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Federal Court of Australia approves its power to make future orders for class closure

June 30, 2022

Federal Court of Australia approves its power to make future orders for class closure

The following piece was contributed by Lillian Rizio and Max Hensen of Australian law firm, Piper Alderman.  The Full Federal Courts’ decision in Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47 (Parkin) confirms the courts’ power to issue pre-mediation (and settlement) soft class closure notices to group members. The decision hints at the (positive) appetite of the Federal Court in making future orders for class closure that facilitate a just outcome,[1] simplifies the assessment of quantum prior to settlement, and reduces an element of risk in funded litigation. Opt-Out Nature of Class Actions   The Australian position on class closure orders is set out in Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Act). It serves as a guide for commencing Class Actions in the Federal Court of Australia, and is the reason why they are run on an ‘opt out,’ and ‘open’ basis. By virtue of the Act, class actions are commenced by a representative applicant on behalf of ‘group members.’ Group members are not required to register their interest, provide their consent, or even have knowledge of the proceedings on foot. Whilst the Act provides that a group member might ‘opt-out’ of the proceedings,[2] it does not compel one to submit information prior to settlement or judgment in order to participate. Ultimately, an ‘opt-out’ proceeding means that the size and composition of a class is difficult to quantify in pre-settlement discussions. Uncertainty as to the potential quantum of a claim complicates settlement negotiations. Background The parties in Parkin sought clarification from the Federal Court on its statutory power to issue notices to class members following two 2020 judgments handed down in the Court of Appeal of New South Wales. Both judgements considered the court’s powers pursuant to the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), in sections that mirrored the powers conferred by the Act on the Federal Court. In Haselhurst v Toyota Motor Corporation Australia Ltd t/as Toyota Australia,[3] the court found that its statutory powers did no extend to authorise it to make orders relating to class closure before settlement. It rationalised that, a class closure order extinguishes the cause of action of a group member. Therefore, that ordering the issuance of one was beyond the scope of its statutory ‘gap-filling’ power in facilitating a just outcome. In Wigmans v AMP Ltd[4] the court found that making an order to issue a notice for soft closure was contrary to the ‘fundamental precept’ of the class action regime.[5] Here, it rationalised that a group member was entitled to not act prior to settlement, or judgement. Questions In seeking clarity on the courts’ statutory powers, the parties in Parkin filed applications which put two questions to the Court. Namely, whether:
  1. section 33ZF of the Act permitted the Court to make orders to notify group members that, if they failed to register their interest, or opt out by a given date, they would remain a group member, but not be entitled to benefit from settlement (subject to Court approval) (Question One); and
  2. section 33X(5) permitted the court to order that group members be notified that in the event of a settlement, the Applicant would seek an order which (if made) would prevent a group member that had failed to register their interest, or opt out by a given date, from being entitled to benefit from settlement (Question Two).
Findings and Discussion Ultimately, the court found that, whilst no power under s 33ZF of the act was ‘enlivened,’[6] the specific power available under s 33X(5) permitted the court to issue the orders sought by the Applicant in Question Two. As to the precedential decisions from the Court of Appeal in New South Wales, the court in Parkin found that:
  1. the decision in Wigmans[7] was ‘plainly wrong.’ Here, the court affirmed that s 33X(5) conferred a power that was ‘broad and unqualified’[8] with respect to making an order that a notice be issued to group members at ‘any stage’ and of ‘any matter’[9]; and
  2. contrary to Wigmans[10] assertion on ‘fundamental precept,’ the court held that whilst group members may take a passive role in proceedings, they can also be required to act prior to settlement, and that the court may exercise its statutory powers to motivate them to do so.
In its discussion relevant to Question One, the court found that the power conferred by s 33ZF was discretionary and ‘gap filling.’[11] On the facts, the court did not consider that a ‘gap’ applied, given the relevance of s 33X(5) in providing a resolution to the issue at hand. Interestingly, however, the court hinted at its sentiment towards potential future application of s 33ZF in the following comment: ‘one could not foreclose the possibility, depending upon the circumstances of the case, that such an order could advance the effective resolution of proceedings.’[12] Conclusion – What does it Mean The decision of the Full Federal Court, means that parties can expect to be awarded notices that identify the intention of ascertaining future class closure orders in proceedings. This has resulted in the ratification of a strategy in which parties can agree to obligate group members to affirm their interest, or opt-out prior to mediation (for settlement purposes). As for the future of class-closure, the court comments on the potential of the issuance of class closure orders enlivened by s 33ZF in instances where they effect the effective resolution of proceedings. Going forward, competing interpretations of the statutory powers conferred upon the courts leaves room for the High Court to interpret the matter, or perhaps, call for statutory reform.  Given the positive findings as to the ability for pre-mediation notices to be issued, the Federal Court will likely be the preferred jurisdiction for class actions commenced on an open class basis. About the Authors Lillian Rizio, Partner Lillian is a commercial litigator with over 14 years’ experience in high stakes, high value litigation. Lillian specialises in class action, funded and commercial litigation, with expertise across a broad range of sectors including financial services, energy & resources, insurance and corporate disputes. Max Hensen, Lawyer Max is a litigation and dispute resolution lawyer at Piper Alderman with a primary focus on corporate and commercial disputes. Max is involved in a number of large, complex matters in jurisdictions across Australia. For queries or comments in relation to this article please contact Lillian Rizio, Partner | T: +61 7 3220 7715 | E:  lrizio@piperalderman.com.au — [1] Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47 at [144]. [2] Part IVA Section 33J Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). [3] (2020) 101 NSWLR 890. [4] (2020) 102 NSWLR 199. [5] Wigmans v Amp Ptd (2020) 102 NSWLR 199 at [89]. [6] Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47 at [1]. [7] Wigmans v AMP Ltd (2020) 102 NSWLR 199. [8] Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47 at [111]. [9] Ibid. [10] Wigmans v AMP Ltd (2020) 102 NSWLR 199. [11] Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47 at [13]. [12] Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47 at [144].

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Litigation Financiers Organize on Capitol Hill

By John Freund |

The litigation finance industry is mobilizing its defenses after nearly facing extinction through federal legislation last year. In response to Senator Thom Tillis's surprise attempt to impose a 41% tax on litigation finance profits, two attorneys have launched the American Civil Accountability Alliance—a lobbying group dedicated to fighting back against efforts to restrict third-party funding of lawsuits.

As reported in Bloomberg Law, co-founder Erick Robinson, a Houston patent lawyer, described the industry's collective shock when the Tillis measure came within striking distance of passing as part of a major tax and spending package. The proposal ultimately failed, but the close call exposed the $16 billion industry's vulnerability to legislative ambush tactics. Robinson noted that the measure appeared with only five weeks before the final vote, giving stakeholders little time to respond before the Senate parliamentarian ultimately removed it on procedural grounds.

The new alliance represents a shift toward grassroots advocacy, focusing on bringing forward voices of individuals and small parties whose cases would have been impossible without funding. Robinson emphasized that state-level legislation now poses the greater threat, as these bills receive less media scrutiny than federal proposals while establishing precedents that can spread rapidly across jurisdictions.

The group is still forming its board and hiring lobbyists, but its founders are clear about their mission: ensuring that litigation finance isn't quietly regulated out of existence through misleading rhetoric about foreign influence or frivolous litigation—claims Robinson dismisses as disconnected from how funders actually evaluate cases for investment.

Commercial

ISO’s ‘Litigation Funding Mutual Disclosure’ May Be Unenforceable

By John Freund |

The insurance industry has introduced a new policy condition entitled "Litigation Funding Mutual Disclosure" (ISO Form CG 99 11 01 26) that may be included in liability policies starting this month. The condition allows either party to demand mutual disclosure of third-party litigation funding agreements when disputes arise over whether a claim or suit is covered by the policy. However, the condition faces significant enforceability challenges that make it largely unworkable in practice.

As reported in Omni Bridgeway, the condition is unenforceable for several key reasons. First, when an insurer denies coverage and the policyholder commences coverage litigation, the denial likely relieves the policyholder of compliance with policy conditions. Courts typically hold that insurers must demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice from a policyholder's failure to perform a condition, which would be difficult to establish when coverage has already been denied.

Additionally, the condition's requirement for policyholders to disclose funding agreements would force them to breach confidentiality provisions in those agreements, amounting to intentional interference with contractual relations. The condition is also overly broad, extending to funding agreements between attorneys and funders where the insurer has no privity. Most problematically, the "mutual" disclosure requirement lacks true mutuality since insurers rarely use litigation funding except for subrogation claims, creating a one-sided obligation that borders on bad faith.

The condition appears designed to give insurers a litigation advantage by accessing policyholders' private financial information, despite overwhelming judicial precedent that litigation finance is rarely relevant to case claims and defenses. Policyholders should reject this provision during policy renewals whenever possible.

Commercial Regulatory Issues

Valve Faces Certified UK Class Action Despite Funding Scrutiny

By John Freund |

The UK Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) has delivered a closely watched judgment certifying an opt-out collective proceedings order (CPO) against Valve Corporation, clearing the way for a landmark competition claim to proceed on behalf of millions of UK consumers. The decision marks another important moment in the evolution of collective actions—and their funding—in the UK.

In its judgment, the CAT approved the application brought by Vicki Shotbolt as class representative, alleging that Valve abused a dominant position in the PC video games market through its operation of the Steam platform. The claim contends that Valve imposed restrictive pricing and distribution practices that inflated prices paid by UK consumers. Valve opposed certification on multiple grounds, including challenges to the suitability of the class representative, the methodology for assessing aggregate damages, and the adequacy of the litigation funding arrangements supporting the claim.

The Tribunal rejected Valve’s objections, finding that the proposed methodology for estimating class-wide loss met the “realistic prospect” threshold required at the certification stage. While Valve criticised the expert evidence as overly theoretical and insufficiently grounded in data, the CAT reiterated that a CPO hearing is not a mini-trial, and that disputes over economic modelling are better resolved at a later merits stage.

Of particular interest to the legal funding market, the CAT also examined the funding structure underpinning the claim. Valve argued that the arrangements raised concerns around control, proportionality, and potential conflicts. The Tribunal disagreed, concluding that the funding terms were sufficiently transparent and that appropriate safeguards were in place to ensure the independence of the class representative and legal team. In doing so, the CAT reaffirmed its now-familiar approach of scrutinising funding without treating third-party finance as inherently problematic.

With certification granted, the case will now proceed as one of the largest opt-out competition claims yet to advance in the UK. For litigation funders, the ruling underscores the CAT’s continued willingness to accommodate complex funding structures in large consumer actions—while signalling that challenges to funding are unlikely to succeed absent clear evidence of abuse or impropriety.