Trending Now
Commercial Investor's Corner Slingshot Capital Special Features

Portfolio Theory in the Context of Litigation Finance (pt. 2 of 2)

The following article is part of an ongoing column titled ‘Investor Insights.’ 

Brought to you by Ed Truant, founder and content manager of Slingshot Capital, ‘Investor Insights’ will provide thoughtful and engaging perspectives on all aspects of investing in litigation finance. 

In part one of this two part series, which can be found here, I explored a variety of portfolio theories and applied them to the litigation finance asset class. This second article continues the application to commercial litigation finance and discusses implications for portfolio construction.

Executive Summary

  • Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) – a mathematical framework based on the “mean-variance” analysis – argues that it’s possible to construct an “efficient frontier” of optimal portfolios offering the maximum possible expected return for a given level of risk
  • MPT states that assets (such as stocks) face both “systematic risks” – market risks such as interest rates – as well as “unsystematic risks” – mostly uncorrelated exposures that are characteristic to each asset, including management changes or poor sales resulting from unforeseen events
  • Post-modern Portfolio Theory (PMPT) adds a layer of refinement to the definition of risk
  • Diversification of a portfolio can mitigate the impact of unsystematic risks on portfolio performance – although, it depends on its composition of assets
  • Behavioural Finance (BF) introduces a suggestion that psychological influences and biases affect the financial behaviors of investors and financial practitioners, also applicable to litigation finance

Slingshot Insights:

  • Portfolio theory is important to the commercial litigation finance asset class due to its inherently high level of unsystematic risks
  • Slingshot’s Rule of Thumb: a portfolio should contain no less than 20 investments in order to provide the benefits associated with portfolio theory
  • Diversification is critical for every fund manager
  • Specialty fund managers may play a positive role in a comprehensive litigation finance investing strategy by assisting with meeting a particular performance objective when defined in the context of acceptable “mean-variance” targets
  • Diversification provides optionality for an under-performing manager to ‘live to fight another day’ if their first fund achieved sub-par performance
  • Portfolio theory is applicable to consumer litigation finance

How Big is Big Enough?

There are many theories about how large a portfolio should be to meaningfully benefit from the application of portfolio theory, with analysts suggesting anywhere from 20 to over 100 investments (typically in relation to public equities).  While I have yet to conduct a study to determine a more finite range applicable to litigation finance, I will say that there are a few elements that are critical to consider, which are specific to litigation finance.

First, litigation finance is by its very nature uncertain in terms of the amount of commitment the fund manager will ultimately deploy in relation to its financial commitment to a single case (i.e. while a manager may commit $5 million to a case, the legal team may only deploy $2MM by the time the case settles). Capital deployment (both quantum and timing) is an uncontrollable variable that makes portfolio theory difficult to apply, because portfolio theory assumes the dollars deployed in each investment are (i) known and (ii) of equal size (although weightings can be assigned).  Accordingly, in order to ensure that the portfolio is diversified on a dollars deployed basis, the portfolio needs to be sufficiently large to ensure that on a committed basis it is not skewed by a few cases which have deployed 100% or more of their initial commitment relative to those cases that have deployed less than 100%.  It is also not uncommon for managers to deploy nil or very little against their commitment as a result of an early settlement (perhaps brought on by the existence of litigation finance itself, or by virtue of the investment being in the form of adverse costs indemnity protection), which adds another element of complexity as relates to the application of portfolio theory.

Second, diversification in the context of litigation finance is not only a mathematical exercise of ensuring no one case represents a disproportionate amount of the fund, it also covers the types and extent of case exposures in the portfolio.  If one is investing only in a single manager, one wouldn’t necessarily want a fund that invests solely in Intellectual Property cases, as an example, because a Systematic risk that effects that sector (for example, litigation reform such as Inter Partes Reviews in patent litigation, or an important case precedent with broad implications) will likely effect all cases in the portfolio and hence diversification will not aid at all in terms of addressing the Systematic risk. Case types, defendants, jurisdictions, judges, plaintiff counsel, defense counsel, case inter-dependencies (where the outcome of one case has a direct impact on the likely outcome of another case in the same portfolio) are all important variables that a manager should consider when creating their portfolio.

Third, litigation finance portfolio financings (the concept of a funder investing in a portfolio of law firm or corporate cases) are, by their very nature, benefitting from the application of portfolio theory. Therefore, in constructing one’s portfolio, one should consider whether the committed capital is being invested in single case portfolios, cross-collateralized portfolio financings or a combination thereof, each of which having different risk-reward profiles.

When we take all of the above into consideration, especially the uncertainty inherent in capital deployment, my general rule of thumb is for managers to target a minimum of 20 equally sized litigation finance case commitments within a portfolio. From there, I adjust based on a variety of factors including case types, financing sizes, jurisdictions, currencies, etc.  Other investors may have a different perspective.  Of course, the portfolio will never be comprised of 20 equally-sized cases due to deployment uncertainty, so I view this as a baseline. If the portfolio is made up of cases with a higher inherent volatility (class actions, intellectual property, international arbitration or large cases), then a larger portfolio would be more appropriate, such that the higher loss ratio in the portfolio – which is inherent in higher risk portfolios – will not disproportionately contribute to the portfolio’s overall performance.

Applicability to Consumer Litigation Finance

Portfolio theory suggests that diversification is exceptionally good at reducing Unsystematic risk; hence, it comes as no surprise that MPT should be more frequently applicable to the commercial litigation finance asset class given the high level of idiosyncratic case risk.  The consumer litigation finance market also exhibits similar idiosyncratic case risk, but I believe it has more Systematic risks related to defendants (usually, insurance companies with a common approach), regulation, and established case precedent where the damages are much more prescribed.  Accordingly, while portfolio theory may not be as critical in this segment of litigation finance, as an investor in the asset class I believe it remains an important value driver for the consumer litigation finance market, especially since the return profile of a single piece of consumer litigation finance is generally not as strong as those inherent in commercial litigation finance due to risk and regulatory differences.

Fund Managers’ Perspective

As an investor experienced with managing capital, deploying capital and portfolio construction, I offer a few observations for consideration.

First, don’t fall in love with your investments (i.e. don’t get caught with personal biases working into your portfolio construction).  It is easy for a fund manager to be attracted to certain cases thinking the particular case is a ‘no brainer’ (perhaps due to personal experience and/or comfort with the merits of the case) and allocate a disproportionate amount of the portfolio to finance that case. However, in the context of an asset class with binary and idiosyncratic risk, the portfolio manager would be taking on a disproportionate amount of risk in doing so.  Once a manager has determined that the case meets their rigid underwriting criteria, her or she must change their mindset to one of portfolio allocator and take a dispassionate view of the case to ensure the portfolio is optimized.  In fact, I would suggest splitting the functional role of underwriting and portfolio construction to ensure the underwriting doesn’t influence portfolio allocation decisions!

Second, do not insist on exceptions to concentration limits.  I have seen a number of fund documents where the manager has carved out exceptions to concentration limits (many of which are not appropriate for this asset class (10%, 15%, 20%) and have been derived from other PE asset classes with completely different risk profiles). By doing so, the manager is adding a lot of risk (and bias) to the portfolio that is both unnecessary and risky to the longevity of the fund, not to mention investor returns.  In my mind, the equation is quite simple: if one creates a diversified set of investments of relatively equal size, and one maintains a sound underwriting methodology, industry data suggests that one’s investment thesis should work. So why jeopardize a sound strategy?

Third, fund managers will live and die by their portfolio results, so why take unnecessary risk in haphazardly allocating capital?

To illustrate the second and third points, let’s consider four potential portfolio outcomes: (i) non-diversified portfolio with poor performance, (ii) non-diversified portfolio with exceptional performance, (iii) diversified portfolio with good performance and (iv) diversified portfolio with poor performance.

As an investor, I would look at situations (i) and (ii) and say “as a fund manager you are ‘dead in the water’”. Why? Situation (i) is self-explanatory: poor underwriting which impacts fund performance, and is buttressed by the fact that the fund manager isn’t astute enough to diversify the portfolio. Situation (ii) communicates the exact same thing, but in a different way. It tells an investor that the fund manager was ultimately successful, but in a way that was risky (in other words, the manager ‘got lucky’) and not likely repeatable (because fund performance was dependent on too few outcomes), which is not what attracts most investors who are looking for a measure of conservatism and persistence in their managers’ return profiles. I contend that this asset class should exhibit a return profile closer to that of growth or leveraged buy-out private equity (strong returns across the portfolio with a few losers for an overall strong return profile) and not venture capital (mostly losers with some exceptionally strong performers which contribute disproportionately to the overall portfolio return, which may be positive or negative).  Recent shifts toward portfolio financings by Burford and other private fund managers, suggest that there is a consensus as to the benefit of diversification on the volatility of portfolio returns.

On the other hand, situation (iii) is an ideal one, where the manager was prudent and the results illustrate underwriting and portfolio construction acumen, with portfolio returns not being disproportionately impacted by a few cases. Situation (iv) is interesting because it is a scenario where a manager can potentially ‘live to fight another day,’ since he or she was prudent with capital allocation, but perhaps something went awry with underwriting, or the portfolio was negatively impacted by a Systematic risk which was beyond the manager’s control. Every fund manager should ask themselves, “why take the risk” in creating a non-diversified portfolio, because it is a lose-lose scenario?  Diversification will always provide the optionality of raising a subsequent fund, even if returns are sub-par.

As we live in a dynamic world with a myriad of financial innovations being developed daily, managers should remain aware of new approaches to reducing risk in their portfolio (i.e. insurance, co-investing, risk-sharing with law firms), which may allow them to invest a smaller amount without taking on undue case concentration risk.  Of course, any instrument that reduces risk incurs a cost, and so one will need to assess the overall risk-reward equation to determine whether it is appropriate for both the manager and the investor.

Diversification is in the eye of the Investor

Managers should also keep in mind that each investor is different.  A manager may have one investor that has decided to maintain a single exposure to litigation finance through the manager, in which case the investor is likely counting on that manager to ensure application of portfolio theory.  On the other hand, an investor may be looking for specific exposures to complement his or her numerous allocations within the litigation finance sector, and so the investor is expected to apply portfolio theory to the various allocations within their portfolio and are less reliant on the fund manager for doing so in their specific fund.

What is critical for managers is that they deploy capital in a responsible manner and not acquiesce to the demands of a given investor with respect to their perspective on portfolio construction and portfolio theory. We are all here to create sustainable long-term businesses, and a given investor may have different objectives that could derail the manager’s own goals.

Slingshot Insights

Investing in a nascent asset class like litigation finance is mainly about investing in people.  Most managers simply don’t have the track record of a fully realized portfolio on which investors can base their investment decision.  Accordingly, much time and attention is spent on understanding how managers think about building their business and in particular their first portfolio.  In addition to the underwriting process, one of the most important considerations for investors to understand is how managers think about portfolio construction and diversification. Portfolio theory plays an integral role in terms of how managers should be thinking about constructing their portfolios from the perspective of the number of cases in the portfolio, but managers should also ensure their own personal bias is not entering into the portfolio and that they have thought about all of the systematic risks that can affect like cases. My general rule of thumb is that most first time managers should be targeting a portfolio of at least 20 equal sized commitments, appreciating that it is almost impossible to achieve equal sized deployments due to deployment risk. It is also not in the manager’s best long-term interest to take a short-cut on diversification for expediency sake (i.e. to raise the next larger fund) and to do so may be interpreted as poor judgment from an investor’s perspective!

As always, I welcome your comments and counter-points to those raised in this article.

Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc. and an investor in the consumer and commercial litigation finance industry.

Commercial

View All
Commercial People Moves

Therium Cuts UK Jobs as Part of Strategic Reorganisation

By Harry Moran |

Recent years have been described as a time of substantial growth and expansion in the global litigation funding market, yet new reporting suggests that one of the industry’s most well-known funders is downsizing its workforce.

An article in The Law Society Gazette provides a brief insight into ongoing changes being made at litigation funder Therium, reporting that the company is undertaking a number of layoffs as part of plans to restructure the business. The article states that these job cuts have been made to Therium’s UK workforce, with the business claiming the cuts are motivated by strategic reorganisation rather than financial pressures. 

There are no details currently available as to which employees have been let go, with Therium having removed the ‘Our People’ section of its website. The Gazette also discovered the incorporation of a new company called Therium Capital Advisors LLP on 15 April 2025, through a review of Companies House records. The new entity’s records list Therium’s chief investment officer, Neil Purslow, and investment manager, Harry Stockdale, as its two designated members. 

Companies House records also show that Therium filed a ‘termination of appointment of secretary’ for Martin Middleton on 19 March 2025. Mr Middleton’s LinkedIn profile currently lists his position as Therium’s chief financial officer, having first joined the funder as a financial controller over 15 years ago.

At the time of reporting, Therium has not responded to LFJ’s request for comment.

Commercial Special Features

Litigation Funding in GCC Arbitration

By Obaid Mes’har |

The following piece was contributed by Obaid Saeed Bin Mes’har, Managing Director of WinJustice.

Introduction

A Practical Overview

Third-party litigation funding (TPF)—where an external financier covers a claimant’s legal fees in exchange for a share of any resulting award—has gained significant traction in arbitration proceedings across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Historically, TPF was not widely used in the Middle East, but recent years have seen a notable increase in its adoption, particularly in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The economic pressures introduced by the COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with the high costs of complex arbitrations, have prompted many parties to view TPF as an effective risk-management strategy. Meanwhile, the entry of global funders and evolving regulatory frameworks highlight TPF’s emergence as a key feature of the GCC arbitration landscape.

Growing Adoption

Although the initial uptake was gradual, TPF is now frequently employed in high-value disputes across the GCC. Observers in the UAE have noted a discernible rise in funded cases following recent legal developments in various jurisdictions. Major international funders have established a presence in the region, reflecting the growing acceptance and practical utility of TPF. Similar growth patterns are evident in other GCC countries, where businesses have become increasingly aware of the advantages offered by third-party financing.

By providing claimants with the financial resources to pursue meritorious claims, third-party funding is reshaping the dispute-resolution landscape. As regulatory frameworks evolve and more funders enter the market, it is anticipated that TPF will continue to gain prominence, offering both claimants and legal professionals an alternative means of managing arbitration costs and mitigating financial risk.

Types of Cases

Funders are chiefly drawn to large commercial and international arbitration claims with significant damages at stake. The construction sector has been a key source of demand in the Middle East, where delayed payments and cost overruns lead to disputes; contractors facing cash-flow strain are increasingly turning to third-party funding to pursue their claims. High-stakes investor–state arbitrations are also candidates – for instance, in investment treaty cases where a government’s alleged expropriation deprives an investor of its main asset, funding can enable the claim to move forward . In practice, arbitration in GCC hubs like Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and others is seeing more funded claimants, leveling the field between smaller companies and deep-pocketed opponents.

Practical Utilization

Law firms in the region are adapting by partnering with funders or facilitating introductions for their clients. Many firms report that funding is now considered for cases that clients might otherwise abandon due to cost. While precise data on usage is scarce (as most arbitrations are confidential), anecdotal evidence and market activity indicate that third-party funding, once rare, is becoming a common feature of significant arbitration proceedings in the GCC. This trend is expected to continue as awareness grows and funding proves its value in enabling access to justice.

Regulatory Landscape and Restrictions on Third-Party Funding

UAE – Onshore vs. Offshore

The United Arab Emirates illustrates the region’s mixed regulatory landscape. Onshore (civil law) UAE has no specific legislation prohibiting or governing litigation funding agreements . Such agreements are generally permissible, but they must not conflict with Sharia principles – for example, funding arrangements should avoid elements of excessive uncertainty (gharar) or speculation . Parties entering funding deals for onshore cases are cautioned to structure them carefully in line with UAE law and good faith obligations. In contrast, the UAE’s common-law jurisdictions – the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) and Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM) – explicitly allow third-party funding and have established clear frameworks.

The DIFC Courts issued Practice Direction No. 2 of 2017, requiring any funded party to give notice of the funding and disclose the funder’s identity to all other parties . The DIFC rules also clarify that while the funding agreement itself need not be disclosed, the court may consider the existence of funding when deciding on security for costs applications and retains power to order costs against a funder in appropriate cases. Similarly, the ADGM’s regulations (Article 225 of its 2015 Regulations) and Litigation Funding Rules 2019 set out requirements for valid funding agreements – they must be in writing, the funded party must notify other parties and the court of the funding, and the court can factor in the funding arrangement when issuing cost orders . The ADGM rules also impose criteria on funders (e.g. capital adequacy) and safeguard the funded party’s control over the case .

In sum, the UAE’s offshore jurisdictions provide a modern, regulated environment for third-party funding, whereas onshore UAE allows it in principle but without detailed regulation.

Other GCC Countries

Elsewhere in the GCC, explicit legislation on litigation funding in arbitration remains limited, but recent developments signal growing acceptance. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait do not yet have dedicated statutes or regulations on third-party funding . However, leading arbitral institutions in these countries have proactively addressed funding in their rules. Notably, the Saudi Center for Commercial Arbitration (SCCA) updated its Arbitration Rules in 2023 to acknowledge third-party funding: Article 17(6) now mandates that any party with external funding disclose the existence of that funding and the funder’s identity to the SCCA, the tribunal, and other parties . This ensures transparency and allows arbitrators to check for conflicts. 

Likewise, the Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution (BCDR) included provisions in its 2022 Arbitration Rules requiring a party to notify the institution of any funding arrangement and the funder’s name,, which the BCDR will communicate to the tribunal and opponents . The BCDR Rules further oblige consideration of whether any relationship between the arbitrators and the funder could compromise the tribunal’s independence. These rule changes in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain align with international best practices and indicate regional momentum toward formal recognition of third-party funding in arbitration.

Disclosure and Transparency

A common thread in the GCC regulatory approach is disclosure. Whether under institutional rules (as in DIAC, SCCA, BCDR) or court practice directions (DIFC, ADGM), funded parties are generally required to disclose that they are funded and often to reveal the funder’s identity . For instance, the new DIAC Arbitration Rules 2022 expressly recognize third-party funding – Article 22 obliges any party who enters a funding arrangement to promptly inform all other parties and the tribunal, including identifying the funder. DIAC’s rules even prohibit entering a funding deal after the tribunal is constituted if it would create a conflict of interest with an arbitrator. This emphasis on transparency aims to prevent ethical issues and later challenges to awards. It also reflects the influence of global standards (e.g. 2021 ICC Rules and 2022 ICSID Rules) which likewise introduced funding disclosure requirements.

Overall, while no GCC jurisdiction outright bans third-party funding, the patchwork of court practices and arbitration rules means parties must be mindful of the specific disclosure and procedural requirements in the seat of arbitration or administering institution. In jurisdictions rooted in Islamic law (like Saudi Arabia), there is an added layer of ensuring the funding arrangement is structured in a Sharia-compliant way (avoiding interest-based returns and excessive uncertainty. We may see further regulatory development – indeed, regional policymakers are aware of litigation funding’s growth and are considering more formal regulation to provide clarity and confidence for all participants .

The GCC region has seen several important developments and trends related to third-party funding in arbitration:

  • Institutional Rule Reforms: As detailed earlier, a number of arbitral institutions in the GCC have updated their rules to address third-party funding, marking a significant trend. The Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) 2022 Rules, the Saudi SCCA 2023 Rules, and the Bahrain BCDR 2022 Rules all include new provisions on funding disclosures. This wave of reforms in 2022–2023 reflects a recognition that funded cases are happening and need basic ground rules. By explicitly referencing TPF, these institutions legitimize the practice and provide guidance to arbitrators and parties on handling it (primarily through mandatory disclosure and conflict checks). The adoption of such rules brings GCC institutions in line with leading international forums (like ICC, HKIAC, ICSID, etc. that have also moved to regulate TPF).
  • DIFC Court Precedents: The DIFC was one of the first in the region to grapple with litigation funding. A few high-profile cases in the DIFC Courts in the mid-2010s involved funded claimants, which prompted the DIFC Courts to issue Practice Direction 2/2017 as a framework. This made the DIFC one of the pioneers in the Middle East to formally accommodate TPF. Since then, the DIFC Courts have continued to handle cases with funding, and their decisions (for example, regarding cost orders against funders) are building a body of regional precedent on the issue. While most of these cases are not public, practitioners note that several DIFC proceedings have featured litigation funding, establishing practical know-how in dealing with funded parties. The DIFC experience has likely influenced other GCC forums to be more accepting of TPF.
  • Funders’ Increased Presence: Another trend is the growing confidence of international funders in the Middle East market. Over the last couple of years, top global litigation financiers have either opened offices in the GCC or actively started seeking cases from the region. Dubai has emerged as a regional hub – beyond Burford, other major funders like Omni Bridgeway (a global funder with roots in Australia) and IMF Bentham (now Omni) have been marketing in the GCC, and local players or boutique funders are also entering the fray . This increased competition among funders is good news for claimants, as it can lead to more competitive pricing and terms for funding. It also indicates that funders perceive the GCC as a growth market with plenty of high-value disputes and a legal environment increasingly open to their business.
  • Types of Arbitrations Being Funded : In terms of case trends, funded arbitrations in the GCC have often involved big-ticket commercial disputes – for example, multi-million dollar construction, energy, and infrastructure cases. These are sectors where disputes are frequent and claims sizable, but claimants (contractors, subcontractors, minority JV partners, etc.) may have limited cash after a project soured. Third-party funding has started to play a role in enabling such parties to bring claims. There have also been instances of investor-state arbitrations involving GCC states or investors that utilized funding (though specific details are usually confidential). The Norton Rose Fulbright report notes that funding is especially helpful in investor-treaty cases where an investor’s primary asset was taken by the state, leaving them dependent on external financing to pursue legal remedies.

As GCC countries continue to attract foreign investment and enter into international treaties, one can expect more ICSID or UNCITRAL arbitrations connected to the region – and many of those claimants may turn to funders, as is now common in investment arbitration globally.

  • Emerging Sharia-Compliant Funding Solutions: A unique trend on the horizon is the development of funding models that align with Islamic finance principles. Given the importance of Sharia law in several GCC jurisdictions, some industry experts predict the rise of Sharia-compliant litigation funding products. These might structure the funder’s return as a success fee in the form of profit-sharing or an award-based service fee rather than “interest” on a loan, and ensure that the arrangement avoids undue uncertainty. While still nascent, such innovations could open the door for greater use of funding in markets like Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, by removing religious/legal hesitations. They would be a notable evolution, marrying the concept of TPF with Islamic finance principles – a blend particularly suitable for the Gulf.

Overall, the trajectory in the GCC arbitration market is clear: third-party funding is becoming mainstream. There have not been many publicly reported court challenges or controversies around TPF in the region – which suggests that, so far, its integration has been relatively smooth. On the contrary, the changes in arbitration rules and the influx of funders point to a growing normalization. Businesses and law firms operating in the GCC should take note of these trends, as they indicate that funding is an available option that can significantly impact how disputes are fought and financed.

Conclusion

Litigation funding in the GCC’s arbitration arena has evolved from a novelty to a practical option that businesses and law firms ignore at their peril. With major arbitration centers in the region embracing third-party funding and more funders entering the Middle Eastern market, this trend is likely to continue its upward trajectory. 

For businesses, it offers a chance to enforce rights and recover sums that might otherwise be forgone due to cost constraints. For law firms, it presents opportunities to serve clients in new ways and share in the upside of successful claims. Yet, as with any powerful tool, it must be used wisely: parties should stay mindful of the legal landscape, comply with disclosure rules, and carefully manage relationships to avoid ethical snags. 

By leveraging litigation funding strategically – balancing financial savvy with sound legal practice – stakeholders in the GCC can optimize their dispute outcomes while effectively managing risk and expenditure. In a region witnessing rapid development of its dispute resolution mechanisms, third-party funding stands out as an innovation that, when properly harnessed, aligns commercial realities with the pursuit of justice.

At WinJustice.com, we take pride in being the UAE’s pioneering litigation funding firm. We are dedicated to providing innovative funding solutions that enable our clients to overcome financial hurdles and pursue justice without compromise. By leveraging third-party litigation funding strategically—balancing financial acumen with sound legal practices—stakeholders in the GCC can optimize their dispute outcomes while effectively managing risk and expenditure.

If you are looking to maximize your dispute resolution strategy through expert litigation funding, contact WinJustice.com today. We’re here to help you navigate the evolving landscape and secure the justice you deserve.

Case Developments Commercial

European Commission Fines Apple €500m and Meta €200m for DMA Breaches

By Harry Moran |

Antitrust and competition claims brought against large multinational corporations often represent lucrative opportunities for litigation funders, and the announcement of a new series of fines being imposed on two of the world’s largest technology companies could set the stage for more of these claims being brought in Europe.

Reporting by Reuters covers a major antitrust development as the European Commission has handed down multimillion dollar fines to both Apple and Meta over their breaches of the Digital Markets Act (DMA). These fines follow non-compliance investigations that began in March 2024, with Apple receiving a €500 million fine for breaching its anti-steering obligation through the App Store, and Meta being fined €200 million for breaching the DMA obligation to allow consumers the option to choose a service that uses less of their personal data.

Teresa Ribera, Executive Vice-President for Clean, Just and Competitive Transition at the European Commission, said that the fines “send a strong and clear message”, and that the enforcement action should act as a reminder that “all companies operating in the EU must follow our laws and respect European values.”

In a post on LinkedIn, Gabriela Merino, case manager at LitFin, explained that these fines “mark the first non-compliance decisions issued by the Commission under the new regulatory framework.” As LFJ covered earlier this month, LitFin is funding a €900 million claim against Google in the Netherlands over its anti-competitive practices that were first brought to light by another European Commission investigation. Merino said that “these latest rulings are a welcome boost” to LitFin’s own case.

Statements from both Apple and Meta decried the fines, with the former arguing that the decision was “yet another example of the European Commission unfairly targeting Apple”. 

The full press release from the European Commission detailing the investigations and associated fines can be read here.