

Litigation Capital Management Limited (AIM:LIT), an alternative asset manager specializing in dispute financing solutions internationally, announces a successful resolution on an investment forming part of LCM’s Fund I portfolio of investments.
Successful Award in Arbitration Investment
LCM’s investment and funding related to a dispute in London Court of International Arbitration proceedings. LCM provided funding and support to the claimant in those proceedings, which recently received an award in its favor. The subject matter, findings and funding terms remain subject to confidentiality.
Initially, the investment was expected to complete within a short time frame from the commencement of funding, however, the matter was delayed due to a number of external factors. This protraction enhanced the returns to LCM and Fund I investors, details of which are highlighted in the table below:
| *AUD$m | Investment performance | LCM performance metrics | Fund I performance metrics | ||||
| Invested capital | 9.2 | 2.3 | 6.9 | ||||
| Investment return | 36.7 | 9.2 | 27.5 | ||||
| Success fee | 21.7 | 5.4 | 16.3 | ||||
| Total revenue | 67.6 | 16.9 | 50.7 | ||||
| ROIC on investment | 635% | 635% | 635% | ||||
| Performance fee* | - | 15.1 | (15.1) | ||||
| Gross profit | 58.4 | 29.7 | 28.7 | ||||
| ROIC after performance fees | 635% | 1291% | 416% |
*The investment returns are subject to change based on the prevailing FX rate and timing of distribution
Patrick Moloney, CEO of LCM, commented: “The Resolution of this investment demonstrates two important features of LCM’s business and its investment strategy. First, it validates the skillset of our investment managers in undertaking a rigorous due diligence exercise and accurately predicting the final outcome of a large and complex commercial dispute resolved through arbitration. Secondly, it is an example of an investment which we had originally expected to resolve in a prior financial period. The return metrics generated by this investment clearly demonstrate how returns are enhanced notwithstanding a delayed resolution. Not only were we extremely happy with the outstanding investment returns, but also LCM’s funded party was grateful for the financial support beyond the originally contemplated investment period.”
Enquiries
| Litigation Capital Management | c/o Tavistock PR |
| Patrick Moloney, Chief Executive Officer | |
| Canaccord (Nomad and Joint Broker) | Tel: 020 7523 8000 |
| Bobbie Hilliam | |
| Investec Bank plc (Joint Broker) | Tel: 020 7597 5970 |
| David Anderson | |
| Tavistock PR | Tel: 020 7920 3150 |
| Tim Pearson | lcm@tavistock.co.uk |
| Katie Hopkins |
About LCM
Litigation Capital Management (LCM) is an alternative asset manager specialising in disputes financing solutions internationally, which operates two business models. The first is direct investments made from LCM's permanent balance sheet capital and the second is third party fund management. Under those two business models, LCM currently pursues three investment strategies: Single-case funding, Portfolio funding and Acquisitions of claims. LCM generates its revenue from both its direct investments and also performance fees through asset management.
LCM has an unparalleled track record driven by disciplined project selection and robust risk management. Currently headquartered in Sydney, with offices in London, Singapore, Brisbane and Melbourne, LCM listed on AIM in December 2018, trading under the ticker LIT.



Slingshot Insights:
Source: https://www.americanlegalfin.com/alfaresources/ On the plus side, the research discovered that while loss rates were relatively high at 12% (again, possibly a consequence of the risk & return threshold of this particular funder) there were numerous instances of the funder taking “hair cuts” (i.e. reducing their accepted returns to below contracted levels) for the benefit of the consumer. In other words, the funders ‘have a heart’ and will proactively reduce their return expectations to leave the injured party in a position that is more equitable than if they stuck to their contracted terms. On the negative side, the net return profile was 44% per annum, which suggests that even after losses and “hair cuts” this is an expensive form of financing. Keep in mind, this study was over a 12-year period prior to 2018, and the rates today are likely not as high as they were in the beginning of the industry due to competition and regulation. A second explanation for the relatively high rates is that depending on the funder’s risk profile, the funder may be willing to take on more risk (i.e. accept more losses) than another funder in return for a higher rate of interest. Whereas another funder may be more conservative and have stricter underwriting standards, accepting fewer cases and lower loss rates, but also charging lower rates of return. Also keep in mind that given how litigious a society the US has become, we must appreciate that inherent in the personal injury system is a higher level of frivolous claims than you might fund in other jurisdictions which could also explain a higher loss rate. For me, this report legitimized (i) the need for, and societal benefits of, this form of financing, (ii) the size of the total addressable market, and (iii) that the competitors in this market (while likely earning an oversized return in the early days of the industry) were flexible with consumers and willing to forego returns to make the outcome fair for all interested parties. In other words, it appeared the market was functioning similar to other consumer-facing finance markets. Benefits of Diversification, Loss Rates & Durational Certainty As I looked at the PSA market, I looked at it through the lens of both the private equity market and the commercial legal finance (CLF) market, and there a few notable differences that make this a more attractive market than commercial legal finance. First, the portfolios inherent in many funders’ businesses are highly diversified. With an average financing size of $3,000, there are hundreds to thousands of claims in any given portfolio. With diversification comes stability, and with the inherent low overall loss rates comes a predictability of returns – all music to the ears of an investor. The one significant problem that appears to be persistent in the commercial legal finance market is the prevalence of overly concentrated portfolios and high concentration limits within fund documents. The consequence of high concentration is high volatility, and that is exactly what is present in most CLF portfolios, hence the increasing need to apply expensive insurance. The other issue for most CLF investments is uncertainty about duration. The personal injury legal market is fairly predictable from a timing perspective, and because the financing is interest rate based (as opposed to tied to a fixed multiple of capital), time is not your enemy (with some exceptions) from an investor’s perspective. CLF on the other hand is very unpredictable from a duration perspective, varying from months to several years. As many commercial funding contracts cap returns to a multiple of drawn capital, time is initially your friend but ultimately your enemy. The unpredictable nature is the bane of the existence for publicly listed commercial legal finance firms, as their shareholders want predictable case outcomes generating predictable returns and cashflows, but the portfolios are inherently unpredictable, and so many times the public shareholders are disappointed. Accordingly, their inherent cashflow volatility prevents their stock prices from reflecting true value (said another way, their stock prices reflect the true value of their businesses after adjusting for the unpredictability of their cashflows). The PSA market, on the other hand, is very predictable, which is why it has been able to obtain risk ratings and thereby attract conservative institutional capital at a relatively low cost of capital. As an investor, I would take a stable 10-15% return all day along in the face of a volatile return profile in the CLF market that can vary from -10% to +30%. They may (emphasis on “may”) both average out to the same return over the long run, one just allows you to sleep much better at night. Similarly, from a business owner’s perspective, stable and predictable returns will always be more highly valued than volatile returns, and so as a business owner, you are significantly better off aiming for predictability for a given return profile. In addition, this will allow business owners to create equity value that they can later monetize through the sale of their business, which is something CLF managers will have difficulty doing due to the volatility of their portfolios. Regulation Another aspect of an industry’s underlying economics is the consistency of the regulatory regime and the potential impact changes in regulations could have on the industry and its economics. On this item, there was less certainty at the time I made my first investment, but as time has progressed, it is clear that more and more states are considering or implementing new regulations for the PSA industry. Legal doctrines of champerty and maintenance are generally being set aside, but not always. Some states view PSA as loans, and hence subject to usury limitations, whereas other states have determined they are not loans because they are non-recourse other than to the outcome of the case, which precludes them from the definition of loans. Some states, like West Virginia, have placed onerous interest rate limitations which have essentially decimated the industry, whereas others have put in place more reasonable limitations. Some states have come out against PSA and others believe it is a necessary part of a functioning economy and supportive of individual rights (Minnesota is still ruling on whether funding is a loan). The Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB) has been monitoring the PSA market since 2011, but it is not quite clear whether they have the authority to regulate the industry and attempts by the CFPB to do so have been rebuffed for the most part – the key distinction seems to be whether these are recourse loans or non-recourse advances. The first is a loan product arguably under the purview of the CFPB, and the second is not contemplated under the CFPB’s mandate. It appears to date the CFBP has only pursued post-settlement lenders and structured settlement providers, which are a different part of the consumer market. Today, regulatory risk remains in the market as most states have not contemplated or implemented regulations, but no different than the payday loan market, done properly and without undue influence from interested parties but in the context of the market’s economic reality and keeping consumer rights in mind, a regulated marketplace brings stability to the market and standards that are ultimately beneficial for consumer and market participants who rely on stability. A ’Feel Good’ Asset Class Beyond the hard numbers, the risk profile and the cash-on-cash returns, lies the “feel good” nature of this asset class, which is what attracted me to the commercial legal finance market. For all of the headline risk and the early profiteering that happens in every industry, PSA is a necessity in the market and becomes increasingly important as our societies become further economically stratified and the middle class continues to thin. Despite its costs, and there are good economic reasons for its cost (within reason), it provides a strong societal benefit to allow those whose lives have been turned upside down as a result of an accident that has had health (mental & physical), financial and personal costs that most of us cannot imagine. The industry represents a ‘ray of hope’ for someone who may have lost hope due to their circumstances. I would posit that the industry itself is not predatory (although I will admit there are profiteers), but in fact is a tool to be used against the predatory insurance companies who are not being held accountable by state regulators because it is impossible for the regulators to respond to every single personal injury claim. If nothing else, insurance is designed to help the injured and the remediation should be swift and commensurate with the financial damage. Having to wait 3-4 years for a settlement outcome and pay out of pocket for hospital bills is anything but swift or commensurate, and is merely a tactic by insurance companies to benefit from the time value of money (i.e. a dollar today is worth less in a year’s time). Investors can take comfort in the fact that funders do not pursue frivolous claims because the risk/reward of doing so upsets the predictability of the industry’s cashflows. Then there are Environmental, Social & Governance (ESG) considerations…. In a world full of ‘ESG washing’, legal finance is perhaps one of the most ESG compliant asset classes that exist. The underlying nature of the claim is rooted in justice, and pre-settlement advances allow for justice to prevail by leveling the playing field between the impecunious injured party and the wealthy insurer with time, money and lawyers at their disposal. The social benefits of litigation are clearly in good alignment with investing in those activities that have a positive impact on society, even if imperfect. As strong as the ESG characteristics are in the commercial legal finance markets, they are even stronger in the PSA market because the impact is measurable and directly impacts an individual’s life. All one has to do is review some of the industry testimonials to understand the impact this form of financing can have on one’s life, and there are tens of thousands of examples of this impact occurring on a yearly basis. As investors consider the headline risk, they should also give weight to the ESG benefits of the asset class. PSA Today While many facets of the PSA market look similar today to what they were at inception, underneath the exterior is a tale of two worlds. From a competitive perspective, there is a segment of the market that has clearly positioned themselves as market leaders and have achieved a level of scale and efficiency that has allowed them to tap into the most conservative and sophisticated levels of capital, in part due to an overall low risk profile and in part due to being strong operators. From a regulatory perspective, this industry will likely be regulated at the state level and that regulation is well underway. I would expect by the end of this decade a majority of states will have some form of regulation or guidance in place and by the end of next decade most, if not all, will. From a competitive perspective, we are now seeing some level of consolidation as some of the larger players are starting to acquire competitors either to bulk up their own operations or to expand into adjacent markets like medical receivables/liens. Regulatory standards will force all market participants to behave appropriately and will generally raise the standards in the market for the benefit of funders and consumers. From a funding perspective, we will continue to see larger funders tap the securitization market for relatively inexpensive financing, or to align themselves with captive sources of financing from institutional investors. In other words, as much as the industry has changed in the last two decades, we should expect to see a similar level of change going forward, but we should never lose sight of the end consumer and the benefits it brings to their lives. After all, someone needs to counter the vast resources of the insurance companies, which left unchecked, will silently inflict damage upon individuals and their families.
Slingshot Insights I have often wondered why institutional investors quickly dismissed the consumer legal finance asset class solely due to headline and regulatory risk. I came to the conclusion that the benefits of diversification are significant in legal finance, and so this factor alone makes consumer legal finance very attractive. Digging beneath the surface you will find an industry that is predicated on social justice (hence, strong ESG characteristics), and while there has and continues to be some bad actors in the industry, there has been a clear bifurcation in the market with the ‘best-in-class’ performers having achieved a level of sophistication and size that has garnered interest from institutional capital as evidenced by the large number of securitizations that have taken place over the last few years (7 by US Claims alone). This market has yet to experience significant consolidation, and recent interest rate increases have likely had a negative impact on smaller funders’ earnings and cashflow, which may present an impetus to accelerate consolidation in the sector. As always, I welcome your comments and counter-points to those raised in this article.
Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc. and an investor in the consumer and commercial legal finance industry. Slingshot Capital inc. is involved in the origination and design of unique opportunities in legal finance markets, globally, investing with and alongside institutional investors. Disclosure: An entity controlled by the author is an investor in the consumer legal finance sector.






Slingshot Insights:
The reason I decided to invest in the PSA market was first and foremost because I found an operating business and management team that I thought had their ethical compass pointed to true north. Secondly, I was able to satisfy myself that the consumers and law firms who relied on this source of financing viewed the business as being a strong, well-respected operator, buttressed by the fact that the business was over five times the size of the next largest competitor, and had achieved its growth organically (i.e. no acquisitions). Their low loss rates (<2%) also signaled that management performed well as underwriters and active managers of the portfolio. Despite the strength of the specific manager in which I ultimately invested, one of my hesitations to investing in the market was derived from some negative articles about competitors, and rumours of a number of nefarious players that were charging exorbitant rates of interest. In addition, many of the institutions with which I interface were constantly referencing the headline risk of the market. Accordingly, before I invested, I took a deeper dive into the industry with a focus on the following risk factors to satisfy myself that there was nothing significant that would impact the outcome of my investment and my ability to exit my position when the time was right. Headline Risk One of the first risks that comes up as you speak to institutions, which generally shy away from consumer legal finance, is the concept of “headline risk”. Headline risk is simply the risk associated with the investors’ brand being tarnished as a result of their portfolio companies’ names being involved in negative press associated either with the industry or the portfolio companies’ customers or regulators. Institutional investors hate headline risk because it may reflect badly on their own brand, and can cause their investors to call into question their judgment, and taken to the extreme, it could end their investor relationships along with the associated fee revenue. Accordingly, in their minds, nothing good comes from headline risk and so they avoid it like the plague. But every investment has some headline risk, so it becomes a question of severity. To understand the severity of headline risk in the PSA market, it is first important to understand how the market has evolved. The PSA market really started in the 90s in reaction to a need in the marketplace for funding. The reality for many Americans (generally of a lower socio-economic status) at that time, and arguably today as well, is that if they are in a car accident (the typical scenario), they are left to their own devices to deal with the economic fallout and in collecting from insurance companies. Insurance companies are generally not the best businesses to negotiate with due to their economic advantages. In short, insurers have time, money and lawyers on their side. All of which the typical injured party does not have. Without financial support, these injured parties were really at the mercy of the insurance industry. The thing about the insurance industry is that they have a strong economic motivation to deny claims and settle for as little as possible, which is the polar opposite to the underlying purpose of insurance. To offset this strong economic motivation, insurers are also motivated by being compliant with their state regulators and they are ultimately reliant on recurring revenue through their brand and their reputations in the market. Unfortunately, not many consumers actually diligence their insurance companies when they buy insurance; they simply go for the ‘best price’. The consequence of selecting ‘best price’ is that this leaves the insurance company with less return with which to settle your claim, which ultimately damages the consumer’s ability to collect on their insurance. So, without the ability to have proper legal representation and recognizing that the accident may have compromised the injured party’s livelihood (health, income, medical expenses, etc.), the injured party is left in a position to accept whatever the insurance company offered and move on with their lives regardless of how painful that was. Enter the funders…. Many of the funders became aware of this inherent inequity in the market through the legions of personal injury lawyers that operate in the US. These lawyers have a front row seat to exactly what is happening in the personal injury market and the extent to which the injured party is taken advantage of by the insurer, or the extent to which the injured party is settling prematurely due to their economic circumstances. The entire funder market really started with lawyers providing these loans to other lawyers’ clients, and then evolved into a business as entrepreneurs recognized the total addressable market and the opportunity set …. and this is when the problems started. In the early days of any industry, the opportunity looks so promising that it attracts those that are myopic in their perspective, and they want to make as much profit as they can in as little time as they can. This is especially true for financial markets that interface with the consumer – payday loans, subprime auto, second and third mortgages, etc. PSA is no different in that it is a financing solution that pertains to the consumer, although it has a distinct difference from most other financing solutions in that it is non-recourse in nature. In the case of the PSA market, the consumer is typically in a difficult situation and traditional lenders will not provide financing because of the poor risk of the plaintiff (other than perhaps credit cards, if available), whether due to their past credit history or due to the economic consequences of the injury they sustained. Where you have a financing solution facing a consumer that usually has no other alternatives, you will tend to find abuse, and this is exactly what happened in the early days of the industry. Many studies have been undertaken that showed effective internal rates of returns, between interest rates and fees, of 40-80% and sometimes even higher. In essence, this was a consequence of a relatively small number of highly entrepreneurial funders that were trying to maximize their returns while providing a service to the market. The problem with this is threefold: (i) it leaves a ‘bad taste in the mouths’ of consumers because they feel they are not being treated fairly and that they have been abused no worse than the abuse they are trying to avoid from the insurance companies, (ii) these same consumers that feel they have been abused will run to their local newspapers (or online outlets) to ‘out’ the bad behaviour of the funder, and hence create the dreaded ‘headline risk’, and (iii) the same consumers may start to approach their elected representatives about their bad experiences which gives rise to regulatory risk. And this is exactly what happened. Here comes regulation … and the market starts to bifurcate…. Recognizing that the behaviour described above is not good for business and is not good for the reputation of the industry, certain individuals in the industry decided to organize and ultimately created two associations, (i) the Alliance for Responsible Consumer Legal Funding (ARC) and (ii) the American Legal Finance Association (ALFA). The genesis of these associations was to protect the consumer from nefarious funders through education, to protect the industry through self-regulation and to protect the industry from the opposition (mainly the insurance companies who stood to lose from the solutions provided by the PSA). Accordingly, over the course of the following years, lobby efforts were organized, educational materials were provided to the consumer, consumer testimonials were created, and standards were created for the benefit of the consumer and thereby for the benefit of the industry. The industry itself is not opposed to regulation, per se; in fact, regulation could be the best thing that ever happened to the industry, if implemented correctly. The industry needed a voice in the conversation to ensure regulation was not driven solely by insurance lobbyists, which are very active in the PSA regulatory conversation, but intended for the protection of consumers and for the protection of the industry – the two parties who stand to benefit the most from a healthy industry. In some cases this has worked out well and in some case regulation has served to effectively destroy the industry in specific states, because the regulations made it uneconomic to run businesses profitably and in a way that provides an appropriate risk adjusted return for investors. The hyperlinked article above relates to regulation passed in the state of West Virginia that capped the rates of interest at 18% (no compounding allowed), which are below typical credit card rates of interest. Arkansas has similarly capped rates at 17%. This was done under the guise of protecting the consumer, but the PSA market no longer exists in the state of West Virginia, and so I am left scratching my head as to how regulation has helped protect the consumer when it has destroyed the economics of the industry which represents the sole solution to the problem. In fact, what it does is protect the insurance industry, and I’m willing to bet the insurance lobby was hard at work behind the scenes crafting the bill. The article references that 10% of all funding investments result in a nil outcome for the funder as the cases are either dismissed or lost at trial. While 10% strikes me as being quite high (although the extensive study cited below references a 12% default rate for one funder), it may result from frivolous cases being brought in the first place, something funding underwriters strive to avoid because it impacts their returns. In addition, there is anecdotal evidence that funders get less than contracted amounts in 30-40% of cases, similar to what was found in the Avraham/Sebok study referenced below. Even at half the default rates, a 5% loss of principal (not including the associated lost accumulated interest) off of an 18% return profile results in a 13% gross return after losses, factor in a conservative 10% cost of capital (15% is not out of norms for smaller funders with less diversified portfolios) and the funder has 3% to both run their business and produce a profit for shareholders. Needless to say, the funding market did not find that attractive and left both the market and the consumer ‘high and dry’ which then allows the insurers to swoop in and keep abusing the consumer by delaying and denying payments. Not exactly what we pay our (handsomely, taxpayer compensated) elected representatives to do, is it? As the industry started to self-regulate and individual states started to proactively regulate, the early movers in the industry began to find that the easy money was slowly disappearing, and either exited the industry or had tarnished their own brands’ reputations. In essence, the industry bifurcated into what I will refer to as the “Professionals” and the “Entrepreneurs”, like many industries before it. The Entrepreneurs went on with a ‘business as usual’ attitude and likely were unable to significantly scale their businesses due to reputational issues, but were still able to provide sufficient returns to merit continuing their businesses, along with the occasional headline.
The Professionals embraced and pushed for self-regulation and a seat at the table where individual states were considering regulation. They further started to professionalize their own organizations by embracing industry standards from the associations, embracing best practices and policies to govern their own operations, and by increasing the level of transparency with consumers. Having built a reputable organization with a strong foundation, these businesses then started focusing on scaling to attract a lower cost of capital where they can then re-invest the incremental profits into their businesses and lower costs to the consumer, either as a result of the benefits of economies of scale, competition or regulation, and thereby become more competitive. Today, some of the larger competitors in the industry have portfolios of hundreds of million of dollars of fundings outstanding, they are attracting private equity capital, and they are raising capital from the securitization markets, which are typically the domain of very conservative institutional investors. These efforts to become more institutional have served them well in terms of increasing their scale, and hence increasing their marginal profitability, lowering their cost of funds to benefit both their operating margins and the cost to the consumer. In doing so, they have effectively broadened the investor base for their operating platforms and the value of their enterprises because they have shed the negative stigma associated with the early days of the industry. Today, these enterprises are highly sophisticated organizations that understand at a deep level how to effectively & efficiently originate, underwrite and finance their businesses to provide a competitive product in the face of a regulating industry. This positions them well long-term, while the Entrepreneurial operators become more marginalized, from a consumer perspective, a commercial perspective and a capital perspective. In part 2 of this article, I will discuss the underlying economics of the pre-settlement advance subsegment, the status of regulation and some thoughts on how the market continues to evolve and why institutional investors are increasingly getting involved.
Slingshot Insights I have often wondered why institutional investors quickly dismissed the consumer legal finance asset class solely due to headline and regulatory risk. I came to the conclusion that the benefits of diversification are significant in legal finance, and so this factor alone makes consumer legal finance very attractive. Digging beneath the surface you will find an industry that is predicated on social justice (hence, strong ESG characteristics), and while there has and continues to be some bad actors in the industry, there has been a clear bifurcation in the market with the ‘best-in-class’ performers having achieved a level of sophistication and size that has garnered interest from institutional capital as evidenced by the large number of securitizations that have taken place over the last few years (7 by US Claims alone). This market has yet to experience significant consolidation, and recent interest rate increases have likely had a negative impact on smaller funders’ earnings and cashflow, which may present an impetus to accelerate consolidation in the sector. As always, I welcome your comments and counter-points to those raised in this article.
Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc. and an investor in the consumer and commercial legal finance industry. Slingshot Capital inc. is involved in the origination and design of unique opportunities in legal finance markets, globally, investing with and alongside institutional investors. Disclosure: An entity controlled by the author is an investor in the consumer legal finance sector.Sutton claims he has received $50MM of capital commitments out of a total $100MM fundraise he is seeking to finance future IP litigation. For its part, TowerBrook will remain a minority investor in Validity, and maintain its commitment to the cases it has already funded.
According to Sutton, TowerBrook does not want to sell its stake in Validity's cases, viewing Validity's IRR as strong overall. The investor is simply concerned about a potential exit from the funder over the coming years, given the lack of enterprise value over anything beyond the portfolio of cases Validity manages.
Currently, Validity has invested more than $400MM in nearly 75 cases, with the portfolio having fully resolved 13 of those, and returned more than the principal investment in 12 of those 13.

In a huge boost to the hopes of millions of UK consumers who stand to gain from a Woodsford-funded collective action against five large shipping companies who engaged in an anticompetitive cartel, the UK Supreme Court announced yesterday that it had refused to allow a further appeal against certification of the collective action to proceed.
In 2018, the European Commission (EC) fined the international shipping companies a total of EUR 395 million for their participation in a cartel between 18 October 2006 and 6 September 2012.
The EC found that the companies fixed prices, rigged bids and allocated the market for roll-on, roll-off (“RoRo”) transport of vehicles into Europe. According to the EC, the companies had agreed to maintain the status quo in the market and to respect each other’s ongoing business on certain routes, or with certain customers, by quoting artificially high prices or not quoting at all in tenders for vehicle manufacturers.
The claim, which seeks compensation significantly in excess of £100 million, is one of the first to be heard in the UK’s Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), which ruled earlier in 2022 that a collective proceedings order (CPO) could be launched on behalf of U.K. consumers and businesses that allegedly paid inflated prices due to the actions of the cartel.
Affected cars include passenger cars and light commercial vehicles such as vans, which represent over 80% of all new car and van purchases in the UK. Examples of affected cars include Ford, Vauxhall, Volkswagen, Peugeot, BMW, Mercedes, Nissan, Toyota, Citroën and Renault.
The CAT action was filed on behalf of the class by consumer rights champion, Mark McLaren. Financed by Woodsford, McLaren is represented by Sarah Ford KC, Emma Mockford and Sarah O'Keeffe of Brick Court Chambers, instructed by Scott + Scott UK.
Woodsford’s Chief Executive Officer, Steven Friel commented: "This is an important milestone for this case specifically, and also for promotion of collective redress in the UK more generally. Woodsford is dedicated to holding corporate wrongdoers to account and helping deliver access to justice. We are proud to support Mr. McLaren, who is now much closer to obtaining compensation for the millions of affected car purchasers.”
Hugh Tait, the Senior Investment Officer leading the case for Woodsford, commented: “This is a great success for consumer redress in the UK, and I am proud of Woodsford’s significant part in it. Woodsford is now clearly established as the most successful ESG and litigation finance business in this area of UK collective redress. My only regret is that big corporate defendants continue to use their significant legal and financial resource to fight technical arguments, with the goal of delaying compensation payments to consumers. “
Impacted customers can find further information about the case at https://www.cardeliverycharges.com/
A detailed case study can be found here.
About Woodsford
Since 2010 Woodsford has been helping to hold corporates to account for their egregious behaviour. Whether it is helping consumers achieve collective redress, ensuring that inventors and universities are properly compensated when Big Tech infringes intellectual property rights, or helping shareholders in collaborative, escalated engagement up to and including litigation with listed companies, Woodsford is committed to ESG and access to justice. Working with most of the world’s leading law firms, our strength lies in the combination of our legal experience, investment, business and technical expertise, together with significant financial resources.
Interviews, photos and biographies available on request.