Trending Now
  • An LFJ Conversation with Ian Coleman, Insurance & Funding Broker, Commercial and General
LFJ Conversation

An LFJ Conversation with Stephen Kyriacou, Head of Litigation and Contingent Risk at WTW

By John Freund |
April 29, 2025

An LFJ Conversation with Stephen Kyriacou, Head of Litigation and Contingent Risk at WTW

Stephen is a seasoned litigation and contingent risk insurance broker and former practicing complex commercial litigator who joined WTW in February 2025 as Head of Litigation and Contingent Risk Insurance.  In his role, Stephen evaluates litigation-related risks and structures bespoke litigation and contingent risk insurance policies for litigation finance, hedge fund, law firm, private equity, and corporate clients.  Prior to joining WTW, Stephen was a Managing Director and Senior Lawyer in Aon’s Litigation Risk Group.  Stephen joined Aon in 2019, and was the first insurance industry professional dedicated solely to the litigation and contingent risk insurance market, leading the Litigation Risk Group’s origination and business development work, in-house legal diligence, efforts to advocate for coverage with underwriters, and negotiation and structuring of insurance policies.  During his time at Aon, Stephen was a three-time Risk and Insurance Magazine “Power Broker” (2022, 2023, 2024); spearheaded the development of judgment preservation insurance and insurance-backed judgment monetization as well as the synergy of litigation and contingent risk insurance with litigation finance; and was responsible for placing billions of dollars in total coverage limits – including the largest ever litigation and contingent risk insurance policy, and several policies that each provided over $500 million in coverage limits – and delivering hundreds of millions of dollars in premium to insurers.  Stephen additionally provided consulting and broking services on litigation-driven, insurance capital-based investment opportunities and sales of litigation claims, insurance claims, and subrogation rights as part of the Aon Special Opportunities Group. Prior to joining the insurance industry, Stephen was a complex commercial litigator in the New York City office of Boies, Schiller & Flexner from 2011 to 2019.  While at BSF, Stephen amassed significant trial, appellate, and arbitration experience representing both plaintiffs and defendants in the U.S. and abroad across a wide array of practice areas, including securities, antitrust, constitutional, insurance, first amendment, employment, government contracting, and criminal law, as well as in multidistrict and class action litigation.  Stephen’s clients included banks and other major financial institutions, private equity firms, technology companies, foreign sovereigns, professional sports teams, television networks, insurance companies, corporate executives, and other high-net-worth individuals.   Stephen earned his J.D. from the New York University School of Law in 2010, and is a member of the New York State Bar.  He also clerked for the Honorable Tanya S. Chutkan in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Below is our LFJ Conversation with Stephen Kyriacou:

We’ve seen increased interest in portfolio-based insurance solutions, particularly as the judgment preservation market has tightened.  What’s driving this shift, and how are clients adjusting their risk strategies in response?

When I first joined the insurance industry back in 2019, after about a decade as a trial and appellate lawyer at Boies Schiller, we were primarily insuring single-case defense-side risks with what we now call adverse judgment insurance or “AJI” policies.  Shortly after I started, the focus shifted to the plaintiff side, though most insurers still preferred insuring single cases with what came to be called judgment preservation insurance or “JPI” policies.  These policies protected plaintiffs who had already won at trial or on summary judgment against appellate risk, effectively guaranteeing a minimum recovery from their trial court judgments no matter what happened on appeal.

JPI was the driving force behind the explosive growth in the litigation and contingent risk insurance market for several years, in large part because these policies allowed plaintiffs to monetize judgments more cost-effectively than they could without insurance.  And as the market grew, so did the size of the judgments that were being insured and the amount of coverage limits that insurers were putting up, both individually and collectively, on these policies.  It got to the point where policies providing over $100 million in coverage for multi-hundred-million-dollar judgments became commonplace, and several policies were written that provided more than $500 million in coverage on billion-dollar-plus judgments.  Individual insurers were also sometimes betting tens of millions of dollars on the outcome of a single case as part of some of these JPI larger policies.

Unfortunately, while more modestly sized JPI policies on smaller judgments have generally performed as expected, with insurers not having to pay many claims, some of these larger, more high-profile JPI policies have run into significant challenges on appeal, on remand, and in places like the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.  And the nature of this insurance is such that one big loss on a multi-hundred-million-dollar policy can more than wipe out the premium gains for insurers on several smaller policies.

The JPI losses that insurers have already incurred, and those they look likely to incur in the near term, have understandably caused many of them to reassess their approach to litigation and contingent risk insurance more broadly.  For some insurers, that has meant pulling back from the space or taking a “back to basics” approach and returning to a focus on defense-side risk.  But for many insurers, it has meant mirroring the pivot that much of the litigation finance industry made several years ago away from single cases – where financial outcomes can hinge entirely on one jury, one trial court judge, or one panel of appellate court judges – and toward a portfolio-focused approach that better spreads risk across multiple diverse cases or litigation-related investments, loans, or other assets.  In fact, the insurers who have come into the market following the JPI boom, and who therefore have no exposure to any of the large JPI policies of recent years, are generally focused, at least for the time being, exclusively on providing this sort of portfolio-based coverage.

Our clients at WTW are embracing this new paradigm.  Where a client may previously have sought to insure a single large patent infringement judgment with a similarly large JPI policy, they might now seek a portfolio-based policy that guarantees a minimum recovery from the combination of that judgment, several other earlier-stage cases that are pending in different trial courts, and numerous other patents they may seek to enforce through litigation in the future.  We’re also working with litigation funders who may previously have sought to insure individual investments on a piecemeal basis once they reached the judgment stage to instead insure portfolios of diversified investments throughout all stages of the litigation lifecycle, including in some cases entire funds or designated sleeves of funds.  Patent and mass tort case aggregators are also increasingly looking to avail themselves of portfolio-based insurance solutions that can be tailored to the unique risk profiles of their businesses and used as a financial tool to spur growth and increase profitability.

Law firms are getting in on the action, as well.  We are seeing tremendous interest in “work-in-progress” or “WIP” wrappers that insure, on a cross-collateralized basis, a law firm’s anticipated contingency fee recovery across a portfolio of cases.  Many of the recent WIP insurance placements that we’ve worked on recently have involved patent infringement cases and IP litigation boutiques, but we are also seeing interest from mass tort, personal injury, and product liability law firms, as well as among AmLaw 200 firms that focus on many different categories of high-value, capital- and labor-intensive plaintiff-side commercial litigation.

Can you walk us through what a portfolio-based insurance wrapper actually looks like – both for a litigation funder and for a law firm? How do the structures differ, and what risks are typically covered?

The basic structure of a portfolio-based insurance wrapper is very straightforward.  Essentially, an insured purchases a policy with a specific amount of coverage limits that guarantees the insured will recover an amount equivalent to those coverage limits from the cases or litigation-related investments, loans, or other assets that comprise the portfolio that’s being insured.  If, at the end of the policy term – or if the policy doesn’t have a specific term, once the last of the covered cases or investments has ended – the insured’s recovery is less than the limits on the policy, the insurers will pay out a “loss” on the policy that effectively trues the insured up to policy limits.

Recovery against the policy limits is measured differently depending on who the insured is:  for litigants insuring pools of plaintiff-side litigation, insurers look to any amounts the litigant earns through damage awards and settlements on those cases; for litigation funders, hedge funds, or others insuring investments in litigation-related assets, insurers look to their returns on those investments; for lenders insuring loans to law firms or other participants in the plaintiff-side litigation ecosystem, insurers look to the amount of principal plus interest repaid on those loans; and for law firms insuring their work-in-process or “WIP”  on a group of cases, insurers look to the contingency fees that the law firm collects on those cases.

For a litigation funder, it’s as simple as identifying a set of investments, loans, or other assets to go into the portfolio, identifying the amount the funder has invested in whatever it is that collateralizes the portfolio, and then insuring a minimum recovery that is some significant percentage of the funder’s overall investment.  And as I mentioned earlier, these policies can insure an entire fund, a designated portion of a fund, a specific LP within a fund, or even a more bespoke portfolio comprised of select investments from within a given fund or from a cross-section of different funds.

As with portfolio policies for litigation funders, WIP policies can be placed on a programmatic basis across a firm’s entire contingency fee case book or on a more selective basis across certain specifically identified cases.  Here’s an example of how a WIP policy might work:  Imagine that a law firm was litigating ten cases on contingency, with an anticipated recovery of more than $100 million in contingency fees and expected WIP of $50 million across the portfolio of cases.  The firm could potentially purchase a WIP policy with a $40 million limit, equal to 80% of its expected WIP, which would provide coverage if, over what is typically a five- to seven-year policy term, the ten cases in the portfolio collectively earn the firm less than $40 million in total contingency fees.  If, at the end of the policy term, the firm had only recovered $20 million in total contingency fees, the policy would cover the $20 million shortfall against the $40 million in policy limits.

WIP policies are often used as a mechanism to attract litigation funding at a much lower cost of capital than otherwise would be available without insurance, including from sources of capital that don’t typically invest in litigation-related assets because of the high risk involved.  There are dozens of different capital sources beyond traditional litigation funders – including hedge funds, family offices, private equity firms, private credit lenders, and other alternative sources of capital – who are keenly interested in lending against WIP policies, as well as against other portfolio-based and single-case insurance policies.

WIP insurance can also be a very useful tool for lawyers within firms where the billable hour is king to get approval from executive or contingency fee committees, or from the broader partnership, to bring high-value contingency fee cases.  These policies provide the firm with a guaranteed minimum recovery from contingency fee litigation by the end of the policy’s term such that, if the cases don’t ultimately work out as planned, the financial result to the firm will be the same as if the lawyers on those cases had spent several years simply billing their time on non-contingency fee matters for clients who received a small discount on those lawyers’ hourly rates.

I should also note that, for any portfolio-based policy, as with some of the more traditional single-case policies like judgment preservation and adverse judgment insurance, premiums are generally in the form of one-time upfront payments.  But for portfolio policies more than single-case policies, there are also mechanisms like deferred and contingent or “D&C” premiums that insurers are increasingly willing to employ to bring down the upfront premium cost in exchange for a modest piece of the recovery waterfall if the cases or investments that comprise the insured portfolio are highly successful.

How are insurers underwriting these portfolio-based structures differently than single-case policies?  Are there specific underwriting thresholds, case mix requirements, or expected returns that make a portfolio “insurable”?

Most insurers define a “portfolio policy” as one that is insuring at least three to five cases, and the more the merrier.  These cases should be uncorrelated, such that they should not all rise and fall together, and the more diversity that can be introduced into the portfolio – with regard to identity of plaintiffs, identity of defendants, specific causes of action, subject matter of the litigation, etc. – the better, as well.

That being said, it is common for an insured portfolio to be comprised of cases from a single plaintiff or representing only a single subject matter area from a litigation funder, law firm, or group of lawyers within a law firm who specialize in that subject matter area – think patent infringement, antitrust, or mass tort litigation.  And of course, insurers are highly vigilant about adverse selection, and will not insure portfolios that they suspect to be comprised of a prospective insured’s cherrypicked worst or riskiest cases or investments.  The easiest way to mitigate this suspicion as a prospective insured is to insure a “complete set” – whether the entirety of a given fund from a litigation funder, a law firm’s entire contingency fee case book, a patentholder’s entire patent portfolio, or a litigant’s entire portfolio of plaintiff-side cases.

Underwriting one of these portfolios is a very different exercise than underwriting a JPI or AJI policy.  Rather than a single case with an extensive, well-developed record (including, as was often the case with JPI placements, the exact appellate record that would be put before an appellate court when they are asked to decide the case), insurers are often faced with a high number of cases and less detailed and voluminous information about each individual case.  Often, cases that are already underway will have a limited history of case filings and unfiled cases will have only a preliminary case description and damages evaluation.  Accordingly, while the number of cases increases substantially, having less information per case can result in the amount of underwriting time, and associated underwriting fees, being relatively similar to a JPI or AJI policy.

In terms of the actual underwriting process, it’s important to keep in mind that insurers do not need to put all their eggs in a single basket on portfolio polices like they do for a JPI or AJI policy.  Instead, they determine the likelihood of success for each case in the portfolio and then assign an expected return to that case.  Then, using a weighted average of all the cases, the insurer determines exactly how likely it is that the portfolio will collectively return an amount that exceeds the limits being purchased.  Insurers are also looking at other things, as well, like a law firm or litigation funder’s track record on similar cases or investments, the underwriting guidelines being used to select cases or investments, the bona fides of the key individuals involved, case budgets, and the judgment collection and enforcement risk presented by the relevant defendants.

It’s also important to keep in mind that the structure of portfolio-based insurance policies makes it much less likely that a policy could suffer a full limit loss given the number of cases or investments that would need to go poorly in order for that to happen.  This is another key differentiator from JPI, where a single adverse appellate court decision or bad remand outcome can sometimes cause a full limit loss.

Lastly, as I noted earlier, insurers will often look to include a deferred and contingent or “D&C” premium in portfolio-based policies, which allow the insurer to participate in the upside of a portfolio of cases or litigation-related investments if the portfolio turns out to be highly successful.  Since a D&C premium only kicks in after the insured has recovered an amount in excess of coverage limits, underwriters of portfolio-based policies with a D&C component will also evaluate the probability that a portfolio brings in proceeds well in excess of limits, thus entitling them to that additional backend premium.

For litigation funders raising capital or structuring new vehicles, how critical is it to have an insurance solution baked in from day one? Are LPs demanding it, or is it still seen as an optional enhancement?

It ultimately depends on the type of investment capital that a funder is looking to attract.  Traditional litigation finance LPs, who seek to make high-risk, high-reward investments, often view insurance as antithetical to why they are investing in litigation finance in the first place, because the premium costs – whether upfront or D&C – cut into their returns.  These investors, and those funders who follow the same ethos, are generally not interested in wrapping their funds with any form of principal protection insurance coverage because they don’t want to forfeit any of their upside in order to do so.

On the other hand, a litigation funder who wraps a new fund with principal protection insurance can attract an entirely new class of investors that typically does not invest in litigation finance – investors who don’t need to understand litigation funding, or even litigation itself, in order to invest.  These LPs may invest in an insurance-wrapped fund precisely because their downside is de minimus or, depending on the limits of the relevant policy, essentially zero, but with a high potential upside – albeit, not as high as the upside would be without insurance.  This makes insurance-wrapped funds an ideal target for certain investment banking, pension fund, private equity, private credit, university endowment, sovereign wealth, family office, and other investors who will happily accept lower returns in exchange for lower – or, again, depending on the specific policy structure, potentially zero – risk.

So based on that, I see insurance coverage on a fund-wide basis as an optional enhancement that is very funder- and LP-dependent.  But it’s important to remember that we have a significant amount of flexibility in how we can structure these policies to best achieve our clients’ financial and risk management goals.  To give one example, there was a deal I worked on that involved a loan that a funder made to a law firm where the funds for the loan came from multiple different LPs, some of which needed principal protection coverage and some of which did not.  We were able to structure an insurance policy that only insured the portion of the loan attributable to the LPs who needed insurance coverage and effectively treated the portion of loan funds that came from the other LPs as co-insurance on the policy.  The significant co-insurance piece brought the cost of coverage down from where it would have been had we insured the entirety of the loan or a high percentage of the loan funds coming from all LPs.  So even in situations where there are distinct or even polar opposite LP needs on a single investment, loan, or other transaction, we can often create an insurance-based solution that works to deliver an optimal balance of risk and reward for everyone, enabling deals to get done that just would not have happened without insurance.

About the author

John Freund

John Freund

More LFJ Conversations

View All
LFJ Conversation

An LFJ Conversation with Ian Coleman, Insurance & Funding Broker, Commercial and General

By John Freund |

Ian is a qualified solicitor (non-practicing) in England & Wales. Having been involved in the Legal Expenses Insurance industry since November 1992, he has dealt with Before the Event (BTE) and After the Event (ATE) Legal Expenses Insurance in its various forms.

His work has included underwriting for ATE cover, a number of the early competition claims seeking damages for abusive anti-competitive conduct being brought then both in the High Court and Competition Appeals Tribunal (CAT) in England.

He also underwrote for ATE cover a number of group actions many of which were run under Group Litigation Orders (GLO) and other case management devices, spanning a wide variety of case types. Ian has underwritten numerous commercial litigation cases, civil fraud claims and insolvency matters.

Since 2020 Ian has acted as a broker, intermediating various insurance products relating to litigation and arbitration risks as well as intermediating litigation funding requirements where required.

Below is our LFJ conversation with Ian Coleman:

What does the landscape for litigation funding look like now in the UK?

There are many strong opportunities available in the UK with excellent law firms. The use of litigation funding has become normalised in conjunction with ATE Insurance to cover the adverse costs exposure. Litigation funding is no longer seen as a tool just for the impecunious.

Opportunities range from commercial arbitration and investor state disputes to commercial litigation, civil fraud claims and of course the various forms of competition compensation claims conducted in the Competition Appeals Tribunal (CAT).

The availability of litigation funding frequently drives the law firm enquiry.

The Supreme Court decision in PACCAR remains current authority albeit that the Government has said that it will legislate to reverse the position and has received recommendation that be both retrospective and prospective. The caveat being when parliamentary time allows. However, a multiple on capital deployed (or in some cases committed) is permitted offering healthy returns for investors.

It has been suggested that ‘light touch regulation’ will be included in any such legislation or in follow-on legislation. The Lord Chancellor requested advice from the Civil Justice Council (CJC) with regards to the question of regulation. The CJC published its Final Report in June 2025. The CJC has recommended that regulation should not apply to arbitration proceedings as it should remain a matter for arbitral centres to determine whether and, if so, how any such regulation should be implemented. In Court and CAT proceedings regulation of litigation funders should be weighted according to whether the funding is provided to consumers or commercial parties.

The CJC suggests a minimum, baseline, set of regulatory requirements should therefore apply to litigation funding generally. These should include provision for: case-specific capital adequacy requirements; codification of the requirement that litigation funders should not control funded litigation; conflict of interest provisions; the application of anti-money laundering requirements; and disclosure at the earliest opportunity of the fact of funding, the name of the funder, and the ultimate source of the funding. The terms of LFAs should not, generally, be subject to disclosure.

It should be noted that the CJC specifically rejected the introduction of caps on litigation funders’ returns.

Law firm portfolio funding or case by case funding are options to consider albeit a balance of the law firm’s and their clients’ needs will be key in deciding which approach is requested. The CJC has recommended specific regulatory provisions for portfolio funding.

What is known as ‘The Arkin Cap’ continues to provide that the Court can make an appropriate decision concerning litigation funder liability for adverse costs on a case-by-case basis. For this reason, litigation funders will inevitably require that suitable ATE is in place.

It should be noted that no regulation has yet been introduced and it is debatable when there will be parliamentary time to attempt to do so. In any event regulation logically would be prospective only.

Can you speak to the issue of domiciling of funding SPVs to maximise insurance availability? 

Where litigation funding is sought it is extremely common in the UK for ATE Insurance to be required as part of the package and often Capital Protection Insurance is purchased by the litigation funder. Most of the insurance capacity for these products emanates from markets based in London.

Insurance may only be sold into a territory for which the insurer has a licence. The licencing requirements are dictated by the domicile of the Proposer (the party seeking insurance).

The Insurers invariably have a licence for the UK and Europe but not necessarily for other territories. In order to maximise the choice of insurance offerings the Proposer is ideally domiciled somewhere in the UK or Europe.

Where the Litigation Funder seeks Capital Protection Insurance (CPI) domiciling the SPV in say Guernsey may have a double benefit both in terms of insurance availability (to achieve the best terms) but also to maximise tax efficiencies. Most jurisdictions levy some form of insurance tax, but those that do not may be seen as attractive to the party paying the insurance premium. Any Litigation Funder seeking to set up an SPV in a tax and licencing friendly location should of course make their own enquiries in order to satisfy themselves that both requirements are met in that particular territory.

Where the Claimant is domiciled in a location that raises licencing challenges this may be overcome by the Litigation Funder providing an Adverse Costs Indemnity via its funding SPV and obtaining the ATE Insurance to cover off that risk.

This will however generally mean that security for costs must be provided but the ATE Policy can be fortified with what has become known as an Anti-Avoidance Endorsement (AAE). AAEs have been accepted in the UK Courts and in many arbitral forums.

Notwithstanding the place of domicile of the Proposer, the insurance policies will generally be written on the basis that the policy is governed by English Law and accordingly the duty of disclosure for the Proposer will be set out in the Insurance Act 2015 for non-consumers and Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 for consumers.

How do clients use insurance to mitigate risk and control funding spend? 

CPI can be obtained to protect some or all the capital deployed. This can be purchased either on a portfolio basis or case by case. Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages and that discussion deserves its own separate analysis. Both do mitigate the risk of losing capital. The scope of claim circumstances is a matter of negotiation with Insurers.

Generally, the conducting law firm will require some funding of their fees. Their fees can be further insulated from risk by Work in Progress Insurance (WiP) which protects an element of base fees should the claim be unsuccessful. In some circumstances WiP may be used to curtail the funding requirement.

For bilateral investment treaty arbitrations Arbitral Award Default Insurance (AADI) may also be available.

ATE is used commonly where costs follow the event to protect the risk of the claimant and litigation funder becoming liable for adverse costs.

Is the Competition Appeals Tribunal still a good funding opportunity?

There has been much discussion about the CAT since the changes in 2015. Case longevity, case outcomes and distribution have been frequent topics of conversation. The question to be posed is whether ‘herd-thought’ means that good opportunities are being over-looked. That has most certainly been the experience of the writer.

The sector in the UK has a number of strong law firms, and the CAT requirements are being clarified with decisions that are now flowing through the forum.

Decisions from senior Courts have further assisted in setting out road maps for bringing and conducting such cases particularly with regards to Opt-Out and abuse of dominant position claims.

It should not be a surprise that as the new regime bedded in the earlier cases would take longer to conclude and the pathway would need to be set.

In Opt-Out cases the CAT does consider the funding and ATE packages at Certification stage together with the Class Representative’s understanding of how they work. Whilst certification can be refused on the basis of the above it does not equate in the event of certification to a blessing of the arrangements which can be revisited later.

Sensible pricing models from the outset are important. Certification will now have some regard to the merits of the claim, scope of the defined class and distribution. These can all be well managed to substantially mitigate the risk of the CAT subsequently intervening in stakeholder entitlements.

For cases that are not Opt-Out the above considerations do not apply.

What can you tell us about the importance of being clear on the source of funds? 

The hygiene factor around funds being used to support litigation and arbitration matters is increasingly significant. Litigation Funders should be aware of this and consider the level of checks that are required in other financial sectors. Matters such as KYC, AML, UBOs and sanctions / PEP enquiries are often mandatory. This approach would be reflective of the CJC recommendations.

The confirmation that such checks have been conducted and were satisfactory could well prove to be decisive where there are competing offers of litigation funding on the table.

LFJ Conversation

An LFJ Conversation with Jason Levine, Partner at Foley & Lardner LLP

By John Freund |

Jason Levine is an antitrust and commercial litigation partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Foley & Lardner LLP.  He previously served as the D.C. office head, and head of U.S. antitrust strategy, at Omni Bridgeway, a global commercial litigation finance company.

Jason’s legal background spans over 25 years in private practice as a first-chair trial lawyer and antitrust litigator in several multinational law firms.  He has tried over a dozen cases and served as lead counsel for plaintiffs and defendants in numerous billion-dollar disputes, including defending against two of the nation’s largest antitrust MDLs.  Jason graduated cum laude from Harvard Law School and clerked for Judge Randall Rader on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

Below is our LFJ conversation with Jason Levine:

Where does litigation finance add the most value in antitrust cases, particularly given their scale, duration, and cost profile? 

As in any complex dispute, litigation finance adds significant value in antitrust cases by shifting the risk of fees and legal costs away from the plaintiff or the law firm and to a funder.  Antitrust cases are particularly well-suited to litigation finance because they can be exceptionally costly, require specialized counsel and often multiple expert witnesses, tend to have a long duration, and can involve massive amounts of discovery.

The aspects of the case where a financing arrangement adds the most value will vary depending on the funding mechanism.  If a law firm is handling a matter on a contingent fee basis, then the greatest value from financing typically comes from covering the legal costs the firm would otherwise advance on its own.  Outside a contingent fee scenario, financing is most important in paying counsel’s legal fees, although the funder may also cover legal costs.  The universal point is that, for companies pursuing antitrust litigation, financing can be very attractive because it is non-recourse, permits the company to reserve its legal budget for defensive and compliance matters that are not amenable to financing, and helps convert the legal function from a proverbial “cost center” into a revenue generator.

Funding also increases the client’s options for which counsel to retain, which is particularly important in antitrust cases given their nature.  With outside financing covering legal fees and costs, the client can focus more on the expertise and “fit” of counsel than on their billing rates.  Relatedly, litigation finance can enable a small company to hire a “Big Law” firm that doesn’t offer contingent fee arrangements, rather than potentially being limited to a firm that does.  The same point applies to expert witnesses, making the top echelon available whereas they might otherwise have been prohibitively expensive.

In short, with a meritorious case and litigation financing behind it, a small corporate plaintiff can match a much larger defendant’s litigation resources.  This benefit of leveling the playing field is very clear in antitrust cases, given their scope and cost to litigate, which helps explain why they are funded at a higher rate than most other categories of commercial litigation.

Are there specific types of antitrust claims or procedural postures where you think funding is especially well suited?

Funding is very well suited to antitrust claims where a company has opted out of a class action and is pursuing its claim independently.  This is particularly true if the opt-out occurs after the putative class action has survived motions to dismiss, if not class certification.  At either point, a funder will consider the opt-out case at least partly de-risked.

This benefits the funder because the case is less risky and will have a shorter remaining duration.  It benefits the funding counterparty because the funder’s required return should be lower, given the de-risking, leaving more of the proceeds for the client and the law firm to share.  Substantively, funding is well suited to various kinds of antitrust cases, so long as quantifiable money damages are at stake rather than solely injunctive relief.

What regulatory or legislative developments in litigation finance should antitrust litigators be paying closest attention to right now?

There is significant activity at both the federal and state level that warrants attention, although not specific to antitrust cases.  At the federal level, bills have been proposed that would seek to compel detailed disclosures of the existence and details of litigation financing arrangements, including to the adverse parties.  Another bill would seek to largely shut down the involvement of foreign entities in litigation finance, both by prohibiting the practice by certain state-affiliated actors and also by requiring extremely detailed disclosures by others.

Although it’s fair to say that none of these proposals are a very high legislative priority, they definitely warrant attention, given how far the proposed federal tax on litigation finance proceeds progressed in 2025.  That tax has not been formally re-introduced yet, but that is another possibility that would merit watching.

As the midterm elections in 2026 draw closer, the prospects for movement on any of these proposals will likely decrease, with the exception of a possible “midnight rider” slipped into a year-end Appropriations bill.  That’s something else to watch out for.  In addition, the Advisory Committee on the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is considering potential Rule amendments involving disclosure of litigation funding uniformly in federal cases, and this is worth monitoring as well.  Given all these developments, defendants have an increased incentive to seek information about litigation funding arrangements through discovery requests.

At the state level, at least a dozen states are perennially considering different disclosure regimes and regulations that would complicate the use of litigation finance.  Some of this is performative, having failed multiple years in a row in some states.  I would keep a particularly close watch for state-specific versions of the litigation finance tax that failed to pass in the U.S. Senate last year, especially in California, New York, Texas, Florida, and Illinois.

How do you expect evolving disclosure or taxation proposals to affect big firm strategy in funded matters?

Certainly, large law firms that are considering funding arrangements, or that have them already, will be monitoring the regulatory landscape for important developments.  I would anticipate that the imposition of new regulations in general will cause firms to focus closely on compliance, both on their part as either funded counterparties or as counsel to them, and also on the part of funders.  This might lead to a tendency to favor larger, more established funders that have robust internal compliance capabilities.

Law firms and their funded corporate clients will also likely scrutinize funding agreements even more carefully.  Similarly, if any new industry-specific taxes are enacted, law firms will likely focus on funders’ ability to adapt their return structures to minimize the passed-through impact.  Pricing in line with the market is always important, but potential tax changes could highlight this even more.  Greater regulation could also lead to further consolidation in the litigation finance industry, leaving fewer – but likely larger – companies in the space, making it all the more important for law firms to seek out whatever edge a particular funder can provide in a deal.

I would not expect any new disclosure or taxation regimes to change the way law firms actually litigate their cases, with the exception of disclosure requirements giving rise to more discovery efforts aimed at funding arrangements.  It is possible that a new, aggressive disclosure regime could give certain companies pause about pursuing funding, but I also consider this unlikely to change law firm litigation strategy.

Based on your own transition, what advice would you give Big Law partners or senior associates considering a move into litigation finance or a finance adjacent role?

I would advise them to be patient and to focus on relationships.  Litigation finance companies do not have a classic recruiting pattern like law firms do.  Headcounts tend to remain steady, with opportunistic hiring for purposes of expansion or replacement of departing personnel.  I know several people whose transitions from a law firm into litigation finance took over a year because there simply weren’t openings available.  In that situation, it’s important make contacts at one or more companies and check in with them periodically, because expressing interest in a position and staying top of mind can make all the difference.  A warm internal introduction is much more valuable than cold outreach.

I would also recommend gaining direct exposure to litigation finance before seeking out a position.  Funders will favor partners and associates who have previously handled funded litigation or at least negotiated deal terms with a funder.  This not only credentializes the job-seeker’s interest in a role, it also demonstrates some familiarity with the industry and how it operates.  Relatedly, job-seekers should learn as much as they can about the funder as possible before approaching it.  What kinds of cases does it fund?  Does it have geographical limits, or funding amounts that it favors?  This information is often on the company’s website, and knowing it shows diligence and also helps ensure fit.  For the few publicly traded funders, I strongly recommend reviewing investor materials and annual reports before interviewing.

In addition, particularly for partners, I would emphasize the importance of objectively assessing one’s network and prospects for helping to generate deal flow.  Similar to a law firm, at most funders, origination is a key aspect of a more senior role.  What is your base of potential funding clients?  Do you have strong contacts with litigation business generators at multiple law firms, or with well-placed in-house counsel at companies with suitable litigation?  Are your contacts limited to particular kinds of litigation, and if so, are those ones that tend to receive funding?

These are important questions to answer as granularly as possible before approaching a funder for a job.  For more junior lawyers, consider where you would fit in the funder’s structure, and how you can add value, particularly in the nuts and bolts of underwriting cases.  Here, again, subject matter is important.  Expertise in areas of law that don’t yield funded cases is unlikely to support the business care for a new hire.

LFJ Conversation

An LFJ Conversation with Thomas Bell, Founder of Fenaro

By John Freund |

Thomas is the Founder of Fenaro, a modern fund management platform for litigation finance. He holds a law degree from Durham University and has spent his career designing and delivering large-scale, complex financial services platforms. Prior to founding Coremaker's Fenaro product, he spent much of his career at Accenture, PwC, and other management consulting firms, working with global banks, asset managers, and institutional investors.

Below is our LFJ Conversation with Thomas Bell:

The litigation finance industry has grown to over $16 billion, yet your blog notes that many firms still run on spreadsheets. What specific operational pain points do fund managers face with legacy systems, and how does Fenaro address them? 

Despite the industry’s rapid growth, most litigation funders continue to rely on in-house spreadsheets or fragmented systems that are not designed to handle litigation finance. From our conversations with funders across the market, three operational pain points consistently arise.

The first is calculation risk. Funders regularly tell us about issues arising from manual models and fragile data infrastructure, ranging from investor reports needing to be reissued due to errors (surprisingly common), to material budget discrepancies only being identified late in a case lifecycle (less common, but in some cases career-ending). Purpose-built fund management systems substantially reduce this risk by centralising data and automating complex calculations.

The second is friction with law firms after a deal has closed. One funder summarised their biggest challenge as “getting lawyers to think in IRR terms.” In practice, this reflects the lack of efficient processes for tracking budgets, agreeing drawdowns, reviewing invoices, and sharing case updates. Fenaro addresses this through the borrower portal, which provides law firms with a structured and transparent way to work with funders throughout the life of an investment, resulting in a much more positive relationship.

The third is operational complexity limiting scale. Many funders speak candidly about ambitious growth plans being constrained by manual reporting, bespoke processes, and operational bottlenecks. Without greater standardisation and automation, it is difficult to scale portfolios or support increased institutional participation. Fenaro is built from the ground up to reduce the overhead of operational processes, while giving funders all the key information required to focus on growing and managing the fund.

Mass tort portfolios can involve thousands of individual claims with constantly shifting data. How does your platform help funders track, value, and report on these complex portfolios without drowning in manual updates? 

In mass tort strategies, some funders are managing regular updates across tens or even hundreds of thousands of individual claims and many different law firms. Several have told us that keeping this information accurate and up to date is a data nightmare that quickly becomes unmanageable, and worry they’re spending too much time on administrative data-wrangling efforts, and not enough time on actually mining the content for value.

Fenaro is designed to process high volumes of case data from multiple law firms in a consistent format. Updates can be submitted through borrower portals or uploaded directly, allowing funders to see the status, valuation, and history of every claim at a glance. As part of this process, the platform runs validation checks and identifies potential duplicate claimants, a serious and well-known issue in mass tort funding. The same validated data is then used to produce investor and internal reports without the need for manual reconciliation.

You've written about the challenges funders face when lending to law firms—particularly around monitoring how capital is deployed. What visibility does Fenaro provide, and how does that change the funder-firm relationship? 

We frequently hear that fund visibility tends to drop sharply after capital is deployed. Monitoring budgets, drawdowns, and expenditure often relies on periodic reporting and manual review.

Fenaro provides funders with continuous visibility at both the portfolio and case level. At the same time, Fenaro gives law firms access to a free borrower portal. Contrary to the perception that firms resist new technology, many lawyers have told us directly that they are willing to adopt tools that reduce administrative burden and improve clarity. The borrower portal allows firms to track funding, compare spend against budgets, submit updates, and request additional capital, reducing friction on both sides and improving the overall relationship.

You've recently launched complex waterfall and scenario modelling functionality. Can you walk us through a use case—how would a fund manager use this feature when evaluating a potential investment or communicating with LPs about projected returns? 

Funders often tell us that building and maintaining waterfall models in spreadsheets is one of the most time-consuming and error-prone parts of the investment process. Fenaro allows complex waterfalls to be configured in seconds, with multi-step logic based on capital return, interest, IRR, MOIC and other calculation types.

A flow view presents the waterfall logic in plain English, and scenario-modelling functionality allows users to test scenarios and explain outcomes to investment committees and LPs. Once a deal is live, waterfalls update automatically as cashflows occur, removing the need for repeated spreadsheet rework and reducing calculation risk.

Looking ahead, where do you see the biggest opportunities for technology to transform how litigation finance firms operate? Are there capabilities that funders are asking for that don't exist yet?

Many funders we speak to see the biggest opportunities in greater standardisation, which would help unlock institutional capital and support a more liquid secondary market. There is still significant friction in how funders, law firms, investors, insurers, and brokers interact, and we’re tackling this one step at a time, focusing on the most pressing pain points first.

We are also frequently asked about AI and machine learning. Our view is that near-term value lies in decision support rather than decision replacement—particularly in reducing the time spent evaluating the majority of cases that are ultimately declined, while equipping underwriters with better information to make faster, more confident decisions. It will likely be some time before the technology is sufficient to take underwriting decisions on behalf of the funder, given the complexity and variation of the underlying legal cases, but things are moving quickly in the AI space so we continue to test and review various models as they evolve.