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Key Takeaways from LFJs Special Digital Event: Mass Torts and Litigation Funding 

Key Takeaways from LFJs Special Digital Event: Mass Torts and Litigation Funding 

On Thursday March 23rd, Litigation Finance Journal hosted a special digital event: Mass Torts and Litigation Funding. Panelists included Michael Rozen (MR), Founder and Managing Partner at TRGP Investment Partners, James Romeo (JR), Managing Partner at Greenpoint Capital, Brian Roth (BR), Chief Executive Officer and Chief Investment Officer of Rocade Capital, and Michael Guzman (MG), Partner at Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel and Frederick. The discussion was moderated by Ed Truant (ET), Founder of Slingshot Capital.

The panel discussion spanned a range of topics, including claims origination, financing/underwriting, plaintiff and defense-side strategies and tactics, the impact of ABS regulation and much more. 

Below are some key takeaways: 

ET: How does the industry originate claims and identify and validate claimants? And how has origination industry evolved over the years from the time of mass TV advertising to the current omni-channel world of advertising? 

MG: First, all of the old traditional methods still work.  Networking, late night TV, radio, advertising – all of that still works. But what I am seeing is a number of firms have either affiliated with or own social media marketers, who are using social media in targeted ways. It’s a lot cheaper depending on how you use it, and it can be a lot faster. So people are using the old techniques, plus a number of new ones.  I’ve had some really good success with that, because you’re not just blanketing the airwaves, the people that you get back are much more focused and more interested in what it is you’re trying to recruit them for. 

JR: I think it’s helpful to go back and think about the history of legal advertising, which started in the late 70’s when two lawyers started advertising, it led to some fighting in the state bar, but ultimately it was decided that legal ads are a form of free speech and that they provide consumers valuable information. 

We’ve now seen this huge evolution around what’s possible. There is very targeted social media and paid search advertising that is driven by analytics. At Triton we’re doing a lot of this, we’ve developed our own in-house marketing team, and we’re using things like intake forms and chatbots to help pre-screen potential claimants. We’re using different identify verification tools and we’re experimenting with different medical retrieval tools to help with the intake of potential claimants. 

ET: Describe the ‘fall-out rate’ of claimants and what are typical fall-out rates evidenced in the market and reasons therefor? Has there been an improvement in fall-out rates as a result of enhanced data analytics and technological sophistication?

MR: Access to justice is always a goal for those who think that corporate America has long gotten away with unequal justice because they have a lot of money and the individual claimants don’t. So having better ways of reaching people who may have been impacted by a drug that’s been pulled from the market or a product that didn’t work as advertised is obviously a good thing. The flip side is, in tougher economic times, you see higher claim rates from people who may not be good claimants, because there is an expectation there may be some quick money to be obtained. 

So I think the fall-out rate is really a function of whether or not you’re in the right economic time with the right kind of claim. Camp Lejeune is an example of that. 3M earplugs is an example of that. We’re talking about hundreds of thousands of claimants, whereas in an ordinary mass tort you may have tens of thousands of claimants. And this is something defendants don’t like, and they push back on litigation finance in particular, and argue that somehow specious claims are being promoted. What is really at the base of that is a desire to create an unequal footing between the haves and the have nots. If you are on the have side, it is obviously to your benefit to have either lower claim rates, fewer number of plaintiffs, and/or a higher fallout rate where you can allege later on that these were not valid claimants, that they were somehow propped by third party financing. 

Nobody who has or will speak on this panel will tell you that investing in non-meritorious claims is a good thing. Yet what the other side of this argument will claim is that somehow the fall-out rate as an individual metric is indicative of whether or not there are valid claims in a particular litigation. I would say you to it is irrelevant—the more claims you have in a litigation, the higher the fall our rate is going to be. 

ET: Given the high fall-out rates and the potential for false claimants, is this sector ripe for the application of blockchain to minimize duplication of claimants and decrease fall-out rates as well as tracking the transactions and pay-outs? 

 BR: Fall out impacts the litigation strategy and settlement strategy. When a litigation starts, nobody really knows what will be a settle-able case, so there’s always going to be some level of origination that’s not going to result in a paid claim at the end of the day. I do think the technology will help with some areas like de-duplication and dual representation, whether it’s blockchain or other smart contracts. We’re seeing billions of dollars transact in the space and there’s very little transparency across the different players in the space. I see that changing over time, and that will impact the fall out rates as well. 

ET: What is the nature of the prototypical plaintiff litigation firm? Why do so called “White Shoe” law firms not get involved in mass tort plaintiff litigation work? 

MG: When I started my career, there was this perception that there were defense-side firms and plaintiff-side firms. Lines were pretty well drawn, people crossed over from time to time. But for the most part, if you did plaintiff’s work you did plaintiff’s work, and you didn’t go back and forth. My firm and lots of others defy that model, and at this point, I’m not sure there is a prototypical plaintiff’s firm. My firm is a litigation boutique, and very early on we realized some of our clients wanted us to be plaintiffs for them, and it was enormously challenging and lucrative to play that role for them.

I think why so many of the so-called ‘white shoe’ law firms have found it difficult to be a plaintiff-side firm is because they have corporate departments or longstanding institutional clients, and some of those clients just don’t like the idea that one of those partner is representing them, but at the same time someone else is off pursuing a mass action or class action, so it gets to be an institutional conflict—it’s hard to manage from a client standpoint, and we’ve dealt with that over the years. 

ET: How has the US mass tort industry evolved in terms of the size of the industry, the quantum of cases and the number of claimants over the years? 

JR: If you look at the federal docket, it took something like 59 years to reach the first 250,000 cases in MDLs, and over the subsequent seven years, from 2007-2014, we hit a total of half a million cases, and then by 2021, we topped 1 million cases. So that’s an additional 500,000 case jump from 2014 to 2021. And there’s currently something like 360,000 cases that are still pending in the federal docket. So there’s definitely been an acceleration of cases, and that’s continued. And I don’t see that sopping any time soon. 

ET: Can you describe the various ways in which finance intersects with the mass tort industry?

BR: Financing is an ever changing landscape, but at the front end, you’re seeing it for case origination, a lot of times it’s done on a non-recourse basis. We see a lot of law firm loans, where you’re financing the whole process from origination to settlement. We’re also seeing capital enter for service providers in the space – lead origination or working up cases, ordering records on a contingent basis. We’re also starting to see some post-settlement finance develop, where firms are basically able to factor their claims. 

As we think about the space, we expect this to continue to evolve and develop, and this matures as an asset class, and we develop more data and track records, you’ll see more segmentation I think. But that should translate into more flexible options for the firm. The space currently is shaped by the rules around fee sharing and the ethical rules for law firms which prevent non-lawyers from having ownership in the firm. Obviously, Arizona and other jurisdictions are changing that, so the landscape of how finance intersects with firms is changing as well. 

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Third Party Funding 3.0: Exploring Litigation Funding’s Correlation with the Broader Economy

By Gian Marco Solas |

The following article was contributed by Dr. Avv. Gian Marco Solas[1], founder of Sustainab-Law and author of Third Party Funding, New Technologies and the Interdisciplinary Methodology as Global Competition Litigation Driving Forces (Global Competition Litigation Review, 1/25).  Dr. Solas is also the author of Third Party Funding, Law Economics an Policy (Cambridge Press).

There is an inaccurate and counterproductive belief in the litigation funding market, that the asset class would be uncorrelated from the global economy. That was in fact due to a much bigger scientific legal problem, that the law itself was not considered as physical factor of correlation, as instrument to measure and determine cause and effects of economic events in legal systems.

This problem has been solved, in both theoretical and mathematical terms, and in fact – thanks to technology available to date such as AI and blockchain – it looks much better for litig … ehm … legal third-party funders. 

Third Party Funding 3.0© opens three new lines of opportunities:

  1. AI allows to detect and file claims that would otherwise not have been viable / brought forward, such as unlocked competition law claims[2], which represent the largest chunk of the market for competition claims. See funding proposal.
  2. Human law as factor of correlation allows to calculate the unexpressed value of the global economy. Everything that, in fact, can be unlocked with litigation, allowing then a public-private IPO type of process to optimize legal systems[3].
  3. Physical modeling of the law also allows to transform debt / liabilities into new investments, thus allowing to settle litigation earlier and with less legal costs, leaving more room to creativity to optimize the investments[4].

While it may be true that the outcome of one single judgement does not depend on the fluctuations of the financial economy, legal reality certainly determines the ups and downs of the litigation funding (and any other) market. Otherwise, we could not explain the rise of litigation funding in the post-financial crisis for instance, or the shockwaves propagated by judgements like PACCAR.

The flip side is that understanding and measuring legal reality, as well as leveraging on modern technologies and innovative legal instruments, the market for legal claims and legal assets is much bigger and sizeable than with the standard litigation financial model.

In order to test Litigation Funding 3.0, I am presenting the following proposal:

10 MILLION EUR in the form of a series A venture capital type of investment to cover one test case's litigation costs, tech, book-building and expert costs aimed at targeting three already identified global or multi-jurisdictional mass anticompetitive claims in the scale of multi-billion dollars, whose details will be provided upon request.

Funder(s) get:

  • Percentage of claims' return as per agreement with parties involved;
  • Property of the AI / blockchain algorithm;
  • License of TPF 3.0.

The funding does not cover: additional legal / litigation / expert / etc. costs.

Below is the full proposal:

THIRD PARTY FUNDING 3.0© & COMPETITION LAW CLAIMS Dr2. Avv. Gian Marco Solas gmsolas@sustainab-law.eu ; gianmarcosolas@gmail.com ; +393400966871 
AI: Artificial Intelligence                  ML: Machine Learning                    TPF: Third Party Funding
GENERAL SCENARIO FOR COMPETITION LAW DAMAGE CLAIMS – IN SHORT
Competition authorities around the globe are rapidly developing AI / ML tools to scan markets / economy and prosecute anti-competitive practices. This suggests a steep increase in competition claims in the coming years, in both volume and scope.  AI also reduces the costs and time of litigation and ML allows to better assess its risks and merit, prompting for a re-modelling of the TPF economic model in competition claims considering empirical evidence of the first wave(s) of funded litigation.
CODIFICATION© IN PHENOGRAPHY© AND TPF 3.0©
New technology and ‘mathematical-legal language’, a combination of digital & quantum where the IT code is the applicable law modelled as - and interrelated with - the law(s) of nature (‘codification©’ in ‘phenography©’). On this basis, an ML / AI legal-tech algorithm has been built in prototype to learn, build and enforce anticompetitive claims in scale, to be guided by lawyers / experts / managers, with a process tracked with and certified in blockchain. New investment thesis (TPF 3.0©) for an asset class correlated to the global real economy, including the mathematical basis for the development of a complex sciences-based / empirical damage calculation to be built by experts. 
LEGAL / LITIGATION TECH INVESTMENT, COMMITMENT AND PROSPECT RETURN
10 MILLION EUR in the form of a series A venture capital type of investment with real assets as collateral for funding to any competition litigation filed with and through this algorithm, that becomes proprietary also of the funder(s). It aims at covering a first test case (already identified), full-time IT engineer, quantum experts and book-building costs. The funder(s) is(are) expected to provide also global litigation management expertise and own the algorithm. Three global or anyway multi-jurisdictional mass anticompetitive claims in the scale of multi-billion in value have already been identified. Details will be provided upon request. Funder(s) also gets license of the TPF 3.0© thesis.

Below is the abstract and table of contents from my research:

Abstract

This article aims at fostering competition litigation and market analysis by integrating concepts borrowed from physics science from an historical legal and evolutionary perspective, taking the third party funding (TPF) market as benchmark. To do so, it first combines historical legal data and trends related to the legal and litigation markets, discussing three macro historical trends or “states”: Industrial revolution(s) and globalisation; enlargement of the legal world; digital revolution and liberalisation of the legal profession. It then proposes the multidisciplinary methodology to assess the market for TPF: mainstream economic models, historical “cyclical” data and concepts borrowed from physics, particularly from mechanics of fluids and thermodynamics. On this basis, it discusses the potential implication of such methodology on the global competition litigation practice, for instance in market analysis and damage theory, also by considering the impact of modern technologies. The article concludes that physics models and the interdisciplinary methodology seem to add value to market assessment and considers whether there should be a case for a wider adoption in (competition) litigation and asset management practices.  

Table of Contents

Introduction. I. Evolution of the legal services, litigation and third party funding market(s) 1.1. Industrial revolution(s) and globalisation 1.2. Enlargement of the legal world and privatisation of justice 1.3. Digital revolution and liberalisation of the legal profession II. Modelling the market(s) with economics, historical and physics models. Third Party Funding as benchmark 2.1. Economic models for legal services, legal claims and third party funding markets 2.2. Does history repeat itself? Litigation finance cycles 2.3. Mechanics of fluids and thermodynamics to model legal markets? III. Impact on global competition litigation 3.1. Market analysis and damage theory 3.2. Economics of competition litigation and new technologies. Conclusions. Third Party Funding 3.0© and competitiveness.

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1. Italian / EU qualified lawyer and legal scientist. Leading Expert at BRICS Competition Law & Policy Centre (Higher School of Economics, Moscow). Ph.D.2 (Maastricht Law School, Economic Analysis of Law; University of Cagliari, Comparative Law) – LL.M. (College of Europe, EU competition Law). Visiting Fellow at Fordham Law School (US Antitrust), NYU (US Legal finance and civil procedure).

2. G. M. Solas, ‘Third Party Funding, new technologies and the interdisciplinary methodology as global competition litigation driving forces’ (2025) Global Competition Litigation Review, 1.

3. G. M. Solas, ‘Interrelation of Human Laws and Laws of Nature? Codification of Sustainable Legal Systems’ (2025) Journal of Law, Market & Innovation, 2.

4. ‘Law is Love’, at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5694423, par. 3.3.

Personal Injury Firms Want Private Equity Investment

By John Freund |

US personal injury law firms are leading a push to open the doors to private equity investment in the legal sector, even in the face of long-standing regulatory opposition to outside ownership of law practices.

According to the Financial Times, a growing number of US firms that built their practices around high-volume, billboard-driven mass tort and injury representation are quietly exploring capital injections from private equity firms. The motivation is fast growth, increased leverage, and the ability to scale operations rapidly, something traditional partner-owned firms have found difficult in a consolidating market.

The move represents a departure from the conventional owner-operator model historically favored by the legal profession, where practicing attorneys hold equity in their firms. Private capital could provide aggressive funding for marketing, case acquisition, litigation infrastructure, and operational expansion, enabling firms to ramp up nationwide acquisition of cases. Critics, however, warn that outside investors prioritizing returns could create pressure to maximize volume over client outcomes.

Private equity’s entrance into legal services is not entirely new, but the aggressive push by personal injury firms may mark a tipping point. If regulators and bar associations ease restrictions on non-lawyer ownership or passive investment, this could fundamentally reshape how US law firms are structured and financed.

For the legal funding industry, this trend signals a potential increase in demand for third-party litigation financing and capital partners. As firms leverage outside investments for growth and case volume, funding providers may find new opportunities or face increased competition.

AmTrust Sues Sompo Over £59M in Legal Funding Losses

By John Freund |

A high-stakes dispute between insurers AmTrust and Sompo is unfolding in UK court, centered on a failed litigation funding scheme that left AmTrust facing an estimated £59 million in losses. At the heart of the case is whether Sompo, as the professional indemnity insurer of two defunct law firms, Pure Legal and HSS, is liable for the damages stemming from their alleged misconduct in the operation of the scheme.

An article in Law360 reports that AmTrust had insured the litigation funding program and is now pursuing Sompo for reimbursement, arguing that the liabilities incurred by Pure and HSS are covered under Sompo’s policies. The two law firms entered administration, leaving AmTrust to shoulder the financial burden. AmTrust contends that the firms breached their professional duties, triggering coverage under the indemnity policies.

Sompo, however, disputes both the factual and legal underpinnings of the claim. The insurer denies that any breach occurred and further argues that even if the law firms had acted improperly, their conduct would not be covered under the terms of the policies issued.

This case follows AmTrust’s recent resolution of a parallel legal battle with Novitas, another financial party entangled in the scheme. That settlement narrows the current dispute to AmTrust’s claim against Sompo.