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Immunity from Lawyer Malpractice – Uniquely Australian

The following article was contributed by Valerie Blacker, a commercial litigator focusing on funded litigation, and John Speer, a lawyer in the Dispute Resolution and Litigation Team at Piper Alderman.

While large class actions receive the lion’s share of media attention, litigation financiers also regularly fund litigation involving a single plaintiff. Given that solicitors are required to maintain professional indemnity insurance, they can be, in instances of negligence, an attractive prospect for financiers: they are well-resourced and have the capacity to satisfy any judgment awarded against them.

The Brisbane Litigation team at Piper Alderman have brought successful professional negligence claims against our clients’ former solicitors involving both funded and unfunded arrangements.[1] This article discusses a common defense raised in these types of proceedings – the advocates’ immunity.

The immunity in brief

In Australia, the advocacy function is immune from a negligence claim.  The immunity applies to a lawyer’s work in the court room. The immunity is rooted in the public policy principle that there should be finality in litigation. It prevents unsuccessful parties from seeking to re-litigate disputes by way of a collateral attack on their lawyers’ performance in court.

A barrister mainly appears in court, and a solicitor mainly performs legal work outside of court.[2] But why does it matter? If a lawyer has been negligent, shouldn’t the client be able to seek relief?

Apparently not – in some jurisdictions. Despite having been abolished in the United Kingdom and even in New Zealand, advocates’ immunity remains firmly in place in Australia.

Indeed, there were at least eighteen court actions in 2022 that have made reference to the immunity as a defense.

Avenues for redress

The immunity is often called upon by solicitors performing ‘out-of-court’ work, but which (so the argument goes) is so ‘intimately connected to the conduct of the case in court’. In two recent examples, the immunity applied to shield a solicitor for failing to present evidence that should have been presented (Golden v Koffel [2022] NSWCA 8), and was extended to protect a solicitor who had given faulty advice (Jimenez v Watson [2021] NSWCA 55).

If a solicitor’s negligent work was actually done in court in the course of a hearing or was done out of court but which led to a decision affecting the conduct of the case in court, the alternative options for an aggrieved client are frankly inadequate.

For example, (1) an unsuccessful party may apply for an order that his or her solicitor be made personally liable for the successful party’s costs in the litigation; (2) an aggrieved client can challenge a solicitor’s bills through an application to the court for a costs assessment; and (3) disciplinary action can be taken which can result in a fine, a reprimand or in a solicitor being disqualified from practice.

At best these alternative options may reduce a client’s costs but none of them will truly compensate a client for the wrongs caused by a lousy solicitor.

Narrowing the scope of the immunity

In a more positive move, the Courts have now made it clear that the immunity does not extend to a solicitor’s work in bringing about a settlement agreement (as an agreement between parties to settle is not an exercise of judicial power).[3] It is also now possible to be compensated for the expense of engaging new lawyers.[4]

NT Pubco Pty Ltd v Strazdins is also notable. The Court there held that a failure to advise clients to seek independent legal advice was held to be likely outside the immunity.[5] The relevant wrong in that case concerned a failure by solicitors to relay to their client comments made by the court at several interlocutory hearings that the client should have been pursuing a particular kind of relief in its litigation. That would be akin to failing to commence proceedings in time. That too should fall outside of the immunity as the aggrieved client’s cause of action was complete and whole before the proceedings were started and the negligent conduct was completely separate from the litigation.

The primary justification for retaining the advocates’ immunity is to ensure the finality of judicial determinations. However, if a client brings a negligence suit against a former solicitor is that not also a separate proceeding that deals with a different issue?

As Kirby J warned, upholding the immunity not only reduces equality before the courts, but is capable of breeding contempt for the law. His Honour questioned ‘why an anomalous immunity is not only preserved in Australia but now actually enlarged by a binding legal rule that will include out-of-court advice and extend to protect solicitors as well as barristers’.[6]

In these circumstances, can the reasons traditionally given for the immunity still persuade, particularly when the rest of common law world has abolished it?

At the risk of offending the doctrine and re-litigating this issue, perhaps we should continue the debate.

About the Authors:

Valerie Blacker is a commercial litigator focusing on funded litigation. Valerie has been with Piper Alderman for over 12 years. With a background in class actions, Valerie also prosecutes funded commercial litigation claims.

John Speer is a lawyer in the Dispute Resolution and Litigation Team located in Brisbane, Prior to joining Piper Alderman John was an associate to the Honourable Justice B J Collier in the Federal Court of Australia, as well as to Deputy President B J McCabe in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. John has also worked as a ministerial adviser and chief of staff in the Parliament of Australia.

 

For queries or comments in relation to this article please contact John Speer | T: +61 7 3220 7765 | E:  jspeer@piperalderman.com.au

[1] These matters resulted in a confidential settlement.

[2] New South Wales and Queensland have a ‘split’ profession, meaning that the roles of barrister and solicitor are separated.

[3] Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd (2016) 259 CLR 1,  [5], [38], [39], [45], [46], [53].

[4] Legal Services Commissioner v Rowell [2013] QCAT OCR207-12.

[5] [2014] NTSC 8 at [134] and [137].

[6] D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1, 109 [346].

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Sony and Apple Challenge Enforceability of Litigation Funding Models

By John Freund |

A pivotal UK court case could reshape the future of litigation finance agreements, as Sony and Apple reignite legal challenges to widely used third-party funding models in large-scale commercial disputes.

An article in Law360 reports that the two tech giants are questioning the validity of litigation funding arrangements tied to multibillion-pound cartel claims brought against them. Their core argument: that certain litigation funding agreements may run afoul of UK laws governing damages-based agreements (DBAs), which restrict the share of damages a representative may take as remuneration. A previous Court of Appeal decision in PACCAR Inc. v. Competition Appeal Tribunal held that some funding models might qualify as DBAs, rendering them unenforceable if they fail to comply with statutory rules.

This resurrected dispute centers on claims brought by class representatives against Apple and Sony over alleged anti-competitive behavior. The companies argue that if the funding arrangements breach DBA regulations, the entire claims may be invalidated. For the litigation funding industry, the outcome could severely curtail access to justice mechanisms in the UK—especially for collective actions in competition law, where third-party financing is often essential.

The UK’s Competition Appeal Tribunal previously stayed the proceedings pending clarity on the legal standing of such funding arrangements. With the dispute now heading back to court, all eyes will be on whether the judiciary draws a clear line around the enforceability of funder agreements under current law.

The decision could force funders to rework deal structures or risk losing enforceability altogether. As UK courts revisit the DBA implications for litigation finance, the sector faces heightened uncertainty over regulatory compliance, enforceability, and long-term viability in complex group litigation. Will this lead to a redefinition of permissible funding models—or to a call for legislative reform to protect access to collective redress?

Funder’s Interference in Texas Fee Dispute Rejected by Appeals Court

By Harry Moran |

A Texas appeals court has ruled that a litigation funder cannot block attorneys from pursuing a fee dispute following a remand order, reinforcing the limited standing of funders in fee-shifting battles. In a 2-1 decision, the First Court of Appeals found that the funder’s interest in the outcome, while financial, did not confer the legal authority necessary to participate in the dispute or enforce a side agreement aimed at halting the proceedings.

An article in Law360 details the underlying case, which stems from a contentious attorney fee battle following a remand to state court. The litigation funder, asserting contractual rights tied to a funding agreement, attempted to intervene and stop the fee litigation between plaintiffs' and defense counsel. But the appellate court sided with the trial court’s decision to proceed, emphasizing that only parties directly involved in the underlying legal work—and not third-party financiers—are entitled to challenge or control post-remand fee determinations. The majority opinion concluded that the funder’s contract could not supersede procedural law governing who may participate in such disputes.

In dissent, one justice argued that the funder’s financial interest merited consideration, suggesting that a more expansive view of standing could be warranted. But the majority held firm, stating that expanding standing would invite unwanted complexity and undermine judicial efficiency.

This decision sends a strong signal to funders operating in Texas: fee rights must be contractually precise and procedurally valid. As more funders build fee recovery provisions into their agreements, questions linger about how far those rights can extend—especially in jurisdictions hesitant to allow funders a seat at the litigation table.

Oklahoma Moves to Restrict Foreign Litigation Funding, Cap Damages

By John Freund |

In a significant policy shift, Oklahoma has enacted legislation targeting foreign influence in its judicial system through third-party litigation funding. Signed into law by Governor Kevin Stitt, the two-pronged legislation not only prohibits foreign entities from funding lawsuits in the state but also imposes a $500,000 cap on non-economic damages in civil cases—excluding exceptions such as wrongful death. The new laws take effect November 1, 2025.

An article in The Journal Record notes that proponents of the legislation, including the Oklahoma Civil Justice Council and key Republican lawmakers, argue these measures are necessary to preserve the integrity of the state's courts and protect domestic businesses from what they view as undue interference. The foreign funding restriction applies to entities from countries identified as foreign adversaries by federal standards, including China and Russia.

Critics, however, contend that the laws may undermine access to justice, especially in complex or high-cost litigation where third-party funding can serve as a vital resource. The cap on non-economic damages, in particular, has drawn concern from trial lawyers who argue it may disproportionately impact vulnerable plaintiffs without sufficient financial means.

Oklahoma’s move aligns with a broader national trend of state-level scrutiny over third-party litigation funding. Lawmakers in several states have introduced or passed legislation to increase transparency, impose registration requirements, or limit funding sources.

For the legal funding industry, the Oklahoma law raises pressing questions about how funders will adapt to an increasingly fragmented regulatory landscape. It also underscores the growing political sensitivity around foreign capital in civil litigation—a trend that could prompt further regulatory action across other jurisdictions.