any remedy specified in this section, for any willful violation of the requirements of this section found to be committed in bad faith, the court may require the transferee for value to pay to the beneficiary up to twice the value paid for the assignment. An Assignment under 11604.5 is Best Reviewed by the Local Probate Court At present, it does not appear that there has been a reported case interpreting an Assignment under Probate Section 11604.5, including whether the consideration paid was grossly unreasonable. However, there have been a long list of cases interpreting precisely that under Probate Code Section 11604 and Probate Code Section 1021.1) See Estate of Boyd, supra, 159 Cal. Rptr. 301-302; Molino v. Boldt (2008) 165 Cal. App. 4^th 913, 81 Cal Rptr 3d. 512. At the same time, it should be noted that there are distinct differences between Assignments given to Heir-Finders and those to Probate Advance Companies. One critical distinction is Probate Advance Companies, such as IFC, provide the Assignor with cash in consideration of a partial Assignment. On the other hand, Heir-Finders, take back a percentage of the Heir’s interest (typically 15% to 40%). Thus, the amount of fees incurred by the Assignee could vary widely depending on the amount the heir recovers. In most instances, the Assignment far exceeds the consideration given to a Probate Advance Company. Moreover, Heir-Finders often receive assignments from multiple heirs in one estate administration even though much of the work would be duplicated. On the other hand, Probate Funding Companies outlay cash consideration for every Assignment they receive. Thus, Probate Funding Companies take on an increased financial risk with every transaction. Also, as in any industry, there are also significant distinctions among the practices of individual Probate Funding Companies including the disclosures they make to the Assignor/Heir. For example, IFC’s contracts, are limited to less than three (3) pages with no hidden fees or other costs tacked on the Assignment post-funding.[3]  The Assignee simply agrees to assign a fixed portion of his/her inheritance for a fixed sum of money.  In other words, a simple $X for $Y purchase.  Thus, it would be a fatal mistake to make a broad-based analysis based on the assumption that one size fits all when it comes to Probate Funding Companies. [4] Moreover, under Probate Code Section 11604.5, the Legislature has placed an affirmative burden on the Transferee (Probate Funding Companies) to file and serve their Assignments shortly after their execution. Hence, the terms are open reviewable by the Courts, Personal Representatives, Attorneys, other interested parties and/or to the public in general. Therefore, there is more than adequate opportunity for objections to be filed or for the Court to question the consideration given for an Assignment, sua sponte. In short, the Legislature left the determination of what amount of fees, charges and other consideration would be deemed “grossly unreasonable” up to the particular Court where administration is ongoing, and to do so on a case by case basis if deemed necessary.   In fact, it is in the best interest for all concerned for the local Court to conduct inquiry if legitimate objections are raised, or on the Court’s own motion. In fact, on many occasions, IFC has responded to questions raised by various courts with regard to the Assignments it has filed and served.[5] Stay tuned for Part 4 of our 4-Part series, where we discuss the risks inherent in Probate Funding, and how those risks should inform the court’s assessment on the validation of an Assignment.  Steven D. Schroeder has been General Counsel/Sr. Vice President at Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. since 2004. Active Attorney in good standing, licensed to practice before all Courts in the State of California since 1985 and a Registered Attorney with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  ---- [1] IFC provided substantial input, counsel and proposed legislative language in response to California Senate Bill 390 which was enacted into law as Probate Code Section 11604.5 on January 1, 2006 regulating the Probate Funding industry in California. SB 390.Section 1 2015, Ch. 190 (AB 1517) Section 71 [2] Probate Code 11604 does not have a time limitation filing period reflected. [3] Some Probate Advance Companies have charged interest or other fees post-funding. [4] See Probate Lending, supra, page 130, in which the author makes questionable statistical findings from one county during a limited period of time, with the assumption that each Probate Advance Company has the same terms and business practices. [5] IFC has responded to multiple orders to show cause in California.

The following is Part 2 of our 4-Part series on Probate Funding by Steven D. Schroeder, Esq., General Counsel/Sr. Vice President at Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. since 2004. Part 1 can be found here. Comparing Assignments with Loans: Apples Are Not Oranges As previously stated, there has been some recent criticism of the companies engaged in Probate funding.[1] An Article entitled: “Probate Lending” started and ended with the premise that Probate Assignments are in fact disguised loans and should be regulated as such. Despite the predetermined conclusion by one author, in fact, the law treats Assignments and Loans quite differently and those distinctions are significant.[2]

1. What is an Assignment?

An Assignment is a term that may comprehensively cover the transfer of legal title to any kind of property. Commercial Discount Co. v. Cowen (1941) 18 Cal. 2d 601, 614; see also In re: Kling (1919) 44 Cal. App. 267, 270, 186 P. 152. When valid consideration is given, the Assignee acquires no greater rights or title than what is assigned. In other words, the Assignee steps in the shoes of the Assignor’s rights, subject to any defenses that an obligor may have against Assignor, prior to Notice of Assignment. See Parker v. Funk (1921) 185 Cal. 347, 352, 197 P. 83.  See also Cal. Civil Code §1459; Cal. Code of Civil Procedure §369. An Assignment may be oral or written and no special form is necessary provided that the transfer is clearly intended as a present assignment of interest by the Assignor. If only a part of the Assignor’s interest is transferred, it may nevertheless be enforced as an equitable Assignment. See McDaniel v. Maxwell, (1891) 21 Or. 202, 205, 27 P. 952. It has been held that any expectancy may be assigned or renounced. See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Broadhurst 157 Cal. App. 2d 375, 321 P. 2d 75. Similarly, a beneficiary may assign or otherwise transfer his or her interest in an Estate prior to distribution. See Gold et. al., Cal Civil Practice: Probate and Trust Proceedings (2005) §3:86, p. 3-78. Probate Assignments are those taken prior to the completion of probate administration for which an heir/beneficiary transfers a portion of his/her expected inheritance in the estate in consideration of a cash advance (i.e. the purchase price).

1. What is a loan?

A loan agreement is a contract between a borrower and a lender which governs the mutual promises made by each party. There are many types of loan agreements, including but not limited to: “home loans”, “equity loans”, “car loans”, “mortgage loan facilities agreements”, “revolvers”, “term loans” and “working capital loans” just to name a few. In contrast to Assignments, loans do not transfer legal title and instead are contracts in which the borrower pays back money at a later date, together with accrued interest to the lender. A loan creates a debtor and creditor relationship that is not terminated until the sum borrowed plus the agreed upon interest is paid in full. Milana v. Credit Discount Co. (1945) 27 Cal. 2d 335, 163 P.2d.869. In order to constitute a loan, there must be a contract whereby the lender transfers a sum of money which the borrower agrees to repay absolutely; together with such additional sums as may be agreed upon for its use.[3] The nature of a loan transaction, can be inferred from its objective characteristics. Such indicia include: presence or absence of debt instruments, collateral, interest provisions, repayment schedules or deadlines, book entries recording loan balances or interest, payments and any other attributes indicative of an enforceable obligation to repay the sums advance. Id, citing Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States 398, F.2d 694, 696 (3d Circ. 1968). Also, unlike Assignments, lenders typically insist upon several credit worthy factors prior to funding. For example, the “borrower” makes representations about his/her character including creditworthiness, cash flow and any collateral that he/she may pledge as security for a loan. These creditworthy representations are taken into consideration because the lender needs to determine under what terms, if any, they are prepared to loan money and whether the borrower has the wherewithal to pay it back, generally within a certain time frame. In cases of Probate Assignments, an Advance Company rarely considers creditworthiness of the Assignee, because it is not he/she who is responsible to satisfy the obligation. That obligation falls upon the Estate or Trust fiduciary. In addition, Probate Assignments cannot be deemed to be a loan if the return is contingent on the happening of some future event, (i.e. Final Distribution). Altman v. Altman (Ch. 1950) 8 N.J. Super.301, 72 A.2d 536., Arneill Ranch v. Petit 64 Cal. App. 3d, 277, 134 Cal. Rptr. 456, 461-463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).  True Probate Assignments, executed in consideration of an advance, have no time limit for payment, nor do they accrue interest post-funding. Furthermore, an assignee is not required to make periodic interest payments and in the vast majority of cases no payment at all. Moreover, although loans are often secured against real property, Assignments in Probate should not be secured. Estate Property is generally not owned or distributed to the heir at the time the Assignment is executed. A critical distinction between Probate Assignments and loans, is that when an Assignment is executed, there is no unconditional obligation that the Assigned amount be paid and/or when it might be paid. Once assigned, the Assignor owes no further obligation to the Assignee over those rights sold/assigned. And, the Assignee has no recourse against the Assignee/Heir should the heir’s distributive share be less that what he/she assigns. In other words, to “constitute [a] true loan [] there must have been, at the time the funds were transferred, an unconditional obligation on the part of the transferee to repay the money, and an unconditional intention on the part of the transferor to secure repayment.”  Geftman v. Comm’r 154 F3rd 61, 68 (3d Cir. 1998) quoting Haag v. Comm’r 88.T.C. 604, 615-16, 1987 WL 49288 aff’d 855 F. 2d 855 (8^th Cir. 1987). Many jurisdictions in addition to California, recognize that the absolute right to repayment or some form of security for the debt as the defining characteristics of loan.[4] While the structure and elements slightly vary, the following is a side by side comparison of some of the basic distinctions of loans and Assignments in Probate Funding:

Loans	Assignments
Tenor: This is the time limit for repaying the loan as well as the interest rate charge.	Tenor: No time limit for payment. No interest accrues.
Obligor on the Assignment: The Borrower is contractually obligated to repay.	Assignee on the Assignment: Assignee/Heir does not pay anything.  A third party (i.e. administrator pays the Assignment.
Recourse: The Borrower is unconditionally obligated.	Recourse: In absence of fraud, the Assignee has no recourse should his interest be less than what is assigned or even $0.00.
Interest Payment and Capitalization: The interest rate charge for the loan and time limit for interest payment. It also stipulates conditions under which unpaid Interest will be added to the outstanding loans.	Interest Payment and Capitalization: Interest does not accrue post funding and the Assignment is fixed.
Penalties: Late payments are typically subject to penalties and/or trigger default.	Penalties: No payments are due.  No Default deadlines for payment imposed on Assignee/Heir.
Creditworthiness: Essential for approval	Creditworthiness: Not essential
Default: Foreclosure is an option; a borrower could bear default.	Default: No penalty no matter when Assignment is paid. Assignments are not secured. Foreclosure is not an option.

Moreover, given the uncertain time frame for recovery and absence of recourse against the Assignee/Heir, it would be impossible to assign an interest rate or make a Truth in Lending (“TILA”) disclosure, 15 U.S.C. §1601 (2012). Since the purpose of the TILA is to assure meaningful disclosure, the simplicity of an Assignment eliminates any necessity of making interest rate disclosures as required by interest bearing loans. When the Assignor sells a portion of his/her interest for a fixed sum Assignment, what additional disclosures are necessary? In short, there are many significant differences between Probate Assignments and Loans. Courts and Legislatures throughout the country have recognized these distinctions and have considered them when regulating or providing necessary review over either product. Stay tuned for Part 3 of our 4-Part series, where we discuss California’s regulation of Probate Funding, and how such regulation can serve as a model for other jurisdictions. Steven D. Schroeder has been General Counsel/Sr. Vice President at Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. since 2004. Active Attorney in good standing, licensed to practice before all Courts in the State of California since 1985 and a Registered Attorney with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  ---- [1]  David Horton and Andrea Chandrasenkher, supra (2016) 126 Yale 105-107.  Professors Horton and Chandrasekher analogized Litigation Funding to the ancient doctrine of champerty even though acknowledging California has never recognized the doctrine, See e.g. Mathewson v. Fitch, 22 Cal. 86, 95 (1863). [2] The conclusions in Probate Lending were debunked, by Jeremy Kidd, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Law, Mercer, Probate Funding and the Litigation Funding Debate, See Wealth Strategies Journal, August 14, 2017. [3] 47 C.J.S. Interest and Usury; Consumer Credit Section 123 (1982). [4] See In re Nelson’s Estate (1930) 211, Iowa 168; Dobb v. Yari, (NJ 1996), 927 F. Supp 814; Turcotte v. Trevino (1976) 544, S.W. 2d 463; quoting.47 C.J,S. Interest and Usury; Consumer Credit Section 123 (1982); Turcotte v. Trevino 544 S.W.2d 463 (1976), Cherokee Funding, LLC v. Ruth (2017) A17A0132; “…New York recognizes the absolute right of repayment or some form of security for the debt as the defining characteristic of a loan.   Its courts have explicitly stated that ‘[f]or a true loan it is essential to provide for repayment absolutely and all events or principal in some way to be secured…’ MoneyForLawsuits VLP v. Row No. 4:10-CV-11537]. Thus, a transaction that neither guarantees the lender an absolute right to repayment nor provides it with security for the debt is not a loan, and as a result, cannot be subject to New York’s usury laws…”   (emphasis added). “…In Brewer v. Brewer, 386 Md. 183, 196-197 (2005), the Court of Appeals held that "redistribution agreements are permissible and, so long as they comply with the requirements of basis contract law, neither the personal representative nor the court has any authority to disapprove or veto them.  See also In re: Garcelon’s Estate 38 P. 414, 415 (Cal. 1894), Haydon v. Eldred, 21 S. W.457, 458 (Ky 1929). See Massey vs. Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. Court of Appeals, 7^th Dist (TX), 07-16-00148-CV.

The following is a contributed article by Steven D. Schroeder, Esq., General Counsel/Sr. Vice President at Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. since 2004.  There have been a few recent articles written on the topic of Probate Advances.[i] Probate Advances are available because a handful of companies are willing to assume a risk and provide funding in return for a partial assignment of a beneficiary’s interest in an Estate, and to a lesser extent Trust Proceedings. One critic has conflated Assignments to Loans without a fair analysis of the many differences between the two legal maxims.[ii] This 4-part series expands upon those differences and provides a legal and practical perspective as to why Probate Advances are a useful option for so many. Why is Probate Funding Needed? Probate Funding is growing in importance due to the increasing percentage of the population (i.e. baby boomers) who die annually and have their Estates and/or Trusts go through probate administration. In theory, the process of distributing a Decedent’s estate should not be complicated. But in practice, administration is rarely quick and easy. Even simple or uncontested Probate administrations take no less than eight (8) months to a year to finalize, while the vast majority of administrations of Probate or Trust Estates take much longer. Due to funding and short staffing issues, many Courts set hearings months out even on uncontested petitions. Quite often, because of questions relating to the admissibility of a Will, the location of intestate heirs, and/or questions regarding those who may be an interested party, it can take a year just to have someone appointed personal representative.[iii] Moreover, once a Personal Representative is appointed, notice is required to be given to creditors which affords creditors anywhere from four (4) months to one (1) year to file a claim, depending upon the jurisdiction. Then, there is the tedious process of locating and marshalling bank accounts and investments, cleaning up and disposing a lifetime of possessions and/or marketing the Decedent’s real property. Rarely are homes sold within a year, even under the best market conditions. Some properties are occupied by holdover tenants or relatives. Even after the property is liquidated, the process of closing an estate through an accounting, setting a hearing and obtaining Court approval, can take many additional months even if the accounting is uncontested. Because of the inherent delays of administration, some heirs, who have pressing financial needs (i.e. debts, foreclosure, rent payments, et. al.), are relieved to know that there is a product provided by Probate Funding Companies which can solve their personal financial problems while probate is ongoing.[iv] Whether the purpose of the funds is to prevent foreclosure, pay rent, pay medical bills, pay household debts or pay for continuing education, it makes simple economic sense that individuals would choose to minimize their risks by obtaining an advance now by assigning a fraction of their future and undetermined interest in an estate, rather than waiting for months or years to receive a distribution. A Case for Probate Funding Vivian Doris Tanner died in Shasta County, California on April 22, 1997. Her May 10, 1992 Will was admitted to probate by Order of the Probate Court on June 16, 1997 and her named Executor, Earl C. Tanner, Jr. was issued Letters Testamentary with full authority under the Independent Administration and Estate’s Act.  Pursuant to the Will, the named beneficiaries were Helen L. Tanner (20%), Marsha L. Tanner (20%), Katherine L. Courtemanche (20%), Erla Tanner (20%) and Earl C. Tanner (20%). In February 2009, Robert Frey, an Attorney in Reno, Nevada contacted Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. (“IFC”) on behalf of his client Helen Tanner, a resident of Incline Village, because his client was experiencing hard times due to the crash of the real estate market. His client needed a significant influx of cash ($100,000.00 or more) in order to prevent the foreclosure of her properties while administration of her mother’s estate was pending. The only remaining assets of the Estate at that time were the Decedent’s interest in Tanner Construction, Inc. which owned a 20% interest in the Dublin Land Company.  IFC was informed that there was ongoing litigation with the Dublin Land Company, including a partnership dissolution suit and a partition action set for trial in the latter portion of 2009. After completing its due diligence, IFC approved funding a $100,000.00 advance for Helen Tanner in consideration of a fixed sum Assignment in the amount of $192,000.00.[v] Shortly thereafter, two (2) other heirs (Marsha Tanner and Katherine Courtemanche) contacted IFC and applied for smaller cash advances, which were also approved.[vi] During the course of administration, the Executor (Earl Tanner, Jr.) filed at least nine (9) annual status reports requesting continuances of administration until the litigation was resolved and the Dublin land was sold.  Finally, on or about November 23, 2017, the Third and Final Account and Report of the Executor was filed and set for hearing on December 11, 2017. The Account was approved, as were IFC’s three (3) Assignments, which were paid off in full on December 27, 2017, approximately nine (9) years after Ms. Tanner’s original $100,000.00 advance was funded.[vii] The Tanner case and others like it illustrate the inherent risk in Probate Funding. It took IFC nearly a decade to collect its Assignments in the Tanner case, while in many other cases the funder never collects. With that risk of non-repayment in mind, we now turn to the legal distinctions between Assignments and Loans. Stay tuned for Part 2 of our 4-Part series, where we explain the differences between Assignments and loans, with reference to relevant case law. Steven D. Schroeder has been General Counsel/Sr. Vice President at Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. since 2004. Active Attorney in good standing, licensed to practice before all Courts in the State of California since 1985 and a Registered Attorney with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  ---- [i] Horton, David and Chandrasenkher, Andrea, Probate Lending (March 24, 2016). 126 Yale Law Journal. 102 (2016); Kidd, Jeremy, Clarifying the ‘Probate Lending’ Debate: A Response to Professors Horton and Chandrasekher (November 16, 2016). Available to SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2870615; Lloyd, Douglas B., Inheritance Funding: The Purchase of an Assignment From an Heir to a Probate or Trust, Litigation Finance Journal (October 31, 2017), http://litigationfinancejournal.com/inheritance-funding-purchase-assignment-her-probate-trust/. [ii] Probate Lending, supra. Professors Horton and Chandrasekher, supra.  Article entitled ‘Probate Lending’. [iii]  In many instances an executor or proposed administrator who is a family member cannot qualify for a bond. [iv] IFC has been providing cash advances in the field for over 25 years. [v] The Assignments included a negotiated provision for early payoff rebates which reduced the assigned amounts to $140,000.00 and $166,000.00 if paid off within 12 and 24 months respectively. [vi] Marsha Tanner and Katherine Tanner each received advances in consideration of a $41,000.00 assignment and a lesser amount with early payoff rebates. [vii] Helen Tanner’s net distributive share was $661,532.00, less IFC’s Assignment, and an unrelated promissory note she owed to estate.

By Mauritius Nagelmueller China is building a multi-trillion dollar trade and infrastructure network – a new silk road – and the legal world is preparing for the disputes that will inevitably arise. What is the Belt and Road Initiative all about, and what impact will it have on litigation finance? Being one of the largest infrastructure and investment projects in history, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)[1] will alter the global economy and define China’s role in it. The initiative covers 65% of the world’s population in more than 68 countries, and 40% of the global GDP. An anticipated overall investment of USD 4-8 trillion will connect China with the rest of Asia, Europe and Africa, through six main geographic corridors and a Maritime Silk Road. China’s position is that BRI will improve the infrastructure along the route, providing a network of highways, railways, ports, energy and development projects for trade and cultural exchange. Chinese state-owned banks, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (formed in 2015, but already encompassing 84 approved member states, and with a capital of USD 100 billion – half of the World Bank’s capital), the Silk Road Fund, and investors from the private sector are providing the necessary financing. About USD 1 trillion has already been invested. It seems likely that BRI, if successful, will shift more economic and political power to China. Major concerns surround the environmental impact of the vast project, uncertainties regarding the exact parameters and how much local economies will actually benefit. Security risks along the Belt remain constant. Some even fear a new Chinese “empire”. It remains to be seen which of these fears are justified, but it is interesting to note that China’s president Xi Jinping, who unveiled BRI in 2013 and made the initiative a central tenet of his foreign policy agenda, will likely remain in power, as the Communist Party of China just announced plans to abolish the two-term limit on the presidency. To predict that legal disputes will arise under BRI is to state the obvious, and the legal community in Asia and beyond is preparing accordingly. Jurisdictions are already competing for recognition as the prime venue for BRI related proceedings. In an effort to provide wide-ranging dispute resolution services, China plans to establish an international commercial court in Xi’an for disputes surrounding the land-based transport corridors, another in Shenzhen for the maritime route, and a central court headquartered in Beijing. All three bodies will provide arbitration and mediation services. China’s neighbors share its expectations regarding dispute resolution. In 2017, Hong Kong and Singapore permitted litigation finance in international arbitration, and the legalization for state court procedures may soon follow. Hong Kong passed its law shortly after a BRI Forum in Beijing, and partly also to strengthen its position as a go-to center for BRI related disputes, particularly for the maritime and construction fields. Arbitration institutions around the world, including the ICC (International Chamber of Commerce), SIAC (Singapore), and HKIAC (Hong Kong), encourage the adoption of their rules in BRI deals, and Malaysia’s KLRCA and Seoul’s KCAB are preparing accordingly. Chinese and Singaporean mediation centers (CCOIC and SIMC) have plans to cooperate for BRI related mediation proceedings, while Hong Kong is developing an online arbitration and mediation tool specialized on the initiative. Chinese officials have even publicly floated the concept of an innovative hybrid method combining aspects of arbitration and mediation, with courts playing a central role as well. Many legislators view litigation finance as a vital component in their jurisdiction’s status as a prime dispute resolution center, and litigation finance firms are aggressively seizing on the new opportunities presented. Select funders have already opened offices in Asia, others will soon follow, or plan to be involved from abroad. Entities who plan to invest along the Belt, including many Chinese companies, will not only face complex regulatory challenges, but also disputes with foreign governments, possibly in multiple jurisdictions. In addition to first-rate legal advice, parties will sometimes require external financing to pursue their claims under BRI. Both investors and law firms will utilize the benefits of litigation finance, and seek tailored financing solutions for their cases arising under BRI related projects. This will include single cases, as well as multiple disputes from investments being bundled into portfolios of claims. BRI will have a significant impact on litigation finance in the coming years, as a host of challenges and new opportunities present themselves. As has occurred previously, litigation finance will support meritorious claims which could not be brought without the assistance of external financing, help businesses and law firms diversify and boost their portfolios without increasing risk, and continue to promote access to justice. Litigation finance will benefit from this unprecedented trade and infrastructure initiative. It has already become part of the legal world, and it will soon be part of BRI. [1] Originally called One Belt and One Road Initiative.   Mauritius Nagelmueller has been involved in the litigation finance industry for more than 10 years.

Although third party funding arrived on the Brazilian scene only recently, the practice has been warmly embraced relative to other Latin American markets. That has to do with Brazil's liquidity crisis following the Great Recession, in addition to fallout in the aftermath of Operation Car Wash, or Operação Lava Jato, and the subsequent reliance on arbitration as a result. According to Ramirez, Brazilians maintain a perception that litigation funding is utilized solely by impecunious claimants, or those facing liquidity constraints. Although perceptions are gradually changing, she points to one local practitioner who claims that “case law on the matter is scarce and major Brazilian arbitration chambers do not publish their precedents, so parties (be it funders, funded parties or adversaries to a funded party) still have to deal with a reasonable (and potentially damaging) degree of uncertainty.” Yet despite the uncertainty, the benefits of litigation funding are widely being recognized, with one practitioner going so far as to state that the practice "will evolve to [allow] major companies seeking reasonable financing that allows them to pursue their core business objectives while conducting high level litigation.” Such is the reality of litigation funding in other major jurisdictions, so why not Brazil? Major obstacles to the adoption of litigation funding have to do with costs and time constraints -- the former containing too few, and the latter containing far too many. The cost of filing a claim (appeal included) in Brazil is extraordinarily low, which of course precludes firms from seeking external funding. Additionally, cases can go through many layers of appeal before reaching conclusion, which means that funders can't accurately predict the timing of their expected recovery. Essentially, the barriers to justice that exist in Brazil work against litigation funders, whereas the barriers that exist in the United States, for example (those being high upfront costs and balance sheet exposure), directly play into a litigation funder's hands. According to Ramirez, by and large, third party funding is unregulated in Brazil. "Only recently did the Brazil-Canada Chamber of Commerce (“CAM/CCBC”) – one of the most renowned institutions in Brazil – issue a resolution specifically recommending that parties disclose the use of funding at the outset of an arbitration (Administrative Resolution 18/2016)." Practitioners on the ground believe in the likelihood that other arbitral institutions will at some point promulgate further regulations on third party funding in Brazil, though at present, the industry remains unregulated. So is Brazil on the precipice of future growth in the area of litigation funding? Ramirez seems to think so. "The resounding message," she writes, "is that Brazil is ripe for third party funding and that the time to enter the market is now. It is also clear that practitioners are enthusiastic about the prospect of having foreign third party funders with significant experience enter the market and level the playing field which has thus far been dominated by a single local Brazilian third party funder." To read Ramirez's article in its entirety, please visit this link. 

For the past 15 years, Brazil has suffered one of the world's most chronic and severe backlogs of pending patents. Now, the Brazilian Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), is looking to reduce that backlog in one fell swoop: by granting patent rights until 2020 to 231,000 pending applications with no examination. The Brazilian government is seeking to introduce this emergency measure as an "extraordinary solution" to the crisis that has plagued the nation's patent market for a generation. Brazil's patent problems arose after it enacted the Patent Statute in 1996, making the nation TRIPS compliant and expanding its range of patentable products and industries. As a result, the number of patent filings has increased 200% over the last 15 years, without a corresponding increase in PTO examiners. Brazil's current average waiting time for all technological patents is over 10 years. For pharmaceutical and telecom patents, the average wait time is over 13 years. According to the PTO, the current number of examiners (326) is sufficient to handle the present influx of new filings, however it is the backlog that is keeping the PTO in check. Therefore, the PTO has floated the idea that 231,000 pending patents within the backlog (not including pharma patents, which are covered by a separate regulatory body) be immediately granted with no examination required. Here's where things get tricky, however: a third party would maintain the right to file a pre-grant opposition within 90 days of the automatic patent filing. Should a pre-grant filing take place, the patent application would automatically be reviewed by the PTO. Companies could then theoretically check the automatic patent application list for competitor patents, and file a pre-grant opposition in order to remove their competitors' patents from the queue. Of course, that type of action would require an upfront legal spend. Perhaps this is an area that astute litigation funders in the market could pursue-- There is additional concern, of course, that patents granted via the automatic waiver may in the long run be vulnerable to invalidity challenges in post-grant opposition, as well as the Federal Courts. Local and state judges may also be reluctant to enforce patent decisions in cases involving patents obtained through automatic application. The PTO itself is not beyond judicial reproach; there have already been numerous lawsuits against the PTO grounded on the unlawfulness of the lengthy backlog, which have successfully compelled the PTO to examine a patent application by means of a court order. So it's not a given that the PTO's automatic grant will be accepted by state and even federal courts. Again, these are all nitty-gritty details that could play out in the litigation finance industry's favor, should the PTO move ahead with its suggested 'extraordinary solution.'

Evolution. Maturity. Growth spurt. Those are the terms one might use to describe Litigation Finance in 2017.  The industry saw a flurry of activity that would make any beehive jealous: Markets opened, funds raised, legal precedents established, and a host of new entrants already looking to disrupt the lit fin industry, which itself is in the midst of disrupting one of the oldest institutions on the planet. So let's take a look back at how Litigation Finance 'took off the training wheels,' and properly came of age in 2017... First, let's state the obvious: As litigation costs have soared globally, more and more companies and law firms are turning to third party funding to finance their legal claims. While legal questions remain over issues concerning disclosure, enforceability, privilege, and costs and security for costs, generally courts have held a favorable view towards third party funding, with rare exceptions. Globally, litigation finance is on the march. New markets opened in Singapore and Hong Kong, international arbitration is cementing its presence in Brazil, and funders are opening shop in countries all around the world, from New Zealand to Canada and everywhere in between. In terms of the funding specifics, Burford Capital - the world's largest litigation funder - conducted a 2017 Litigation Finance Survey. Their findings show the most requested types of financing by practice area:

1. IP/Patents
2. Contract
3. Business Torts
4. Asset Recovery
5. International Arbitration
6. Monetization Of Pending Legal Receivables
7. Bankruptcy/Insolvency
8. Antitrust/Competition
9. Securities
10. Fiduciary Duty
11. Fraud
12. Tax Disputes

Notably, over the last 12 months, among AmLaw 100 ranked firms, 74 made at least one request for financing from Burford or represent a client who did. Burford also tops the list in terms of fundraises, having launched a $500MM investment vehicle in 2017. Not to be outdone, Chicago-based Longford Capital also raised $500MM, the largest such fund in North America. IMF Bentham raised an aggregate $350MM over 3 fundraises - all taking place in 2017. And other firms such as LexShares and Pravati Capital both raised investment vehicles. New entrants, both large and small, also made a splash in 2017. Nick Rowles-Davies launched his long-awaited fund, Chancery Capital, and boutique shops like TownCenter Partners expanded their presence nationwide. Meanwhile, 2017 also saw the expansion and launch of potential industry disruptors, like CrowdJustice (which expanded from the UK into the US), Facebook Personal Fundraising (which launched this year and has the potential to disrupt consumer legal funding), and of course, Legalist, which has been making highly-publicized moves to attract attention and gain market share. Peter Thiel - the 'Godfather of Litigation Finance' (I'm trying to coin that... if it catches on, you heard it here first!) - invested in the Silicon Valley-based startup, which aims to disrupt the lit fin industry by using algorithms instead of lawyers. Think about that: Litigation Finance is disrupting the world's legal system, and now a startup is trying to disrupt the disruptor! But wait - I've saved the best for last! 2017 is also the year that the FIRST AND ONLY dedicated news source to the litigation finance industry opened its doors. Any idea who I'm talking about...? NO??? Well here's a nifty article that might help jog your memory... All said, 2017 was a turning point. This is the year that lit fin finally went mainstream. Everyone from in-house counsel to private practice litigators to Wall Street investors to lawmakers around the world are perking up and taking notice. We're excited for what 2018 has in store, and eagerly anticipating the industry's inevitable expansion both in the United States and globally. Here's to a memorable 2017, and to even bigger news stories on the horizon... Happy 2018 everyone!!

By Mauritius Nagelmueller This article aims to provide an overview of the most significant recent developments in the litigation finance industry. Part 2 of this 2-part series discusses the rapid growth of litigation finance across the globe, as well as its multi-dimensional expansion into diverse markets. If you’d like to reference Part 1 of this series, you can find it here. Growth The most significant overall trend in litigation finance is simply put: growth – a vibrant and ongoing increase in the use and acceptance of the industry. Litigation finance has emerged from a promising niche into a mainstream alternative asset class. The use has multiplied in the recent years, and among many other characteristic features, investors are attracted by the chance to diversify their portfolios with uncorrelated assets. The demand in the legal world is still much higher than the supply of litigation finance – an indicator that normally only the best cases are receiving financing. By now, the business spans the financing of both plaintiffs and defendants, single cases and portfolios, at practically every stage of the dispute, for example also at the enforcement phase. As litigation finance has become a multi-billion-dollar business, surveys and reports by universities and journals, as well as financing providers point to its continued growth, with no signs of stopping any time soon. While detailed data grows increasingly available, it is hard for reporters or councils to keep pace with the industry, which continues to evolve before initial research can proffer valid conclusions. While this powerful forward movement promotes access to justice in the eyes of many, the impact on the civil justice system concerns others. Calls for more rules and regulation regarding inter alia, disclosure and conflicts of interest remain loud. Whichever side one chooses, the market for this service is growing, the demand enormous, and high-quality cases tend to find high-quality finance providers. Expansion For all the reasons stated above, as well as in the Part 1 of this series, 2017 has been the year of expansion for litigation finance firms. New offices in multiple jurisdictions, new funds that are larger or have innovative structures, and broader services providing the full spectrum of finance and risk management related to legal disputes. A wave of new office launches took place in multiple directions internationally. Litigation finance firms from the U.K. entered the U.S. market, and are eager to establish their business in New York City, Washington D.C., Philadelphia, California, and a number of other locales across the U.S. Strategic recruiting, e.g. of former U.S. judges and biglaw partners, builds strong teams in a constantly growing environment, and makes a career in litigation finance a more and more attractive option. Following the developments in Asia described previously, litigation finance firms have opened their first offices in Singapore. The market is also growing in Canada, where local courts have increasingly embraced litigation finance for the past 15 years. International litigation finance and insurance firms seem attracted, and have ventured into Canada this year. And funds are growing bigger accordingly. The largest players have billions of dollars committed to the legal market, able to invest hundreds of millions in a short period of time. The biggest single litigation investment fund in North America has been raised this year, at $500 million. An increase in size is not the only development, however, since crowdfunding and innovative online platforms play a progressively important role, opening the market to an even broader range of participants. Litigation finance has never been one-dimensional, but has included tailored financing concepts and related services like asset tracing for some time. The progress of portfolio financing shapes the market thoroughly. More recently, the range of available insurance options has developed in the U.S., bringing a new variety of sophisticated services, such as contingency fee insurance and attorney fee insurance solutions which can offer a cheaper hedge compared to financing. All in all, it will be fascinating to watch how things play out in the years ahead. Whatever the outcome, 2017 will certainly be remembered as a transformative year for the nascent industry of litigation finance.   Mauritius Nagelmueller has been involved in the litigation finance industry for more than 10 years. This 2-part article is for general information purposes only and does not purport to represent legal advice. The views and opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of his employer. No reader should act or refrain from acting on the basis of any information related to this 2-part article without seeking the appropriate advice from a lawyer licensed in the recipient’s jurisdiction.

By Mauritius Nagelmueller This article aims to provide an overview of the most significant recent developments in the litigation finance industry. Part 1 of this 2-part series discusses the shifting policies in regard to litigation finance in both the U.S. and across the globe, as well as the potential for technological innovation to disrupt the industry in the near future. Change of Policy A change of policy, including new rules regarding litigation finance, can be witnessed across several jurisdictions globally. In the U.S., the legality and enforceability of litigation finance agreements still varies from state to state. Many of the fundamental differences stem from the doctrines of maintenance and champerty, and each states’ respective interpretations of those doctrines. A number of states, including New York, Florida, Texas, Ohio, Maine and Nebraska, are mostly viewed as litigation finance-friendly. In states that are less attractive for - or even hostile to - financing, such as Alabama, Colorado, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Minnesota and others, choice-of-law and forum selection clauses can sometimes be a lifesaver for a strong case in need of financing. While great uncertainty remains in many states across the country (especially in regard to the legality of specific forms and details of litigation finance agreements), we can identify the overall trend towards permission of litigation finance across the land. To name two examples, the New York legislature introduced a safe harbor provision[1] in 2004, excluding third party investments in litigation from the champerty prohibition, where a sophisticated investor puts in at least $500,000. To “enhance New York’s leadership as the center of commercial litigation”[2], the provision has been strongly endorsed by New York courts in recent years. Additionally, Ohio installed some regulation of litigation finance through Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.55, thereby overruling a former Ohio Supreme Court decision[3] voiding a litigation finance agreement. The phenomenon of legislative actively smoothing the way for litigation finance is happening on an international scale. In Persona Digital Telephony[4], the Irish Supreme Court affirmed in May 2017 that maintenance and champerty remain a bar to litigation finance. The rule against maintenance and champerty is still in force in Ireland, as per the court, and it is up to the government to amend it through legislation. No one has been prosecuted for these offences in Ireland in more than 100 years, and, according to The Sunday Times, a new Contempt of Court Bill, which was published by a government TD in July 2017, would repeal the ancient laws. And the developments in Hong Kong and Singapore will likely have an enormous impact on the dispute finance industry. Singapore allowed third party funding in international arbitration in early 2017, Hong Kong followed suit only a few months later. In Singapore[5], financing agreements in relation to international arbitration and related court or mediation proceedings are now enforceable. The new law in Hong Kong[6] provides that maintenance and champerty do not apply to third party funding in domestic and international arbitration and mediation. Both jurisdictions add a certain amount of regulation to their new rules, mostly covering conflict of interest and disclosure requirements. Singapore permits only professional funders with a paid-up share capital of not less than SGD 5 million. While the new legislation does not include state court procedures, the covered alternative dispute resolution procedures will serve as a “testbed,” according to Singapore’s Senior Minister of State for Law. Leading litigation finance firms opened new offices in Singapore immediately after their longstanding lobbying efforts in the region turned out to be successful. The first financing of a Singaporean arbitration was announced in late June 2017. The business promises to flourish, especially when first disputes will arise from China’s multi-trillion(!) One Belt One Road trade and infrastructure initiative. The demand for litigation finance is strong in the global market, and financing providers are aggressive in seizing new opportunities. Numerous jurisdictions feel an urge to become, or remain, a prime venue for dispute resolution in various areas of the law, and legislators are amending their legal frameworks accordingly. Litigation finance will carve its way into more and more jurisdictions, embraced by venues which consider this industry vital to their position as prime dispute resolution centers. However, others remain critical of litigation finance and its impact on the civil justice system. Various business groups have proposed to amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, and the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure might discuss a disclosure requirement for litigation finance in a subcommittee. Technology Finance, law, and technology are becoming an interdependent complex, and it is advisable to look over the rim of one’s own tea cup to take advantage of these sectors combined. Crowdfunding brings a new twist to litigation finance, artificial intelligence and big data will become vital for sourcing and analyzing cases, and online platforms are growing into a powerful fundraising tool. In legal crowdfunding, individuals can launch online campaigns to seek funding for legal cases. While this might not be the first choice for plaintiffs in large scale commercial cases, it is particularly interesting for cases in the areas of human rights, criminal justice, or environmental cases. Supporters can be reached with the help of dedicated firms, or also via large social networks. Some have called attention to associated ethical risks, and caution lawyers to use such new tools in light of the long-established rules of professional responsibility. Online litigation finance platforms also exist for accredited investors who want to invest in specific cases or portfolios. Investors can sign up, access anonymized information about cases, contribute to the financing, and receive a share of the profit. Before the cases are accepted onto the platform, they must first pass the due diligence of lawyers, and in some cases sophisticated software tools. Such tools increasingly utilize artificial intelligence and big data, both for analyzing and sourcing cases, which is another major evolution in the litigation finance market. Algorithms will more and more help to predict the probabilities of case outcomes, in order to minimize uncertainty. Technological innovation combined with human experience and judgment will ultimately enhance the industry’s ability to spread its wings to as yet untapped markets. Adopting quantitative methods of older industries and absorbing the best possible use of data analytics should play an important role in the future of litigation finance. The largest legal databases are boosting their data analytics components, and while it seems unlikely today that the sophisticated expertise of lawyers can ever be replaced by a software, these tools have the potential to make the work of humans much easier and more effective. If rightly used, they can be a game changer. Artificial intelligence and algorithms are on everyone’s lips, but only a few pioneers have started to take advantage of the new opportunities technology brings to the litigation finance table. Perhaps even further down the road we might see the broader use of case prediction and attorney referral bots, as well as the use of cryptocurrency. Blockchain technology, the enforceability of so-called smart contracts, as well as the use of cryptocurrency (which could serve some interests in litigation finance since privacy can be upheld, but also arouse further criticism for lack of transparency and regulation) are still up in the air, but certainly worth keeping an eye on. Stay tuned for Part 2 of this 2-part series, which will discuss the rapid growth of litigation finance markets across the globe, as well as its multi-dimensional expansion into diverse markets.   Mauritius Nagelmueller has been involved in the litigation finance industry for more than 10 years. This 2-part article is for general information purposes only and does not purport to represent legal advice. The views and opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of his employer. No reader should act or refrain from acting on the basis of any information related to this 2-part article without seeking the appropriate advice from a lawyer licensed in the recipient’s jurisdiction. [1] Judiciary Law § 489 (2). [2] Justinian Capital SPC v. WestLB AG, No. 155 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2016). In Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2005) the Supreme Court of the State of New York already clarified in 2005 that the champerty statute is not violated in the first place, if the assignment of a portion of a lawsuit’s recovery is not for the “primary purpose and intent” of bringing a suit on that assignment. [3] Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 99 Ohio St.3d 121, 2003-Ohio-2721. [4] Persona Digital Telephony Ltd and another v. The Minister for Public Enterprise and others, [2017] IESC 27. [5] Singapore Civil Law (Amendment) Act 2017; Civil Law (Third Party Funding) Regulations 2017; new rules in Singapore’s Legal Profession Act and Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules. [6] Hong Kong Arbitration and Mediation Legislation (Third Party Funding) (Amendment) Bill 2016.

Guest Post by Mauritius Nagelmueller, who has been involved in the litigation finance industry for more than 10 years. Access to justice remains one of the prevailing issues within the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), especially for developing countries. To enforce the promise of a fairer trading system, developing country participation in the DSB must be improved, given that relationships between WTO members are predicated on power dynamics, rather than adherence to the rule of law. Third party funding has provided access to justice for claimants with meritorious claims, but with limited financial capacity in the private sector, as well as in investor-state disputes. The industry is also capable of leveling the playing field in the DSB, as it can be utilized by developing countries to finance a WTO dispute. An expansion of the current third party funding business model to include financing sovereigns in WTO disputes would create a win-win situation, by allowing developing countries to bring claims which they otherwise could not afford, and by granting third party funders the opportunity to adopt a more neutral stance towards sovereigns by providing their services in support, rather than in mere contention (as is the case today). And demand is significant, given that most obstacles to developing country participation in the DSB are related to costs, such as high-priced experts that must be brought on to account for a lack of expertise, the fear of economic pressure from the opposing state, and the lengthy proceedings which often place a strain on a developing country’s resources (member states estimate a time frame of 15 months from the request for consultations to the report of the Appellate Body. A period of at least 6 to 14 months should be added to this, as a reasonable period for the implementation of recommendations. Although this time frame is short in comparison to other international procedures, the financial hardship for developing countries can be fatal). The costs of initiating a dispute of medium complexity in the WTO are in the region of $500,000, however legal fees can sometimes exceed $10,000,000. In many cases, developing countries are forced to rely on the financial support of local industries affected by the dispute. This begs the question, why hasn’t there been an influx of third party funders into WTO dispute resolution? There are two chief concerns which seem to keep funders shying away. The first involves the typical remedies in WTO disputes, which regularly circumvent a direct financial compensation that the funder could benefit from. Still, complainants seek monetary benefits, be it through concessions (the losing country compensates the winning country with additional concessions equal to the original breach), or retaliation (the winning country withdraws concessions in that amount). A simple solution to this issue is for the winning party to provide a share of those benefits to the funder. One possibility is to assess the level of harm caused by the illegal measure challenged in the dispute, and accept that as a basis for the compensation of the funder. If the WTO Panel decisions are implemented, and the disputed measures that were found to be inconsistent with the WTO are withdrawn, a certain value of trade is not affected by those measures anymore and can be realized again. Affected industries, or the affected country, can set aside part of the gain to compensate the funder. In the case of compensation or the suspension of concessions, the complainant gains from increased tariff revenue, and is able to compensate the financing entity from a portion of the same. In any event, financial benefits of a winning party can be measured, and any compensation for the funder will represent only a minor percentage of the gained value of trade. The second main concern surrounds the area of enforceability, and whether WTO mechanisms would allow financing agreements. But those would have to be enforced in local courts, and the WTO DSB technically cannot rule on non-WTO agreement issues. However, there are provisions that allow the DSB to engage in arbitration if the parties both agree. A practical solution would therefore be to include an arbitration or dispute settlement provision in the financing agreement that operates outside of the DSB. Based on the aforementioned demand, as well as the practical solutions which can mitigate possible concerns, it is clear that external funding of WTO disputes can provide a flexible, independent and powerful alternative for developing countries to increase access to justice, as well as for developed countries to “outsource the risk” of a WTO dispute. It’s only a matter of time before third party funding makes its way into the WTO. ** A version of this article first appeared in International Economic Law and Policy Blog