John Freund's Posts

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New Zealand’s Prime Minister Expresses Support for a Formal Class Action Regime

Class actions have been proven time and time again to be an immensely valuable tool for consumers and communities to seek justice against large corporations and institutions, with litigation funders often playing a crucial role in supporting these claims. However, there are still many jurisdictions, such as New Zealand, where there is no formal class action regime in place, thereby creating barriers for the efficient facilitation of these class actions. An article in the NZ Herald highlights recent comments from Chris Hipkins, the Prime Minister and leader of the Labour Party, who has expressed his desire to put in place a formal class actions regime, if his government maintains power after next month’s general election.  As LFJ reported last year, New Zealand’s Law Commission published a report containing its proposals for structural reform of the country’s legal system, which include the introduction of a Class Actions Act. Amokura Kawharu, president of the Law Commission, highlighted various issues including the prohibitively high cost of litigation and stated that “class actions and litigation funding are not a silver bullet for those issues, but we think they can both make important contributions.” Putting forward his party’s perspective on the issue, Hipkins seemed to agree with the commission’s perspective and argued that “those who would benefit from a regime the most, such as consumers and those on lower incomes, are often shut out of the legal system because of the cost of taking individual action.” This move is part of a wider Labour Party agenda that aims to reform the legal system, with Hipkins emphasizing that they would seek to work with all those involved in the legal system to design this new regime.

Certum Group Adds Experienced Litigation Funder, Former U.S. Supreme Court Clerk William Marra as Director

Certum Group, which provides bespoke solutions for companies facing the uncertainty of litigation, has appointed William C. Marra as a director responsible for leading the company’s litigation finance strategy. Marra is a seasoned litigation funder and former U.S. Supreme Court clerk who will help Certum continue its mission of growing and redefining the litigation finance landscape. “We are delighted to welcome aboard Will, who shares our mission-driven approach to helping clients mitigate legal risk and vindicate their rights,” said Joel Fineberg, Certum’s founder and managing director. “Will’s wide-ranging experience in both the legal and business worlds will be an asset as we continue to innovate in the fast-growing world of litigation funding.” Certum Group created the first and only litigation risk transfer platform that combines insurance, premium finance, and litigation funding to provide tailored solutions for companies, litigants, and law firms. Founded 10 years ago, the team is comprised of former litigators, judicial clerks, actuaries, and financial professionals who design risk transfer and funding solutions to meet legal, business, and financial objectives. “I am delighted to join the talented team at Certum,” said Marra, who grows Certum’s presence in the New York City area. “Funding gives litigants with meritorious claims better access to the courts, and I look forward to helping Certum’s clients get access to litigation funding, insurance, and other solutions that will help them achieve their legal and business goals.” Marra’s unique blend of legal and financial expertise mirrors Certum’s distinctive approach to helping clients mitigate legal risk by offering the widest breadth of legal and financial products currently available in the market. Marra graduated magna cum laude from Harvard University and Harvard Law School. He co-teaches a course on litigation finance at the University of Pennsylvania’s Carey Law School, and his law review article, The Shadows of Litigation Finance, was published by the Vanderbilt Law Review. Prior to joining Certum, Marra spent several years at another litigation funder, where he managed litigation investments from sourcing and diligence through funding and resolution. Marra litigated commercial, constitutional, and appellate matters at Cooper & Kirk PLLC in Washington, D.C. He also clerked for both Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. of the U.S. Supreme Court and Chief Judge William H. Pryor Jr. of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

About Certum Group

Certum Group provides bespoke solutions for companies facing the uncertainty of litigation. We are the leader in providing comprehensive alternative litigation strategies, including class action settlement insurance, litigation buyout insurance, judgment preservation insurance, adverse judgment insurance, contingency fee insurance, capital protection insurance, litigation funding, and claim monetization. Our team of experienced former litigators, insurance professionals, and risk mitigation specialists helps companies remove the financial and operational volatility arising out of litigation by transferring the outcome risk. Learn more at www.certumgroup.com.
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Benefits of Litigation Financing for Debt Recovery in India

When looking to demonstrate the benefits of using litigation financing, it can often be easy to simply highlight its utility and effectiveness in isolation. However, for those unsure of whether to adopt a relatively new tool, it can be even more powerful to demonstrate the ways in which third-party funding is more useful than the alternatives when tackling a specific problem, such as debt recovery. In a guest article for Financial Express, Kundan Shahi, CEO of LegalPay, provides a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of litigation financing versus debt recovery agents (DRAs) within India.  Shahi highlights that the use of DRAs has been considered the standard approach for Indian financial institutions looking to recover bad loans. However, he also notes that DRAs have come under criticism for their low success rates, with only 2 in 10 cases reaching a positive resolution, as well as the ‘aggressive and intrusive’ methods used by DRAs that have bordered on illegality. Shahi acknowledges that although adoption of litigation financing in India has been slower than in other territories, it is beginning to gain momentum and can offer a real alternative for companies pursuing debt recovery. He argues that litigation funding avoids any of the aggressive tactics used by DRAs, ensuring ‘ethical and legal compliance’, whilst also acting as a way for institutions to reduce the financial risk of debt recovery. Furthermore, given the nature of litigation funders’ work where recovery of assets is paramount, there is an increased probability of higher recovery rates compared to DRAs.

Mill City Ventures III, Ltd. Extends Further Credit to Mustang Litigation Funding

Mill City Ventures III, Ltd. ("Mill City") (NASDAQ:MCVT), a specialty short-term finance and non-bank lender, announced today that it extended an additional $1 million of short-term loan principal to Mustang Funding LLC d/b/a Mustang Litigation Funding ("Mustang") and refinanced and extended earlier provided short-term loan principal. In December 2022, Mill City announced that it had entered into a non-binding letter of intent with Mustang contemplating a merger combination transaction with Mustang. Contemporaneously, Mill City provided Mustang with a $5 million short-term loan to provide additional capital. The most recent $1 million of additional short-term lending brings the total amount of capital committed to Mustang to $8 million. The principal amount of all short-term loans made to Mustang accrues interest at the per annum rate of 15% and becomes due and payable upon the earlier of May 31, 2024, or 90 days after any termination of discussions for the contemplated combination transaction. Mill City's Chief Executive Officer, Douglas M. Polinsky said, "[O]ur December 2022 announcement of our intention, subject to certain identified conditions and to entering into a definitive agreement with Mustang, to effect a combination transaction with Mustang signifies what we believe to be a transformational opportunity for Mill City and its shareholders. For the entirety of 2023, we have been working diligently, in a collaborative manner, with Mustang to lay the foundation for this combination transaction. Our most recent extension of further credit to Mustang aggregates to $8 million of total investment with Mustang-approaching 50% of our net assets-reflecting both our profound commitment and confidence in Mustang and our expectation of completing an eventual combination." Jimmy Beltz, Co-Founder and President of Mustang, commented, "We are extremely excited to have Mill City's support, evidenced by its continuing financial commitment to our company, and are working toward a definitive agreement for the merger. Mustang is continuing to grow its litigation funding business and anticipates that the merger will enable it to further capitalize on the opportunities available within the emerging litigation finance industry. Post-merger, Mustang expects to benefit from being able to access public markets for capital, while also presenting investors with the ability to participate in a differentiated, Nasdaq-listed, litigation finance company." Mill City does not anticipate providing any further updates with respect to a possible transaction with Mustang until the earlier to occur of its entry into a definitive agreement with Mustang or the termination of discussions.
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Litigation Funder LegalPay Closes Rs 12 Crore Interim Financing Bond

LegalPay, India’s first and largest player in the legal financing industry, has announced the successful closure of its Rs 12 crore Interim Financing Bonds. This innovative investment instrument in the fixed income category, which was launched earlier this year in January, boasts a remarkable coupon rate of 14% compounding annually. "We are thrilled to celebrate the success of our Interim Financing Bonds and our contribution to the economic revitalization of companies like Lavasa Corporation," said Mr. Kundan Shahi, Founder & CEO at LegalPay. "We are proud to have successfully closed our Interim Financing Bonds, but our true pride lies in the impact we create in the legal & insolvency ecosystem and the value we create for our investors and our clients. We are here to alleviate financial burdens, mitigate risks, and ensure that justice prevails." The bond has set new standards in the financial industry by realizing its opportunity in an impressive timeframe of just eight months despite having an original tenure of 36 months with a callable feature. LegalPay's Interim Financing Bonds represent a paradigm shift in the world of investments, offering a unique opportunity to investors and companies alike. The funds raised through this visionary initiative have been strategically employed to support Lavasa Corporation, a prominent player in the infrastructure sector. The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) approved the resolution plan of Darwin Platform Infrastructure Limited (DPIL), which offered Rs 1,814 crore to the creditors and homebuyers of Lavasa. Raj Infrastructure Development India, one of Lavasa's creditors, filed a bankruptcy petition against the company after it failed to meet its payment obligations. The petition was approved in August 2018. Notably, LegalPay's unwavering commitment to a rigorous underwriting process played a pivotal role in mitigating the perceived risks associated with this opportunity. In the face of skepticism, LegalPay's cutting-edge technology and AI-driven analysis, combined with its diligence and expertise, prevailed, resulting in the rapid realization of this investment. This remarkable success in just 8 months stands as a testament to LegalPay's strong underwriting, powered by advanced technology, and its dedication to delivering outstanding results to its investors. However, LegalPay's impact extends far beyond this successful bond closure. LegalPay is dedicated to providing critical capital to companies undergoing insolvency, breathing new life into struggling businesses, and fuellingeconomic growth. LegalPay's innovative approach is revolutionizing the way companies navigate litigation challenges, alleviating their financial burdens and providing a lifeline for those seeking funding for their legal battles. About LegalPay Currently managing claims worth INR 2700Crores, LegalPay aims to manage INR 5000 Crores with its proprietary tech and AI by the end of FY 2025. This demonstrates the company's dedication to substantially impacting India's legal and financial landscape. With groundbreaking instruments like Interim Financing Bonds and a commitment to supporting companies in insolvency and financing legal claims, LegalPay is making a substantial impact on the Indian legal andfinancial landscape while creating quintessential value for both businesses and investors.
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Funding Opportunity: 4 Rivers Seeks Funding for Breach of Contract Claim

Funding is required for a claim involving a concession held by a state-of-the-art industrial facility utilizing leading technologies to recycle used tires into rubber raw material, rubber compound, and value-added rubber end products. The concession agreement is between the plaintiff and a quasi-governmental entity in the GCC region. The claim is likely to be the subject of an ICC arbitration. We have strong evidence to show breaches of the concession agreement, including delays by the respondent(s) in facilitating land ownership (Building Permit) and providing utility services as required for the project; and failure to provide a minimum quantity of tires as stipulated in the agreement. Approximately USD 1 million funding is required. Sunk costs plus interest are circa USD 10 million but a higher figure can be supported based on a DCF calculation of lost profits. Any interested parties can contact Peter Petyt at: peter@4rivers.legal
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Burford Capital Statement on YPF Damages Ruling

Burford Capital Limited, the leading global finance and asset management firm focused on law, today releases the following statement in connection with the September 8, 2023 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (the “Ruling”) issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”) in connection with the Petersen and Eton Park cases against the Republic of Argentina and YPF (the “Case” or the “YPF Litigation”).

The Ruling follows a prior decision on March 31, 2023 by the Court granting summary judgment on liability against Argentina and setting for an evidentiary hearing questions around the date on which Argentina should have made a tender offer for YPF’s shares and the appropriate rate of pre-judgment interest to be applied.  That evidentiary hearing was held on July 26-28, 2023 and the Ruling is the Court’s decision on the issues raised for hearing.

The Court decided the issues raised at the hearing in Petersen’s and Eton Park’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs’”) favor, holding that the appropriate date for the tender offer was April 16, 2012 and that pre-judgment interest should run from May 3, 2012 at a simple interest rate of 8%.

The Court has asked the parties to memorialize the Ruling in a proposed judgment and submit it to the Court, which Petersen and Eton Park will endeavor to do forthwith.  We discuss below the computation of potential damages but in round numbers the Court’s Ruling implies a judgment against Argentina of approximately $16 billion.

In other words, the Ruling results in a complete win against Argentina at the high end of the possible range of damages.

Jonathan Molot, Burford’s Chief Investment Officer who leads Burford’s work on the Case, commented:

“We have been pursuing this case since 2015 and it has involved substantial Burford management time along with the dedicated engagement of a team of some of the best lawyers on the planet from multiple law firms and world-class experts (going up against very good lawyers, and winning). Burford is uniquely positioned to pursue these kinds of cases and secure wins for clients and substantial returns for shareholders – not only because of the size and scale of these kinds of cases, but because of the internal and external resources we can uniquely bring to bear. There is no aspect of this case, from strategy to minutiae, that did not involve an experienced Burford team spending many thousands of hours getting to this point. This case represents what Burford is all about and exemplifies the contribution we make to the civil justice system – without us, there would be no justice in this complicated and long-running case for Petersen and Eton Park.”

Christopher Bogart, Burford’s Chief Executive Officer, commented:

“In our recent shareholder letter, we referred to the YPF-related assets as one of Burford’s four pillars of value and I’m pleased to see this extraordinary win and the value it could create for our shareholders once we complete the litigation process and collect from Argentina. The Ruling is a major milestone for Burford and we continue to see momentum in our overall portfolio and continued demand for our capital and services.”

Introductory matters

As is customary in US litigation, the Ruling was released without prior notice to Burford or the parties by its posting on PACER, the publicly available official US federal court site, at 10:45am EDT on September 8, 2023, and was thus public immediately upon release. The Ruling is also available in its entirety on Burford’s IR website at http://investors.burfordcapital.com for the convenience of investors who did not wish to register for a PACER account.

While Burford offers in this release its views and interpretation of the Ruling, those are qualified in their entirety by the actual text of the Ruling and we caution that investors cannot rely on Burford’s statements in preference to the actual Ruling. In the event of any inconsistency between this release and the text of the actual Ruling, the text of the actual Ruling will prevail and be dispositive. Burford disclaims, to the fullest extent permitted by law, any obligation to update its views and interpretation as the litigation proceeds. Moreover, the Case remains in active litigation and Argentina has declared its intention to appeal any decision; all litigation carries significant risks of uncertainty and unpredictability until final resolution, including the risk of total loss. Finally, Burford is and will continue to be constrained by legal privilege and client confidences in terms of the scope of its ability to speak publicly about the Case or the Ruling.

Burford also cautions that there are meaningful remaining risks in the Case, including further proceedings before the Court, appeals, enforcement and collateral litigation in other jurisdictions. Moreover, litigation matters often resolve for considerably less than the amount of any judgment rendered by the courts and to the extent that any settlement or resolution discussions occur in this Case no public communication about those discussions will be possible until their conclusion.

The Ruling

The Court previously held that (i) the bylaws “on their face, required that the Republic make a tender offer” for Petersen’s and YPF’s shares; (ii) “the Republic failed to make the tender offer”; and (iii) the failure “harmed Plaintiffs because they never received the compensated exit” that the bylaws promised. Indeed, the Court held that “once the Court decides the legal issues, the relatively simple facts in this case will demand a particular outcome” and held that “there is no question of fact as to whether the Republic breached”.

Thus, the Court held that “Plaintiffs were damaged by the Republic because Plaintiffs were entitled to receive a tender offer that would have provided them with a compensated exit but did not”.

The Court previously held that the damages to be awarded will consist of the tender offer price under Formula D of the bylaws calculated in US dollars as of a constructive notice date that is 40 days prior to Argentina taking control and triggering the tender offer obligation. The Court said it must decide as a factual matter whether the operative notice date for the calculation is 40 days before April 16, 2012, when the Presidential intervention decree was implemented, or 40 days before May 7, 2012, when the Argentine legislature took follow-up action.  In the Ruling, the Court concluded that April 16, 2012 was the appropriate date.

The calculation of damages using a notice date that is 40 days before the April 16, 2012 takeover was included in Plaintiffs' publicly filed summary judgment brief and would imply tender offer consideration of approximately $7.5 billion for Petersen and $900 million for Eton Park, before interest.

The Court also previously reserved for determination the prejudgment interest rate that would run from the date of the breach in 2012 through the issuance of a final judgment in 2023. The Court accepted that “the commercial rate applied by the Argentine courts is the appropriate measure” and noted that Plaintiffs had pleaded that that rate was “between 6% and 8%”, but “the Court reserves judgment on the precise rate it will utilize”.  After the hearing, the Court ultimately applied an 8% rate from May 3, 2012 until the date of the judgment, and thereafter interest will accrue at the applicable US federal rate until payment.

Subject to final computations by the parties’ experts, that finding implies interest of approximately $6.8 million for Petersen and $815 million for Eton Park, yielding a total judgment of approximately $14.3 billion for Petersen and $1.7 billion for Eton Park, or $16 billion in total.

Investors may find notable the Court’s commentary on Burford’s role in the case:

The Court also rejects the Republic’s effort to inject Burford Capital into these proceedings. This remains a case brought by plaintiffs against a defendant for its wrongful conduct towards them, and the relevant question is what the Republic owes Plaintiffs to compensate them for the loss of the use of their money, not what Plaintiffs have done or will do with what they are owed. The Republic owes no more or less because of Burford Capital’s involvement. Furthermore, the Republic pulled the considerable levers available to it as a sovereign to attempt to take what it should have paid for and has since spared no expense in its defense. If Plaintiffs were required to trade a substantial part of their potential recovery to secure the financing necessary to bring their claims, in Petersen’s case because it was driven to bankruptcy, and litigate their claims to conclusion against a powerful sovereign defendant that has behaved in this manner, this is all the more reason to award Plaintiffs the full measure of their damages.

Next steps

The Court has asked the parties to submit a proposed judgment reflecting the Ruling, which Plaintiffs will endeavor to do promptly.  Once that judgment issues, Argentina has indicated its intention to appeal. There is also a process for seeking reconsideration from the District Court of its own ruling, although such motions rarely prevail as they are being made to the same judge who decided the matter originally.

Once the Court issues its final judgment, that judgment will be appealable as of right to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Second Circuit presently is taking around a year to resolve appeals once filed, although there is meaningful deviation from that mean. The District Court’s judgment would be enforceable while the appeal is pending unless Argentina posts a bond to secure its performance, which we consider unlikely, or unless a court grants a relatively unusual stay.

Following the Second Circuit’s decision, either party can seek review from the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court accepts cases only on a discretionary basis and we believe the likelihood of it accepting a commercial case of this nature that does not present a contested issue of law is quite low, particularly given that Argentina has already once in this Case unsuccessfully sought Supreme Court review.

With an enforceable judgment in hand, Plaintiffs will either need to negotiate a resolution of the matter with Argentina, which would certainly result in what would likely be a substantial discount to the judgment amount in exchange for agreed payment, or engage in an enforcement campaign against Argentina which would likely be of extended duration relying on Burford’s and its advisors’ judgment enforcement expertise. Burford will not provide publicly any information about its enforcement or settlement strategies.

Burford’s position

Burford has different economic arrangements in each of the Petersen and Eton Park cases. At bottom, on a net basis, we expect that the Burford balance sheet will be entitled to around 35% of any proceeds generated in the Petersen case and around 73% of any proceeds generated in the Eton Park case.

In the Petersen case, Burford is entitled by virtue of a financing agreement entered into with the Spanish insolvency receiver of the Petersen bankruptcy estate to 70% of any recovery obtained in the Petersen case. That 70% entitlement is not affected by Burford’s spending on the cases, which is for Burford’s account; it is a simple division of any proceeds. From that 70%, certain entitlements to the law firms involved in the case and other case expenses will need to be paid, reducing that number to around 58%.

Burford has, however, sold 38.75% of its entitlement in the Petersen case to third party investors, reducing Burford’s net share of proceeds to around 35% (58% x 61.25%).

In the Eton Park case, there is both a funding agreement and a monetization transaction. The net combined impact of those transactions is that Burford would expect to receive around 73% of any proceeds. Burford has not sold any of its Eton Park entitlement.

In both Petersen and Eton Park, the numbers above are approximations and will vary somewhat depending on the ultimate level of case costs by the end of the Case, as we expect continued significant spending on the Case.

About Burford Capital

Burford Capital is the leading global finance and asset management firm focused on law. Its businesses include litigation finance and risk managementasset recovery and a wide range of legal finance and advisory activities. Burford is publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE: BUR) and the London Stock Exchange (LSE: BUR), and it works with companies and law firms around the world from its offices in New York, London, Chicago, Washington, DC, Singapore, Dubai, Sydney and Hong Kong.

For more information, please visit www.burfordcapital.com.

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The American Legal Finance Association Objects to U.S. District Judge’s Case Management Order Regarding Litigation Funding

The American Legal Finance Association (ALFA) objects on behalf of its 30 members to the Case Management Order No. 61 issued by U.S. District Judge M. Casey Rodgers on August 29, 2023 in the 3M Combat Arms Earplug Product Litigation. The Order prohibits claimants in the Litigation from obtaining consumer legal funding without court approval and does not cite any applicable factual basis or legal precedent for such an order. The Order was issued without providing any due process to ALFA members whose funding contracts are in demand by claimants.

“U.S. District Judge M. Casey Rodgers Case Management Order regarding Litigation funding in the 3M Combat Arms Earplug Products Liability Litigation goes well beyond the current treatment of such fundings by the Federal judiciary and exceeds the Court’s authority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” said Jack Kelly, ALFA Managing Director. “While a small number of Federal courts have required the disclosure of pre-settlement funding deals, no Federal court has barred plaintiffs their constitutional right to contract for necessary financial assistance while they wait for recovery in the Litigation.”

Legal and economic experts widely agree that responsible consumer funding of the type offered by ALFA members provides a vital lifeline for claimants to pay living and medical expenses during a lengthy litigation process, and to avoid resorting to other sources of money that are considerably more expensive and can have very negative credit consequences. Those benefits should be freely available to claimants in this Litigation who are represented by counsel.

The American Legal Finance Association recognizes the Court’s concern that some irresponsible providers of consumer funding, who are not members of ALFA, have engaged in predatory practices in another large mass tort settlement.  ALFA filed an amicus curiae brief in that case to support joint enforcement action of the New York Attorney General and the federal Consumer Financial Protection Board against those funding firms. ALFA has also spoken out against bad industry actors and strongly advocates for fair, ethical, and transparent funding standards across the consumer legal funding industry.

While ALFA recognizes the Court's desire to protect claimants from abuse, Judge Rodgers’ Order prohibits claimants in the Litigation from exercising their constitutional right to contract for financial assistance, an act that no other judicial body, federal or state, has ever taken. That is objectionable and should be reconsidered based on a more complete record.

About the American Legal Finance Association (ALFA): ALFA represents the leading consumer legal funding companies nationwide. The organization supports sensible regulation in the industry that protects consumers through increased transparency while ensuring access to consumer legal funding. Learn more at https://www.americanlegalfin.com/.

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Westfleet Advisors Opens Houston Office Led by Litigation Finance Veteran

Westfleet Advisors, the leading U.S. litigation finance advisory firm, announced today that it has expanded its executive team with the addition of Wendie Childress as Managing Director and Counsel. Ms. Childress was most recently an Investment Advisor at commercial litigation funder Validity Finance, where she forged and deepened relationships throughout the U.S. legal market and advised parties seeking funding through all stages of the process.  "We are delighted to attract such high-quality talent and extensive industry experience to our team, enabling us to expand our capacity to serve our growing client base," said Charles Agee, Founder and CEO of Westfleet Advisors. "Wendie's background is especially well-suited for the type of advisory services we provide, and we are pleased to bolster our presence in the growing and underserved Texas market as well." "I'm thrilled to join Charles and his talented team at Westfleet and excited to combine my experience as a litigation funder and trial counsel for the benefit of parties seeking litigation funding," said Ms. Childress. "There is obviously a continuity with what I have done in my years in the litigation finance industry, but an important draw for me in joining Westfleet is the ability to serve counsel and their clients in new ways. I can now help them secure the most favorable terms and find the best structural fit across a vast array of options industrywide." Ms. Childress brings substantial litigation experience to her new role at Westfleet, having spent seventeen years at top trial boutique Yetter Coleman, LLP, where she represented plaintiffs and defendants in complex commercial litigation and arbitration. "Not only has Wendie developed deal expertise over many years in the litigation finance industry, she also perfectly understands the issues and concerns of Westfleet's core audience because she has been in their shoes," Agee added. "Having seen the challenges and opportunities of complex legal disputes from the perspective of both counsel and funder, I appreciate the need for clients to have a bona fide expert on their litigation financing deal team. And by closely advising clients through the process, I can help trial counsel stay focused on what matters most – winning the case," said Childress. "Also, in publishing objective industry analysis and research, Westfleet carries its commitment to transparency well beyond our individual client engagements. That matters a great deal to me and to my colleagues in the bar." 
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House Oversight Committee Announces Hearing to Investigate ‘Left-Wing Activists’ Use of Litigation Funding 

Opposition to the use of litigation funding and calls for increased regulation of the industry are not uncommon, but have traditionally focused on claims that the practice incentivizes frivolous litigation, or that the lack of transparency is damaging to the judicial system. However, a new hearing announced in the US House of Representatives takes on the issue from a different angle, alleging that third-party funding is being exploited by ‘left-wing activists’. The House Committee on Oversight and Accountability announced yesterday that it would be holding a hearing on Wednesday, September 13, titled “Unsuitable Litigation: Oversight of Third-Party Litigation Funding.” The purpose of the hearing, according to the press release, is to “investigate how left-wing activists are funding litigation against companies and agencies to achieve liberal policy goals”, whilst also examining issues around funders’ level of control in lawsuits. Representative James Comer (R-Ky), chairman of the committee, provided the following statement as part of the announcement:  “Private equity and left-wing billionaires are funding litigation against companies and agencies in an all-out effort to sway policy and determine outcomes in the courtroom. These tactics are not only being used consistently to push an agenda, but also seek to enable agencies to implement burdensome regulations and avoid public scrutiny. The House Oversight Committee must work to prevent financiers from hijacking America’s courtrooms, and I look forward to hearing from witnesses on how Congress can also address these litigation schemes to protect industry and consumers.” The witnesses who will appear before the committee will include: 
  • Maya Steinitz, Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law
  • Erik Milito, President, National Ocean Industries Association
  • Julie Lucas, Executive Director, MiningMinnesota
  • Aviva Wein, Assistant General Counsel, Johnson & Johnson

Hereford Litigation Funds New UK Class Action Against Google

There has been understandable concern, in the weeks since the Supreme Court’s judgement in PACCAR, that the appetite among funders to support large group actions in the UK might be diminishing. However, there are little signs of any slowdown in new funding commitments, as a new class action targeting Google and funded by Hereford Litigation was just announced. An article in The Guardian covers a new class action that has been filed with the Competition Appeal Tribunal, alleging that Google’s anti-competitive behaviour in the search engine market has caused an increase in prices for consumers across the whole UK economy. The class action, which is being led by Hausfeld and funded by Hereford Litigation, is seeking an estimated £7.3 billion compensation to account for the approximately 65 million users of Google in the UK. Luke Streatfield, partner at Hausfeld, explained that at the core of this claim is the allegation that “Google has choked off competition in search engines for years, to the detriment of the businesses that use its services – and, ultimately, consumers.” As a result of these monopolistic and anti-competitive behaviours, consumers have been faced with “higher prices and poorer quality” across a range of sectors.  In response to the lawsuit, a spokesperson for Google provided the following statement: “This case is speculative and opportunistic – we will argue against it vigorously. People use Google because it is helpful. We only make money if ads are useful and relevant, as indicated by clicks – at a price that is set by a real-time auction. Advertising plays a crucial role in helping people discover new businesses, new causes and new products.”

Omni Bridgeway Funds Class Action Against BGC Housing Group in Western Australia 

Providing financing for class actions remains one of the best possible engagements for litigation funders, as it represents not only the potential for lucrative returns, but also epitomizes the mission statement of funders to widen access to justice and support communities who lack the resources to seek compensation. A funding announcement for another class action in Western Australia, this one seeking legal redress for homeowners from a construction group, is a pertinent reminder of the positive impact that funders can have. Reporting by WAtoday covers the announcement from Morgan Alteruthemeyer Legal Group that it has secured funding from Omni Bridgeway to pursue a class action against BGC Housing Group, representing homeowners who suffered financial losses from delays in BGC’s construction of the houses. The class action in federal court could represent up to 5000 homeowners who signed contracts with BGC between July 2019 and June 2022. Spencer Lieberfreund, partner at Morgan Alteruthemeyer Legal Group, explained that the funding agreement with Omni Bridgeway would allow the firm to bring the class action, whilst providing “individuals a way of seeking financial compensation without being exposed personally to legal costs.”  BGC Proposed Class Action Group, a grassroots organization that has been raising awareness of the issues facing BGC homeowners, welcomed the news of Omni Bridgeway’s involvement and joined Lieberfruend in encouraging other homeowners to register for the lawsuit. Jess Spithoven, one of the founders of the campaign group, emphasized that “securing funding to commence a class action is not enough,” and that the most important thing was for all BGC homeowners to join the class action. At present, Spithoven’s organisation counts more than 2200 homeowners as members. Homeowners are encouraged to register their interest in the class action through Omni Bridgeway’s BGC Class Action website.

Silver Bull Secures US$9.5M in Litigation Funding to Pursue Damages Claim Against the Mexican Government

Silver Bull Resources Inc. (TSX: SVB, OTCQB: SVBL) (“Silver Bull” or the “Company”) is pleased to announce that it has secured funding for its international arbitration proceedings against the United Mexican States (“Mexico”) under the Agreement between the United States of America, Mexico, and Canada (the “USMCA”) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”). HIGHLIGHTS Litigation Funding Agreement (“LFA”) signed with Bench Walk Advisors LLC (“Bench Walk”) to pursue international arbitration claims against Mexico for breaches of its obligations under NAFTA.
  • The LFA facility is available for immediate draw down and provides funding to cover legal, tribunal and external expert costs and corporate operating expenses associated with the Company.
  • US$9.5 million is provided as a purchase of a contingent entitlement to damages in the event that a damages award is recovered from Mexico.
  • Legal counsel for the claim is Boies Schiller Flexner (UK) LLP (“BSF”), an international law firm with extensive experience in international investment arbitration concerning mining and other natural resources, to act on its behalf. The BSF Team will be led by Timothy L. Foden, a noted practitioner in the mining arbitration space.
  • The arbitration arises from Mexico’s unlawful expropriation and other unlawful treatment of Silver Bull and its investments resulting from an illegal blockade of Silver Bull’s Sierra Mojada project that began in September 2019 and continues to this day.
Silver Bull’s CEO, Mr. Tim Barry commented, “Whilst it had been Silver Bull’s intention to continue developing the Sierra Mojada Project, an illegal blockade by a small group of local miners trying to extort and force an underserved royalty payment from the Company began in September 2019 and continues to this day. Despite numerous requests to the Mexican Government to uphold the law and end the illegal blockade, the Government failed to act, preventing Silver Bull from accessing the site for over four years and preventing the Company from conducting its lawful business in Mexico. The direct actions and inactions by the Mexican Government has driven away investors from the project and resulted in the expropriation of the Sierra Mojada project. “The substantial litigation funding secured under the LFA is a testament to the strength of Silver Bull’s claims. The US$9.5 million funding facility is non-dilutive to Silver Bull shareholders and will cover the full legal budget of the claim, expert, and ancillary costs, as well as Silver Bull’s operating expenses. Bench Walk will have a contingent entitlement to damages in the event that damages are awarded.” Mr. Barry continued, “We note that other companies have successfully enforced their rights through international arbitration and received substantial sums for damages. Recent examples of this include (i) a US$110 million award issued by the World Bank International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) tribunal in August 2023 to Indiana Resources Ltd. regarding the revocation of its mining license by the Tanzanian Government in 2018, which case was led by our legal counsel Tim Foden from BSF, and (ii) a US$5.8 billion award issued by the World Bank ICSID tribunal to Barrick Gold/Antofagasta regarding Pakistan’s unlawful denial of a mining permit for the Reko Diq copper project.” BACKGROUND TO THE CLAIM: The arbitration has been initiated under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States process, which falls under the auspices of the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), to which Mexico is a signatory. Silver Bull officially notified Mexico on March 2, 2023 of its intention to initiate an arbitration owing to Mexico’s breaches of NAFTA by unlawfully expropriating Silver Bull’s investments without compensation, failing to provide Silver Bull and its investments with fair and equitable treatment or full protection and security, and not upholding NAFTA’s national treatment standard. Silver Bull held a meeting with Mexican government officials in Mexico City on May 30, 2023, in an attempt to explore amicable settlement options and avoid arbitration. However, the 90-day period for amicable settlement under NAFTA expired on June 2, 2023, without a resolution. Despite repeated demands and requests for action by the Company, Mexico’s governmental agencies have allowed the unlawful blockade to continue, thereby failing to protect Silver Bull’s investments. Consequently, Silver Bull will seek to recover an amount of approximately US$178 million in damages that it has suffered due to Mexico’s breach of its obligations under NAFTA, which includes sunk costs of approximately US$82.5 million, usually considered minimum damages in such cases. THE SIERRA MOJADA DEPOSIT: Silver Bull’s only asset is the Sierra Mojada deposit located in Coahuila, Mexico. Sierra Mojada is an open pittable oxide deposit with a NI 43-101 compliant Measured and Indicated “global” Mineral Resource of 70.4 million tonnes grading 3.4% zinc and 38.6 g/t silver for 5.35 billion pounds of contained zinc and 87.4 million ounces of contained silver. Included within the “global” Mineral Resource is a Measured and Indicated “high grade zinc zone” of 13.5 million tonnes with an average grade of 11.2% zinc at a 6% cutoff, for 3.336 billion pounds of contained zinc, and a Measured and Indicated “high grade silver zone” of 15.2 million tonnes with an average grade of 114.9 g/t silver at a 50 g/t cutoff for 56.3 million contained ounces of silver. Mineralization remains open in the east, west, and northerly directions. For a full summary of the Sierra Mojada resource, please refer to Silver Bull’s news release located at the following link: https://www.silverbullresources.com/news/silver-bull-resources-announces-5.35-billion-pounds-zinc-87.4-million-ounces-silver-in-updated-sierra-mojada-measured-and/
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Funders of Suspended Law Firm Seek to Join Disciplinary Case

Moving beyond single-case funding and actively supporting law firms through direct funding is certainly a tempting prospect for many funders, creating new avenues for lucrative returns on their investments. However, as LFJ recently reported, these investments can be risky where the funded law firm faces financial difficulties, or in this example, where the firm is the target of allegations of malpractice and barred from collecting case fees. An article in Reuters provides the details on the unusual case of McClenny, Moseley & Associates, a Texas law firm that is currently facing disciplinary proceedings in the Western District of Louisiana. The firm and its attorneys came under the courts’ scrutiny earlier this year after it had filed hundreds of lawsuits against insurers, on behalf of households who had suffered property damage from hurricanes.  Allegations were leveled that the attorneys had “improperly solicited or paid for clients, brought claims against the wrong insurers, filed duplicate lawsuits or sued insurers that had already settled with their clients.” The Louisiana court has since suspended a group of the firm’s attorneys and, last month, prohibited them from collecting on any costs or fees from over 200 lawsuits it had filed in the district. However, the disciplinary case against McClenny, Moseley & Associates now has a new dimension, as two litigation funders, Equal Access Justice Fund and EAJF ESQ Fund, have asked U.S. District Judge James Cain to allow their participation in the disciplinary case. Having lent a combined $30 million to the law firm, the funders argued in their filing that they “need a seat at the table because the existing parties have not adequately represented (nor are they expected to adequately represent) the Lenders’ interests.” According to Reuters’ reporting, the funders are also pursuing litigation against the law firm in a Texas state court, as they seek to protect their investment which may now be in danger if the suspended law firm is not allowed to collect on any proceeds from the funded cases.

High Court Approves GLO for Claim Against Bayer Over Essure Sterilisation Device

The vast power and resources of the pharmaceutical industry means that where patients and consumers suffer harm from faulty products or treatments, it can often be incredibly difficult for these individuals to seek legal recourse. However, the news of a group litigation order (GLO) being approved against a global pharmaceutical giant demonstrates the power of collective actions, especially those that are well-funded, in furthering access to justice. An article in The Times covers the news that a GLO has been approved by the High Court for a claim brought against Bayer over its Essure sterilization device, which allegedly caused “excruciating pain, abnormal bleeding and nickel poisoning” for hundreds of women in the UK. Whilst the international pharmaceutical company has previously agreed settlements totaling £1.2 billion with around 40,000 women in the US, its failure to do so in the UK has led to this class action being brought. Pogust Goodhead, which is representing the UK claimants, has already been part of a similar claim in the Netherlands through the ‘Stichting Essure Claims’, an independent foundation representing Dutch women who have suffered similar injury from the devices. Whilst no specific funder has been named for the UK action, according to the claim’s website, Pogust Goodhead assures any potential claimants that it will “arrange all necessary insurance and funding”. Last year, Pogust Goodhead’s CIO, Ana Carolina Salomão Queiroz confirmed that the Stichting Essure in the Netherlands had received funding from Redbreast Associates N.V. Alicia Alinia, global COO at Pogust Goodhead stated that Bayer’s Essure device “has simply failed and has caused irreparable damage physically and mentally”. In response to the GLO being granted, Bayer released a statement claiming that “while all birth control products and procedures have risks, the totality of scientific evidence on Essure demonstrates that the benefit risk profile is positive.”

Analyzing the Impact of the Supreme Court’s Judgement on Offshore Litigation Funding 

In the weeks since the Supreme Court issued its decision in the PACCAR case, there has been much discussion about how funders and litigants will adapt their litigation funding agreements (LFAs) to comply with the DBA Regulations. However, most of these conversations have focused on LFAs for cases before English courts, whilst the potential impact on litigation funding in offshore jurisdictions has been largely unaddressed. In a new piece of analysis, Simon Jerrum, partner at Appleby, looks at the potential implications for funded cases taking place across the following seven offshore jurisdictions: the British Virgin Islands (BVI), Cayman Islands, Bermuda, Jersey, Guernsey, Isle of Man, and Mauritius. Assessing each of these jurisdictions in turn, he examines both the existing regulations that are in place govern the use of third-party funding, as well any case law that has indicated the courts’ stance on the enforceability and management of funding agreements.  For example, in the BVI, Jerrum notes that as it is a common law jurisdiction and lacks any equivalent of the domestic DBA Regulations, we are unlikely to see any “significant impact on litigation funding in the BVI.” Alternatively, when looking at the Cayman Islands’ introduction of the Private Funding of Legal Services Act 2020, Jerrum argues that it represents “a conscious decision by the legislature to allow the funding market to develop”, once again indicating that there will not be an immediate threat to funded cases. In concluding his analysis, Jerrum states that whilst many of these jurisdictions have legal structures that are at least seemingly favorable to litigation funding, he expects that “funders are likely to be considering amendments to all of their funding agreements regardless of the jurisdiction.” Jerrum suggests that this is a wise strategy, given that the Supreme Court represents a “persuasive authority in all of the offshore jurisdictions”, and that if there are challenges in these territories, the Court has “binding authority in the event that a case is appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.”

Delta Capital Partner Management Welcomes Accomplished Strategic Advisor as Chief Marketing Officer

Delta Capital Partners Management, a global private equity firm specializing in litigation and legal finance, is pleased to announce that David Temporal has joined the company as its Chief Marketing Officer.  Temporal also will be a member of the firm’s Management Committee and its Investment Committee. Temporal will oversee Delta’s worldwide marketing and communication responsibilities; work closely with Delta’s President and the firm’s existing team in London as they continue to expand the firm’s offerings across the UK and Europe; and work closely with Delta’s CEO on various key marketing and business development initiatives. Temporal has held various senior positions in the legal and marketing industries over his 30+ year professional history, including advising Magic Circle, Silver Circle, and AmLaw 100 firms with respect to attorney and practice group acquisitions, M&A, and other strategic activities. Temporal is also an entrepreneur having founded and led his own successful strategic consulting firm, Lexington Strategic Advisors. “I am thrilled to have David join the Delta team, where he will leverage his considerable marketing prowess and creativity to materially enhance our worldwide marketing and communication strategies.  As we have continued to expand globally, we had been searching for someone of David’s caliber to augment our existing team in London and also to assist with the execution of various important business development initiatives that we will be launching in the coming months.  David is perfect in these roles and I could not be more excited,” said Christopher DeLise, Delta’s Founder, CEO, and Co-CIO. “Joining the team at Delta provides me with a perfect opportunity to bring my experience-based, market insights about the legal sector and work to progress the development of Delta’s innovative funding solutions, which I believe to be a hugely valuable resource for law firms and businesses,” said Temporal. About Delta Delta Capital Partners Management LLC is a US-based, global private equity firm specializing exclusively in litigation and legal finance, judgment and award enforcement, and asset recovery.  Delta creates bespoke financing solutions for professional service firms, businesses, governments, financial institutions, investment firms, and individual claimants to enable them to investigate claims, pursue litigation or arbitration, recover assets, enforce judgments or awards, and more effectively manage their risks, cash flow, and capital expenditures.
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Innovation in Legal Finance (Part 2): What is “Event Driven Litigation Centric” Investing & Why Should Investors Care?

The following is a contributed piece by Ed Truant, founder of Slingshot Capital, Part 1 of this 2-part series can be found here Executive Summary
  • EDLC Investing is a relatively new, niche market requiring highly specialized skills
  • EDLC has many advantages over CLF investing, although it is not a directly comparable investment strategy due to its application to publicly traded markets
  • EDLC investing requires investors to have more of a buy/hold mentality than a ‘trader’ mentality due to the ‘fundamental’ risk being assumed
  • Despite EDLC ‘events’ being non-correlated, the publicly listed security aspects of their portfolios add some level of correlation which will impact fund performance, both positively and negatively
Slingshot Insights:
  • There are many benefits and few drawbacks to EDLC investing as compared to CLF
  • The scalability of EDLC investing is only limited to the number of dispute events
  • The ability to control and take advantage of risks, including the ability to influence litigation, in EDLC investing makes this an overall superior asset class in my opinion
  • The tools open to EDLC managers to mitigate risk or enhance returns (hedging, changing position sizes, trading during the investment period, liquidity) provide a number of benefits to securing better risk adjusted outcomes and allows them to avoid complete losses, although they come with a cost
  • EDLC investors may also have the ability to undertake CLF investing within their mandates
In Part 1 of this article, I introduced the concept of Event Driven Litigation Centric (EDLC) investing and started exploring some of the ways in which it differs from Commercial Litigation Finance (CLF) investing.  In this article we will dive deeper into some case studies and discuss some of the relative benefits and the return attributes of the asset class. Case Studies In order to make the concept more tangible, I reached out to a successful and influential investor in the EDLC market to provide some case studies of events in which they had invested along with some insight into how these investments were structured and the returns they produced. Case Study #1 – Indivior PLC (Ticker: INDV.L) Indivior touches on many of the themes at the center of EDLC investing.  Indivior Plc (“Indivior”) pioneered the use of buprenorphine for the treatment of opioid use disorder (“OUD”), including for the abuse of heroin and oxycontin.  For the past two decades, Indivior has dominated the OUD treatment market by virtue of its strong patent portfolio and continued improvements and refinement of its drugs.  However, in 2018, the company was hit with a criminal indictment in Virginia by the Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) for its aggressive marketing activities.  This led to a massive drop in the company’s public securities (bonds and equity), driving a once £3.6 billion market cap company to the point where the equities were trading down to the average of 41 pence during the first quarter of 2020, effectively liquidation levels.  It was at that point that the EDLC manager began its analysis, starting with researching the DOJ’s legal allegations.  This was supplemented with FOIA requests to the FDA, CDC and DEA, agencies that supervise and regulate Indivior.  Finally, the EDLC manager attended hearings in an obscure courthouse in Abington, Virginia where they were the only observer in the courtroom.  These due diligence steps, amongst others, led to the strong conclusion Indivior would settle the DOJ case for a fraction of the damages sought after and once resolved, the strength of the underlying business would be appreciated by the market.  These conclusions led the EDLC manager to make a significant investment at the then depressed stock price levels.  In July 2020, the DOJ and Indivior settled and the equity securities materially appreciated, trading at 120 pence at the time of the settlement.  Notably, this opportunity existed only for EDLC investors as there was no opportunity for investment by CLF investors. Indivior’s stock price currently trades around 1,800 pence, which translates to 360 pence prior to the reverse stock split as a comparison to the 120 pence price at time of settlement and the 41 pence price when the investment was made or 9 times appreciation in value from trough to current market values. This is a notable example because not only did value get created through the valuation dislocation related to the event, but the underlying thesis of the strength of Indivior’s business provided further upside as the company continued to capitalize on their product pipeline and expand market share. Case Study #2 – Hertz Global Holdings Inc. (formerly Hertz Corporation) (New Ticker: HTZ) Where Indivior presented a mispriced security arising from a claim against a company, Hertz equity was mispriced based on the market believing that the Hertz bankruptcy process would extinguish pre-emergence equity holders.  The EDLC manager had prior experience in bankruptcy equity situations and believed Hertz equity holders were entitled to a recovery in the bankruptcy case, a view no one in the market believed as reflected by Hertz equity trading as low as $0.50.  Based on prior experience in bankruptcy equity situations, the manager assembled the appropriate advisors and like-minded hedge funds, the Hertz Ad Hoc Equity Steerco (the “Steerco”), to litigate in the bankruptcy case for a recovery.   The Steerco, partnering with a private equity team consisting of Apollo, Knighthead and Certares (the “AKC Team”), succeeded in convincing the court to hold an auction to bid for the assets of Hertz, as opposed to allowing the creditors to take control.  The AKC Team succeeded in winning the auction and, as a result of their involvement, the manager had the opportunity to invest an outsized proportion of capital in what was one of the most successful restructurings in 2021.  As an EDLC investor, it was able to increase and decrease its position throughout the bankruptcy case as new facts arose, an option most CLF investors do not have.  Equally important was the manager’s ability to drive the litigation (unlike CLF investors who are passive) to enhance recoveries for their specific Ad Hoc Equity group.  And finally, due to their deep involvement in the process and partnership with the private equity sponsors (Apollo and Certares), the Manager developed a deep appreciation of the underlying business which provided a competitive advantage well after Hertz’s emergence from bankruptcy.  In the month following Hertz’ emergence from bankruptcy on July 1, 2021, the average value of the assets received per share of pre-reorganized equity was $8.95, and further increased in the months to follow.  From trough to peak an EDLC investor could have stood to earn 18X their investment. Investment Scale One of the drawbacks of the CLF market is a lack of scale.  The average single case funding contract is $4.3MM, according to Westfleet’s 2022 Litigation Finance Market Report. There are larger single case and portfolio financing investments available, but fewer in numbers. So, if you are an investment manager that is looking to achieve economies of scale for your own fund and manage significant amounts of money for large institutional investors, scale is a critical success factor that is not inherent in the CLF market (while portfolio financings do allow you to increase scale they are also limited in number and the large single case investments are few and far between which is why Burford, the world’s largest litigation finance company, mainly focuses on portfolio financings). Conversely, EDLC investing is only limited by the size of the publicly listed entities that are impacted by the event. In the context of the public markets, this is a massive potential marketplace estimated at $119 trillion and $46 trillion for the Global and American bond markets, respectively. Global and American equity markets add another $100 trillion and $40 trillion, respectively. Accordingly, the scale for EDLC is only limited by the number and size of companies that are impacted by a litigation or similar event at any given point in time. EDLC investors can take as large or as small a position in the debt and equity of companies as they want based on what is appropriate in the context of the risk inherent in the transaction and their portfolio construction parameters as well as any limitations therein. Further, EDLC investors are not only limited to investing long, they can also take short positions, where available. We will discuss more about short sales when we review the benefits of hedging. Another benefit of scale is that the transaction costs related to EDLC investments can be amortized over a much larger investment and so they are relatively less meaningful to the outcome of the investment as compared to the single case CLF market where the average case size is much lower and therefore the transaction costs (funding contracts, diligence, expert opinions, etc.) have a much more significant negative impact (or ‘drag’) to the net return on investment. Return Timelines Most independent EDLC investors are structured in the form of a hedge fund. Hedge funds typically get compensated annually for their performance, making them a relatively short-term type of investment strategy. While the EDLC manager has the option to invest in longer-duration investments, they know full well how they will be measured by their investors. Conversely, CLF managers have no choice but to invest in and get judged on longer-term performance, similar to many private equity (“PE”) managers.  However, unlike PE managers I would content it is impossible to value single case investments whereas it is easier to value enterprise value of operating companies (less so for earlier stage ventures) and so the CLF manager loses the ability to mark-to-market their investments the way PE does. Therefore, it is not uncommon for CLF managers to run negative returns in their funds (in part due to the J-curve effect and in part due to the fact that investments are held at cost until a write-down or realization event) for the first few years of the fund’s life as they deploy their commitments and their early investments start to progress (although invariably CLF managers will have some strong early unexpected wins). So, if you are an investor in these strategies you will naturally favour the manager that can produce positive short-term returns over one that may ultimately produce good returns but only after a significant portion of the portfolio (think > 75%, depending on fund concentration) of the portfolio has been realized (which is not to say this is the appropriate way in which to measure performance, it’s just a reflection of investor bias). Suffice it to say, comparing the two strategies in terms of short-term performance will yield dramatically different results and you may only find out your CLF investor is good after 5, 6, or 7 years, which is too long for most investors. For foundations, endowments and pension plans that have longer-term investment horizons they are more apt to give the CLF manager the benefit of the doubt. For most other investors, they will want to see performance manifest fairly quickly and so EDLC investment will probably be more in alignment with their expectations. Liquidity & Duration While investors typically speak of duration and liquidity as two separate and distinct concepts, for commercial litigation finance investors the two are intertwined. For a CLF investor, their ability to obtain liquidity on their investment is typically limited to obtaining co-investors or attracting a secondary purchaser if they can find one, potentially assisted with the application of insurance.  For EDLC investors, they are inherently investing (although not exclusively) in the public markets which means their investments are as liquid as it gets (perhaps less so for Rule 144 Debt, which is a less liquid market). The availability of liquidity has a direct consequence for duration.  For example, if a litigation funder enters into a funding contract their main avenue for liquidity stems from the proceeds (or not) that result from the outcome of the case and the collection of the proceeds, which can take anywhere from a few months to a few years.  In certain circumstances and typically for very large cases there exists a ‘secondary’ market that will allow a funder to sell all or a portion of their interests in the case as the case becomes de-risked through the litigation process. A prime example of this are the secondary sales Burford Capital had arranged for its interest in the ‘Peterson’ claims, which allowed them to book significant gains and obtain cashflow even though the litigation had not been decided. Although, for litigation funders, this source of liquidity is a bit of an anomaly and mainly available to the largest of the cases. EDLC investors on the other hand, because they are typically investing in liquid markets to begin with, have the ultimate power over when to liquidate their positions, how much to liquidate (it doesn’t have to be all or nothing as it is with most litigation funding contracts), and how much to hedge their gains (or losses) if they are in a gain (or loss) position.  In essence, the EDLC investor is, subject to the vagaries of the markets, in control of their duration.  Although one could argue that the EDLC investor does require the event to occur in order to maximize their investment and so the ideal duration may be governed by the timing of the event.  The significant benefit associated with liquidity cannot be understated.  Other than binary risk, the single biggest risk inherent in financing litigation is duration and generally the longer the duration inherent in an investment, the lower the internal rates of return that investment can create because there is typically a limit to the quantum of proceeds or multiples of capital they can charge. A related point Is that CLF requires continued funding for appeals and remands.  Litigation duration is unpredictable and CLF managers may be forced to fund until final resolution/settlement.  EDLC Investors often realize the appreciation in their investment upon a positive decision, allowing the EDLC fund to exit without the risk of getting over-turned on appeal. Taxation There has been much written about the taxation of litigation funding contracts and the use of prepaid forward contracts as a method to ensure capital gains treatment for US tax purposes.  Unfortunately, there is very little in terms of precedent that exists to give CLF investors comfort that the outcome of funding contracts will in fact be taxed as capital gains for US tax purposes. The same uncertainty exists in many other jurisdictions. One of the benefits of EDLC investing is that it mainly involved investing in “securities” and it has been well established that gains/loss on securities are capital in nature. In the US there are differences in taxation between long-term and short-term capital gains but there is 100% certainty that gains and losses on securities are capital in nature. Accordingly, the certainty inherent in the taxation of EDLC gains is a significant benefit for investors that can save time and money as compared to assuming tax risk associated with CLF investing. Enough about theory, what about returns? Having been involved in the litigation finance market and being privy to a variety of fund managers’ results, the vast majority of which are for funds that have not been completely realized (an inherent limitation in assessing performance), I can tell you that from my perspective the industry in general is likely under-performing investors’ expectations, on average. However, I would also tell you that the experience is very manager specific with some investors content with their returns and others ecstatic.  In other words, as with many asset classes manager selection is critical to performance. On average, the CLF industry wins cases about 70% of the time and hence loses the remaining 30% (whether via outright loss, partial loss or withdrawals of financing commitments).  That 30% loss ratio places a lot of pressure on the remaining winning cases to perform, which would be fine if managers could control duration. But they can’t!  The combination of binary risk and duration risk makes this a very challenging asset class.  In addition, I am finding many managers do not understand how to build properly diversified portfolios and hence many of the portfolios I see are far too concentrated which makes it difficult to manage the inherent volatility of a portfolio with binary risk characteristics, especially when you marry that volatility with duration risk. When I look at the performance of EDLC investing, it is difficult to draw conclusions on performance simply because there are so few managers that pursue this strategy in a way that dominates their portfolios and even then much of this information is private.  What I can say is that the EDLC Manager with whom I have invested has produced approximately 52.84% returns since inception (29 months), but the returns are somewhat a mixture of realized and unrealized returns (i.e. they have yet to exit their investment but the underlying investments have gone up or down in value due to the volatility inherent in the public markets).  As I have referenced in the section below, the issue with an EDLC manager’s performance is that it combines realized and unrealized returns in any given period and so while you have invested in the manager to produce returns through their investment hold periods, the mark-to-market that occurs within the portfolio during the interim tends to muddy the return profile.  In ‘bull markets’, it will make the results look better than they actually are and in ‘bear markets’, such as those we are currently in right now, it can tend to make the results appear worse. Ironically, it is the current markets that make the best buying opportunities for EDLC managers as it is times of stress that contribute to more litigation and regulatory events and hence more and better opportunities as stock prices are also generally depressed, but such periods may add some duration risk. If you strip out the unrealized returns and focus on the realized returns, then the picture will more closely reflect the reality of the strategy.  One way to do this is to look at Special Purpose Vehicles (“SPVs”) that may be set up for specific investments where the size of the investment opportunity exceeds the fund’s concentration limits and review the performance of these SPVs which focus on a single investment thesis. On this metric, the EDLC Manager in which I have invested has had some exceptional returns across a number of investments which have exceeded 50% IRRs.  Of course, not every investment is successful, but I do like the fact that there are very few circumstances where the EDLC investor suffers a complete loss which is a meaningful statistical difference between the two strategies’ risk/reward profiles. In addition, you need to be very careful in extrapolating the outcomes of a handful of investments as statistically they will not be representative of the performance of a broader portfolio over a longer period of time. It is not uncommon and some might say it is necessary for CLF managers to book high IRR realizations early on in the life of the portfolio, but these early wins typically have low MOICs and are ultimately necessary to offset the losses that statistically occur in most portfolios. Having said that, the EDLC manager with whom I have invested produced +11.04% return in 2022, a year in which S&P 500, Dow Jones Industrial Average and the Russell 2000 returned -18.01%, -8.78% and -21.56%, respectively.  Accordingly, the EDLC investor produced strong non-correlated returns despite the portfolio being exposed to correlation, which I believe speaks volumes of the ability of this asset class to produce significant alpha.  The alpha is essentially driven through material public information, but one needs to be aware that the information is available and know where to look to find it and interpret it, which is the ‘secret sauce’ to exceptional returns in the EDLC space. Too Good to be True? If you are a CLF manager or investor, this is probably sounding almost too good to be true, right? Well, there are some downsides to EDLC investing. One of them is that EDLC returns are ultimately subject to the volatility of the markets as their investments are typically valued daily by the markets, which may, but more than likely do not, possess the same level of material public information as the EDLC investor. So, while an EDLC investor may be right, the stock market may decide otherwise at least until the date of the event that is causing the mis-pricing is reached and the resulting event information is disseminated through the public markets. Now, if we look at the larger publicly-listed litigation finance firms (Burford, Omni Bridgeway and LCM), we will also see that their stock prices are somewhat correlated despite investing in an otherwise non-correlated asset class.  So, they suffer some of the same correlation risks as an EDLC investor might although I suspect if one did the technical analysis they might find that EDLC portfolios are probably more highly correlated to the markets than the publicly listed litigation finance managers, in part because their investment positions are poorly understood by the market which is the reason for the investment to begin with and in part because their portfolios are almost entirely publicly listed companies with price transparency.  In the case of a pure play CLF fund their returns will be as uncorrelated as one can find in financial markets, which is a strong benefit for investors looking to offset their correlation exposures. However, I think what is important is to have the right perspective and time horizon when making any such investments involving “events”, be they litigation or anything else.  In the case of both EDLC and CLF, your investment thesis is based on the intended outcome that the manager is underwriting and not the variability inherent in the positions taken to affect those investments.  The following theoretical stock chart illustrates the point that you need to be invested for the right period of time to allow the outcome underlying the investment to realize or you may suffer as a consequence.  If your hold period is too short, you may suffer from the volatility of the markets and what would otherwise be a great investment if you held from A to B, the point of the realization of the underlying event (i.e. a 35% gain), becomes a poor investment because you decided to exit the fund at C (i.e. a 55.5% loss). As an investor, you really need to provide the EDLC manager with adequate time to prove out their thesis and judge their performance on the sum total of the outcomes (i.e. when they close their positions) of their various investments as opposed to the market’s view of their value in the periods in between when the investment is made and the event occurs and even then it may take another quarter or two before the market fully understands and properly values the impact of the event’s economic impact on the security.  And to a certain extent EDLC is perhaps best invested in through a private equity fund type structure where the investor does not have the option to obtain liquidity for a fixed period of time so that they don’t make the same mistake that many public market investors do, which is to let emotion overtake rational thought and sell out of their investment at the worst possible time.  Interestingly, the volatility illustrated in the chart above also presents an opportunity for the EDLC manager to take advantage of this volatility by increasing their position as the stock price moves toward C and decrease their position to lock in gains as the stock price heads toward B.  In other words, they can double down on their strong conviction investments if the market continues to get it wrong. All this to say whereas CLF is about as non-correlated an investment strategy as you can get, there is an element of correlation that EDLC investors have to contend with during the manager’s hold period.  Conversely, CLF managers don’t have the same price transparency for their investments as they derive their value from the contractual terms of the funding contract, which are ultimately driven by the outcome of the litigation, and hence it is virtually impossible to value litigation (although IFRS is going to make the publicly-listed entities attempt to do just that - it may work in the context of valuing a portfolio, but likely not in the context of a single case).  Although, I would contend that this is a small price to pay for all of the inherent benefits accorded the EDLC investing strategy relative to CLF investing and is no worse than the illiquidity afforded CLF investing. Fundamental Risk The other significant difference between the two strategies is the fact that an EDLC investor is assuming “fundamental” or company risk when they invest directly in debt or equity securities, whereas CLF investing is investing in a financial contract tied to litigation outcome.  Accordingly, an EDLC investor could be 100% correct about the undervalued nature of a given security in light of the litigation, yet their returns may suffer either due to correlation, as discussed above, or due to the fundamental risk inherent in the positions they acquire as they are direct investors in the company and a derivative investor in the claim. If a company wins its litigation event, but has to take a write-down in its operations or misses its revenue expectations then the EDLC investor may still lose overall.  However, it is very unlikely they will lose their entire investment which is a real risk in CLF investing. Of course, the opposite is also true and one could argue that the fundamental risk can also serve as a hedge for the litigation.  For example, the other scenario that could arise is that the manager was wrong on the outcome of the litigation but right on the fundamentals of the business which would allow the losses of one to offset the gains of the other, acting as an imperfect hedge. So, the inherent assumption of fundamental risk associated with EDLC investing can serve as an amplifier of returns, positive or negative, or it can serve as a hedge against the outcome of the litigation event. So, why isn’t EDLC investing a massive market? Simply put, it’s not an easy discipline to master and it does come with some uncontrollable variables. Understanding litigation and the potential outcomes thereof is very difficult to master. Understanding financial valuation is difficult as well as being complex, uncertain and varying with the markets. Understanding commercial operations of an operating business and its industry dynamics takes managers a lifetime to master. Finding all of those specialties in one place, is very rare.  To be fair, no one can be an expert in all of those areas effectively and so there is an element of EDLC investing which involves leveraging other experts and effectively operating as a ‘quarter-back’ to make the ‘plays’ happen. But as we all know, finding a Tom Brady or Peyton Manning doesn’t happen very often! Slingshot Insights As you will see from my disclosure below, I like the strategy so much I became an investor and this strategy now represents my largest investment in legal finance related strategies. In my opinion it provides all of the same exposures as those of litigation finance, but does so in a way that mitigates downside risk and maximizes upside potential. It adds an element of flexibility for the manager that can’t be found in CLF investing, in my experience.  The clear taxation treatment removes an area of lingering concern for me as it relates to the CLF marketplace. As long as you have an appropriate investing horizon and are prepared to deal with some mark correlation while the investment thesis plays out, this appears to me to be a significantly better approach to obtaining exposure to idiosyncratic risks to create a portfolio of uncorrelated outcomes. As always, I welcome your comments and counterpoints to those raised in this article.  Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc. and an investor in the consumer and commercial litigation finance industry.  Slingshot Capital inc. is involved in the origination and design of unique opportunities in legal finance markets, globally, advising and investing with and alongside institutional investors. Disclosure: An entity controlled by the author is an investor in investing vehicles managed by the EDLC Manager referred to herein.
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Settlement in LCM-Funded Australian Class Action

Litigation Capital Management Limited (AIM:LIT), a leading international alternative asset manager of disputes financing solutions, announces the outcome of the settlement reached in an Australian class action funded by it.

As previously announced (15 May 2023), the class action was brought in the Federal Court of Australia against the Commonwealth of Australia on behalf of persons who are alleged to have suffered loss and damage as the result of the contamination of their land at seven sites around Australia in proximity to Department of Defence military bases.

The Commonwealth has agreed to pay the sum of AUD$132.7M in order to resolve the class action. A confidential deed of settlement was executed and has now been approved by the court, allowing the disbursement of funds, subject to the unlikely event of appeal.

The claim forms part of LCM’s managed Global Alternative Returns Fund ("Fund I") and was funded directly from LCM's balance sheet (25%) and Fund I Investors (75%). Details of the returns are highlighted below:

*AUD$mInvestment performanceLCM performance metrics
Invested capital13.53.4
Investment return28.67.2
Total revenue42.110.6
ROIC on investment2.122.12
Performance fee*-6.4
Gross profit28.613.6
ROIC after performance fees2.124.03

*The investment returns are subject to change based on the prevailing FX rate and timing of distribution

Patrick Moloney, CEO of LCM, said: "This settlement is a positive start to the fiscal year, demonstrating the momentum LCM’s portfolio has gained over the last six months. We continue to scale our portfolio of investments through increased commitments which are a key indicator of future growth and long term shareholder value.” 

About LCM

 Litigation Capital Management (LCM) is an alternative asset manager specialising in disputes financing solutions internationally, which operates two business models. The first is direct investments made from LCM's permanent balance sheet capital and the second is third party fund management. Under those two business models, LCM currently pursues three investment strategies: Single-case funding, Portfolio funding and Acquisitions of claims. LCM generates its revenue from both its direct investments and also performance fees through asset management.

LCM has an unparalleled track record driven by disciplined project selection and robust risk management. Currently headquartered in Sydney, with offices in London, Singapore, Brisbane and Melbourne, LCM listed on AIM in December 2018, trading under the ticker LIT.

www.lcmfinance.com

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Indian Litigation Funding Market Primed for Future Growth

When looking at the future of litigation finance, unlocking the potential of the Asian market may be the key to exponential growth for third-party funders. Within this region, India offers one of the most enticing opportunities, with an incredibly high volume of legal claims brought every year and a legal system that could benefit from an influx of outside capital. A feature in Asian Legal Business India uncovers the changing attitudes towards litigation finance in the country, looking at the underlying drivers of adoption, and the challenges that may face the nascent market.  Citing data from the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report, the article notes that the average cost of litigation in India accounts for 31 percent of the claim’s value, notably 10 percent higher than the cost of litigation in OECD countries. These high costs combined with the equally disproportionate length of commercial contract disputes, 1,445 days in India versus 590 days for OECD countries, provide fertile ground for the growth of third-party funding.  Kundan Shahi, founder and CEO of LegalPay, notes that the recent judgement in the Delhi High Court and legislative developments in other states “mark a palpable shift in perception and signal a resounding acceptance of this transformative product.” Naresh Thacker, head of disputes at Economic Laws Practice, cautions that whilst the increasing acceptance and adoption of litigation financing is positive, “it may garner attention from legislative bodies to consider introducing a regulatory framework.” Looking towards the future of litigation finance in India, Shahi argues that “growth is inevitable”, but points out whilst the structural deficiencies in the country’s legal system are drivers of demand, they still create issues. To continue this growth, Shahi suggests that if the Indian courts can achieve “a better timeline record for the disposal of commercial litigations/ arbitration, the market will attract more investors.”

Judge in Torres Strait Island Case Highlights Funder’s Motives

Whilst litigation funders and their supporters regularly promote the benefits that the practice can bring to the legal system, it is immediately clear that not all parties within the courts share the same appreciation for third-party funding. An ongoing dispute between a local council in northern Australia and a shipping operator has highlighted this issue once again, with a judge suggesting that the funder’s motives are not necessarily aligned with the local community’s best interests.  Reporting by ABC News covers the latest updates from the dispute between the Torres Strait Island Regional Council (TSIRC) and Sea Swift, one of Australia’s largest shipping companies, over the council’s issuance of $66 million in invoices. The legal case revolves around 253 invoices that TSIRC sent to Sea Swift last December, requesting that the shipping company pay “default maritime fees” for failing to adequately self-report its use of the council-owned boat ramps and jetties.  Justice Peter Applegarth, of the Supreme Court, issued a judgement on Monday that stated TSIRC’s attempt to charge these fees exceeded the council’s authority. Furthermore, Justice Applegarth questioned TSIRC’s methods of calculating the $66 million total for the ‘maritime fees,’ and suggested that the “extraordinarily large demand” may have been an “intended to bring Sea Swift to the settlement table.” As TSIRC is being supported by an unnamed litigation funder, Justice Applegarth’s ruling was of particular interest, since during his call for the dispute to be “promptly mediated”,  he highlighted the role of the funder and argued it was “not supporting TSIRC's litigation as an act of charity or out of love for the people of the Torres Strait.” The judge clarified that he was not seeking to denigrate the work of the funder or its lawyers, and that his “encouragement for the parties to submit to early mediation is not intended to deprive lawyers of work or a litigation funder of its slice of any eventual court award in favour of TSIRC.” Whilst the judge suggested the council’s resources could be better used to support its community, which is home to “the financially poorest people in our state”, TSIRC’s chief executive, James William, defended the council’s use of third-party funding. In a statement to ABC News, William said that “the proceedings have not cost TSIRC anything, as the fees are all being funded on very reasonable terms, which I am not in a position to give any further details on.”

Judge in 3M Lawsuit Orders Disclosure of Funding Arrangements

As LFJ highlighted in an article yesterday, the issue of disclosure for litigation funding has never been more prominent, and there is no universally agreed upon solution in sight across the US district courts. However, a settlement in one of the largest multi-district lawsuits in the US has provided another fresh example of this divisive issue. Reporting by Bloomberg Law outlines the latest development in the 3M earplug litigation, with District Judge M. Casey Rodgers ordering the claimants’ lawyers to produce information about their funding arrangements. Earlier this week, 3M announced it had agreed to a $6 billion settlement to resolve around 260,000 lawsuits, and it was swiftly followed by Judge Rodgers’ order for the plaintiffs’ attorneys to disclose what proportion of the settlement would be distributed to funders. In her order, Judge Rodgers explained that her intention was to prevent claimants from being “exploited by predatory lending practices, such as interest rates well above market rates, which can interfere with their ability to objectively evaluate the fairness of their settlement options.” Whilst the information will be filed under seal, the order requires the disclosure of any financing arrangements with claimants and includes the requirement for those individual funding agreements to be delivered. Both claimants and lawyers are also prohibited from engaging in new funding agreements without the court’s permission. In a statement to LFJ, Eric Schuller, president of the Alliance for Responsible Consumer Legal Funding (ARC), provided the following comment: “Unfortunately, there is a lot of misinformation when it comes to Consumer Legal Funding. All of ARC members follow a set of Best Practices that include having the consumer's attorney review the contract. This is why ARC is a proponent of proper regulation of the industry so that there is no confusion on the transaction and the consumer is fully informed as to the cost associated with the transaction.”

$137.2 Million Settlement in PFAS Class Action Funded by LCM

One of the most prominent examples of environmental pollution affecting individuals and communities in recent years has been the spread of Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), otherwise known as ‘forever chemicals’. However, litigation funders are proving to be a powerful ally for those communities who have suffered harm from government or corporate malpractice, as a recent settlement in an Australian class action has demonstrated. An article by The Daily Advertiser provides an overview of the latest development in the class action brought against the Australian government, which represented landowners who were affected by toxic PFAS chemicals in firefighting foam. The parties in the class action had reached an in-principle agreement for a $137.2 million settlement in May and on August 25, the settlement was approved by the Federal Court’s Justice Michael Lee. Contamination from these forever chemicals had reportedly affected around 30,000 landowners in Australia, with the class action alleging that the government had not taken adequate measures to prevent these chemicals from spreading into the soil and groundwater. Shine Lawyers represented the claimants, and the firm’s joint head of class actions, Craig Allsop, emphasised that “this does not have to be the end of the battle for compensation and acknowledgement", as individuals who suffered personal injury from these toxic chemicals can still bring claims. In a post on LinkedIn, Litigation Capital Management (LCM) stated that it was “very pleased to have funded the class action brought on behalf of group members against the Commonwealth of Australia in relation to the alleged contamination of their land by PFAS.” Lina Kolomoitseva, senior investment manager at LCM, managed the funder’s involvement in the class action.

LexCapital Provides Update on Strategic Initiatives and Partnerships

Despite the looming possibility of increased regulation for litigation finance in the European Union, in the last year we have seen a surge in litigation funding activity within individual European jurisdictions. Among these countries, Italy has been one of the most notable for its increase in activity, and has seen new domestic funders launch operations, with LexCapital entering the market in July 2022. In a post on LinkedIn, Giuseppe Farchione, COO of LexCapital, provides an update on the funder’s recent activities and its plans for the remainder of 2023. Farchione stated that the LexCapital team are “enthusiastic about the project, about the partners who have placed their trust in the management team that has formed and is getting stronger.” Farchione also provided a list of LexCapital’s current and planned initiatives:
  • The launch of the Rottamazione dei derivati (Scrapping of derivatives) campaign, to “collect the interest and acquire the disputed rights of/from all subjects” who have suffered harm from illegitimate financial derivative contracts.
  • The planned launch of the ‘LexInsurance’ initiative, which will see LexCapital partner with leading Italian insurers to offer ATE insurance coverage to litigants.
  • A proprietary business intelligence system: LexCapital Litigation Assessment (LLA), which has now entered into its testing phase and includes a database of 1.2 million judgements.
  • A strategic partnership with German and French partners focused on antitrust litigation, which will be announced when the contracts are finalised.
  • A separate partnership with a Spanish partner also focused on antitrust litigation, also to be announced in future.
  • A strategic agreement with an Italian consumer association to support their members’ collective actions or individual claims.
Studying and planning to launch a social impact and not for profit initiative, including speaking at the “Sustaining Access to Justice in Europe: New Avenues for Costs and Funding” conference in Rotterdam.

Analysing the Varying Funding Disclosure Requirements in District Courts

Whilst much has been made of ongoing efforts to increase disclosure requirements for third-party litigation funding in patent lawsuits, it is important to remember that there is little uniformity in these requirements across the US. A new piece of analysis examines some of the most notable jurisdictions across America, providing insight into recent rulings to see where plaintiffs should be most aware of disclosure rules.  A new article by Zacharias Shepard, associate at Baker Botts, provides an overview of recent court decisions that have impacted disclosure requirements for third-party funding of patent disputes. He first considers the ongoing saga in the District of Delaware, where Chief Judge Colm Connolly’s standing order has imposed stringent disclosure measures that require parties to not only disclose the identity of any third-party funders, but also details around the funders’ level of control and financial interest. As Shepard notes, this standing order has already faced challenges, most notably from Nimitz Technologies, whose petition to reverse one of Judge Connolly’s orders was denied by the Federal Circuit. He suggests that whilst there are likely to be further challenges to Judge Connolly’s standing order, plaintiffs involved in cases in the District of Delaware should initially be prepared to disclose details around their funding arrangements. In contrast, Shepard highlights recent rulings from the Eastern District of Texas that have favoured plaintiffs by allowing funding arrangements to remain confidential. Of particular note among these rulings was Hardin v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., where the Court held that “[l]itigation funders have an inherent interest in maintaining the confidentiality of potential clients’ information and, therefore, [Plaintiffs] had an expectation that the information disclosed to the litigation funders would be treated as confidential.” Nearby, in the Western District of Texas, there are no mandatory disclosure requirements for third-party funding, but Shepard points out that the district’s Local Rule CV-33 does allow ‘parties to use interrogatories to identify publicly-owned non-party companies that have financial interests in the outcome of the litigation.’ In the Northern District of California, Shepard explains that whilst a local rule requires ‘disclosure of non-parties having a financial interest in the case’, rulings in this jurisdiction have largely favoured plaintiffs’ desire to maintain the confidentiality of their funding arrangements.  

Jordan Litigation Funding Listed Among Law Firm’s Creditors in Bankruptcy Filings

With the ongoing maturation of the litigation funding industry, we regularly hear funders discussing opportunities for growth around investing directly into law firms rather than simply investing into cases. However, these investments are clearly not without risk, as a recent law firm bankruptcy has demonstrated. Reporting in The Legal Intelligencer highlights the news that Sacks Weston LLC, a Philadelphia-based law firm, filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy last week. Sacks Weston had previously made headlines last year, when its former partner, Scott Diamond, pled guilty to stealing legal fees in excess of $319,000 since 2018. The bankruptcy documentation reveals that the law firm still has between $10 to $40 million in funds available for its creditors, with Jordan Litigation Funding listed among those creditors.  Jordan Litigation Funding has already filed a lawsuit against Sacks Weston, alleging that the law firm has failed to repay two loans, with the separate loans valued at $90,000 and $60,000. However, in its bankruptcy filing, Sacks Weston reported that the total amount owed to Jordan Litigation Funding is only $124,000, which leaves a $26,000 disparity between the two parties’ figures. Sacks Weston is represented in its bankruptcy filings by David Smith, founding partner at Smith Kane Holman, who stated that they “expect that the Firm will successfully reorganize its affairs and emerge from its chapter 11 case.”

ABA Innovation Leaders Don’t Want Non-Lawyers Owning Law Firms

Many say the future of law is linked to financial structures such as litigation finance, and similar legal investment products that expand access to justice. Yet, ABA innovation unit leaders have firmly stated their position that non-lawyers should be prevented from holding a stake in law firm ownership. Bloomberg Law reports that ABA Innovation leaders are arguing that the expansion of law firm ownership structures could jeopardize lawyer independence, at the detriment to claimants and the broader legal system. A majority of jurisdictions in the United States have adopted decades-old ABA rules that do not allow fee sharing agreements between lawyers and non-lawyers. Yet reducing costs and barriers to entry for quality legal services should be paramount, according to proponents for legal innovation quoted in Bloomberg's feature.  The ABA innovation unit was founded in 2016 with an annual budget of approximately $400,000, earmarked mostly to establish greater access to legal aid services for the underprivileged. According to Bloomberg, the ABA innovation budget was cut to around $300,000 a year. With such cuts to investment in innovation, some legal scholars suggest greater urgency to further the ABA's iconic legacy. 

Innovation in Legal Finance (Part 1 of 2): What is “Event Driven Litigation Centric” Investing & Why Should Investors Care?

The following is a contributed piece by Ed Truant, founder of Slingshot Capital, Executive Summary
  • EDLC Investing is a relatively new, niche market requiring highly specialized skills
  • EDLC has many advantages over CLF investing, although it is not a directly comparable investment strategy due to its application to publicly traded markets
  • EDLC investing requires investors to have more of a buy/hold mentality than a ‘trader’ mentality due to the ‘fundamental’ risk being assumed
  • Despite EDLC ‘events’ being non-correlated, the publicly listed security aspects of their portfolios add some level of correlation which will impact fund performance, both positively and negatively
Slingshot Insights:
  • There are many benefits and few drawbacks to EDLC investing as compared to CLF
  • The scalability of EDLC investing is only limited to the number of dispute events
  • The ability to control and take advantage of risks, including the ability to influence litigation, in EDLC investing makes this an overall superior asset class in my opinion
  • The tools open to EDLC managers to mitigate risk or enhance returns (hedging, changing position sizes, trading during the investment period, liquidity) provide a number of benefits to securing better risk adjusted outcomes and allows them to avoid complete losses, although they come with a cost
  • EDLC investors may also have the ability to undertake CLF investing within their mandates
As I interface with investors and fund managers in the legal finance market, I am constantly on the lookout for new investing strategies that can either provide a better risk-reward outcome than traditional legal finance investments, or add an element of ‘edge’. Edge is a word used in asset management circles to describe a unique point of differentiation that results in a better risk-reward outcome, which could either result in lower risk or higher returns or a balance of both, as compared to another manager executing the same strategy. In the commercial litigation finance market, many of the fund offerings are generally homogenous with ‘edge’ being provided by an area of specialization where the team has a data or insight advantage in comparison to their peer group, which in turn, allows them to outperform their competitors. Sometimes the manager has decided to focus on a particular case type (consumer, mass tort, bulk claims, etc.) and their portfolio consists entirely of that single case type, where they have created a point of differentiation around their ability to identify good cases and perhaps some efficiency associated with originating and administering claims to settlement. Sometimes, the manager will have a particular expertise in a particular claim type, Intellectual Property (“IP”) for example, and their portfolio consists entirely of IP claims. Another way to differentiate yourself is to apply an existing model to a different market.  In commercial litigation finance, many of the funding contracts are private, illiquid and are generally providing financial support to small private companies with limited financial resources.  However, there is another model that applies many of the same litigation finance attributes, but to the much larger public markets, and this may be referred to as the “Event Driven Litigation Centric” (“EDLC”) Investing market. Perhaps a more appropriate moniker is Event Driven Dispute Centric investing, as the strategy stretches beyond litigation and could involve any dispute (i.e. regulatory, customer, employee, etc.) that gives rise to a pricing dislocation. “Event Driven” investing is nothing new. It has been practiced by hedge funds and professional investors for decades. Investopedia does a great job of describing event driven investing, which follows: An event-driven strategy is a type of investment strategy that attempts to take advantage of temporary stock mis-pricing, which can occur before or after a corporate event takes place. It is most often used by private equity or hedge funds because it requires necessary expertise to analyze corporate events for successful execution. Examples of corporate events include restructurings, mergers/acquisitions, bankruptcy, spinoffs, takeovers, and others. An event-driven strategy exploits the tendency of a company's stock price to suffer during a period of change. However, if you do a search for Event Driven Litigation Centric investing, your browser may come back with few results, if any. If it does, it may reference situations involving securities litigation, which is but one application of this strategy. EDLC is not for the faint of heart, but there are many attributes that merit discussion and contemplation, because in comparison to commercial litigation finance, I believe it has many advantages and few disadvantages. First, let’s define what it is.  Event Driven Litigation Centric Investing Defined EDLC is a form of investing where the event involves litigation either for or against a publicly listed entity, where the investment is typically in the form of debt, equity, or both. EDLC investors look for investment opportunities where a piece of litigation (or similar event like a regulatory breach or other issue) arose for or against a corporation, and the market has either misinterpreted the risk or the reward such that the debt or equity of the corporation in question is either lower or higher than its intrinsic value when you adjust for the potential effect of the litigation (or other similar) event. It is often the case that the public markets are not rational (despite efficient financial market theories), and they consistently under or over react to an event, especially a litigation event where the potential outcomes and timing are inherently uncertain and almost impossible to accurately value.  To be fair to the public investor, including institutional investors, they simply have neither the information nor the skill to properly and accurately value the financial impact of such an event. Accordingly, in the absence of that information and insight, they indiscriminately ‘dump’ the stock and repatriate the proceeds elsewhere, or they mistakenly believe the event is less impactful than it is in actuality, and hold on to a stock that is overvalued (which indicates that perhaps a short position is warranted).  This is the exact point in time when EDLC investors start to roll up their sleeves and do a deep dive into the event to determine whether the impact on the company’s debt/equity is justified, over-estimated or under-estimated and react accordingly. In addition to the legal event causing the stock to drop or get mis-priced, there are also situations where the company has a claim that the market under-appreciates or is unaware of.  A strong example is the Hertz equity story (see Case Studies section in part 2 of this series) where no investor believed equity was entitled to a recovery in the bankruptcy.  The EDLC investors’ efforts to form an ad hoc committee, convince the court to give equity its ‘day in court’, bring in other funds believing in the equity story, and partnering with one of the private equity firms bidding for Hertz were activities an EDLC manager employed to reach a positive result In Hertz.  It was the involvement of an EDLC investor that prevented Hertz equity investors from getting ‘wiped out’, which was the only plan under consideration just two months before its emergence from bankruptcy. Once the EDLC investor validates their thesis regarding the potential impact on the subject company by combing over publicly available information, including data obtained through Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests or attending court hearings concerning the litigation and gaining a deep understanding of how these events may resolve, they then create a thesis to support an investment approach.  Once an investment approach is approved by the investment committee, the team starts to acquire an appropriately sized position in the stock or debt (or derivatives thereof) of the company with the idea that once the litigation that has given rise to the market reaction is either settled or there is sufficient information in the market for the market to value the impact, the debt or equity will then become appropriately priced by the market and the investment manager may choose to sell the securities at that time to lock in their gain and move on to the next opportunity, all else being equal. With EDLC now defined, let’s now look at how it differs from Commercial Litigation Finance (“CLF”). Comparison of EDLC to CLF Public Markets vs. Private Markets As mentioned, EDLC is essentially the application of legal finance to the public markets.  However, in order to appreciate what that means we must look at the differences inherent in the two markets. The size of the public and private markets in the US are relatively comparable with the private markets larger than the public markets based on capital raised ($2.9 trillion for private and $1.5 trillion for public based on a 2019 study), depending on how you approach the valuation of each. However, the liquidity of public markets at $33 trillion dwarf the private markets at $0.10 trillion in annual trades. These factors make the public markets much more attractive as there are many more options available to fund managers to mitigate risk and enhance returns. The public markets are also closely regulated (although some would argue not enough) and in the US financial markets this is the purview of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).  The private markets are also regulated by the SEC, but much less so than the public markets due to the sophisticated nature of the investors in the private markets.  The public markets need to be more highly regulated as they are accessible by retail investors and therefore more susceptible to unscrupulous actors. In theory, the public markets are efficient and the prices therein reflect all information about the public company.  Private markets, on the other hand, are not transparent and therefore are considered to be inefficient in terms of information available to the markets (although any leveraged buy-out private equity fund may beg to differ), which many believe make them better investments. Given that the private markets lack transparency, investors are dependent on specialists to understand the value of these assets, whether those are private equity firms or litigation assets.  The quantification of value of litigation assets is that much more difficult due to the lack of information on the defendant’s position and due to the inherent idiosyncratic risk accorded every litigation in addition to the unknown position the defendant will take in terms of resolving the litigation. While the public markets are considered to reflect perfect information, it is rarely the case.  Further, in the case of an event like a dispute, the public market investors are generally ill equipped to understand the nuances of the dispute and the potential outcomes. All this to say, both markets rely on experts to guide decision making and in this respect the two markets are similar although the skill sets of the managers are very different. Asymmetric Returns Hedge fund managers love opportunities where their downside is limited, but their upside is not similarly constrained. In these types of opportunities, the downside risk pales in comparison to the upside potential, hence the outcomes are referred to as “asymmetric”. To a certain degree, this applies to CLF investing. For a given $1 investment, the CLF investor may lose the $1, but can stand to earn $3, $4, $5 or more if the investment is successful. However, in many funding contracts, for competitive reasons, the upside is limited and the limits are tied to duration. For example, a funder may be limited to a three times multiple on their investment if the investment pays out within three years, and that may increase to five times if it pays out in five years, but beyond that any additional duration is the risk of the investor as few are prepared to guarantee or compensate for duration risk.  Sometimes funding contract proceeds are contracted as a percentage of the case proceeds, and in such cases, the proceeds are only limited to the quantum of proceeds collected, thereby providing less constraints on the upside of the investment (but those claims generally have higher risks of downside loss). In contrast, EDLC investors can make their investments in equities and the very nature of equities is that their upside is unlimited.  And the consequence of this is not only can they benefit from the mispricing of the security in the market related to the litigation or regulatory event, they can also benefit (or potentially suffer) from the successful (or unsuccessful) operations of the company in which they are investing.  Accordingly, this puts the onus on the manager to not only analyze the event in the context of the value of the business, but they must also analyze the operations of the business in the context of the market(s) in which it competes. If an EDLC manager were to invest in the equity of a business on the basis of solely the litigation event that is impairing their value of the equity, then if that same business is performing poorly any gains that may result from the resolution of the event may be completely offset by the company’s operational performance, which is where hedging may come in to play. Another tool EDLC investors have at their disposal is to vary the size of the investment to take Into account the risk of movements in fundamental value.  For example, while an EDLC investor may be positively inclined to Sonos' intellectual property claim against Google, they may decide to size their Sonos position to a small percent of their portfolio and then wait until closer to the trial to increase the size to their more typical hold size.  This is unlike CLF investors who typically cannot modulate their Investment to take account of market conditions. Hedging When a CLF investor enters into an investment, they are typically limited in terms of their ability to hedge themselves, as their options to limit risk are constrained since many of the plaintiffs are private enterprises. Sometimes, the borrower might be a publicly-listed company that has other financial options to offer in terms of derivatives that could serve to limit downside risk to accentuate upside returns, but this more the exception than the norm. More recently, insurance products have been developed for the CLF market to effectively share the risk that CLF investors assume and while these have been generally helpful to offset loss, they can come at a steep price which significantly affects the economics of the CLF investing (although the same can be said for the cost of hedging in EDLC investing). It also remains to be seen whether these insurance products will ultimately pay off in the event of a loss as there hasn’t been a lot of empirical evidence of this given the nascency of the CLF insurance market (the same counter-party risk does not generally apply to derivatives). Conversely, in the world of EDLC investing the investor can typically use derivatives to structure their investment from the outset, which could potentially serve as a hedge (e.g. put options) to limit their downside risk if they are investing long the equity or an equity sweetener (e.g. call options) to potentially enhance the benefits inherent in a positive outcome.  Credit default swaps may be helpful to limit downside risk if the EDLC investor is investing in publicly-listed debt. Of course, as with any financial instrument the use of options comes with a cost.  The other challenge associated with derivatives is that they are generally time sensitive products, and since litigation is inherently difficult to judge in terms of timing, the use of derivatives comes with duration risk in addition to the binary risk associated with the litigation inherent in the EDLC investment. In this sense, options would be considered an imperfect hedge. EDLC Investors may also seek to Isolate the litigation claim.  Some empirical examples Include: (i) long Buenos Aires bonds (the only Argentinian province that has not restructured) and short Argentina sovereign bonds (which has high correlation to Buenos Aires debt), (ii) long Hertz equity and short Avis equity, and (iii) long Mallinckrodt first liens that have a make-whole claim (claim for call-protection) and short pari passu first lien debt that has no make-whole claim, thereby taking out company and market risk.  These are all tools that CLF investors typically don’t have in their funding contracts, mainly because many of their clients are privately held. Active vs. Passive Investing In the context of CLF investing, once the funding contract has been negotiated, the funder is prohibited by law, in most jurisdictions, from interfering in the case or influencing the lawyer or the plaintiff in their decision-making process.  Some funders will actively try to assist the plaintiff and counsel by organizing and participating in mock trials or they may bring data analysis to the attention of their partners to make for better decision making but by and large they are passive investors. EDLC investors on the other hand are typically active investors. They may sit on credit committee boards if they are owners of the debt and are actively trying to represent the best interests of the debt holders to maximize their return. They may also interact with management teams and provide their insight on the litigation event as it would not be uncommon for them to be in attendance at court events in an effort to ascertain whether the outcome of the event is likely to result in a manner consistent with their thesis, or perhaps inform them as to whether they should reduce their exposure or exit altogether. Other examples of activism include recommending supplemental strategic counsel to companies to enhance litigation strategies, sharing legal due diligence material with the company to improve litigation knowledge (i.e. sharing FOIA materials to improve knowledge about its competitors), and joining ad hoc bondholder groups. In addition, the EDLC investor can also provide the company financing to monetize litigation trust units other unsecured investors have no interest in. Lender vs. Owner They say “ownership has its privileges” and it is no less applicable to EDLC investing. Litigation Funders are non-recourse investors that ultimately obtain their rights through their funding contracts and as such their rights are limited to the terms and conditions of those very funding contracts and they cannot influence the outcome of the case.  Once they make their investment, there is not much they can do other than provide their opinions, provide value added services and watch the investment play out, which also makes them dependent on legal counsel and subject to the plaintiff’s wishes.  On the odd occasion and on the assumption the litigation has been de-risked and is of a decent size, the manager may be able to engage in a secondary market transaction to monetize part of their investment, similar to what Burford did with its “Peterson” investment. EDLC investors on the other hand are either unsecured or secured creditors in the case of debt investments and shareholders in the case of equity investments. As a creditor, EDLC investors have a number of protections afforded them either through their contractual documents or through rights established in common law or bankruptcy law to protect their investments.  Indeed, EDLC Investors in restructuring investments have an array of bankruptcy code provisions at their disposal to further their litigation interests.  In Hertz, the ad hoc equity holders challenged the proposed terms of the bankruptcy plan pursuant to sections 105 and 363 amongst other provisions of the US Bankruptcy Act to require an auction for the sale of Hertz. As an equity investor, they also have rights as shareholders in the company and protections afforded through state and federal law.  A relevant example is RenRen, a Chinese company with U.S. American Depositary Receipts, where the company colluded with Softbank to transfer valuable assets at significantly below market value.  Shareholders in RenRen challenged these transactions In NY state court arguing shareholder protection laws precluded the company's actions.  Shareholders succeeded with RenRen resulting in a positive resolution in December 2022.  In other words, they have a seat at the table and are potentially highly influential to decision making (either through the company or through the courts if they are chairing a creditor committee) and perhaps more so than even the company’s own management, in part because they are so highly specialized in their field and in part because of the protections the law provides. Many tools, many options For the most part CLF investors have one tool at their disposal and that is in the form of a funding contract. As there are no limits to the imagination, there are occasions when CLF investors can get creative and design funding contracts to work like derivative agreements or add elements of optionality, but those opportunities are few and far between in the CLF market in part due to competitive pressures at the time when these funding contracts are being sought and in part due to the private ownership structure of many of the litigation funding clients.  In this sense, the CLF market is a bit limited in terms of the ‘tools’ it can bring to the table and the solutions it can provide. Although, there are new insurance products being developed daily and managers like Soryn IP Capital are bringing true innovation into the legal finance market which I expect we will continue to see as the market evolves. One of the benefits of EDLC is that the capital markets provide many potential ways to approach investing which can be utilized in concert or separately, many ‘tools’ if you will.  While EDLC investors are mainly involved in public debt and equity investments, they also have many more ways to access investing in derivative markets (puts, calls, credit default swaps, etc.) that can serve to reduce risk or enhance the asymmetric returns for which this form of investing allows. EDLC investors can also undertake private transactions with these entities to provide similar outcomes to CLF, but typically they will enhance their positions by combining that with some sort of equity position to ‘juice’ their returns thereby enhancing the upside of the asymmetric return profile.  In short, the EDLC investor has many more options at its disposal to create the right product for each situation to (i) enhance the risk/return profile of the investment, (ii) control duration, and (iii) avoid a complete loss scenario. In addition to having many different options to structure their exposure, depending on the nature of their investment they may have the added benefit of being able to apply margin/leverage to enhance returns, which is something not typically available to CLF funders given the inherent binary nature of their investments and a general aversion by LP investors in these funds to allow for the use of leverage. Of course, the ability to risk share is also something that publicly-listed companies have at their disposal.  So, the EDLC manager has to be fully aware of the existence and extent of insurance coverage their investee company has in place for the given litigation exposure as this will serve to mitigate risk for the company and potentially negate the affect the outcome the litigation event will have on the price of its debt and/or equity. Deployment Risk? What deployment risk? I have written in the past about a risk that is unique to litigation finance relative to other alternative asset classes which is its double deployment risk.  The first deployment risk stems from the fact that most funders are investing out of a ‘blind pool’ fund which requires investors to commit before investments have been identified, a very normal practice in private equity. The second deployment risk stems from the fact that commitments are deployed into cases over time as part of a risk mitigating strategy and a reflection of the fact that resolutions can happen at any given point in time in the litigation cycle. As such, monies are not drawn and put to work immediately in most claims, whereas management fees are charged on these monies regardless of whether the commitment to the investments are drawn.  With less ‘money at work’ the returns on committed capital (as distinct from drawn capital) are diluted, whereas the impact of management fees on returns are accentuated, which places pressure on the portfolio to generate strong net returns. With EDLC investing, while the first deployment risk is equally applicable, when the EDLC investor makes the decision to invest, their investment monies go to work immediately if the manager chooses to commit to a full position out of the gate.  So, EDLC investing does not have the second deployment risk inherent in CLF investing, and they can scale their investments accordingly.  They then have the further flexibility to either sell down their position or increase their position depending on how things are progressing, how the markets are reacting and how the investment fits into their portfolio.  It is not uncommon for EDLC investors to “trade” their positions during their hold periods based on new knowledge and market reactions thereto. The lack of the second deployment risk also has a direct impact on the extent to which the management fees can represent a ‘drag’ on returns, which are exacerbated in CLF investing.  Multiple “kicks at the can” In the discussion of asymmetric returns, I touched on the concept of benefiting from both the event and the performance of the business excluding the impact of the event. This is an important distinction vis-a-vis CLF investing as the outcome of the event in CLF investing is the only path to generating returns. Absent a positive outcome, the investment will have to be written off to its net realizable value (often zero in the event of a loss at court). One of the fundamental differences between EDLC and CLF is that EDLC invests in securities whereas CLF finances expenses that are used to pursue litigation which can be viewed as sunk costs.  Once the investment is made, there is no option for recovery other than the outcome of the litigation. Whereas with EDLC investing there could be multiple paths to returns and the investment is never likely to be zero the way it can be with CLF, unless the subject firm is pushed into bankruptcy as a result of the outcome of the case.  And even then, an EDLC investor may be able to extract some value for its investors through the bankruptcy process, as outlined in the Hertz case study. So, even if the litigation ultimately goes against the company and validates the market price of the debt or equity in the marketplace, the EDLC investor can then look to the underlying earnings of the company to potentially provide a return. For this reason, EDLC investors are less likely to invest in businesses where the fundamentals of the business are in question (Hertz was an exception given the prospects for the car rental business during Covid). Further, because the EDLC investor is involved deeply in the investment by virtue of their specialized due diligence and knowledge, they may have an informational advantage that allows them to sell their position to less informed parties and thereby minimize their losses. In the second part of this two part series we will examine some case studies, discuss additional attributes of the two investment strategies that investors should factor in to their decision-making process and answer an important question - “is this too good to be true”? Slingshot Insights As you will see from my disclosure below, I like the strategy so much I became an investor and this strategy now represents my largest investment in legal finance related strategies. In my opinion it provides all of the same exposures as those of litigation finance, but does so in a way that mitigates downside risk and maximizes upside potential. It adds an element of flexibility for the manager that can’t be found in CLF investing, in my experience.  The clear taxation treatment removes an area of lingering concern for me as it relates to the CLF marketplace. As long as you have an appropriate investing horizon and are prepared to deal with some mark correlation while the investment thesis plays out, this appears to me to be a significantly better approach to obtaining exposure to idiosyncratic risks to create a portfolio of uncorrelated outcomes. As always, I welcome your comments and counterpoints to those raised in this article.  Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc. and an investor in the consumer and commercial litigation finance industry.  Slingshot Capital inc. is involved in the origination and design of unique opportunities in legal finance markets, globally, advising and investing with and alongside institutional investors. Disclosure: An entity controlled by the author is an investor in investing vehicles managed by the EDLC Manager referred to herein.
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LCM Funding Confirms $13.6m in Financing to Panthera Resources’ Subsidiary 

Whilst the duration of litigation and arbitration proceedings often take focus in discussions of dispute funding, we are not privy to the degree of analysis and due diligence which funders undertake before finalising any financing arrangements. However, in recent months, we have gained an insight into one such example, observing the time it has taken for LCM Funding and Panthera Resources to go from initial agreement to final confirmation. An article in ShareCast covers the announcement by Panthera Resources that LCM Funding, a subsidiary of Litigation Capital Management, has completed its due diligence and confirmed that it will provide funding for a claim brought by Indo Gold (IGPL), a Panthera subsidiary. LFJ reported in February that LCM Funding and Panthera Resourced had entered into an arbitration funding agreement for IGPL’s claim against the Indian government, but the following months saw multiple deadline extensions for LCM Funding to complete its due diligence on the claim. This announcement also reveals that LCM Funding will be providing a total of $13.6 million in financing to IGPL, a sum that has risen from the initially stated $10.5 million in financing announced in February. Mark Bolton, managing director at Panthera Resources, stated the company was “pleased that LCM has reaffirmed its view that IGPL has a meritorious claim against the Republic of India.” He further praised “LCM's detailed examination,” and highlighted that it had been “supported by advice from multiple legal, mining and valuation experts over many months.”

NZ Supreme Court Rules in Favour of Mainzeal’s Liquidators

There has been much written about the utility and benefits of litigation funding for liquidators and creditors pursuing legal redress against failed companies. A recent judgement from New Zealand’s highest court has once again demonstrated that whilst these proceedings are by no means quick, third-party funding can be a powerful tool for those seeking access to justice. Reporting by the NZ Herald provides an overview of last week’s judgement handed down by New Zealand’s Supreme Court, which ordered the directors of failed construction firm Mainzeal to pay more than $50 million to its creditors and subcontractors. This judgement puts an end to over eight years of litigation following Mainzeal’s liquidation in February 2013, which saw creditors lose over $111 million. The judgement comes over a year after the Supreme Court heard the final appeal in March 2022, with the court ruling that Mainzeal’s directors had breached its duties under the Companies Act and allowed the business to trade in a manner that lacked care or diligence, thereby creating a substantial risk of financial loss for creditors. BDO has acted as the liquidator of Mainzeal and had received financing from Auckland-based funder, LPF Group, with legal costs over the preceding years rising to nearly $10 million. Andrew McKay, partner at BDO, highlighted that the judgement was not the end of the journey, stating that “we are committed to recovering the damages awarded by the court including in part from the insurers, enforcement action against the directors to ensure creditors receive compensation for their financial losses.”