Trending Now

Federal Court of Australia approves its power to make future orders for class closure

Federal Court of Australia approves its power to make future orders for class closure

The following piece was contributed by Lillian Rizio and Max Hensen of Australian law firm, Piper Alderman The Full Federal Courts’ decision in Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47 (Parkin) confirms the courts’ power to issue pre-mediation (and settlement) soft class closure notices to group members. The decision hints at the (positive) appetite of the Federal Court in making future orders for class closure that facilitate a just outcome,[1] simplifies the assessment of quantum prior to settlement, and reduces an element of risk in funded litigation. Opt-Out Nature of Class Actions   The Australian position on class closure orders is set out in Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Act). It serves as a guide for commencing Class Actions in the Federal Court of Australia, and is the reason why they are run on an ‘opt out,’ and ‘open’ basis. By virtue of the Act, class actions are commenced by a representative applicant on behalf of ‘group members.’ Group members are not required to register their interest, provide their consent, or even have knowledge of the proceedings on foot. Whilst the Act provides that a group member might ‘opt-out’ of the proceedings,[2] it does not compel one to submit information prior to settlement or judgment in order to participate. Ultimately, an ‘opt-out’ proceeding means that the size and composition of a class is difficult to quantify in pre-settlement discussions. Uncertainty as to the potential quantum of a claim complicates settlement negotiations. Background The parties in Parkin sought clarification from the Federal Court on its statutory power to issue notices to class members following two 2020 judgments handed down in the Court of Appeal of New South Wales. Both judgements considered the court’s powers pursuant to the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), in sections that mirrored the powers conferred by the Act on the Federal Court. In Haselhurst v Toyota Motor Corporation Australia Ltd t/as Toyota Australia,[3] the court found that its statutory powers did no extend to authorise it to make orders relating to class closure before settlement. It rationalised that, a class closure order extinguishes the cause of action of a group member. Therefore, that ordering the issuance of one was beyond the scope of its statutory ‘gap-filling’ power in facilitating a just outcome. In Wigmans v AMP Ltd[4] the court found that making an order to issue a notice for soft closure was contrary to the ‘fundamental precept’ of the class action regime.[5] Here, it rationalised that a group member was entitled to not act prior to settlement, or judgement. Questions In seeking clarity on the courts’ statutory powers, the parties in Parkin filed applications which put two questions to the Court. Namely, whether:
  1. section 33ZF of the Act permitted the Court to make orders to notify group members that, if they failed to register their interest, or opt out by a given date, they would remain a group member, but not be entitled to benefit from settlement (subject to Court approval) (Question One); and
  2. section 33X(5) permitted the court to order that group members be notified that in the event of a settlement, the Applicant would seek an order which (if made) would prevent a group member that had failed to register their interest, or opt out by a given date, from being entitled to benefit from settlement (Question Two).
Findings and Discussion Ultimately, the court found that, whilst no power under s 33ZF of the act was ‘enlivened,’[6] the specific power available under s 33X(5) permitted the court to issue the orders sought by the Applicant in Question Two. As to the precedential decisions from the Court of Appeal in New South Wales, the court in Parkin found that:
  1. the decision in Wigmans[7] was ‘plainly wrong.’ Here, the court affirmed that s 33X(5) conferred a power that was ‘broad and unqualified’[8] with respect to making an order that a notice be issued to group members at ‘any stage’ and of ‘any matter’[9]; and
  2. contrary to Wigmans[10] assertion on ‘fundamental precept,’ the court held that whilst group members may take a passive role in proceedings, they can also be required to act prior to settlement, and that the court may exercise its statutory powers to motivate them to do so.
In its discussion relevant to Question One, the court found that the power conferred by s 33ZF was discretionary and ‘gap filling.’[11] On the facts, the court did not consider that a ‘gap’ applied, given the relevance of s 33X(5) in providing a resolution to the issue at hand. Interestingly, however, the court hinted at its sentiment towards potential future application of s 33ZF in the following comment: ‘one could not foreclose the possibility, depending upon the circumstances of the case, that such an order could advance the effective resolution of proceedings.’[12] Conclusion – What does it Mean The decision of the Full Federal Court, means that parties can expect to be awarded notices that identify the intention of ascertaining future class closure orders in proceedings. This has resulted in the ratification of a strategy in which parties can agree to obligate group members to affirm their interest, or opt-out prior to mediation (for settlement purposes). As for the future of class-closure, the court comments on the potential of the issuance of class closure orders enlivened by s 33ZF in instances where they effect the effective resolution of proceedings. Going forward, competing interpretations of the statutory powers conferred upon the courts leaves room for the High Court to interpret the matter, or perhaps, call for statutory reform.  Given the positive findings as to the ability for pre-mediation notices to be issued, the Federal Court will likely be the preferred jurisdiction for class actions commenced on an open class basis. About the Authors Lillian Rizio, Partner Lillian is a commercial litigator with over 14 years’ experience in high stakes, high value litigation. Lillian specialises in class action, funded and commercial litigation, with expertise across a broad range of sectors including financial services, energy & resources, insurance and corporate disputes. Max Hensen, Lawyer Max is a litigation and dispute resolution lawyer at Piper Alderman with a primary focus on corporate and commercial disputes. Max is involved in a number of large, complex matters in jurisdictions across Australia. For queries or comments in relation to this article please contact Lillian Rizio, Partner | T: +61 7 3220 7715 | E:  lrizio@piperalderman.com.au — [1] Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47 at [144]. [2] Part IVA Section 33J Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). [3] (2020) 101 NSWLR 890. [4] (2020) 102 NSWLR 199. [5] Wigmans v Amp Ptd (2020) 102 NSWLR 199 at [89]. [6] Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47 at [1]. [7] Wigmans v AMP Ltd (2020) 102 NSWLR 199. [8] Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47 at [111]. [9] Ibid. [10] Wigmans v AMP Ltd (2020) 102 NSWLR 199. [11] Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47 at [13]. [12] Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47 at [144].
Secure Your Funding Sidebar

Commercial

View All

Bloomberg Law Cites Legal Funding Journal Podcast in Commentary on Funder Transparency

By John Freund |

A recent episode of the Legal Funding Journal podcast was quoted in a Bloomberg Law article on funder control of cases. In the episode, Stuart Hills and Guy Nielson, Co-Founders of RiverFleet, discussed the thorny topic this way: “What do funders care about? They certainly do care about settlements and that should be recognized. They do care about who is the legal counsel and that should be recognized. They care about the way the case is being run. They care about discontinuing the legal action and they care about wider matters affecting the funder.”

The provocative new commentary from Bloomberg Law reignites the longstanding debate over transparency in third-party litigation funding (TPLF), asserting that many funders exercise considerable control over litigation outcomes—despite public disavowals to the contrary.

In the article, Alex Dahl of Lawyers for Civil Justice argues that recent contract analyses expose mechanisms by which funders can shape or even override key litigation decisions, including settlement approval, counsel selection, and pursuit of injunctive relief. The piece singles out Burford Capital, the sector’s largest player, highlighting its 2022 bid to block a client’s settlement in the high-profile Sysco antitrust matter, even as it publicly claimed to be a passive investor. Such contradictions, Dahl contends, underscore a pressing need for mandatory disclosure of litigation funding arrangements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The analysis points to contracts that allegedly allow funders to halt cash flow mid-litigation, demand access to all documents—including sensitive or protected materials—and require plaintiffs to pay sanctions regardless of who caused the misconduct. Courts and opposing parties are typically blind to these provisions, as the agreements are often shielded from disclosure.

While funders like Burford maintain that control provisions are invoked only in “extraordinary circumstances,” Dahl’s article ends with a call for judicial mandates requiring transparency, likening funder involvement to insurers, who must disclose coverage under current civil rules.

For legal funders, the takeaway is clear: scrutiny is intensifying. As the industry matures and high-profile disputes mount, the push for standardized disclosure rules may accelerate. The central question ahead—how to balance transparency with funder confidentiality—remains a defining challenge for the sector.

Siltstone vs. Walia Dispute Moves to Arbitration

By John Freund |

Siltstone Capital and its former general counsel, Manmeet (“Mani”) Walia, have agreed to resolve their dispute via arbitration rather than through the Texas state court system—a move that transforms a high‑stakes conflict over trade secrets, opportunity diversion, and fund flow into a more opaque, confidential proceeding.

An article in Law360 notes that Siltstone had accused Walia of misusing proprietary information, diverting deal opportunities to his new venture, and broadly leveraging confidential data to compete unfairly. Walia, in turn, has denied wrongdoing and contended that Siltstone had consented—or even encouraged—his departure and new venture, pointing to a release executed upon his exit and a waiver of non‑compete obligations.

The agreement to arbitrate was reported on October 7, 2025. From a governance lens, this shift signals a preference for dispute resolution that may better preserve business continuity during fundraising cycles, especially in sectors like litigation finance where timing, investor confidence, and deal pipelines are critical.

However, arbitration also concentrates pressure into narrower scopes: document production, expert analyses (especially of trade secret scope, lost opportunity causation, and valuation), and the arbitrators’ evaluation. One point to watch is whether interim relief—protecting data, limiting competitive conduct, or preserving the status quo—will emerge in the arbitration or via court‑ordered relief prior to final proceedings.

ASB Agrees to NZ$135.6M Settlement in Banking Class Action

By John Freund |

ASB has confirmed it will pay NZ$135,625,000 to resolve the Banking Class Action focused on alleged disclosure breaches under the Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act (CCCFA), subject to approval by the High Court. The settlement was announced October 7, 2025, but ASB did not admit liability as part of the deal.

1News reports that the class action—covering both ASB and ANZ customers—alleges that the banks failed to provide proper disclosure to borrowers during loan variations. As a result, during periods of non‑compliance, customers claim the banks were not entitled to collect interest and fees (under CCCFA sections 22, 99, and 48).

The litigation has been jointly funded by CASL (Australia) and LPF Group (New Zealand). The parallel claim against ANZ remains active and is not part of ASB’s settlement.

Prior to this announcement, plaintiffs had publicly floated a more ambitious settlement in the NZ$300m+ range, which both ASB and ANZ had rejected—labeling it a “stunt” or political gambit tied to ongoing legislative changes to CCCFA.

Legal and regulatory observers see this deal as a strategic move by ASB: it caps its exposure and limits litigation risk without conceding wrongdoing, while leaving open the possibility of continued proceedings against ANZ. The arrangement still requires High Court consent before going ahead.