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Litigation Finance is Cheaper Than You Might Think!

Litigation Finance is Cheaper Than You Might Think!

The following was contributed by Matthew Pitchers, Head of Investment Valuation at Augusta Ventures I was in conversation the other day with a prospective user of our finance – a law firm who will remain nameless. The conversation was going well, very well in fact, until those seven words came up: “what is it going to cost me?”. I replied that our fee would be based on the higher of a multiple on the funds deployed or a set percentage of damages awarded. After a few seconds of silence which felt like an eternity, the response I got back was “that is very expensive, and I don’t think my client will go for it”. This left me bemused because whilst there is a general misconception that litigation funding is expensive, when compared to other sources of secured and unsecured funding available on the market, it is in fact very competitive and sometimes even cheap. This left me thinking about how best to explain this to the enquirer at the other end of the phone who would be left explaining all available options to his client. What is litigation funding? What I wanted to say was: Sir, in considering how expensive litigation funding is, one needs to first analyse what litigation funding is. This is easier to think about when considering what litigation isn’t. It isn’t a traditional debt product. There are no guaranteed cash flows. There is no obligation on the user of the debt to repay it. Any returns that the funder makes are payable from what the defendant pays if the claim is successful, not from the finance user. Furthermore, the entire financial risk of the case is transferred to the funder, and if a case loses, the risk of adverse costs falls to the funder and not the claimant. Therefore, an amount invested upfront in a legal case in order to share in the same risks and rewards as the claimant, feels more akin to a purchase of an equity participation in a start-up than a one-step-removed loan. To put it another way: If you were going on Dragon’s Den and your great idea was to ask the Dragons for an upfront investment in a legal case for a future share of any available returns which may or may not occur, how much of the case do you think the Dragons would want? What the market says In haggling over the value of your idea, the Dragons would probably consider the availability of unsecured loans, and the returns expected from venture capital start-up funding. If you, as an individual, were to go into the market today and look for an unsecured loan you might find APR’s that range from 10.3% per annum, for those people with excellent credit scores, up to 32.0% per annum for those with poor credit scores, and that is only on amounts up to £25,000. A good benchmark for the percentage of cases a litigation fund might win, despite all the due diligence that is performed, is around 70%. Loaning out money with only a 70% chance of getting any of it back is not similar to loaning money to a person with an excellent credit score, so litigation funders are firmly in poor credit score territory, where an APR could typically be between 28.5% and 32.0%. And remember, that is only on amounts up to £25,000, an investment in a legal case more-often-than-not, is many multiples of this size. A such, the IRR that the funder aims for is more akin to those expected by venture capitalists, who might typically look for 30-40% annual returns on a start-up investment. The tenor of investments A classical case tenor for litigation funding is usually two to four years. In the interim period the funder will have not received any payments. Their risk exposure goes up over time as more money is deployed as the legal case progresses, and there is limited availability to claw back any investment if the case looks like it isn’t going to win. It is, to all intents and purposes, an investment with a binary outcome and once invested there is no going back. An investment with an annualised return of 40% over three years would expect to achieve a 2.74X money multiple for the investor at the end of the life of the investment. Over four years the money multiple would be expected to be 3.84X. This would be at the upper end of what a litigation funder might achieve. A normal equity investment in a company has fewer downsides regarding the capital locked up, as covenants would be in place to claw back any investments if the company were mismanaged in the interim period. Summary In short, litigation funders are able to make worthwhile returns through rigorous diligence, investing in  cases that they expect to win and which meet their internal criteria, whilst building up a large enough portfolio that the effect of the unsystematic binary risk of losing an individual case is diluted. In return, a competent litigation funder should expect to achieve on their portfolio a rate of return that is better than a correlated investment, but lower than that achieved in the start-up markets. A claimant, in using litigation finance, should expect all their costs to be covered, and any risk of adverse costs to be transferred to the funder. In effect it becomes a risk-free investment for the claimant, whilst they still take the larger share of any return. This would be the dream scenario for any owner of a start-up company, selling a small stake in the company and removing all future down-side risk to themselves, whilst removing the burden of future costs. In summary Sir, this is a great opportunity for your client and it is highly competitive. Instead, I said to the man on the other end of the phone: ‘I’m sorry yes, it does sound expensive, let me see what we can do’.
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Bloomberg Law Cites Legal Funding Journal Podcast in Commentary on Funder Transparency

By John Freund |

A recent episode of the Legal Funding Journal podcast was quoted in a Bloomberg Law article on funder control of cases. In the episode, Stuart Hills and Guy Nielson, Co-Founders of RiverFleet, discussed the thorny topic this way: “What do funders care about? They certainly do care about settlements and that should be recognized. They do care about who is the legal counsel and that should be recognized. They care about the way the case is being run. They care about discontinuing the legal action and they care about wider matters affecting the funder.”

The provocative new commentary from Bloomberg Law reignites the longstanding debate over transparency in third-party litigation funding (TPLF), asserting that many funders exercise considerable control over litigation outcomes—despite public disavowals to the contrary.

In the article, Alex Dahl of Lawyers for Civil Justice argues that recent contract analyses expose mechanisms by which funders can shape or even override key litigation decisions, including settlement approval, counsel selection, and pursuit of injunctive relief. The piece singles out Burford Capital, the sector’s largest player, highlighting its 2022 bid to block a client’s settlement in the high-profile Sysco antitrust matter, even as it publicly claimed to be a passive investor. Such contradictions, Dahl contends, underscore a pressing need for mandatory disclosure of litigation funding arrangements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The analysis points to contracts that allegedly allow funders to halt cash flow mid-litigation, demand access to all documents—including sensitive or protected materials—and require plaintiffs to pay sanctions regardless of who caused the misconduct. Courts and opposing parties are typically blind to these provisions, as the agreements are often shielded from disclosure.

While funders like Burford maintain that control provisions are invoked only in “extraordinary circumstances,” Dahl’s article ends with a call for judicial mandates requiring transparency, likening funder involvement to insurers, who must disclose coverage under current civil rules.

For legal funders, the takeaway is clear: scrutiny is intensifying. As the industry matures and high-profile disputes mount, the push for standardized disclosure rules may accelerate. The central question ahead—how to balance transparency with funder confidentiality—remains a defining challenge for the sector.

Siltstone vs. Walia Dispute Moves to Arbitration

By John Freund |

Siltstone Capital and its former general counsel, Manmeet (“Mani”) Walia, have agreed to resolve their dispute via arbitration rather than through the Texas state court system—a move that transforms a high‑stakes conflict over trade secrets, opportunity diversion, and fund flow into a more opaque, confidential proceeding.

An article in Law360 notes that Siltstone had accused Walia of misusing proprietary information, diverting deal opportunities to his new venture, and broadly leveraging confidential data to compete unfairly. Walia, in turn, has denied wrongdoing and contended that Siltstone had consented—or even encouraged—his departure and new venture, pointing to a release executed upon his exit and a waiver of non‑compete obligations.

The agreement to arbitrate was reported on October 7, 2025. From a governance lens, this shift signals a preference for dispute resolution that may better preserve business continuity during fundraising cycles, especially in sectors like litigation finance where timing, investor confidence, and deal pipelines are critical.

However, arbitration also concentrates pressure into narrower scopes: document production, expert analyses (especially of trade secret scope, lost opportunity causation, and valuation), and the arbitrators’ evaluation. One point to watch is whether interim relief—protecting data, limiting competitive conduct, or preserving the status quo—will emerge in the arbitration or via court‑ordered relief prior to final proceedings.

ASB Agrees to NZ$135.6M Settlement in Banking Class Action

By John Freund |

ASB has confirmed it will pay NZ$135,625,000 to resolve the Banking Class Action focused on alleged disclosure breaches under the Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act (CCCFA), subject to approval by the High Court. The settlement was announced October 7, 2025, but ASB did not admit liability as part of the deal.

1News reports that the class action—covering both ASB and ANZ customers—alleges that the banks failed to provide proper disclosure to borrowers during loan variations. As a result, during periods of non‑compliance, customers claim the banks were not entitled to collect interest and fees (under CCCFA sections 22, 99, and 48).

The litigation has been jointly funded by CASL (Australia) and LPF Group (New Zealand). The parallel claim against ANZ remains active and is not part of ASB’s settlement.

Prior to this announcement, plaintiffs had publicly floated a more ambitious settlement in the NZ$300m+ range, which both ASB and ANZ had rejected—labeling it a “stunt” or political gambit tied to ongoing legislative changes to CCCFA.

Legal and regulatory observers see this deal as a strategic move by ASB: it caps its exposure and limits litigation risk without conceding wrongdoing, while leaving open the possibility of continued proceedings against ANZ. The arrangement still requires High Court consent before going ahead.