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An LFJ Conversation with Joshua Coleman‑Pecha, Senior Associate, Holman Fenwick Willan

By John Freund |
January 21, 2025

An LFJ Conversation with Joshua Coleman‑Pecha, Senior Associate, Holman Fenwick Willan

Joshua Coleman-Pecha is a senior international construction, infrastructure and technology dispute specialist working in the MENA region. He advises on construction and technology projects from inception to completion. Joshua is a qualified solicitor advocate, meaning he has rights of audience in the courts of England & Wales, and is a PRINCE 2 qualified project manager.

Joshua advises on all aspects of complex dispute avoidance and resolution. He has represented several clients in billion-dollar disputes before a variety of arbitral institutions including ICC, LCIA, UNCITRAL, DIAC, and SCCA. He has experience handling disputes under the governing laws of England & Wales, the UAE, Saudi, and Qatar.

Joshua’s recent significant work includes advising in relation to oil and gas processing facilities, drilling contracts (onshore and offshore), a water desalinisation plant, a battery energy storage park, the MENA region’s largest metro system, and a major railroad and metro project in the UAE and Saudi respectively. Joshua has experience of projects across the region having handled disputes in, for example, the UAE, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Turkey. His clients include international oil & gas companies, refining and petrochemical companies, EPC contractors, oil & gas service companies, EPC employers, and international technology providers. Finally, he acts in a hybrid role as general counsel to a billion dollar pharmaceutical company based in the UAE.

Joshua was recently recognized as a ‘Key Lawyer’ in Oil, Gas and Natural Resources by Legal 500 2024. He is also a member of various construction industry associations and a contributing member of the Legal Funding Journal.

Below is our LFJ Conversation with Joshua Coleman‑Pecha: The MENA region, and Saudi Arabia in particular, is a growing jurisdiction in the global legal funding market.  What has hindered funders from embracing this market in the past, and why the change–what has prompted more funders to take an interest in this part of the world? 

I think there have been a few factors that have limited funders’ interest in operating in the Saudi market, or, financing disputes that involve Saudi law and / or Saudi Courts.

First, the high-level point is that legal funding is not prohibited under Saudi law. However, until now, in Saudi and across the GCC, whilst the view has been that written laws do not prohibit legal funding, there has been a high degree of uncertainty as to how, in practice, the courts would treat parties backed by legal funders. Quite understandably, legal funders and litigants have been hesitant to be the ‘test cases’ on which this issue is examined. To some extent I think this hesitancy remains, though it is decreasing as GCC countries refine their laws and legal practice, and legal funders look to the growing markets across the GCC for new opportunities.

Second, for many years Sharia has been the dominant system of law in Saudi. Sharia law is a huge subject, and it is impossible to consider all the aspects of it here. However, in summary, it is a combination of several different texts and is subject to several schools of legal interpretation. As with other GCC countries, Saudi is a civil law system, and does not rely on binding precedent. It may be that legal funders have been hesitant to make investments in an environment that they don’t feel they fully understand. However, in recent times, Saudi has taken significant strides towards codifying its laws. All GCC countries are on this path to a greater or lesser extent, which helps provide certainty. In addition, with better recording and proliferation of court judgments and legal knowledge across the entire market, my sense is that international investors are becoming more confident in these surroundings.

Third, all GCC countries have been signatories to the New York Convention for some time. However, recent years have seen an acceleration of arbitration across the GCC, as recognition of the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals and willingness to enforce arbitral awards increases. In Saudi, part of the country’s ‘Vision 2023’ is to have the leading arbitral institution in the Middle East, and be considered one of the leading arbitral institutions worldwide. Saudi has implemented a new Arbitration Law, and the Saudi Center for Commercial Arbitration (SCCA) has received significant investment, allowing it to hire globally recognised practitioners to join its senior ranks. Its rules are based on UNCITRAL rules and were updated in 2023 to reflect the most modern sets of arbitral rules globally.

Fourth, through discussion with various funders, my understanding of their view is that investing in Saudi is outside their commercial risk parameters. Factors such as uncertainty over duration of legal proceedings, lack of knowledge of Sharia, and questions over enforcement have made it difficult to determine likely ROI. Certainty over enforcement of arbitral awards in Saudi is increasing and the reasons for this are discussed below / later.

Finally, from the perspective of a funded party, and bearing in mind a lot of these parties are contractors in the construction industry, I think there is hesitancy to use legal funding as it can wipe out profit margins.

You deal with the Saudi construction claims sector specifically. What is the TAM of this market, and why should litigation funders take an interest here? 

The market is huge. Focusing just on the projects sector alone, there are approximately USD 1.8trn of projects planned or underway in Saudi (USD 330bn of which are already underway), making it the largest market in the MENA region. Over the last five years, the Saudi projects sector has, on average, awarded USD 60bn of projects a year, which looks set to grow year-on-year to around USD 80bn by 2028.

It is impossible to accurately estimate the number or value of disputes emanating from these projects. Of course, arbitration is private, but also many issues or disputes will not come to light due to being settled through commercial negotiations. We do know that right now approximately 440 projects in Saudi are identified as being ‘on hold’ (which means there is almost certainly going to be some form of dispute arising) with a combined value of USD 231bn. As the number and value of projects approaching completion or achieving completion increases, I expect to see these figures grow.

How do claimants and litigators on the ground feel about litigation funding? How do they look at the practice from both an economic and cultural perspective? 

For the reasons discussed above, legal funding has yet to proliferate in GCC countries. My experience is that, at best, many legal advisors (both in private practice and in-house) and potential litigants have limited knowledge about legal funding and are therefore sceptical of its merits. At worst, these parties may not know anything about legal funding at all, or, have a misunderstanding of what it is about and how it can help. I believe that education is needed before legal funding can be considered ‘mainstream’ in this region.

Where legal funding may be better known is amongst international entities (like international contractors) operating in Saudi or the wider GCC. However, even where there more understanding as regards the concept and a willingness to consider it as an option, barriers remain. For example, contractors are often put off legal funding when the cost is revealed.

Construction disputes are often fact heavy, require a significant amount of analysis before funders can begin to assess the merits, and, if they go to trial, will require lengthy investment periods. All this means that funder risk goes up, so the required returns go up, which can seriously damage contractor profits. There’s little point in a contractor taking funding if it’s going to wipe out the contractor’s profit margin on the underlying project.

My personal view is that discussion between contractors and funders can yield a solution. On the one hand contractors may be persuaded to take funding based on a holistic view of its financial benefits. Portfolio funding may make taking funding economically palatable to contractors. However, also in my view, the greatest opportunity for striking investment deals lies in the fact that both employers and contractors tend to want to settle disputes at the earliest opportunity. If legal funders are willing to take this into account, it may shift the investment metrics sufficiently to make legal funding attractive to all parties.

What about enforcement in Saudi Arabia? How much of a concern is this, and what steps should funders take to allay their concerns about enforcement over a specific claim? 

The laws

Saudi has been signatory to the New York convention since 1994. However, its arbitration friendliness has increased massively in the last few years, including the creation of the previously mentioned SCCA in 2016. In addition, two key rules have been promulgated:

In 2012, Saudi passed KSA Royal Decree M/34 concerning the approval of the Law of Arbitration (KSA Arbitration Law) (together with its Implementing Rules) and in 2013, Royal Decree M/53 (Enforcement Law). The KSA Arbitration law is modelled on the UNCITRAL model law, which is regarded as international best practice.

The KSA Arbitration Law curtailed the Saudi courts’ interventionist powers in relation to arbitrations seated in Saudi Arabia by recognizing for the first time the parties’ autonomy to tailor their arbitration procedure in certain important respects, including by explicitly recognizing the adoption of institutional arbitration rules. The KSA Arbitration Law also addressed a key concern under the old law – the power of the Saudi courts to reopen and effectively re-litigate awards on their merits.

The Enforcement Law has led to the creation of specialized enforcement courts, whose jurisdiction supersedes that of the Board of Grievances (the court previously competent to hear requests for enforcement of arbitral awards). This in turn has started to have a salutary effect on the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, which until 2017 was an uncertain prospect. The Enforcement Law contains provisions that affect all aspects of enforcement of judgments and arbitral awards, both domestic and foreign. In practice, the Enforcement Law has resulted in the unprecedented enforcement of several foreign arbitral awards, which is welcome development. It is hoped that the Rules supplementing the KSA Arbitration Law will help to provide more certainty around how the courts will apply the KSA Arbitration Law, including with respect to enforcement of arbitral awards.

Domestic Arbitral Awards

Domestic arbitral awards must comply with the KSA Arbitration Law. The Enforcement Courts have jurisdiction to enforce domestic arbitral awards under article 9(2) of the Enforcement Law. For a domestic arbitral award, it must be declared as enforceable by the appeal court with initial jurisdiction over the dispute. Therefore, an application is needed to the relevant appeal court for a declaration that the award is enforceable by the party seeking enforcement. The declaration is normally represented by a court stamp, after which the request for enforcement can be registered with the Enforcement Court.

Domestic arbitral awards that are enforceable include:

  • monetary awards
  • specific performance
  • sale or delivery of tangible and intangible property

Article 55 of the KSA Arbitration Law outlines the procedural and substantive requirements of a valid arbitral award. Pursuant to this provision, the competent court must verify the following conditions to issue an order for enforcement:

  • The arbitral award must not contradict other court decisions or laws on the same subject in Saudi Arabia.
  • The loser has been duly notified of the arbitral award.
  • The arbitral award must not violate Saudi public policy (Sharia). My understanding is that where the Saudi Courts have been confronted with an award where part of it contradicts Sharia, in some instances, they have been willing to strike out the unenforceable part and enforce the remainder.

Furthermore, the arbitral award must comply with the formality requirements of the KSA Arbitration Law and be compliant with Sharia principles. Article 49 of the KSA Arbitration Law states that an arbitral award is not subject to appeal. However, under article 50(1), a party may apply to annul an arbitral award issued on the following grounds:

  • “if no arbitration agreement exists, or if such agreement is void, voidable, or terminated due to expiry of its term;
  • if either party, at the time of concluding the arbitration agreement, lacks legal capacity, pursuant to the law governing his capacity;
  • if either arbitration party fails to present his defence due to lack of proper notification of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or for any other reason beyond his control;
  • if the arbitration award excludes the application of any rules which the parties to arbitration agree to apply to the subject matter of the dispute;
  • if the composition of the arbitration tribunal or the appointment of the arbitrators is carried out in a manner violating this Law or the agreement of the parties;
  • if the arbitration award rules on matters not included in the arbitration agreement; nevertheless, if parts of the award relating to matters subject to arbitration can be separated from those not subject there to, then nullification shall apply only to parts not subject to arbitration; and
  • If the arbitration tribunal fails to observe conditions required for the award in a manner affecting its substance, or if the award is based on void arbitration proceedings that affect it.”

Furthermore, under article 50(2) of the KSA Arbitration Law, the court may, on its own jurisdiction, nullify the arbitral award if:

  • it violates Sharia or Saudi public policy; or
  • the subject matter of the dispute was not arbitrable, e.g., not capable of being resolved by arbitration, under Saudi law.

The application for nullification of the arbitral award must be made 60 days after the nullifying party was notified of the award.

Foreign Arbitral Awards

Foreign awards must comply with the Enforcement Law as well as the New York Convention for enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. For a foreign arbitral award, a party does not need a declaration that it is enforceable from the relevant domestic appeal court. Instead, the party requesting enforcement can apply directly to the Enforcement Court, with no statute of limitations applicable.

For foreign arbitral awards to be enforceable they must meet the following criteria:

  • The award must be a final award and must not contradict another judgment or court order issued on the same subject in Saudi Arabia, or contradict the public policy of Saudi Arabia.
  • Reciprocity must be established between Saudi Arabia and the jurisdiction in which the award is issued. The burden on proving reciprocity is on the party requesting enforcement.
  • The award must have been issued by a tribunal with jurisdiction under the relevant foreign law, and the subject matter of the aware, should not be under mandatory jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia;
  • All parties must have conducted the proceedings with all procedural regularities in place, with due representation If the respondent to the proceedings was notified, but was not represented, and this can be evidenced, such an award is still enforceable.

The Enforcement Court has jurisdiction to enforce foreign arbitral awards in accordance with the requirements of the Enforcement Law:

  • Saudi courts must not have jurisdiction to decide the dispute.
  • The tribunal issuing the award must have had jurisdiction over the dispute.
  • The arbitral proceedings were conducted in accordance with due process, e.g., the parties had fair opportunities to present their cases.
  • The arbitral award is final and not subject to appeal under the law of the seat of arbitration.
  • The arbitral award must not contradict other court decisions or laws on the same subject in Saudi Arabia.
  • The arbitral award must not violate Saudi public policy.

The New York Convention is considered the foundation for enforcing arbitral awards in a state other than where the arbitral award was issued (i.e., foreign arbitral awards). All arbitral awards not issued under the KSA Arbitration Law are considered foreign arbitral awards. Contracting states to the New York Convention must recognise foreign arbitral awards as binding and enforce them under their rules of procedure, and without imposing “substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges” for foreign arbitral awards than the State would impose on domestic arbitral awards.

Process for Enforcement of Arbitral Awards

To enforce an arbitration award the application for enforcement must include:

  • “the original award or an attested copy thereof;
  • a true copy of the arbitration agreement;
  • an Arabic translation of the arbitration award attested by an accredited authority, if the award is not issued in Arabic; and
  • a proof of the deposit of the award with the competent court, pursuant to article 44 of KSA Arbitration Law.”

Article 6 of the Enforcement Law addressing all judgments and awards, states that all judgments issued by an Enforcement Court are subject to appeal and the court of the KSA Arbitration Law appeal’s judgment would then be final. However, for arbitral awards issued under the KSA Arbitration Law, article 55(3) of the KSA Arbitration Law does not allow appeal of an order to enforce an arbitral award. By contrast, an order refusing enforcement is appealable.

The enforcement procedure is as follows:

  • An enforcement request is made through the Najiz application (the Ministry of Justice’s online portal) is made by the applicant.
  • The request is reviewed procedurally by the Enforcement Court, and is then referred to an enforcement judge. This will require up to three days.
  • If the enforcement judge is satisfied, an enforcement order will be issued (Article 34 decision), ordering one party to comply within five days of the notice.

The applicant must wait twenty days for the Enforcement Court to notify the relevant party of the Article 34 decision. If this is not done, the applicant may request for the notice to be served by publication in local press, by the Enforcement Court. Although the applicant will initially pay for the publication of the notice (three to five days are required for publication from payment), the costs are able to be reimbursed from the enforcement order.

If the Article 34 decision is not adhered to, within five days of notification, the enforcement judge may be requested to enforce sanctions against the non-complying party. Such measures, under Article 46 are issued up to ten days after the expiry of the Article 34 decision or from the date of applicant’s request to issue an Article 46 decision, provided that the request is made at least five days after the Article 34 decision is notified. All decisions by an enforcement judge are final, unless they relate to certain procedures or costs.

Other Considerations on Enforcing Arbitration Awards

The public policy exception to enforcing foreign arbitral awards has traditionally been very broad. An award that contradicts Sharia law or public policy will not be enforced by the Enforcement Court. However, if the part that contradicts public policy can be separated from the rest of the award, only that part should not be enforced.

The Enforcement Law sets out that the enforcement judge cannot enforce a foreign arbitral award if it includes what is contradictory to public policy. The implementing regulations of the Enforcement Law defines “public policy” as the Islamic Sharia. Saudi Arabia Royal Decree No. 44682/1443 dated 28 August 2021 limits the definition of public policy to general rules of Islamic law based on the Quran and the Sunnah. Recently successful grounds were:

  • Late payment charges were found to amount to usury.
  • Compensation for holding back money was found to amount to usury.
  • The award involved the sale of property which the purported seller did not own.

Public policy is not limited to procedural deficiencies. The Saudi court can, of its own volition, refuse to enforce an award that contradicts Sharia, including any of the evidence relied on by the tribunal that is not acceptable under Sharia (for example, if the tribunal relied on the testimony of a person with a mental impairment). The court could also refuse enforcement if the award itself contradicts Sharia (for example, an award of interest).

Other Enforcement Mechanisms

Saudi Arabia is also party to Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Co-operation and the GCC Agreement for the Enforcement of Judgments, Rogatory, and Judicial Publication.

One of the benefits of a more mature market is the presence of consultants, advisors and experts whom funders can rely on. How prevalent are such experts within the Saudi legal / litigation funding market?  What can funders do to ensure they are receiving reliable, actionable advice? 

Until recently, to participate in the Saudi market, international firms had to enter an alliance with a local partner firm. With the change of laws in this area, several international firms have now opened their own Saudi office, and HFW (the firm I work at) is one of those. This divergence perhaps causes some difficulty for clients seeking joined-up legal advice. Naturally, high quality Saudi firms focus on work in the local courts, where they have rights of audience. International firms are more likely to focus on international clients, working with contracts under foreign laws, with arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. In both cases, the proliferation of work requires additional legal practitioners, and this growth potentially comes at the cost of quality legal advice or, at least, relevant experience.

Of course, it is tempting for me to say that HFW should be every funder’s first call for Saudi related advice! The reality, as everyone knows, is that every dispute is different and requires different skill sets, sector knowledge, legal qualification(s), and price point. I’m sure it doesn’t really need to be said, as legal funders know their jobs better than I do, but I would always suggest seeking advice from firms and individuals who have wide experience in the jurisdiction, have advised on disputes in the relevant sector in that jurisdiction previously, and understand what legal funders need and want to be able to make their investment decision.

About the author

John Freund

John Freund

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LFJ Conversation

An LFJ Conversation with Lauren Harrison, Co-Founder & Managing Partner of Signal Peak Partners

By John Freund |

Lauren Harrison serves as a co-founder and managing partner of Signal Peak Partners. Named one of Lawdragon’s Global 100 Leaders in Litigation Finance, Ms. Harrison brings over 25 years of high stakes commercial litigation experience to her role as funder. Prior to co-founding Signal Peak, Ms Harrison served as a Vice President to Law Finance Group.

As a trial lawyer, Lauren was a partner at Vinson & Elkins and later at Jones Walker. She was recognized as a Texas Super Lawyer annually from 2009 to 2021, a Best Lawyer in America for Intellectual Property, Antitrust Law and Commercial Litigation, and a Top Woman Attorney. Chambers recognized Ms. Harrison for her Antitrust work. She was awarded a Pro Bono College of the State of Texas Award for her work on behalf of nonprofit art institutions.

Lauren is a frequent speaker at conferences and law schools, presenting recently at BU Law School, SMU Law School, the UH Law Center, the Institute for Energy Law, and LitFinCon.

Below is our LFJ Conversation with Lauren Harrison:

Your inaugural Signal Peak Symposium brings together leaders from the judiciary, in-house counsel, and elite law firms. What motivated you to launch this invitation-only gathering, and what key message or change in the litigation-finance industry are you hoping the Symposium will advance?

Litigation funding conferences are a great way to connect with our counterparts within the industry. They offer space to discuss innovation and to workshop best practices. We are fortunate that, for the most part, third party funders recognize that each of us fills a niche. Rather than competing in a zero sum game, we contribute to the evolution of a powerful litigation tool. That said, industry events can devolve into echo chambers. We wanted to create an event where our peers do not form a supermajority, and where we can listen with fresh ears to new ideas.  Our sector faces rising tides of interest in regulation, taxation and disclosure. The time is now to come together to address those issues, and in order to do that it is important to have the full range of stakeholders and policymakers present. 

Signal Peak was founded on values like honesty, alignment of interests, speed, and creativity, and you’ve framed litigation funding as helping plaintiffs ascend complex cases. How does the Symposium help reinforce your firm’s identity and commitment to transparency and partner-first funding?

Litigation finance events typically do not draw much interest from the market side - practicing litigators and their clients. A point of pride at Signal Peak is that we are trial lawyers for trial lawyers. We want to hear attorneys’ insights about how we can be of help and to enjoy a level of discourse that comes from having experience with the type of complex commercial disputes that we are sourcing and underwriting. We have a comfort level with the tools, timelines and techniques of the adversarial process that builds trust. In a guild profession that is guided by ethical and fiduciary bounds, shared experience is significant. We expect our event to highlight our foundational expertise, to promote collaboration, and to create new opportunities to better serve our market. 

Your professional backgrounds are in civil litigation at top firms and then litigation funding. How does that dual experience shape your strategy at Signal Peak, and how do you expect that background to resonate with attorneys and plaintiffs attending the Symposium?

We understand that every first chair lawyer is essentially the CEO of their case, and some of their core executive functions are accessing needed capital and deploying resources efficiently towards case conclusion. Because we have worn the shoes of the trial attorneys who participate in funding, we are focused on keeping their and their clients’ needs front and center.  While we will never look for case control or intercede in the attorney-client relationship, we do look for opportunities to partner with top lawyers in ways that help them manage case expenses and durational risk. We like to say that all boats rise on a rising tide. Signal Peak strives to align with lawyers’ and their clients’ interests so that everyone has sufficient back end interest to reach their goals.

The Symposium will include a keynote tribute to H. Lee Godfrey, honoring his career. Why was it important to include that tribute in your inaugural event, and how does his legacy influence how you think about access to justice and the future of litigation finance?

Lee Godfrey and his partner the late Steve Susman developed the model that underlies Signal Peak’s business, and really our entire industry. We want to work with attorneys who are willing to invest in their cases just as we do, and Lee and Steve exemplified that with gusto. Lee was a personal friend and one of the great trial attorneys ever to set foot in a courtroom. Stories of his prowess are legion, and I do not want to steal anyone’s thunder by previewing them here. I will say that Lee’s voir dire was the stuff of legend, and his gentlemanly wittiness on cross examination will likely not be matched.

What are you hoping that someone considering working with Signal Peak (either as an attorney with a case needing funding or as a potential investor) will take away from the Symposium and from Signal Peak’s launch so far?  

We are excited to showcase our team. Before Mani Walia and I decided to join forces, we knew that our values and interests were aligned, but we did not predict the extent to which Signal Peak would feel greater than the sum of its parts. We are eager for our colleagues Jackson Schaap and Carly Thompson-Peters to share the spotlight with us. We could not have accomplished so much in such a short time without their brilliant collaboration. I hope that our friends who join us in Houston on February 26 will get to see the alchemy that blends our team and will understand that when they work with Signal Peak, they will become part of a cohesive and nimble group.

LFJ Conversation

An LFJ Conversation with Logan Alters, Co-Founder & Head of Growth at ClaimAngel

By John Freund |

Logan Alters is the Co-Founder and Head of Growth at ClaimAngel, the nation's first transparent legal-funding marketplace. He built the company from a concept into a nationwide platform trusted by 500+ law firms, 25+ funders, and 20,000+ fundings at $100M+ in volume, all at one standardized rate. Before ClaimAngel, Logan worked across MedTech, consumer products, and venture capital. He earned his degree from UC Berkeley Haas School of Business in three years while competing as a Division I point guard.

Below is our LFJ Conversation with Logan Alters:

ClaimAngel positions itself as a transparency-first platform at a time when plaintiff funding is facing heightened scrutiny from regulators and bar associations. How do you see ethics, disclosure, and alignment with ABA and state rules reshaping the future of the industry, and what specific standards is ClaimAngel trying to institutionalize?

We started ClaimAngel because we saw a gap that nobody was closing. Plaintiffs have access to a new asset, their case, but the industry built to serve them wasn't working. There are more than a thousand funding companies in the U.S., each setting its own rates, contracts, and processes. That fragmentation created an environment where anything goes. Rates compounded in ways clients couldn't understand until settlement. Fees got buried in contracts. Law firms experienced the frustration firsthand or heard the stories and decided not to recommend funding at all. The whole system defaulted to relationships over results: who you knew mattered more than what you offered. Funders competed for access instead of competing on terms. That model doesn't scale, and it doesn't serve plaintiffs.

That's the problem we set out to solve. Not by becoming funder #1,001, but by building marketplace infrastructure. In 2023, we pitched Morgan & Morgan's executives on a different future. A marketplace, not a funding company. One rate, one process, one outcome for every client. They didn't think it could be done, but they believed in the mission. John Morgan recently called ClaimAngel the Charles Schwab of client funding. The comparison resonated with us because it captures exactly what we're building. Schwab didn't invent investing. He standardized it. He made access equal and fees transparent. Before Schwab, Wall Street rewarded insiders. After Schwab, everyone got the same deal. Plaintiff funding is at that same inflection point.

We've now processed more than $100 million in volume across more than 20,000 fundings. Every contract includes plain-English rate disclosures. Every case shows plaintiffs what they'll owe at settlement before they sign and at any time in their portal. That's the standard: no surprises, no fine print. That's not a pilot. That's proof the model works.

We're not a funder. We're the infrastructure that makes funding predictable, transparent, and aligned with what plaintiffs and law firms actually need. When every client gets the same terms, and every contract looks the same, there's nothing to hide from regulators or bar associations. Standardization is the compliance solution.

The industry has operated like the wild west for too long. Regulators are stepping in. Bar associations are paying attention. Law firms are already choosing partners based on compliance and transparency, not relationships. That's the shift. More than 500 firms have at least one client funded through ClaimAngel. The next chapter will be defined by who builds the standard, not who has the best relationships. That's what we're here to do.

You describe plaintiff funding as being at a pivotal moment where opaque, high-rate transactions are giving way to marketplace models. What pressures or structural changes are driving that shift, and why is standardization becoming a competitive advantage?

The old model is breaking down. Not because anyone decided it should, because the market moved.

Law firms are shifting their focus toward efficiency and growth, minimizing anything that creates friction. They want funding that helps them maximize case value, not funding that eats into their fees at settlement. A firm managing thousands of cases can't afford the chaos of tracking liens with unpredictable compounding rates that make settlements harder to close. They want one process that works every time.

This is especially true for smaller firms. A solo practitioner or ten-person shop just wants to practice law. They don't want funding to become another thing they have to manage. Standardization means funding works as a tool in the background, not an encroachment on how they run their practice.

People are more financially aware than they were ten years ago. They understand interest. They ask about caps. They compare terms. The days of burying fees in contracts and hoping no one notices are over. When clients ask questions, firms need answers they can stand behind.

On the other side of the table, insurance carriers are already ahead. They use data to model case values, they identify plaintiffs under financial pressure, and they extend timelines knowing desperate clients will settle for less. Their algorithms win. When a plaintiff can't afford to wait, the carrier knows it, and the offer reflects that weakness. As funding becomes more widespread and predictable, carriers will have to adjust. Plaintiffs who can afford to be patient change the calculus entirely. That's the power of standardized funding.

Capital markets are moving too. Litigation finance is maturing into a real asset class, and institutional money is looking for places to deploy. But capital doesn't flow into fragmentation. A thousand funders with a thousand different rate structures and contract terms isn't investable infrastructure. Standardization is what unlocks scale. It's what allows the industry to grow from a few billion dollars to tens of billions deployed annually.

These forces aren't pushing toward a slightly better version of the old model. They're pushing toward new infrastructure. The companies that figure this out early will define the next era of plaintiff funding.

Your Rule of One framework aims for one rate, one process, one outcome. Why pursue a true standard instead of a traditional pricing strategy, and how do you respond to funders who argue flexibility is necessary for risk management?

One rate. One process. One outcome. That's not a tagline. It's the entire model.

A client knows exactly what they will owe. A law firm knows what a lien looks like at any point. No surprises. No shifting rates. No complicated projections. Simplicity isn't a marketing angle. It's a consumer protection tool and an operational stability tool for firms of any size.

The old model worked differently. Every funder created its own rate structure, contract terms, and interpretation of risk. Most clients don't understand why a four percent monthly compounding rate leads to a 6x repayment in 24 months. That complexity benefits only the insiders who understand it.

Bob Simon at Simon Law Group put it simply: lawyers have an ethical duty to do what's best for their clients. If a client needs access to capital to care for themselves or loved ones, you should help them find the lowest interest rate. That's not optional. It's the job.

The consequences of getting it wrong are real. Firms inherit cases all the time where the previous attorney used funding with poor terms, and by the time the case settles, the client's net is so low the case can't even settle. It leads to law firm fee reductions or the client drops the firm or it goes to trial. That's not what plaintiff funding is supposed to do.

Funders often defend rate flexibility as risk management. But pricing in plaintiff funding didn't evolve from risk. It evolved from fragmentation. With no shared standard, companies layered compounding, step-ups, duration triggers, underwriting fees, broker fees that can reach twenty percent, and buyout fees. None of this reflects actual case risk. It reflects legacy complexity built in isolation.

That complexity helped keep plaintiff funding adoption stuck at four to six percent of the total potential market. Rates rose so high that funding became a last resort. Yet more than ninety-seven percent of personal injury cases settle or win. When an asset class has a loss profile comparable to credit card defaults, extreme pricing is hard to defend. Real risk management comes from disciplined underwriting, transparency, and fair pricing, not stacking fees to justify high rates.

Standardization isn't a constraint. It's the path to mass adoption. The Rule of One isn't a theory. It's 20,000+ fundings across 500+ firms. That's proof at scale.

You’ve set a standardized rate of 27.8 percent simple annually with a 2x cap. What was the economic thinking behind those parameters, and how does this model align incentives across plaintiffs, law firms, and funders?

We didn't start by asking what rate we could charge. We started by asking who we're actually competing with.

Ninety-five percent of plaintiffs don't use plaintiff funding. When someone is injured, out of work, and waiting on a claim, they reach for credit cards and personal loans. That's the market we're converting.

The problem is that consumer credit wasn't built for a plaintiff's reality. It prices the borrower, not the case. It assumes steady income and monthly payments. A plaintiff has access to a new asset, their case, but a credit card can't tap into that. The pressure spills onto law firms and ultimately the settlement.

So we worked backward from that reality. If we want to convert plaintiffs away from credit cards, we need to beat credit card economics for someone who can't work, can't make monthly payments, and doesn't know when their case will settle. That's how we arrived at 27.8 percent simple rate with a 2x cap.

Here's what that looks like in practice. A plaintiff who takes $5,000 and settles in 18 months owes around $7,400 with all fees. With a typical compounding product with a slew of origination and servicing fees, that same funding could easily exceed $15,000. That difference is the gap between a client who walks away whole and a client who resents their attorney.

For funders, the math works if they're willing to evolve. The old model delivered returns that would make a hedge fund blush, but in just a small percentage of cases. Our model delivers lower per-case returns but at scale, with fast capital deployment, consistent servicing, and a loss rate in the single digits, comparable to credit card defaults. The key is predictability. Our 27.8% annual rate (no compounding ever) works out to 6.95% every three months until settlement or the 2x cap. The 2x cap means a plaintiff who takes $5,000 will never owe more than $10,000, and that cap doesn't hit until 46 months. Most "2x caps" in the industry hit at one, two, or three years. Ours gives plaintiffs nearly four years.

That rate is only sustainable because our marketplace collapsed the cost structure. Traditional models relied on sales teams, manual deployment, and relationship-driven acquisition. That overhead required high rates. Our marketplace removes most of that friction. No sales cycle, no manual underwriting queues, standardized processes across every case. Efficiency and market competition make a lower rate viable. Insurance carriers already use data to identify weak and desperate plaintiffs. Our marketplace gives funders the same advantage. We standardized underwriting with quality case data (injury details, liability, policy limits, case docs, and more), so funders make calculated decisions in minutes instead of reputation-based approvals. Lower costs and disciplined underwriting mean we can sustain 27.8% at scale. It's a different business. It requires funders who see where the industry is going and law firms that recognize their clients deserve better. We've built the infrastructure to make that easy.

The legacy model asked: how much can we charge? We asked: how do we convert the ninety-five percent? One question builds an industry. The other protects a margin.

You’ve argued that plaintiff funding is best understood as a tool that converts time into negotiating power. How does ClaimAngel’s marketplace help plaintiffs stay in the fight longer and capture more of their claim’s true value?

How many situations in life can you actually buy time? That's what plaintiff funding is. Not debt. Not a loan. Time. And when you have a legal case, time is power.

When someone is injured and out of work, time is the one thing they don't have. Bills pile up. Pressure builds. Insurance carriers know this and wait. The longer a plaintiff can't afford to hold out, the lower the offer. That's not negotiation. That's leverage working against the people who need it most.

Funding flips that dynamic. A plaintiff who can pay rent and cover medical bills while their case develops is a plaintiff who can wait for the right offer. That's why they hired their attorney in the first place: to fight for the true value of their claim, not to take the first check that shows up.

When plaintiffs have time, law firms can do the work they were hired to do. Gather full medicals. Wait for maximum recovery. Push back on lowball offers. The cases that settle for $40,000 under pressure become six-figure results when the client isn't calling every day saying they need the money now. One client told us she was three days from losing her apartment when she got funded. Eighteen months later, her case settled for six figures. That's what time buys. Firms get more revenue with less pressure to settle early. Clients walk away with what they deserve from the start.

But here's the problem with traditional funding: time is power until settlement day, when it turns into kryptonite. A plaintiff who borrowed $5,000 at compounding rates suddenly owes $15,000+. The attorney's fee gets reduced. The client's net recovery shrinks. Everyone fought for two years to maximize the settlement, and the funding lien swallows the value. That's not time as power. That's time as extraction. Our model solves this. At 27.8% simple with a 2x cap, that same $5,000 costs $7,400, not $15,000. The client and attorney walk away with what they earned. Time stays power, even at settlement.

That's what ClaimAngel's marketplace delivers. In traditional funding, a plaintiff applies to one funder, waits for approval, and might get rejected. Then they start over. Our marketplace removes that friction. Multiple funders see the case simultaneously. Standardized terms mean no negotiation. A plaintiff who applies Monday can have funding by Wednesday. When you're three days from losing your apartment, that speed is the difference between staying in the fight and taking whatever offer is on the table.

The industry maximized what plaintiffs owe. We maximize what plaintiffs keep.

LFJ Conversation

An LFJ Conversation with Ian Garrard, Managing Director of Innsworth Advisors

By John Freund |

Ian Garrard is the managing director of Innsworth Advisors Limited, the advisor and manager to the funds that provide third party litigation funding for high value claims in the UK, EU and US.

Claims under management include high profile and groundbreaking claims in the UK’s Competition Appeal Tribunal against Meta and Amazon, claims in the Netherlands against Oracle and Salesforce, as well as claims against VW in Germany and Apple in the US.  Before moving into litigation funding, Ian was a lawyer in private practice (on financing, restructuring and litigation matters) as well as a founder of specialist law firms and an advisor to major oil & gas interests on exploration and production assets.

Below is our LFJ Conversation with Ian Garrard:

The claim against Rightmove alleges that the portal charged estate-agents “excessive and unfair” listing fees, and that the action will proceed on an opt-out basis for thousands of agencies. What specifically attracted Innsworth to fund this case, and how does it fit with your overall litigation-funding strategy? 

Your readers will appreciate that we can’t say too much at this early stage, but on our evaluation it is a strong case on its merits, with a considerable amount of harm caused to the proposed class of businesses. Jeremy Newman, the proposed class representative and a former CMA panel member has an excellent team supporting him, led by lawyers from Scott+Scott UK LLP. Innsworth is a committed funder of opt out collective actions in the Competition Appeal Tribunal and this case fits squarely within our focus. More information on the claim is available at rightmovefeesclaim.com.

More generally, this is an exciting time for us. We are funding three other opt out claims in the CAT and we have just announced a claim on behalf of Uber drivers in the UK and Europe, which alleges that Uber has unlawfully used automated decision-making, including profiling, in its pricing systems to dynamically set driver pay by algorithm and reduce their take-home pay. If the claim doesn’t settle in the pre-action phase then the intention is to issue collective proceedings before the Amsterdam District Court in the Netherlands. We also have lots of promising cases in our pipeline at the moment, working in collaboration with a range of London and EU based law firms.

Opt-out class actions in the UK’s competition-law space have historically faced procedural and payout-challenges. How is the funding arrangement structured in this Rightmove claim to align incentives across Innsworth, the claimants, and their legal counsel? 

There has been much said and written about the challenges the UK’s opt out regime is working through - including the need to balance reasonable certainty as to the level of returns a funder will derive and the desire to ensure that the regime delivers for the benefit of the class. The benefit of any recovery by the class comes at a cost - as in any commercial context – and the CAT to its credit recognises the importance of third party funding to the functioning of the opt-out regime. Recognising this and the interests of the class, the funding is structured in a way that seeks to align those interests.

From a business model perspective, Rightmove commands a dominant share of UK property-portal traffic and listings (reportedly over 80%). How do you assess the strength of the antitrust and competition arguments in the claim, and how does Innsworth evaluate the potential for a precedent-setting outcome if the tribunal rules favourably? 

The Rightmove fees claim announcement follows a series of English unfair pricing judgments which have gone a long way to clarify how an English court or tribunal will approach these kinds of cases. Rightmove uses its high market share as a marketing tool and has achieved sky-high margins over many years, achieved through regularly increasing its prices.  Many agents feel they have no choice but to be on Rightmove and Rightmove knows that. Commentary from industry figures following the announcement of the claim has highlighted how strongly many class members feel about Rightmove’s pricing.

Litigation funding in large scale opt-out claims is increasingly visible to institutional investors. How does Innsworth view its role as a funder in terms of transparency, reputation-risk management, and alignment with claimant-interests?   

We take our role as a stakeholder in the UK (and global) litigation funding community very seriously and we are confident in the value that our funding provides. The service we provide, of non-recourse funding, protects claimants against the costs of litigation.

If our funding unlocks redress for a class, that is a recovery for those harmed that would not otherwise have been achieved, so there is therefore a synergy between the interests of a funder and a class harmed by breach of competition law.  Innsworth is transparent about its funding and terms of funding in the Competition Appeal Tribunal.

We do think there is a debate to be had about whether defendants should have access to financial information on e.g. a claim budget and funder commission. We think it’s fair that a defendant should be satisfied that a litigation funder can meet any adverse costs order made against it in an opt out claim (as England and Wales is a ‘loser pays’ jurisdiction). But currently defendants to these claims will scrutinise claim budgets and funding agreements in detail and use this to make opportunistic arguments, while claimants typically have no visibility on defendant budgets and funding. It’s an example of the information asymmetries which exist when seeking to hold dominant companies to account.

What is your take on the litigation funding market for opt out claims in England and Wales at the moment? 

We’ve seen a real slowdown in the number of claims being filed in the last year or so. A lot of this is due to uncertainty as to the level of return that the Competition Appeal Tribunal will permit a funder to receive, even if this has been freely agreed between a class representative and funder. Of course, the effect of PACCAR has made funding more challenging in England and Wales generally.

That said, Dr Kent’s recent success in her claim against Apple highlights the potential of the regime to hold dominant companies to account and to deliver meaningful redress to class members. The judgment is timely as the UK government is currently considering making reforms to the opt out regime in the face of a concerted lobbying effort from big business groups. We think the opt out regime is starting to deliver on its objective of improving competitiveness in the UK economy, so making any wholesale changes now would be counterproductive, but the prospect of reforms is adding to the uncertainty facing the regime.