The following article is part of an ongoing column titled ‘Investor Insights.’  Brought to you by Ed Truant, founder and content manager of Slingshot Capital, ‘Investor Insights’ will provide thoughtful and engaging perspectives on all aspects of investing in litigation finance.  Executive Summary

• Evolution of Litigation Finance necessitates the need for a secondary market
• Investing in Litigation Finance secondaries is much more difficult than other forms of private equity due to the inherent difficulty in valuing the ‘tail’
• Experts should be utilized to assess case merits and valuation
• Life cycle of litigation finance suggests timing is right for secondaries

Slingshot Insights:

• Investing in the ‘tail’ of a portfolio, where most secondary transactions will take place, can be more difficult than primary investing
• Dynamics of the ‘tail’ of a portfolio are inherently riskier than a whole portfolio, which is partially offset by enhanced information related to the underlying cases
• Secondary portfolios are best reviewed by experts in the field and each significant investment should be reviewed extensively
• Derive little comfort from portfolios that have been marked-to-market by the underlying manager
• Investing in secondaries requires a discount to market value to offset the implied volatility associated with the tail

In part 1 of this article, I explored some of the basic concepts of secondary investing, specifically in the context of the commercial litigation finance asset class.  This article continues the discussion and explores some of the unique aspects and characteristic of the ‘tail’ of a litigation finance portfolio, why now is a particularly good time for secondary transactions and other investment considerations with respect to secondary investing. Investing in the ‘tail’ In a prior article, I made reference to three phases of risk in the context of litigation (there are more but let’s keep it simple for now).  As a case evolves, it moves from a phase where the case is “De-Risking” because more information is flowing to the point where both parties have an abundance of, and equal information about, the litigation (yet still have different perspectives based on subjective value judgments), which moves the case into something I referred to as the zone of “Optimal Resolution” (credit to John Rossos at Bridgepoint Financial who developed this ‘three phases of risk’ analogy). Optimal Resolution is a period of time where both parties understand what information the other party has, the legal precedents being referenced, and perhaps some insights into how similar cases would have been judged in the past.  With an abundance of information, the two parties should come together to form a conclusion around a reasonable settlement and bring the case to an end.  However, if they fail to do so, the case starts to enter into the “Re-Risk” stage where the parties typically commence with a trial or arbitration, at which stage both sides may get more entrenched in their positions and if they do the outcome ultimately becomes binary, as it will be decided by a third party (i.e., judge, arbitrator or a jury) without a vested economic interest in the outcome.  Any good litigator will tell you to avoid a binary outcome if at all possible, as these outcomes are quite unpredictable (i.e. your odds of winning may be better in Vegas). I make reference to these three phases because the ‘tail’ tends to capture the Re-Risk stage of litigation/arbitration, which is the riskiest part of the litigation process.  So, when investors are looking at a secondary portfolio of single case investments, they are almost by definition investing at the riskiest part of the lifecycle of the case.  Of course, that is not always the case, and it depends whether you are the plaintiff or the defendant.  If you are a plaintiff, you may have a number of interim procedural wins and so you may believe there is a stronger possibility of success as compared to when the manager first under-wrote the case.  Therefore, you may be feeling relatively good about your prospects. However, while one would think justice is equitable, consistent and repeatable, that is rarely the case, which makes this stage of the litigation process the most dangerous, as the plaintiff may be lulled into a false sense of security based on some procedural wins and damning evidence against the defendant. The fact that these cases are in the tail of the portfolio firmly suggests that (i) they have been going on for a long time, which means that (ii) you may have two entrenched, deep pocketed parties who are not likely to give in soon, which means that (iii) the outcome will more likely than not end up in a binary decision.  Of course, it may also mean that it is closer to resolution, as many cases have been settled on the ‘court room steps’. Accordingly, the risks are different than those of investing into a ‘blind pool’ portfolio where the cases have yet to be picked. In a nutshell, the investor in a secondary does not get the benefit of the early wins and relatively more attractive IRRs to offset the more binary characteristics of the tail, which likely includes bigger losses (if for no other reason than a loss in the tail means the original capital commitment has likely been fully consumed).  Since the secondary investor has to make his or her returns from the more binary portion of the portfolio, which means higher volatility as the probability of a loss is higher in the tail segment of the distribution (a well-known statistical characteristic), ultimately, it would be dangerous for a new investor to pay a premium, and conversely, it is likelier the investor will need to buy at a discount. But discount to what – original cost or current fair market value?  Discounting to cost is a fairly easy exercise, but may not be meaningful.  Discounting to fair market value is pretty challenging in the context of a tail comprised of single case investments, each of which is more likely than not in the Re-Risking stage of the investment life cycle.  Nevertheless, it is only logical that a secondary investor should treat the investment as though it was a new portfolio and underwrite every significant investment in the portfolio from scratch, to do otherwise would be reckless.  A “diligence light” approach is not acceptable given the potentially higher risks inherent in the tail and so as much, if not more, time should be spent underwriting secondary portfolios as compared to primary portfolios. Also recognize that when selling secondary portfolios the seller and their advisors are in ‘sell mode’, and so a second set of sober and skeptical eyes is probably the best way to value these assets.  An astute investor can also structure the investment by limiting its downside by negotiating a lower entry price in exchange for a sharing of the upside with the exiting investor, so that it becomes a ‘win-win’ transaction with the secondary investor getting some downside protection, and the exiting investor retaining some upside. A positive aspect of investing in the tail is that the majority of the legal spend has taken place and so your deployment risk is probably low, which essentially means that if you win, your ROI will likely be a multiple of a higher known number as compared to when the investment was originally underwritten. That’s IF you win!  It also means that you have the ability to determine the impact of fees on expected returns based on when the fees were charged in relation to when the cash was invested, which may help with the gross-to-net return spread issue that can be significant in litigation finance.  There is also the potential that these cases may settle relatively early in the life cycle of the secondary investor’s ownership period, which will likely generate stronger IRRs and MOICs, and hopefully minimize the ‘fee drag’ (the impact fees have on net investor returns). Why now? There has been much recent chatter in the litigation finance sector about secondary opportunities, so why now? Well, it’s mainly reflective of the extent of time the industry has been in existence.  The commercial litigation finance industry started in earnest between five and ten years ago in the US.  Accordingly, a meaningful amount of capital has been raised and a sufficient amount of time has passed to allow for the conditions necessary for secondaries – namely supply.  The supply mainly stems from a confluence of investor interest in liquidity for their longer dated investments, and GP interest in ‘putting some points on the board’, meaning they need to show some track record so they can raise a subsequent fund. Simply, the timing seems right, and when an institution needs a way to achieve liquidity for its portfolio, it will find a way to do so. How best to approach investing in secondary transactions? Different from other forms of private equity, acquiring litigation finance investments in the secondary market requires the expertise of a litigation finance fund manager.  I say this because of the risks inherent in the tail end of the portfolio, and the expertise required to assess this tail is the same expertise required to underwrite new investments.  It would be a mistake to confuse investing in secondary transactions in litigation finance with other private equity sectors like leveraged buy-out or venture capital, where the valuation metrics and approach to valuation are much more transparent and well accepted. Valuation in litigation finance is much more in the realm of ‘beauty is in the eye of the beholder’ (aka “a subjective value judgment”), with one group seeing much more value in a case than another based on their biases and experiences.  Managers that invest in secondaries should be prepared to do extensive diligence on a large part of the portfolio, and certainly those investments in the portfolio that appear riskier and disproportionately large relative to the average case size in the portfolio. The other important element is to ensure that you have a diversified portfolio.  If you are purchasing a tail portfolio, then it likely means there are fewer investments than what was present in the original portfolio earlier in its investment cycle; hence, there will be a higher degree of volatility, in statistical terms.  Since there are now fewer investments in the tail portfolio and the early resolutions likely provided strong returns, the remainder of the tail has to stand on its own merit and so it will be important to ensure the tail portfolio is large enough to be diversified in its own right.  To the extent it is not well diversified, I would consider spreading your overall secondary allocations across more than one portfolio, until you get a desired (target) degree of diversification (case types, case sizes, geographies, defendants, law firms, etc.) with a limited concentration risk within the portfolio.  A portfolio with 50 cases might seem diversified, but if three of those cases represent 30% of the capital and they all turn out to be losers (which is statistically a very real potential outcome), then it puts a lot of pressure on the remaining portfolio to both offset the large losses while simultaneously producing target returns for the portfolio as a whole. Lastly, I would consider putting in place an insurance wrapper for ‘first loss’ insurance.  This type of insurance can be expensive, and so you need to be prudent and careful not to over-insure.  You have to look at the risk of loss probabilistically, and such an analysis could show that you don’t likely have to insure 100% of the principal, but probably just a fraction of the principal, and preferably through first-loss coverage, where the insurer takes the obligation for the loss on the first, say, 20% - 30% of the portfolio (the riskiest portion, statistically speaking), and the investor is exposed for the remaining 70% - 80% (the decreasingly less risky portion). I think most secondary portfolios should be valued at a significant discount to market value with a range of probability-sequenced outcomes to triangulate to a valuation. The valuator should not lose sight of the fact that approximately 30% of litigation finance backed cases lose, and so this should be a starting point for the analysis of the potential value of the portfolio, and stress-tested from there to reflect the higher risk inherent in the ‘tail’.  However, there can also be specific investment opportunities which through the process of de-risking may represent better opportunities than they did before the de-risking process and the investor may be able to justify or may be forced to accept a higher valuation in order to be able to transact. In situations where the litigation is so significant that it can actually have an impact on a defendant’s publicly traded securities, you could also use options on the publicly traded securities of your counter-party to hedge your investment such that if you lose the case you make money on the hedge, and if you win the case, the cost of unravelling the hedge becomes the cost of an otherwise successful transaction.  Of course, any hedge will be imperfect as the stock price of the defendant can be influenced by a number of factors in addition to the outcome of the litigation, the very outcome you are trying to hedge. David Ross, Managing Director & Head of Private Credit at Northleaf Capital Partners notes: "We approach secondary transactions in a prudent and judicious manner with thorough analysis on concentration risk, deep dive on case merits and outcomes, as well as comprehensive financial diligence and modeling. We tend to mitigate investment risk by way of conservative structuring and cautious underlying assumptions that provide significant cushion for the investment." It is only through a cautious approach that one can successfully invest in commercial litigation finance secondaries.  Other areas of litigation finance (consumer, law firm lending, etc.) will likely have different risks and portfolio characteristics that allow for less extensive diligence on the portfolio, which may be a consideration for some investors. Slingshot Insights For those investors interested in the litigation finance secondary market, I think it is important to approach the investment with caution and a high level of expert diligence to offset the implied volatility that the ‘tail’ of the portfolio offers.  It is also important to understand the motivations of the seller – a manager looking to create a track record will have different motivations than an investor who needs liquidity.  The seller’s motivations may also offer insight into the extent price can be negotiated. It is important not to lose sight of the typical loss rate of the industry and the fact that the tail should exhibit enhanced volatility (more losses) as compared to a whole portfolio, and so an investor should model their returns, and hence their entry price, accordingly. Should you choose to make a secondary investment, consider a variety of options to de-risk the investment by sharing risks and rewards with others (i.e. insurance providers or the vendor of the asset). Above all else, make sure your secondaries are diversified or part of a larger diversified pool of assets. As always, I welcome your comments and counter-points to those raised in this article.  Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc. and an investor in the consumer and commercial litigation finance industry.  Slingshot Capital inc. is involved in the origination and design of unique opportunities in legal finance markets, globally, investing with and alongside institutional investors.

The following article was contributed by Mikolaj Burzec, a litigation finance advisor and broker. He is also a content writer for Sentry Funding. The Competition Appeal Tribunal, London's specialist competition court, has confirmed that a special purpose company led by Mark McLaren, formerly of The Consumers' Association, will act as the Class Representation. McLaren represents millions of motorists and businesses who bought or leased a new car between October 2006 and September 2015 against five shipping companies that imported cars into Europe. The European Commission has already found that the car carriers fixed prices, manipulated bids, and divided the market for roll-on roll-off transport by sea. According to the Commission, the carriers had agreed to maintain the status quo in the market and to respect each other's ongoing business on certain routes, or with certain customers by offering artificially high prices or not bidding at all in tenders for vehicle manufacturers. The class action follows the EC decision. It is one of the first actions of its kind in the UK and damages for car buyers are estimated at around £150 million. The class representative Mark McLaren has set up a non-for-profit company - Mark McLaren Class Representative Limited - specifically to bring this claim. Mark is the sole director and only member of the company and therefore has full control over it. In a collective action, the class representative is responsible for conducting the action on behalf of the class. His duties include:

• instructing specialist lawyers and experts
• deciding whether to proceed with the claim and, in particular, deciding whether to refer an offer of settlement to the Competition Appeal Tribunal for approval
• communicating with the class and issuing formal notices to class members by various means, including posting notices on this website.

An independent advisory committee will be appointed to assist in the decision-making process. The claim From 2006 to 2012, five major shipping companies were involved in a cartel that affected prices for the sea transport of new motor vehicles, including cars and vans. During the period of the cartel, the shipping companies exchanged confidential information, manipulated tenders and prices, and reduced overall capacity in the market for the carriage of cars and vans. The cartel resulted in car manufacturers paying too much to transport new vehicles from their factories around the world to the UK and Europe. Customers who bought a new car or van between 18 October 2006 and 6 September 2015 probably also paid too much for the delivery. This is because when a manufacturer sets the price of its new cars or vans, it takes into account the total cost of delivery, including shipping costs. For simplicity, car manufacturers usually divide their total delivery costs equally among all the cars and/or vans they sell. When a customer buys a new car or van, he pays for "delivery", either separately or as part of the on-road price. Although the car manufacturers themselves have done nothing wrong, customers who bought a new car or van between 18 October 2006 and 6 September 2015 are likely to have paid an increased delivery charge. The European Commission has already decided to impose fines of several hundred million euros on the shipping companies. The lawsuit seeks to recover these extra costs from the shipping companies who were involved in the cartel. The Competition Appeal Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal has authorised the claims to proceed as a class action. This means that millions of motorists and businesses could be entitled to compensation and these individuals and companies will now automatically be represented in court unless they choose to leave (opt-out) the claim. McLaren is the first Collective Proceeding Order judgment in which the Tribunal has explicitly considered the position of larger corporates within an opt-out class with the defendants having argued that big businesses should be removed and treated on an opt-in basis. The Tribunal’s refusal to treat larger businesses in the class differently to smaller corporates and consumers is noteworthy, and these aspects of the judgment will no doubt be of interest for the future proposed collective actions which feature businesses. McLaren further explored the appropriate legal test applied to the methodology in order to establish a class-wide loss at the certification stage. The Tribunal denied the defendants' strike out request, which was based on purported inadequacies in the claimant's methodology. The Tribunal concluded that its job at the certification stage is not to analyse the expert methodology's merits and robustness; rather, the Tribunal will determine whether the methodology provides a "realistic chance of evaluating loss on a class-wide basis." It further stressed that this does not imply that the Tribunal must be convinced that the approach will work, or that the methodology must be proven to work. The Tribunal emphasized the critical role of third-party funding in collective actions, as well as confirmed that the potential take-up rate by the class is not the only measure of benefit derived from the proceedings, with another benefit being the role of collective claims in deterring wrongful conduct. Despite the fact that the sums involved per class member may be little, the Tribunal focused on the fact that the total claim value is significant and that the majority of class members would be able to retrieve information about vehicle purchases. In the end, the Tribunal managed two issues that have been discussed in earlier decisions: inclusion of deceased consumers in the class and compound interest. Corresponding to the previous, McLaren was not allowed to change his case to incorporate potential class individuals who had died before procedures being given, because of the expiry of the limitation period. Regarding the latter, in contrast to the judgment in Merricks last year, the Tribunal was ready to certify compound interest as a standard issue even though it is common just to a part of the class who had bought vehicles using finance agreements. The Tribunal’s decision is conditional upon McLaren making adjustments to his methodology to account for the ruling on these points, and any determination as to the need for sub-classes. Case name and number: 1339/7/7/20 Mark McLaren Class Representative Limited v MOL (Europe Africa) Ltd and Others The whole judgment is available here: https://www.catribunal.org.uk/judgments/13397720-mark-mclaren-class-representative-limited-v-mol-europe-africa-ltd-and-others

The following article is part of an ongoing column titled ‘Investor Insights.’  Brought to you by Ed Truant, founder and content manager of Slingshot Capital, ‘Investor Insights’ will provide thoughtful and engaging perspectives on all aspects of investing in litigation finance.  Executive Summary

• Evolution of Litigation Finance necessitates the need for a secondary market
• Investing in Litigation Finance secondaries is much more difficult than other forms of private equity due to the inherent difficulty in valuing the ‘tail’
• Experts should be utilized to assess case merits and valuation
• Life cycle of litigation finance suggests timing is right for secondaries

Slingshot Insights:

• Investing in the ‘tail’ of a portfolio, where most secondary transactions will take place, can be more difficult than primary investing
• Dynamics of the ‘tail’ of a portfolio are inherently riskier than a whole portfolio, which is partially offset by enhanced information related to the underlying cases
• Secondary portfolios are best reviewed by experts in the field and each significant investment should be reviewed extensively
• Derive little comfort from portfolios that have been marked-to-market by the underlying manager
• Investing in secondaries requires a discount to market value to offset the implied volatility associated with the tail

In my discussions with litigation finance institutional investors, the topic of secondary investments has been raised a number of times by those who understand the economics of the asset class and are seeking to take advantage of some of the longer duration cases and portfolios in existence.  In this article, I explore why there is interest in the secondary market, why now, and how best to approach investing in secondary investments, as well as some watch-outs. The concept of secondaries has been well established in the private equity world, specifically leveraged buy-out private equity, and, having been in existence for a couple of decades now, represents a mature strategy not only within leveraged buy-out, but also infrastructure, real estate, venture capital, growth equity, etc.  So, it is not surprising to see the concept applied to litigation finance. As David Ross, Managing Director & Head of Private Credit at Northleaf Capital Partners, notes "Having been active in private equity secondaries for close to twenty years, Northleaf has extended its secondaries expertise over the past few years to include investments in litigation finance, which is an area that provides attractive and uncorrelated returns for our investors. Executing investments in litigation finance requires dedicated expertise but can provide attractive transaction dynamics for both existing investors seeking liquidity and prospective investors capable of underwriting and structuring an attractive secondary." To begin with, let’s first define what constitutes a “secondary” transaction.  Essentially, a secondary is any transaction where one party is acquiring the interests from the original investor (the ‘primary’ investor) in an investment opportunity.  In the case of litigation finance, this could take the form of a single case investment, portfolios or LP interests in funds, among other opportunities.  In this sense, they are the ‘second’ investor to own the investment, as they have acquired their interest from the first investor through the acquisition transaction. Types of Secondaries In order for a secondary market to make sense, at least for institutional investors, there needs to be a sufficient number of opportunities that are adequately aged to allow for one party to sell at typically, but not always, a discount to either their original cost or their current fair market value of the investment.  These opportunities can arise for a number of reasons, as outlined below. For fund managers, they may be looking to raise a new, larger fund, and in order to do so they will have to demonstrate that they are good stewards of capital and that they can produce attractive returns to investors relative to the risk they assume.  If these managers do not have a sufficient number of realizations in their predecessor portfolios, they will have to create a track record by selling off interests in single cases or entire portfolios.  In this way, they will receive arm’s length validation that their portfolio has intrinsic value, with the idea that other potential investors should take comfort in the fact that a third party has assessed the attractiveness of opportunities and decided to invest at a value that is, hopefully, in excess of their original cost, or matches their internal assessment of fair market value.  Of course, this assumes that the purchaser is a knowledgeable purchaser of litigation finance assets and an expert at valuing litigation finance investments, of which few exist in the world, as valuation is perhaps more art than science. A relatively recent public example of this is Burford’s multiple secondary sales of interests in their Petersen case, which was sold in several tranches at increasing valuations as Burford continued to de-risk their investment through positive case developments during its hold period.  According to the Petersen article hyperlinked above, Burford generated $236 million in cash from selling off interests in the claim, which significantly benefited its reported profitability and cashflow, and evidently, fueled its stock price at the time.  All in all, a smart move by Burford to hedge its bets and de-risk its investment by selling down to other investors.  However, it remains to be seen whether those who acquired the secondary interests in Peterson were as astute as the sellers, time will tell. For investors, they may be in a situation where they are in a liquidity squeeze, and could be frustrated with the duration of the litigation finance portfolio and therefore wish to exit the remainder of their investment to redeploy capital into a new fund or a new strategy. They could also have had a change in management which created a shift in strategy, or any number of other causes.  For investors in individual cases or funds, they currently face a difficult task in finding a secondary investor to acquire their interests, which can be made more difficult by the fact that the manager may not be motivated to find them a purchaser, as there is no economic incentive to do so. The fate of these investors remains in the hands of the manager.  However, if there are enough investors clamoring for liquidity, then the manager may be forced to hire an investment bank or another intermediary expert to solicit the markets’ appetite and obtain bids for the portfolio; but this will come at a cost which is typically assumed by the selling investor. But is a secondary a “realization”? The short answer is NO! While a secondary can be an indication of perceived value in the market, it is simply a point-in-time estimate of value by the new, prospective owner that makes a series of assumptions to underlie their valuation. As such, it has no bearing on whether the case is more or less likely to settle or win, whether the defendant has the resources to pay, and whether it could take two years or ten years to collect. Litigation is well known to have a binary outcome.  In the context of large cases where there are significant dollars at risk, it may be in the best interests of the defendant to take the trial risk and deal with the consequences by ultimately settling for a fraction of the damages after the court decision is handed down.  In the Petersen case referenced above, it has been felt by some in the market that an award could still be years away (in the absence of collection frustration tactics that the Argentinian government may pursue); and even then, there is some concern that the decision may allow for damages denominated in Argentine pesos, which have been significantly devalued since the case began.  In addition, the Argentine government has defaulted on its sovereign debt a few times over the last numbers of years and is currently in default on its International Monetary Fund loans, so it is difficult to assess the risk of collectability. Just because you win a case, doesn’t mean you get to collect the spoils. Collection is a whole other issue and perhaps a topic for another article.  Suffice it to say, that a case is not completely de-risked until the ‘cash is in the bank’ (your bank account, not the lawyer’s trust account). So, I personally would take very little comfort in the fact that another party has looked at a case and made a decision that it has value – you would have to have a deep understanding of that buyer’s motivations (are they merely incentivized to get money invested? Are they motivated by Litigation Finance FOMO?) and that buyer’s ability to value litigation, which is difficult to do with accuracy because of the number of variables & uncertainties involved. Why are litigation finance secondaries interesting? Perhaps the better question is, “Are litigation finance secondaries interesting?” And the answer is, “It depends”. When you look at a portfolio of litigation finance single cases, there are a number of individual investments that typically resolve early in the fund’s life, and this usually gives rise to attractive internal rates of return (“IRR”), but low multiples of  invested capital (“MOIC”); then, there are those that resolve in and around the 30 month mark, which is a fairly typical duration, which should result in stronger MOICs and perhaps somewhat lower IRRs; and then, there is the ‘tail’ of the portfolio (see chart below).  The ‘tail’ of a portfolio refers to those cases that are outside of the normalized expectation for case realizations in terms of duration that reside in the portfolio near the end of, or perhaps even outside of, the investment vehicle’s life.  These cases could be outside the normal time distribution because the cases are highly complex, the defendant has tried to procedurally frustrate & delay the litigation, the case is going through a long drawn out trial or arbitral process, or the nature of the case simply takes longer (intellectual property, international arbitration, etc.) among other explanations. Often, when an investor is provided with a secondary opportunity, they are quite likely looking at investing in the ‘tail’ of the portfolio because the early part of the portfolio has already been resolved, and the proceeds have either been paid out or used to fund the cases remaining in the tail.  Investing in the tail has many implications for expected outcomes. The potential tail outcomes, as depicted with red arrows in the chart below, indicate the uncertainty in both quantum and duration of the tail. In part 2 of this article, I will explore some of the intricacies of ‘investing in the tail’ and explore considerations for investing in secondary transactions in litigation finance investments. Slingshot Insights  For those investors interested in the litigation finance secondary market, I think it is important to approach the investment with caution and a high level of expert diligence to offset the implied volatility that the ‘tail’ of the portfolio offers.  It is also important to understand the motivations of the seller – a manager looking to create a track record will have different motivations than an investor who needs liquidity.  The seller’s motivations may also offer insight into the extent price can be negotiated. It is important not to lose sight of the typical loss rate of the industry and the fact that the tail should exhibit enhanced volatility (more losses) as compared to a whole portfolio, and so an investor should model their returns, and hence their entry price, accordingly. Should you choose to make a secondary investment, consider a variety of options to de-risk the investment by sharing risks and rewards with others (i.e. insurance providers or the vendor of the asset). Above all else, make sure your secondaries are diversified or part of a larger diversified pool of assets. As always, I welcome your comments and counter-points to those raised in this article. Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc. and an investor in the consumer and commercial litigation finance industry.  Slingshot Capital inc. is involved in the origination and design of unique opportunities in legal finance markets, globally, investing with and alongside institutional investors