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Price Control to Ensure the Affordability of Litigation Finance?

The following post was contributed by Guido Demarco, Director & Head of Legal Assets of Stonward.

In March 2021, the European Parliamentary Research Service published a study on Responsible Private Funding of Litigation. This study was later supplemented by a draft report prepared by the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs in June 2021. Both documents, the study, and the draft report, contain certain recommendations to regulate litigation funding and criticize the economic costs that these funds impose on their clients by referring to them as “excessive”, “unfair” and “abusive”.

Specifically, on the issue of fees, the study suggests setting a 30% cap on funders’ rates of return, while the draft report recommends that LF agreements should be invalid if they foresee a benefit for the claimant equal to or less than 60% (unless exceptional circumstances apply). In other words, a cap of 40%.

While this might be viewed as a logical measure to make litigation finance more affordable, what needs to be considered is that the funders’ expected return is simply a consequence of the risks and costs that arise from litigation, not the other way round.

The costs

Let us take the case of a foreign national, ‘Citizen Kane,’ who makes an investment in the energy sector in Ruritania[1]. Let us imagine that a bilateral treaty between Mr. Kane’s country of nationality and Ruritania protects Citizen Kane’s investment. The Republic of Ruritania suddenly indirectly expropriates Mr. Kane’s business without due compensation. To claim damages, Mr. Kane will start an arbitration through the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The total cost of the dispute will depend on the complexity and the duration of the case, including the number of pleadings, experts, hearings, and the time incurred by the attorneys. Only the first advance to ICSID can be circa $150,000.

If Citizen Kane estimates damages of $30 million, the costs of such a dispute could easily amount to $3 million or more. In investor-state arbitration, the mean costs for investors are about $6.4m and the median figure is $3.8m. The mean tribunal costs in ICSID arbitrations is $958,000 and the median $745,000.[2]

Therefore, after years suffering arbitrary measures and pursuing fruitless disputes in local courts, Citizen Kane will now have to invest an additional circa $3 million to file a claim for damages with a completely uncertain outcome. Even if Citizen Kane wins, Ruritania may not be willing to follow the award voluntarily, and he will have to incur more expenses to enforce the judgment.

The risks

Aware of the prohibitive costs of litigation, Ruritania may play the long game, unnecessarily prolonging the dispute to financially drain the claimant while expecting a future administration will be in office to foot the bill down the road. This might be challenging even for a financially healthy company, as litigation costs are often considered an expense on the profit and loss statement and therefore CFOs are increasingly looking for alternatives to preserve working capital for the company’s main activity.

How long will the proceeding take? What will be the final amount of the damages awarded? Will the other party voluntarily follow the award? What if, in the end, I lose? These questions have no exact answers because the answers depend on third parties, including how a judge or tribunal interprets the law and the facts of case, as well as the performance of experts and lawyers in pursuing the claim.

The litigation budget and estimated damages will play a key role in the investment decision, together with the merits of the case, liquidity, and reputation of the respondent, as well as the reputation of the law firm chosen by the client. Analyzing the risk is not easy, considering the latest figures that show that investors prevail in only 47% of cases, and that the median amount of damages claimed vis a vis damages awarded is 36%.

However, the main factor in determining risk is the structure of non-recourse litigation finance loans. This is not just a typical loan, but a mechanism to transfer risk. It is normal that the greater the risk assumed by the funder, the higher the return expected.

Conclusion

Limiting a funder’s expected return will not reduce financing costs for clients, and therefore will fail to make litigation more affordable, which is the aim of the EU’s regulation proposal. Funders will not grant funding if they perceive the risk/reward of a case is not worth the given circumstances. However, a cap on the return could have a direct effect on the number of cases taken up by funders – which is already low – since there will be cases in which the combination of factors described above will not make the investment worthwhile, considering the risk tradeoff. Unfortunately, there is a cost floor shared by both large and small cases, and complex claims like Citizen Kane’s expropriation case would be made all the more challenging to finance. A cap could therefore limit Mr. Kane’s litigation options.

Should funders charge any profiteering fee? No, but a cap to the fees may not be the solution. In the end, the direct beneficiaries of the proposed regulation could end up being certain states such as Ruritania, which act as defendants in arbitration or judicial cases, rather than the individuals that the EU is attempting to protect. Ironically, states finance their legal firepower with taxes, the same taxes that Citizen Kane has paid for years to the Republic of Ruritania.

[1]  Ruritania is a fictional country used as a setting for novels by Anthony Hope, such as The Prisoner of Zenda (1894). Jurists specialising in international law and private international law use Ruritania when describing a hypothetical case illustrating some legal point.

[2] 2021 Empirical Study: Costs, Damages and Duration in Investor-State Arbitration, British Institute of International and Comparative Law and Allen & Overy, available at: Costs, damages and duration in investor-state arbitration – Allen & Overy.

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Sony and Apple Challenge Enforceability of Litigation Funding Models

By John Freund |

A pivotal UK court case could reshape the future of litigation finance agreements, as Sony and Apple reignite legal challenges to widely used third-party funding models in large-scale commercial disputes.

An article in Law360 reports that the two tech giants are questioning the validity of litigation funding arrangements tied to multibillion-pound cartel claims brought against them. Their core argument: that certain litigation funding agreements may run afoul of UK laws governing damages-based agreements (DBAs), which restrict the share of damages a representative may take as remuneration. A previous Court of Appeal decision in PACCAR Inc. v. Competition Appeal Tribunal held that some funding models might qualify as DBAs, rendering them unenforceable if they fail to comply with statutory rules.

This resurrected dispute centers on claims brought by class representatives against Apple and Sony over alleged anti-competitive behavior. The companies argue that if the funding arrangements breach DBA regulations, the entire claims may be invalidated. For the litigation funding industry, the outcome could severely curtail access to justice mechanisms in the UK—especially for collective actions in competition law, where third-party financing is often essential.

The UK’s Competition Appeal Tribunal previously stayed the proceedings pending clarity on the legal standing of such funding arrangements. With the dispute now heading back to court, all eyes will be on whether the judiciary draws a clear line around the enforceability of funder agreements under current law.

The decision could force funders to rework deal structures or risk losing enforceability altogether. As UK courts revisit the DBA implications for litigation finance, the sector faces heightened uncertainty over regulatory compliance, enforceability, and long-term viability in complex group litigation. Will this lead to a redefinition of permissible funding models—or to a call for legislative reform to protect access to collective redress?

Case Developments Commercial

Funder’s Interference in Texas Fee Dispute Rejected by Appeals Court

By Harry Moran |

A Texas appeals court has ruled that a litigation funder cannot block attorneys from pursuing a fee dispute following a remand order, reinforcing the limited standing of funders in fee-shifting battles. In a 2-1 decision, the First Court of Appeals found that the funder’s interest in the outcome, while financial, did not confer the legal authority necessary to participate in the dispute or enforce a side agreement aimed at halting the proceedings.

An article in Law360 details the underlying case, which stems from a contentious attorney fee battle following a remand to state court. The litigation funder, asserting contractual rights tied to a funding agreement, attempted to intervene and stop the fee litigation between plaintiffs' and defense counsel. But the appellate court sided with the trial court’s decision to proceed, emphasizing that only parties directly involved in the underlying legal work—and not third-party financiers—are entitled to challenge or control post-remand fee determinations. The majority opinion concluded that the funder’s contract could not supersede procedural law governing who may participate in such disputes.

In dissent, one justice argued that the funder’s financial interest merited consideration, suggesting that a more expansive view of standing could be warranted. But the majority held firm, stating that expanding standing would invite unwanted complexity and undermine judicial efficiency.

This decision sends a strong signal to funders operating in Texas: fee rights must be contractually precise and procedurally valid. As more funders build fee recovery provisions into their agreements, questions linger about how far those rights can extend—especially in jurisdictions hesitant to allow funders a seat at the litigation table.

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Oklahoma Moves to Restrict Foreign Litigation Funding, Cap Damages

By John Freund |

In a significant policy shift, Oklahoma has enacted legislation targeting foreign influence in its judicial system through third-party litigation funding. Signed into law by Governor Kevin Stitt, the two-pronged legislation not only prohibits foreign entities from funding lawsuits in the state but also imposes a $500,000 cap on non-economic damages in civil cases—excluding exceptions such as wrongful death. The new laws take effect November 1, 2025.

An article in The Journal Record notes that proponents of the legislation, including the Oklahoma Civil Justice Council and key Republican lawmakers, argue these measures are necessary to preserve the integrity of the state's courts and protect domestic businesses from what they view as undue interference. The foreign funding restriction applies to entities from countries identified as foreign adversaries by federal standards, including China and Russia.

Critics, however, contend that the laws may undermine access to justice, especially in complex or high-cost litigation where third-party funding can serve as a vital resource. The cap on non-economic damages, in particular, has drawn concern from trial lawyers who argue it may disproportionately impact vulnerable plaintiffs without sufficient financial means.

Oklahoma’s move aligns with a broader national trend of state-level scrutiny over third-party litigation funding. Lawmakers in several states have introduced or passed legislation to increase transparency, impose registration requirements, or limit funding sources.

For the legal funding industry, the Oklahoma law raises pressing questions about how funders will adapt to an increasingly fragmented regulatory landscape. It also underscores the growing political sensitivity around foreign capital in civil litigation—a trend that could prompt further regulatory action across other jurisdictions.