Trending Now

Immunity from Lawyer Malpractice – Uniquely Australian

The following article was contributed by Valerie Blacker, a commercial litigator focusing on funded litigation, and John Speer, a lawyer in the Dispute Resolution and Litigation Team at Piper Alderman.

While large class actions receive the lion’s share of media attention, litigation financiers also regularly fund litigation involving a single plaintiff. Given that solicitors are required to maintain professional indemnity insurance, they can be, in instances of negligence, an attractive prospect for financiers: they are well-resourced and have the capacity to satisfy any judgment awarded against them.

The Brisbane Litigation team at Piper Alderman have brought successful professional negligence claims against our clients’ former solicitors involving both funded and unfunded arrangements.[1] This article discusses a common defense raised in these types of proceedings – the advocates’ immunity.

The immunity in brief

In Australia, the advocacy function is immune from a negligence claim.  The immunity applies to a lawyer’s work in the court room. The immunity is rooted in the public policy principle that there should be finality in litigation. It prevents unsuccessful parties from seeking to re-litigate disputes by way of a collateral attack on their lawyers’ performance in court.

A barrister mainly appears in court, and a solicitor mainly performs legal work outside of court.[2] But why does it matter? If a lawyer has been negligent, shouldn’t the client be able to seek relief?

Apparently not – in some jurisdictions. Despite having been abolished in the United Kingdom and even in New Zealand, advocates’ immunity remains firmly in place in Australia.

Indeed, there were at least eighteen court actions in 2022 that have made reference to the immunity as a defense.

Avenues for redress

The immunity is often called upon by solicitors performing ‘out-of-court’ work, but which (so the argument goes) is so ‘intimately connected to the conduct of the case in court’. In two recent examples, the immunity applied to shield a solicitor for failing to present evidence that should have been presented (Golden v Koffel [2022] NSWCA 8), and was extended to protect a solicitor who had given faulty advice (Jimenez v Watson [2021] NSWCA 55).

If a solicitor’s negligent work was actually done in court in the course of a hearing or was done out of court but which led to a decision affecting the conduct of the case in court, the alternative options for an aggrieved client are frankly inadequate.

For example, (1) an unsuccessful party may apply for an order that his or her solicitor be made personally liable for the successful party’s costs in the litigation; (2) an aggrieved client can challenge a solicitor’s bills through an application to the court for a costs assessment; and (3) disciplinary action can be taken which can result in a fine, a reprimand or in a solicitor being disqualified from practice.

At best these alternative options may reduce a client’s costs but none of them will truly compensate a client for the wrongs caused by a lousy solicitor.

Narrowing the scope of the immunity

In a more positive move, the Courts have now made it clear that the immunity does not extend to a solicitor’s work in bringing about a settlement agreement (as an agreement between parties to settle is not an exercise of judicial power).[3] It is also now possible to be compensated for the expense of engaging new lawyers.[4]

NT Pubco Pty Ltd v Strazdins is also notable. The Court there held that a failure to advise clients to seek independent legal advice was held to be likely outside the immunity.[5] The relevant wrong in that case concerned a failure by solicitors to relay to their client comments made by the court at several interlocutory hearings that the client should have been pursuing a particular kind of relief in its litigation. That would be akin to failing to commence proceedings in time. That too should fall outside of the immunity as the aggrieved client’s cause of action was complete and whole before the proceedings were started and the negligent conduct was completely separate from the litigation.

The primary justification for retaining the advocates’ immunity is to ensure the finality of judicial determinations. However, if a client brings a negligence suit against a former solicitor is that not also a separate proceeding that deals with a different issue?

As Kirby J warned, upholding the immunity not only reduces equality before the courts, but is capable of breeding contempt for the law. His Honour questioned ‘why an anomalous immunity is not only preserved in Australia but now actually enlarged by a binding legal rule that will include out-of-court advice and extend to protect solicitors as well as barristers’.[6]

In these circumstances, can the reasons traditionally given for the immunity still persuade, particularly when the rest of common law world has abolished it?

At the risk of offending the doctrine and re-litigating this issue, perhaps we should continue the debate.

About the Authors:

Valerie Blacker is a commercial litigator focusing on funded litigation. Valerie has been with Piper Alderman for over 12 years. With a background in class actions, Valerie also prosecutes funded commercial litigation claims.

John Speer is a lawyer in the Dispute Resolution and Litigation Team located in Brisbane, Prior to joining Piper Alderman John was an associate to the Honourable Justice B J Collier in the Federal Court of Australia, as well as to Deputy President B J McCabe in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. John has also worked as a ministerial adviser and chief of staff in the Parliament of Australia.

 

For queries or comments in relation to this article please contact John Speer | T: +61 7 3220 7765 | E:  jspeer@piperalderman.com.au

[1] These matters resulted in a confidential settlement.

[2] New South Wales and Queensland have a ‘split’ profession, meaning that the roles of barrister and solicitor are separated.

[3] Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd (2016) 259 CLR 1,  [5], [38], [39], [45], [46], [53].

[4] Legal Services Commissioner v Rowell [2013] QCAT OCR207-12.

[5] [2014] NTSC 8 at [134] and [137].

[6] D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1, 109 [346].

Commercial

View All
Community Spotlights

Community Spotlight: Scott Davis, Partner, Klarquist

By John Freund |

Scott focuses on intellectual property litigation, representing clients in courts throughout the U.S. He has had great success both obtaining relief for intellectual property owners and defending suits in a wide range of technical fields in cases involving patent, trade secret, unfair competition, employment agreement, copyright, DMCA, trademark, trade dress, product configuration, and false advertising claims.

Scott has litigated cases involving chemical, mechanical, medical device, internet, software, encryption, computer, clean energy, automotive, apparel, food, agricultural, and pharmaceutical technologies. Representing some of the largest companies in the world as well as smaller businesses and start-ups, he has succeeded for clients such as Adobe, British Airways, Columbia River Knife & Tool, Capsugel, Costco, Danner, DexCom, Intuit, Microsoft, Nightforce, Phibro Animal Health Corporation, SAP, SunModo, and Yelp.

Describing his past success and approach with the Klarquist litigation team, IAM Patent 1000 recently lauded Scott’s ability to assess the best strategies and his talent for understanding and simplifying complex technology, and noted that Scott will “always put your objectives first and act like a part of your team.”

Company Name and Description: Klarquist is a full-service intellectual property (IP) law firm with services including IP counseling, patents, trademarks, copyrights, litigation, and post-grant USPTO proceedings. Because we focus our practice exclusively on intellectual property, our prosecution professionals leverage a thorough understanding of our clients’ cutting-edge technology to an extent not seen in general practice firms. Our technical expertise covers biotechnology, physics and optics, chemistry, electrical and mechanical engineering, software and computer science, plants, and semiconductors.

Klarquist is one of the oldest and largest intellectual property law firms in the Pacific Northwest. For more than 80 years, the firm has provided intellectual property legal services to innovators of all stripes and sizes. The firm has over 60 attorneys and patent agents, more than 90% of whom hold technical degrees and many with doctorates in their respective fields. Klarquist professionals are adept at handling all phases of intellectual property matters, from procurement to transfer to litigation of disputes and post-grant review proceedings. Our roster of clients includes some of the most innovative companies and institutions in the world, from Amazon and Microsoft to the U.S. Government, which chooses Klarquist to procure its patents more than any other firm in the nation. As a full-service intellectual property boutique, Klarquist is uniquely equipped to handle any matter, for any innovator, in virtually every area of modern technology.

Website: www.klarquist.com

Year Founded: 1941

Headquarters: Portland, Oregon

Areas of Interest: Dispute resolution, litigation, and patent post grant proceedings.

Member Quote: "Litigation funding provides a key to unlock access to civil justice."

$170 Million Settlement Approved in Allianz Class Action

By Harry Moran |

A complex Australian class action that emerged through the consolidation of two separate group proceedings has reached a successful conclusion, with the court approving a large settlement and thereby marking a significant win for the litigation funder who backed the case. 

A post on LinkedIn from Balance Legal Capital highlighted the approval of the settlement in the Allianz class action, with the Supreme Court of Victoria approving the A$170 million sum to bring the group proceedings to a close. The class action, which Balance Legal Capital funded, was brought on behalf of over 200,000 Australian customers who purchased a vehicle and were then sold Allianz or Allianz Life “add-on” insurance products by the dealership, alleging that the insurers engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct.

Johnson Winter Slattery (JWS) and Maurice Blackburn Lawyers jointly represented the plaintiffs in the class action. In 2021, the Court had ordered the consolidation of this group proceeding with a similar class action against Allianz, resulting in two representative plaintiffs: Ms Tracy-Ann Fuller and Mr Wilkinson.

The judgment approving the proposed settlement was made today, with the court approving a $30,000 payment to the two plaintiffs. The court also maintained the Group Costs Order (GCO) of 25% of the settlement, with a $42.5 million payment set to be divided between JWS and Maurice Blackburn, with a further sum of up to $4.72 million allocated to Maurice Blackburn for the administering of the settlement distribution scheme. 

On the costs incurred by the law firms, Justice Matthews wrote that they were, “satisfied that the costs are reasonable and proportionate to the issues in dispute and the overall amount in dispute.” The judge went on to highlight that the class action “was a very large and complex proceeding and it is unsurprising that the costs are substantial.”

The full judgment and settlement approval orders can be read here. More information about the case can be found on the Allianz Class Action website.

Judge Halves Funder’s Legal Costs in Mastercard Case

By Harry Moran |

The dispute between Walter Merricks and Innsworth Capital in the Mastercard claim has been one of the most visible examples of a rift between a class representative and litigation funder. 

An article in The Law Society Gazette provides an update on the ongoing fallout from the settlement in the Mastercard litigation, as the acting president of the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) has described the funder’s legal costs of over £52,000 as “wholly disproportionate and unreasonable”. These comments came in a ruling on costs that Mr Justice Roth had ordered the class representative to pay, relating to the funder’s legal costs for responding to Mr Merricks’ application for a court order (‘Documents Application) that would have prevented the funder from using confidential documents in its intervention.

In his assessment of Innsworth’s submissions on costs, the judge accepted that the funder’s need to oppose the Documents Application was “critical to its ability to participate effectively in opposing the CSAO Application” and went on to say that he had “no criticism of the time spent by the solicitors.” However, Justice Roth did highlight the decision to instruct “both leading and junior counsel to advise on the response” and the fact that in this matter, “Akin Gump is charging at well over double, and in the case of the Grade B solicitor almost three times, the London 1 Guideline Rates.”

The ruling goes on to note that whilst Innsworth “may choose to agree with its solicitors to pay a much higher rate of fees”, it does not automatically follow “that costs incurred at those rates are recoverable from the other side”. Determining the final costs, Justice Roth settled on a reduction of the solicitors’ fees down from £26,355.50 to £12,000, and similarly reduced the counsel fees to £10,000, which he still described as “generous”. As a result, the final sum for Innsworth’s costs was set at £22,000.

The full ruling from Mr Justice Roth can be read here.