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Price Control to Ensure the Affordability of Litigation Finance?

Price Control to Ensure the Affordability of Litigation Finance?

The following post was contributed by Guido Demarco, Director & Head of Legal Assets of Stonward. In March 2021, the European Parliamentary Research Service published a study on Responsible Private Funding of Litigation. This study was later supplemented by a draft report prepared by the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs in June 2021. Both documents, the study, and the draft report, contain certain recommendations to regulate litigation funding and criticize the economic costs that these funds impose on their clients by referring to them as “excessive”, “unfair” and “abusive”. Specifically, on the issue of fees, the study suggests setting a 30% cap on funders’ rates of return, while the draft report recommends that LF agreements should be invalid if they foresee a benefit for the claimant equal to or less than 60% (unless exceptional circumstances apply). In other words, a cap of 40%. While this might be viewed as a logical measure to make litigation finance more affordable, what needs to be considered is that the funders’ expected return is simply a consequence of the risks and costs that arise from litigation, not the other way round. The costs Let us take the case of a foreign national, ‘Citizen Kane,’ who makes an investment in the energy sector in Ruritania[1]. Let us imagine that a bilateral treaty between Mr. Kane’s country of nationality and Ruritania protects Citizen Kane’s investment. The Republic of Ruritania suddenly indirectly expropriates Mr. Kane’s business without due compensation. To claim damages, Mr. Kane will start an arbitration through the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The total cost of the dispute will depend on the complexity and the duration of the case, including the number of pleadings, experts, hearings, and the time incurred by the attorneys. Only the first advance to ICSID can be circa $150,000. If Citizen Kane estimates damages of $30 million, the costs of such a dispute could easily amount to $3 million or more. In investor-state arbitration, the mean costs for investors are about $6.4m and the median figure is $3.8m. The mean tribunal costs in ICSID arbitrations is $958,000 and the median $745,000.[2] Therefore, after years suffering arbitrary measures and pursuing fruitless disputes in local courts, Citizen Kane will now have to invest an additional circa $3 million to file a claim for damages with a completely uncertain outcome. Even if Citizen Kane wins, Ruritania may not be willing to follow the award voluntarily, and he will have to incur more expenses to enforce the judgment. The risks Aware of the prohibitive costs of litigation, Ruritania may play the long game, unnecessarily prolonging the dispute to financially drain the claimant while expecting a future administration will be in office to foot the bill down the road. This might be challenging even for a financially healthy company, as litigation costs are often considered an expense on the profit and loss statement and therefore CFOs are increasingly looking for alternatives to preserve working capital for the company’s main activity. How long will the proceeding take? What will be the final amount of the damages awarded? Will the other party voluntarily follow the award? What if, in the end, I lose? These questions have no exact answers because the answers depend on third parties, including how a judge or tribunal interprets the law and the facts of case, as well as the performance of experts and lawyers in pursuing the claim. The litigation budget and estimated damages will play a key role in the investment decision, together with the merits of the case, liquidity, and reputation of the respondent, as well as the reputation of the law firm chosen by the client. Analyzing the risk is not easy, considering the latest figures that show that investors prevail in only 47% of cases, and that the median amount of damages claimed vis a vis damages awarded is 36%. However, the main factor in determining risk is the structure of non-recourse litigation finance loans. This is not just a typical loan, but a mechanism to transfer risk. It is normal that the greater the risk assumed by the funder, the higher the return expected. Conclusion Limiting a funder’s expected return will not reduce financing costs for clients, and therefore will fail to make litigation more affordable, which is the aim of the EU’s regulation proposal. Funders will not grant funding if they perceive the risk/reward of a case is not worth the given circumstances. However, a cap on the return could have a direct effect on the number of cases taken up by funders – which is already low – since there will be cases in which the combination of factors described above will not make the investment worthwhile, considering the risk tradeoff. Unfortunately, there is a cost floor shared by both large and small cases, and complex claims like Citizen Kane’s expropriation case would be made all the more challenging to finance. A cap could therefore limit Mr. Kane’s litigation options. Should funders charge any profiteering fee? No, but a cap to the fees may not be the solution. In the end, the direct beneficiaries of the proposed regulation could end up being certain states such as Ruritania, which act as defendants in arbitration or judicial cases, rather than the individuals that the EU is attempting to protect. Ironically, states finance their legal firepower with taxes, the same taxes that Citizen Kane has paid for years to the Republic of Ruritania. [1]  Ruritania is a fictional country used as a setting for novels by Anthony Hope, such as The Prisoner of Zenda (1894). Jurists specialising in international law and private international law use Ruritania when describing a hypothetical case illustrating some legal point. [2] 2021 Empirical Study: Costs, Damages and Duration in Investor-State Arbitration, British Institute of International and Comparative Law and Allen & Overy, available at: Costs, damages and duration in investor-state arbitration – Allen & Overy.
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Pogust Goodhead Secures Landmark Win Against BHP in Brazil Dam Case

By John Freund |

In a major breakthrough for cross-border group litigation, Pogust Goodhead has secured a resounding victory in its long-running claim against mining giant BHP over the 2015 collapse of the Fundão tailings dam in Mariana, Brazil. The UK High Court has ruled BHP liable for the disaster, which killed 19 people and unleashed a wave of toxic sludge through the Rio Doce basin, displacing entire communities and leaving lasting environmental damage.

According to Non-Billable, the ruling confirms BHP’s liability under both Brazilian environmental law and the Brazilian Civil Code. In rejecting the company’s jurisdictional and limitation defenses, the court made clear that English law recognizes the right of over 600,000 Brazilian claimants to pursue redress in UK courts. The judgment underscores BHP’s operational and strategic control over the Samarco joint venture and found that the company was aware of critical dam defects more than a year before the collapse. The attempt to distance itself through the argument of being an indirect polluter was also dismissed.

This outcome is a critical milestone in one of the largest group actions ever brought in the UK. A trial on damages is now scheduled for October 2026, with case management proceedings set to resume in December.

The win comes amid internal turbulence at Pogust Goodhead, including recent leadership changes and reported tensions with its litigation finance backers, but the firm remains on course to press forward with what could be a multibillion-dollar compensation phase.

Incentive Payments Not Essential for Named Plaintiffs, Study Finds

By John Freund |

A new empirical study by Brian Fitzpatrick of Vanderbilt Law School challenges a widely held assumption in class action litigation: that incentive payments are necessary to recruit named plaintiffs. The research, published in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, analyzed federal class-action filings from January 2017 through May 2024, using data drawn from the legal-tech platform Lex Machina. It leveraged a natural experiment created by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s 2020 ruling that barred incentive payments in the 11th Circuit (Florida, Georgia, Alabama) while other circuits continued permitting them.

An article in Reuters states that according to the analysis, the volume of class-actions filed in the 11th Circuit did not meaningfully decline relative to other circuits after the ban on incentive payments. In other words, the absence of such payments did not appear to impair the ability of plaintiffs’ counsel to find willing named plaintiffs.

Fitzpatrick and his co-author, graduate student Colton Cronin, observed that although courts routinely approve modest incentive awards (averaging about $7,500 in non-securities class actions) to compensate the named plaintiff’s extra effort post-settlement, the data suggest that payments may not be a driving factor in recruitment.

Fitzpatrick emphasizes that this is not to say incentive payments have no role. He notes that there remains a moral argument for compensating named plaintiffs who shoulder additional burdens. These include depositions, discovery responses, trial participation, and public exposure. Yet the study’s finding is notable. Motivation for class-representation may be rooted more in altruism, reputation or justice-seeking than in straightforward financial gain.

For the legal-funding industry and class-action litigators, the findings are significant. They suggest that reliance on incentive payments to secure named plaintiffs may be less critical than previously assumed, potentially lowering a transactional cost input in structuring class settlements. On the other hand, third-party funders and litigation financiers should consider how the supply of willing named plaintiffs might remain stable even in jurisdictions restricting such payments.

Merricks Calls for Ban on Secret Arbitrations in Funded Claims

By John Freund |

Walter Merricks, the class representative behind the landmark Mastercard case, has publicly criticized the use of confidential arbitration clauses in litigation funding agreements tied to collective proceedings.

According to Legal Futures, Merricks spoke at an event where he argued that such clauses can leave class representatives exposed and unsupported, particularly when disputes arise with funders. He emphasized that disagreements between funders and class representatives should be heard in open proceedings before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), not behind closed doors.

His comments come in the wake of the £200 million settlement in the Mastercard claim—significantly lower than the original £14 billion figure cited in early filings. During the settlement process, Merricks became the target of an arbitration initiated by his funder, Innsworth Capital. The arbitration named him personally, prompting Mastercard to offer an indemnity of up to £10 million to shield him from personal financial risk.

Merricks warned that the confidentiality of arbitration allows funders to exert undue pressure on class representatives, who often lack institutional backing or leverage. He called on the CAT to scrutinize and reject funding agreements that designate arbitration as the sole forum for dispute resolution. In his view, transparency and public accountability are vital in collective actions, especially when funders and claimants diverge on strategy or settlement terms.

His remarks highlight a growing debate in the legal funding industry over the proper governance of funder-representative relationships. If regulators move to curtail arbitration clauses, it could force funders to navigate public scrutiny and recalibrate their contractual protections in UK group litigation.