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Probate Funding: A Useful Option for So Many

Litigation Finance Primer

Probate Funding: A Useful Option for So Many

Litigation Finance Primer
The following is a contributed article by Steven D. Schroeder, Esq., General Counsel/Sr. Vice President at Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. since 2004.  There have been a few recent articles written on the topic of Probate Advances.[i] Probate Advances are available because a handful of companies are willing to assume a risk and provide funding in return for a partial assignment of a beneficiary’s interest in an Estate, and to a lesser extent Trust Proceedings. One critic has conflated Assignments to Loans without a fair analysis of the many differences between the two legal maxims.[ii] This 4-part series expands upon those differences and provides a legal and practical perspective as to why Probate Advances are a useful option for so many. Why is Probate Funding Needed? Probate Funding is growing in importance due to the increasing percentage of the population (i.e. baby boomers) who die annually and have their Estates and/or Trusts go through probate administration. In theory, the process of distributing a Decedent’s estate should not be complicated. But in practice, administration is rarely quick and easy. Even simple or uncontested Probate administrations take no less than eight (8) months to a year to finalize, while the vast majority of administrations of Probate or Trust Estates take much longer. Due to funding and short staffing issues, many Courts set hearings months out even on uncontested petitions. Quite often, because of questions relating to the admissibility of a Will, the location of intestate heirs, and/or questions regarding those who may be an interested party, it can take a year just to have someone appointed personal representative.[iii] Moreover, once a Personal Representative is appointed, notice is required to be given to creditors which affords creditors anywhere from four (4) months to one (1) year to file a claim, depending upon the jurisdiction. Then, there is the tedious process of locating and marshalling bank accounts and investments, cleaning up and disposing a lifetime of possessions and/or marketing the Decedent’s real property. Rarely are homes sold within a year, even under the best market conditions. Some properties are occupied by holdover tenants or relatives. Even after the property is liquidated, the process of closing an estate through an accounting, setting a hearing and obtaining Court approval, can take many additional months even if the accounting is uncontested. Because of the inherent delays of administration, some heirs, who have pressing financial needs (i.e. debts, foreclosure, rent payments, et. al.), are relieved to know that there is a product provided by Probate Funding Companies which can solve their personal financial problems while probate is ongoing.[iv] Whether the purpose of the funds is to prevent foreclosure, pay rent, pay medical bills, pay household debts or pay for continuing education, it makes simple economic sense that individuals would choose to minimize their risks by obtaining an advance now by assigning a fraction of their future and undetermined interest in an estate, rather than waiting for months or years to receive a distribution. A Case for Probate Funding Vivian Doris Tanner died in Shasta County, California on April 22, 1997. Her May 10, 1992 Will was admitted to probate by Order of the Probate Court on June 16, 1997 and her named Executor, Earl C. Tanner, Jr. was issued Letters Testamentary with full authority under the Independent Administration and Estate’s Act.  Pursuant to the Will, the named beneficiaries were Helen L. Tanner (20%), Marsha L. Tanner (20%), Katherine L. Courtemanche (20%), Erla Tanner (20%) and Earl C. Tanner (20%). In February 2009, Robert Frey, an Attorney in Reno, Nevada contacted Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. (“IFC”) on behalf of his client Helen Tanner, a resident of Incline Village, because his client was experiencing hard times due to the crash of the real estate market. His client needed a significant influx of cash ($100,000.00 or more) in order to prevent the foreclosure of her properties while administration of her mother’s estate was pending. The only remaining assets of the Estate at that time were the Decedent’s interest in Tanner Construction, Inc. which owned a 20% interest in the Dublin Land Company.  IFC was informed that there was ongoing litigation with the Dublin Land Company, including a partnership dissolution suit and a partition action set for trial in the latter portion of 2009. After completing its due diligence, IFC approved funding a $100,000.00 advance for Helen Tanner in consideration of a fixed sum Assignment in the amount of $192,000.00.[v] Shortly thereafter, two (2) other heirs (Marsha Tanner and Katherine Courtemanche) contacted IFC and applied for smaller cash advances, which were also approved.[vi] During the course of administration, the Executor (Earl Tanner, Jr.) filed at least nine (9) annual status reports requesting continuances of administration until the litigation was resolved and the Dublin land was sold.  Finally, on or about November 23, 2017, the Third and Final Account and Report of the Executor was filed and set for hearing on December 11, 2017. The Account was approved, as were IFC’s three (3) Assignments, which were paid off in full on December 27, 2017, approximately nine (9) years after Ms. Tanner’s original $100,000.00 advance was funded.[vii] The Tanner case and others like it illustrate the inherent risk in Probate Funding. It took IFC nearly a decade to collect its Assignments in the Tanner case, while in many other cases the funder never collects. With that risk of non-repayment in mind, we now turn to the legal distinctions between Assignments and Loans. Comparing Assignments with Loans: Apples Are Not Oranges As previously stated, there has been some recent criticism of the companies engaged in Probate funding.[viii] An Article entitled: “Probate Lending” started and ended with the premise that Probate Assignments are in fact disguised loans and should be regulated as such. Despite the predetermined conclusion by one author, in fact, the law treats Assignments and Loans quite differently and those distinctions are significant.[ix]
  1. What is an Assignment? 
An Assignment is a term that may comprehensively cover the transfer of legal title to any kind of property. Commercial Discount Co. v. Cowen (1941) 18 Cal. 2d 601, 614; see also In re: Kling (1919) 44 Cal. App. 267, 270, 186 P. 152. When valid consideration is given, the Assignee acquires no greater rights or title than what is assigned. In other words, the Assignee steps in the shoes of the Assignor’s rights, subject to any defenses that an obligor may have against Assignor, prior to Notice of Assignment. See Parker v. Funk (1921) 185 Cal. 347, 352, 197 P. 83.  See also Cal. Civil Code §1459; Cal. Code of Civil Procedure §369. An Assignment may be oral or written and no special form is necessary provided that the transfer is clearly intended as a present assignment of interest by the Assignor. If only a part of the Assignor’s interest is transferred, it may nevertheless be enforced as an equitable Assignment. See McDaniel v. Maxwell, (1891) 21 Or. 202, 205, 27 P. 952. It has been held that any expectancy may be assigned or renounced. SeePrudential Ins. Co. of America v. Broadhurst 157 Cal. App. 2d 375, 321 P. 2d 75. Similarly, a beneficiary may assign or otherwise transfer his or her interest in an Estate prior to distribution. See Gold et. al., Cal Civil Practice: Probate and Trust Proceedings (2005) §3:86, p. 3-78. Probate Assignments are those taken prior to the completion of probate administration for which an heir/beneficiary transfers a portion of his/her expected inheritance in the estate in consideration of a cash advance (i.e. the purchase price).
  1. What is a loan? 
A loan agreement is a contract between a borrower and a lender which governs the mutual promises made by each party. There are many types of loan agreements, including but not limited to: “home loans”, “equity loans”, “car loans”, “mortgage loan facilities agreements”, “revolvers”, “term loans” and “working capital loans” just to name a few. In contrast to Assignments, loans do not transfer legal title and instead are contracts in which the borrower pays back money at a later date, together with accrued interest to the lender. A loan creates a debtor and creditor relationship that is not terminated until the sum borrowed plus the agreed upon interest is paid in full. Milana v. Credit Discount Co. (1945) 27 Cal. 2d 335, 163 P.2d.869. In order to constitute a loan, there must be a contract whereby the lender transfers a sum of money which the borrower agrees to repay absolutely; together with such additional sums as may be agreed upon for its use.[x] The nature of a loan transaction, can be inferred from its objective characteristics. Such indicia include: presence or absence of debt instruments, collateral, interest provisions, repayment schedules or deadlines, book entries recording loan balances or interest, payments and any other attributes indicative of an enforceable obligation to repay the sums advance. Id, citing Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States 398, F.2d 694, 696 (3d Circ. 1968). Also, unlike Assignments, lenders typically insist upon several credit worthy factors prior to funding. For example, the “borrower” makes representations about his/her character including creditworthiness, cash flow and any collateral that he/she may pledge as security for a loan. These creditworthy representations are taken into consideration because the lender needs to determine under what terms, if any, they are prepared to loan money and whether the borrower has the wherewithal to pay it back, generally within a certain time frame. In cases of Probate Assignments, an Advance Company rarely considers creditworthiness of the Assignee, because it is not he/she who is responsible to satisfy the obligation. That obligation falls upon the Estate or Trust fiduciary. In addition, Probate Assignments cannot be deemed to be a loan if the return is contingent on the happening of some future event, (i.e. Final Distribution). Altman v. Altman (Ch. 1950) 8 N.J. Super.301, 72 A.2d 536., Arneill Ranch v. Petit 64 Cal. App. 3d, 277, 134 Cal. Rptr. 456, 461-463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).  True Probate Assignments, executed in consideration of an advance, have no time limit for payment, nor do they accrue interest post-funding. Furthermore, an assignee is not required to make periodic interest payments and in the vast majority of cases no payment at all. Moreover, although loans are often secured against real property, Assignments in Probate should not be secured. Estate Property is generally not owned or distributed to the heir at the time the Assignment is executed. A critical distinction between Probate Assignments and loans, is that when an Assignment is executed, there is no unconditional obligation that the Assigned amount be paid and/or when it might be paid. Once assigned, the Assignor owes no further obligation to the Assignee over those rights sold/assigned. And, the Assignee has no recourse against the Assignee/Heir should the heir’s distributive share be less that what he/she assigns. In other words, to “constitute [a] true loan [] there must have been, at the time the funds were transferred, an unconditional obligation on the part of the transferee to repay the money, and an unconditional intention on the part of the transferor to secure repayment.”  Geftman v. Comm’r 154 F3rd 61, 68 (3d Cir. 1998) quotingHaag v. Comm’r 88.T.C. 604, 615-16, 1987 WL 49288 aff’d 855 F. 2d 855 (8thCir. 1987). Many jurisdictions in addition to California, recognize that the absolute right to repayment or some form of security for the debt as the defining characteristics of loan.[xi] While the structure and elements slightly vary, the following is a side by side comparison of some of the basic distinctions of loans and Assignments in Probate Funding:
LoansAssignments
Tenor: This is the time limit for repaying the loan as well as the interest rate charge.Tenor: No time limit for payment. No interest accrues.
Obligor on the Assignment: The Borrower is contractually obligated to repay.Assignee on the Assignment: Assignee/Heir does not pay anything.  A third party (i.e. administrator pays the Assignment.
Recourse: The Borrower is unconditionally obligated.Recourse: In absence of fraud, the Assignee has no recourse should his interest be less than what is assigned or even $0.00.
Interest Payment and Capitalization: The interest rate charge for the loan and time limit for interest payment. It also stipulates conditions under which unpaid Interest will be added to the outstanding loans.Interest Payment and Capitalization: Interest does not accrue post funding and the Assignment is fixed.
Penalties: Late payments are typically subject to penalties and/or trigger default.Penalties: No payments are due.  No Default deadlines for payment imposed on Assignee/Heir.
Creditworthiness: Essential for approvalCreditworthiness: Not essential
Default: Foreclosure is an option; a borrower could bear default.Default: No penalty no matter when Assignment is paid. Assignments are not secured. Foreclosure is not an option.
Moreover, given the uncertain time frame for recovery and absence of recourse against the Assignee/Heir, it would be impossible to assign an interest rate or make a Truth in Lending (“TILA”) disclosure, 15 U.S.C. §1601 (2012). Since the purpose of the TILA is to assure meaningful disclosure, the simplicity of an Assignment eliminates any necessity of making interest rate disclosures as required by interest bearing loans. When the Assignor sells a portion of his/her interest for a fixed sum Assignment, what additional disclosures are necessary? In short, there are many significant differences between Probate Assignments and Loans. Courts and Legislatures throughout the country have recognized these distinctions and have considered them when regulating or providing necessary review over either product. Probate Assignments are Adequately Regulated in California In California, it is the exclusive jurisdiction of the Probate Court to determine entitlement for distribution, Cal. Probate Code §§11700-11705. Probate Courts may also apply equitable principles in fashioning remedies and granting relief in proceedings otherwise within its jurisdiction. Estate of Kraus(2010) 184 Cal. App 4th 103, 114, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 760, 768. Thus, even without a specific statute addressing assignments, Probate Courts in California, as well as other jurisdictions, have conducted oversight over the propriety of Assignments in Probate.  See In Re: Michels’s Estate 63 P. 2d 333, 334 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936). For decades, the California Legislature has also regulated Assignments or Transfers by a beneficiary of an estate, see Cal. Probate Code §11604 (formerly Cal. Probate Code §1021.1). The validity of those statutes was well established. Estate of Boyd (1979) 98 Cal. App. 3d 125, 159 Cal. Rptr. 298, and the Courts have recognized the Probate Judge is empowered to give much stricter scrutiny to the fairness of consideration than would be the case under ordinary contract principals. Estate of Freeman (1965) 238 Cal. App., 2d 486, 488-89; 48 Cal. Rptr. 1. The initial purpose of Probate Code Section 1021.1(followed by 11604), was to provide for judicial supervision of proportional assignments given by beneficiaries to so called “heir hunters” (Estate of Wright (2001) 90 Cal. App. 4th 228; Estate of Lund (1944) 65 Cal. App. 2d 151; 110 Cal Rptr. 183.  However, courts have since interpreted that these sections are not limited to that class and can also be applied to Assignees and Transferees generally. Estate of Peterson (1968) 259 Cal. App. 2d. 492, 506; 66 Cal Rptr. 629. Despite the broad interpretation, California adopted additional legislation specifically directed to Probate Advance Companies. In 2006, the California Legislature enacted Probate Code Section 11604.5,[xii] to regulate companies (Probate Advance Companies) who are in the business of making cash advances in consideration of a partial Assignment of the heir’s interest. With the enactment of Section 11605.4, the California Legislature also made it abundantly clear that the transactions under this section are not those made in conformity with the California Finance Lenders Law. Cal. Probate Code Section 11604.5 (a) This section applies when distribution from a decedent’s estate is made to a transferee for value who acquires any interest of a beneficiary in exchange for cash or other consideration. (b) For purposes of this section, a transferee for value is a person who satisfies both of the following criteria: (1) He or she purchases the interest from a beneficiary for consideration pursuant to a written agreement. (2) He or she, directly or indirectly, regularly engages in the purchase of beneficial interests in estates for consideration. (c) This section does not apply to any of the following: (1) A transferee who is a beneficiary of the estate or a person who has a claim to distribution from the estate under another instrument or by intestate succession. (2) A transferee who is either the registered domestic partner of the beneficiary, or is related by blood, marriage, or adoption to the beneficiary or the decedent. (3) A transaction made in conformity with the California Finance Lenders Law (Division 9 (commencing with Section 22000) of the Financial Code) and subject to regulation by the Department of Business Oversight. (4) A transferee who is engaged in the business of locating missing or unknown heirs and who acquires an interest from a beneficiary solely in exchange for providing information or services associated with locating the heir or beneficiary(emphasis added). Although it is not specifically required under Probate Code Section 11604, the Legislature also imposed an affirmative obligation on Probate Assignees to promptly file and serve their Assignments, to ensure full disclosure to the representatives, the Courts and/or other interested parties.[xiii] Also, the legislature made it clear that unlike loans, Probate Assignments are non-recourse, meaning that the beneficiary faces no further obligation to the Assignee, absent fraud. As stated in 11604.5: (f)“…(4) A provision permitting the transferee for value to have recourse against the beneficiary if the distribution from the estate in satisfaction of the beneficial interest is less than the beneficial interest assigned to the transferee for value, other than recourse for any expense or damage arising out of the material breach of the agreement or fraud by the beneficiary…” …(*emphasis added). Moreover, in enacting PC 11604.5, the legislature specifically gave the Probate Court wide latitude in fashioning relief, when reviewing probate Assignments. “… (g) The court on its own motion, or on the motion of the personal representative or other interested person, may inquire into the circumstances surrounding the execution of, and the consideration for, the written agreement to determine that the requirements of this section have been satisfied. (h) The court may refuse to order distribution under the written agreement, or may order distribution on any terms that the court considers equitable, if the court finds that the transferee for value did not substantially comply with the requirements of this section, or if the court finds that any of the following conditions existed at the time of transfer: (1) The fees, charges, or consideration paid or agreed to be paid by the beneficiary were grossly unreasonable. (2) The transfer of the beneficial interest was obtained by duress, fraud, or undue influence. (i) In addition to any remedy specified in this section, for any willful violation of the requirements of this section found to be committed in bad faith, the court may require the transferee for value to pay to the beneficiary up to twice the value paid for the assignment. An Assignment under 11604.5 is Best Reviewed by the Local Probate Court  At present, it does not appear that there has been a reported case interpreting an Assignment under Probate Section 11604.5, including whether the consideration paid was grossly unreasonable. However, there have been a long list of cases interpreting precisely that under Probate Code Section 11604 and Probate Code Section 1021.1) See Estate of Boyd, supra, 159 Cal. Rptr. 301-302; Molino v. Boldt (2008) 165 Cal. App. 4th 913, 81 Cal Rptr 3d. 512. At the same time, it should be noted that there are distinct differences between Assignments given to Heir-Finders and those to Probate Advance Companies. One critical distinction is Probate Advance Companies, such as IFC, provide the Assignor with cash in consideration of a partial Assignment. On the other hand, Heir-Finders, take back a percentage of the Heir’s interest (typically 15% to 40%). Thus, the amount of fees incurred by the Assignee could vary widely depending on the amount the heir recovers. In most instances, the Assignment far exceeds the consideration given to a Probate Advance Company. Moreover, Heir-Finders often receive assignments from multiple heirs in one estate administration even though much of the work would be duplicated. On the other hand, Probate Funding Companies outlay cash consideration for every Assignment they receive. Thus, Probate Funding Companies take on an increased financial risk with every transaction. Also, as in any industry, there are also significant distinctions among the practices of individual Probate Funding Companies including the disclosures they make to the Assignor/Heir. For example, IFC’s contracts, are limited to less than three (3) pages with no hidden fees or other costs tacked on the Assignment post-funding.[xiv]  The Assignee simply agrees to assign a fixed portion of his/her inheritance for a fixed sum of money.  In other words, a simple $X for $Y purchase.  Thus, it would be a fatal mistake to make a broad-based analysis based on the assumption that one size fits all when it comes to Probate Funding Companies. [xv] Moreover, under Probate Code Section 11604.5, the Legislature has placed an affirmative burden on the Transferee (Probate Funding Companies) to file and serve their Assignments shortly after their execution. Hence, the terms are open reviewable by the Courts, Personal Representatives, Attorneys, other interested parties and/or to the public in general. Therefore, there is more than adequate opportunity for objections to be filed or for the Court to question the consideration given for an Assignment, sua sponte. In short, the Legislature left the determination of what amount of fees, charges and other consideration would be deemed “grossly unreasonable” up to the particular Court where administration is ongoing, and to do so on a case by case basis if deemed necessary.   In fact, it is in the best interest for all concerned for the local Court to conduct inquiry if legitimate objections are raised, or on the Court’s own motion. In fact, on many occasions, IFC has responded to questions raised by various courts with regard to the Assignments it has filed and served.[xvi] What are the Risks in Probate Funding?  Similar to California Probate Code 11604, (formerly Cal. Probate Code 1021.1), the Legislature, in enacting Probate Code 11604.5, has specifically indicated that Assignments relative to Probate Advances will not be set aside unless it is clear that the consideration paid is “grossly unreasonable”, at the time the transaction was executed. In fact, the Probate Court can presume the validity of an Assignment, in the absence of any objection raised or evidence submitted to the contrary. See Lynch v. Cox. (1978) 83 Cal. App. 3rd 296, 147 Cal. Rptr. 861. However, nothing in the Probate Code Sections 11604 or 11604.5 indicates a legislative intent to modify the law concerning the evaluation date to be utilized in appraising the fairness of a contract. In interpreting statutes, courts are required to do so in a manner which will produce a reasonable and not an absurd result. See Freedland v. Greco (1955) 45 Cal. 2d 462, 289 P.2d 463. Thus, in the absence of any evidence that the consideration received by the Assignor was grossly unreasonable, at the time received, the Assignee should be presumed to have had the benefit of all the protection the law provides. See Boyd v. Baker (1979) 98 Cal. App. 3rd 125, 159 Cal. Rptr. 298, 304. Moreover, given that the Probate Funding Company has no assurance of recovery at the time the Assignment is executed, nor any recourse against the Assignor/Heir, it is imperative that the Court consider the many risks a Probate Advance Company assumes during administration.    The following are just a few examples of those risks: *Mismanagement or conversion of Estate funds by the Personal Representative; *Unanticipated claims, such as Medical, Medicaid, Uninsured Medical Hospital or Nursing Bills; *Litigation, including but not limited to Will Contests, Property Disputes, Reimbursement Claims; *Inaction or Delays by the Personal Representative and/or Probate Attorney; *Previously unknown will discovered, disinheriting the Assignor; *Spousal/Domestic Partner Support Claims; *Tax Liability/Litigation; *Partnership Dissolution; *Foreclosure of Estate property; *Child Support Liens; *Unusually high extraordinary personal representative and/or Attorney Fee Claims; *Devaluation of Real Estate Market (i.e. 2008); *Bankruptcy by an heir; *Litigation against the heir. Alienation:  An Heir’s Right. Clearly, the Probate court has the jurisdiction to review an Assignment under Probate Code §11604.5 and consider whether the consideration paid was “grossly unreasonable” at the time it was executed. See Estate of Wright (2001) 90 Cal. App.4th 228, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572.  Yet, it must be remembered that an heir’s right to alienate his/her interest is an important one and should not be infringed upon in a random or desultory manner. See Gold, et. Cal Civil Practice: Probate and Trust Proceedings (2005) §3:86, p. 3-78. Conditions restraining alienation, when repugnant to the interest created are void. SeeCalifornia Civil Code §711. In this vein, Courts should also consider the fact that the lion’s share of heirs who have obtained probate advances have done so out of their own free will, without solicitation and/or direct marketing.[xvii] Many heirs who research probate advances find that it is a preferred option to loans or other sources of funding, which take substantial time to qualify, require credit checks and extensive documentation and create personal obligations. Therefore, as long as terms of the Assignment are simple, straightforward and unambiguous – and it appears on its face that the Heir was given full disclosure and consented to the transaction – Courts should be hesitant to interfere with the Heirs’ right of alienations. Conclusion It is intellectually dishonest to ignore the obvious legal distinctions between Probate Assignments and Loans. Probate Funding Companies like IFC provide a valuable option for many heirs who would not be able to qualify for a traditional loan and/or do not wish to personally obligate themselves. Probate Funding Companies assume a myriad of risks while administration is pending with no guaranty of absolute repayment. In California, the Legislature has enacted Probate Code Section 11604.5 which governs the transfer of a beneficial interest in the form of an Assignment, and clearly distinguishes these transactions from loans. Further, that section affords the Probate Court all the authority it needs to review Assignments and determine whether, at the time the Assignment was given, the consideration paid was grossly unreasonable. In reviewing its terms, Courts must always consider an Heir’s inherent right of alienability. If fair disclosure was given by the Probate Advance Company, and it is found that the heir understood and consented to the Assignment, the Court should be very cautious in modifying the terms of an Assignment, ex post facto. In part 1 of this series, we cited just one case of many which demonstrates why Probate Funding is a useful option for so many heirs, and a far better option than a recourse loan.  In that case, Ms. Tanner would have likely lost her house to foreclosure if it was not for the availability of the Probate Advance provided by IFC. In hindsight, Helen Tanner made a very good deal for herself – even if she had the ability to qualify for a loan, the cost to her over such a protracted period would have been significantly greater. On the other hand, the return for IFC, some nine (9) years later, was considerably less than ideal. That being said, the end-result in Tanner was far better for IFC than in the numerous other Estates in which it has incurred significant losses through the years. Heirs/beneficiaries are fortunate that there are Companies willing to take risk and pay heirs a sum of money for a fixed Assignment during Probate administration with zero personal recourse against the heir. Steven D. Schroeder has been General Counsel/Sr. Vice President at Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. since 2004. Active Attorney in good standing, licensed to practice before all Courts in the State of California since 1985 and a Registered Attorney with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  —- [i] Horton, David and Chandrasenkher, Andrea, Probate Lending (March 24, 2016). 126 Yale Law Journal. 102 (2016); Kidd, Jeremy, Clarifying the ‘Probate Lending’ Debate: A Response to Professors Horton and Chandrasekher(November 16, 2016). Available to SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2870615; Lloyd, Douglas B., Inheritance Funding: The Purchase of an Assignment From an Heir to a Probate or Trust, Litigation Finance Journal (October 31, 2017), http://litigationfinancejournal.com/inheritance-funding-purchase-assignment-her-probate-trust/. [ii] Probate Lending, supra. Professors Horton and Chandrasekher, supra.  Article entitled ‘Probate Lending’. [iii]  In many instances an executor or proposed administrator who is a family member cannot qualify for a bond. [iv] IFC has been providing cash advances in the field for over 25 years. [v] The Assignments included a negotiated provision for early payoff rebates which reduced the assigned amounts to $140,000.00 and $166,000.00 if paid off within 12 and 24 months respectively. [vi] Marsha Tanner and Katherine Tanner each received advances in consideration of a $41,000.00 assignment and a lesser amount with early payoff rebates. [vii] Helen Tanner’s net distributive share was $661,532.00, less IFC’s Assignment, and an unrelated promissory note she owed to estate. [viii]  David Horton and Andrea Chandrasenkher, supra (2016) 126 Yale 105-107.  Professors Horton and Chandrasekher analogized Litigation Funding to the ancient doctrine of champerty even though acknowledging California has never recognized the doctrine, See e.g. Mathewson v. Fitch, 22 Cal. 86, 95 (1863). [ix] The conclusions in Probate Lending were debunked, by Jeremy Kidd, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Law, Mercer, Probate Funding and the Litigation Funding Debate, See Wealth Strategies Journal, August 14, 2017. [x] 47 C.J.S. Interest and Usury; Consumer Credit Section 123 (1982). [xi] See In re Nelson’s Estate (1930) 211, Iowa 168; Dobb v. Yari, (NJ 1996), 927 F. Supp 814; Turcotte v. Trevino (1976) 544, S.W. 2d 463; quoting.47 C.J,S. Interest and Usury; Consumer Credit Section 123 (1982); Turcotte v. Trevino 544 S.W.2d 463 (1976), Cherokee Funding, LLC v. Ruth (2017) A17A0132; “…New York recognizes the absolute right of repayment or some form of security for the debt as the defining characteristic of a loan.   Its courts have explicitly stated that ‘[f]or a true loan it is essential to provide for repayment absolutely and all events or principal in some way to be secured…’ MoneyForLawsuits VLP v. Row No. 4:10-CV-11537]. Thus, a transaction that neither guarantees the lender an absolute right to repayment nor provides it with security for the debt is not a loan, and as a result, cannot be subject to New York’s usury laws…”   (emphasis added). “…In Brewer v. Brewer, 386 Md. 183, 196-197 (2005), the Court of Appeals held that “redistribution agreements are permissible and, so long as they comply with the requirements of basis contract law, neither the personal representative nor the court has any authority to disapprove or veto them.  See also In re: Garcelon’s Estate 38 P. 414, 415 (Cal. 1894), Haydon v. Eldred, 21 S. W.457, 458 (Ky 1929). See Massey vs. Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. Court of Appeals, 7th Dist (TX), 07-16-00148-CV. [xii] IFC provided substantial input, counsel and proposed legislative language in response to California Senate Bill 390 which was enacted into law as Probate Code Section 11604.5 on January 1, 2006 regulating the Probate Funding industry in California. SB 390.Section 1 2015, Ch. 190 (AB 1517) Section 71 [xiii] Probate Code 11604 does not have a time limitation filing period reflected. [xiv] Some Probate Advance Companies have charged interest or other fees post-funding. [xv] See Probate Lending, supra, page 130, in which the author makes questionable statistical findings from one county during a limited period of time, with the assumption that each Probate Advance Company has the same terms and business practices. [xvi] IFC has responded to multiple orders to show cause in California. [xvii] Over 90% of heirs seek funding through IFC’s website, by other heirs who have already contracted with IFC, by lawyers or personal representatives.
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Consumer Legal Funding and Social Inflation: Clearing the Misconceptions

By Eric Schuller |

The following was contributed by Eric K. Schuller, President, The Alliance for Responsible Consumer Legal Funding (ARC).

Over the past decade, insurance companies, tort reform advocates, and certain think tanks have increasingly pointed to “social inflation” as a driving force behind higher insurance premiums and larger jury awards. Let’s be clear “social inflation” is not a formally a defined economic concept; it’s an insurance industry narrative that describes some real legal and cultural trends The term itself is elastic, meant to describe cultural, legal, and economic shifts that allegedly lead to outsized liability costs. Critics have attempted to lump Consumer Legal Funding (CLF) into this category, claiming that it somehow fuels runaway verdicts and higher settlement values.

But such claims are deeply flawed. Consumer Legal Funding is fundamentally distinct from litigation financing or any mechanism that could impact the cost of litigation or influence the size of awards. CLF does not bankroll attorneys, experts, or trial strategies; rather, it provides modest, non-recourse financial assistance to injured individuals so they can pay rent, keep the lights on, and buy groceries while their legal claims move through an often slow and complex justice system.

Consumer Legal Funding has nothing to do with social inflation by exploring the mechanics of CLF, unpacking the definition of social inflation, analyzing the evidence, and dismantling the arguments insurers use to conflate the two.

Understanding Social Inflation

“Social inflation” is a term widely used in the insurance industry but often poorly defined. Broadly, it refers to increases in insurance claims costs beyond what can be explained by general economic inflation. Insurers believe it is due to several factors, including:

  1. Expanding liability concepts – Courts and legislatures allowing broader recovery for damages.
  2. Plaintiff-friendly juries – Larger awards due to shifting attitudes toward corporations and insurers.
  3. Aggressive plaintiff bar strategies – Creative legal theories, demand of damages at high levels.
  4. Erosion of tort reform – Judicial rulings striking down statutory caps or limits.

While these elements may influence claims costs, they have little to do with the day-to-day survival assistance provided through Consumer Legal Funding. CLF is not part of the litigation itself—it is part of the consumer’s household economy.

What Consumer Legal Funding Actually Is

Consumer Legal Funding is a simple, consumer-focused financial product:

  • Non-recourse funds – The consumer receives a small amount of financial assistance (average $3,000–$5,000) against the potential proceeds of their legal claim. If they lose the case, they have no further obligation.
  • Restricted use – The funds cannot be used to pay legal fees or litigation costs. They are meant for everyday living expenses such as rent, medical co-pays, utilities, and food.
  • Separate from litigation – Attorneys remain fully in charge of legal strategy, and courts determine the value of the case without reference to whether a consumer has received CLF.
  • Statutory protections – In states where CLF is regulated, statutes explicitly prohibit the funds from being used to finance litigation.

In essence, CLF is about financing life, not litigation it ensures that injured consumers are not put into a “forced settlement” simply because they cannot afford to wait for fair compensation.

The False Link Between CLF and Social Inflation

Opponents of CLF often argue that providing consumers with financial breathing room allows them to hold out for larger settlements, thereby inflating claims costs. This narrative is problematic for several reasons:

  1. Settlements are driven by case value, not desperation.
    Settlement negotiations are based on liability facts, damages evidence, and the likelihood of success at trial. A consumer’s ability to pay rent has no bearing on whether a defendant is legally liable for an injury.
  2. CLF levels the playing field, not tips it.
    Insurers routinely exploit financial desperation to force low-ball settlements. CLF prevents this imbalance but does not artificially inflate case value, it simply ensures consumers can wait for the fair value of their settlement and not a forced settlement. 
  3. No evidence connects CLF to higher verdicts or insurance premiums.
    Despite repeated assertions, insurers have not produced empirical studies demonstrating that states with regulated CLF experience higher claim costs or premium growth compared to states without it.
  4. Average funding amounts are too small to affect case economics.
    With fundings averaging just a few thousand dollars, it cannot influence the outcome of the litigation.

Social Inflation Drivers: CLF Isn’t One of Them

To further dismantle the narrative, it is important to examine what is thought to be the drivers of “social inflation” and show where CLF stands in relation.

1. Jury Attitudes and “Nuclear Verdicts”

Juries may award higher damages due to distrust of corporations or outrage over egregious conduct. These cultural and psychological factors are wholly unrelated to whether a consumer had help paying rent while waiting for trial.

2. Expanding Damages Categories

Courts and legislatures increasingly allow recovery for noneconomic damage or broaden definitions of liability. CLF has no influence over judicial doctrine or statutory reform.

3. Litigation Tactics 

CLF contracts explicitly bar funding companies from interfering in legal strategy.

By every measure, CLF is not a driver of social inflation but a consumer protection tool.

Evidence From Regulated States

Roughly a dozen states—including Ohio, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Utah, and Vermont—have enacted statutes regulating Consumer Legal Funding. These states continue to have competitive insurance markets, and there is no evidence of outsized premium growth attributable to CLF.

If CLF were truly a driver of so-called social inflation, one would expect observable differences in these states’ insurance markets compared to others. None exists.

Insurer Motivations for Blaming CLF

Why, then, do insurers persist in linking CLF to social inflation? Several strategic motivations are at play:

  1. Deflection from internal cost drivers.
    Insurers face rising costs due to investment losses, catastrophic weather events, and corporate overhead. Blaming “social inflation” provides a convenient external scapegoat.
  2. Preservation of settlement leverage.
    Low-ball settlements save insurers billions annually. CLF disrupts this model by giving consumers the financial means to reject unfair offers.
  3. Regulatory advantage.
    By conflating CLF with commercial litigation finance, insurers push for broad disclosure and restrictions that would make CLF less accessible, thereby tilting the field back in their favor.

In short, attacks on CLF are less about economics and more about control of the settlement process.

Consumer Stories: The Human Impact

Behind every policy debate are real people. Consider these examples:

  • Maria, a single mother in Ohio, suffered a serious injury in a car accident. While her case moved through litigation, she was unable to work. A $3,000 funding allowed her to pay rent and avoid eviction. Her case later settled for fair value based on her medical damages, not because she received CLF.
  • James, a factory worker in Tennessee, used a $4,500 funding to cover medical co-pays and keep food on the table for his family. Without CLF, he would have been pressured to accept an early, inadequate settlement. His attorney, free from outside interference, negotiated based on case facts.

These stories illustrate that CLF prevents forced settlements, a concept fundamentally at odds with the idea of social inflation.

Reframing the Debate: CLF as a Consumer Protection Tool

Instead of vilifying CLF, policymakers and regulators should recognize it as a consumer protection mechanism that:

  • Preserves access to justice by ensuring consumers can sustain themselves while cases proceed.
  • Protects vulnerable populations from financial exploitation by insurers.
  • Operates transparently under statutory frameworks that prohibit interference with litigation.
  • Provides an alternative to payday loans or credit card debt.

By reframing CLF in this way, legislators can see that it is part of the solution to financial inequity in the justice system, not a contributor to systemic cost drivers like “social inflation”.

Conclusion

The narrative that Consumer Legal Funding contributes to social inflation is unsupported by evidence, inconsistent with the mechanics of the product, and misleading its intent. CLF does not increase jury awards, expand liability doctrines, or drive insurance premiums. Instead, it provides a lifeline for consumers caught in the limbo of pending legal claims.

Policymakers should reject the false linkage and recognize Consumer Legal Funding for what it is: a narrow, humane financial product that has nothing to do with so called “social inflation”, but everything to do with justice and survival.

Three Sounds, Three Purposes: Understanding Consumer Legal Funding, Commercial Litigation Financing, and Attorney Portfolio Financing

By Eric Schuller |

The following was contributed by Eric K. Schuller, President, The Alliance for Responsible Consumer Legal Funding (ARC).

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When people talk about third party litigation financing, they often lump everything into one bucket—as if every type of funding that touches the legal system is essentially the same. But that’s a misconception. The world of legal finance is much more varied, and each type serves a distinct role for a distinct audience.

A good way to understand the differences is to step away from the courtroom and into the world of music. Think of Consumer Legal Funding as a rock band, Commercial Litigation Financing as a symphony orchestra, and Attorney Portfolio Financing as a gospel choir.

All three make music—they all provide funding connected to the legal system—but they produce very different sounds, are organized differently, and serve different purposes. Let’s explore these three “musical groups” of legal funding to understand how they work, why they exist, and what separates them.

Consumer Legal Funding: The Rock Band

Immediate, Personal, and Audience-Driven

A rock band connects directly with its fans. The music is raw, emotional, and often tied to the lived experiences of ordinary people. That’s exactly what Consumer Legal Funding does—it provides individuals with direct financial support while they are waiting for their personal injury cases to resolve.

Most people who seek consumer legal funding have been in a car accident, or experienced some other harm caused by negligence. While their cases work their way through the legal system, they still need to pay rent, buy groceries, keep the lights on, and support their families. Consumer Legal Funding steps in to help them cover these day-to-day expenses.

Like a rock band that thrives on the energy of a crowd, Consumer Legal Funding is closely tied to the needs of everyday people. It’s not about abstract legal theories or corporate strategy. It’s about giving real people financial breathing room so they can withstand the pressure from insurers who might otherwise push them to settle for less than they deserve.

Flexibility and Accessibility

Just as a rock band doesn’t require a massive concert hall or multimillion-dollar backing, Consumer Legal Funding is accessible on a small, personal scale. A consumer can request a few hundred or a few thousand dollars to cover immediate needs, and repayment is contingent on the case outcome. If the plaintiff loses, they owe nothing.

This non-recourse structure mirrors the risk of a rock band going on tour—they might make money, or they might not, but the fans are there for the experience. Similarly, Consumer Legal Funding companies take the risk that the case might not succeed, and they may not get their investment back.

Critics and Misconceptions

Rock bands often face criticism for being too loud, too disruptive, or too unconventional compared to “serious” classical music. Consumer Legal Funding gets similar pushback. Critics sometimes argue it encourages frivolous lawsuits or drives up settlement costs. But the reality is the opposite—the funds provided to a consumer doesn’t fund lawsuits; they fund life necessities for individuals already in the legal system.

Consumer Legal Funding’s role is narrow but vital. Like a rock band giving a voice to ordinary people, it empowers individuals who might otherwise be silenced by financial hardship.

Commercial Litigation Financing: The Symphony Orchestra

Complex, Structured, and High-Stakes

Where Consumer Legal Funding is the rock band of the legal funding world, Commercial Litigation Financing is the full symphony orchestra—large, complex, and meticulously coordinated.

Here, the players are not individuals injured in accidents but corporations, investors, and law firms involved in high-value commercial disputes. These cases can involve intellectual property battles, antitrust issues, international contract disputes, or shareholder actions. The stakes often run into the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars.

Like an orchestra, Commercial Litigation Financing is structured and multi-layered. Each section—strings, brass, woodwinds, percussion—must work together under the baton of a conductor. In litigation finance, this “conductor” is the funding company, aligning investors, lawyers, and plaintiffs toward a common goal: seeing the case through to resolution.

Strategic and Long-Term

Orchestras don’t play three-minute songs; they perform long symphonies that require endurance, precision, and careful planning. Similarly, Commercial Litigation Financing is not about immediate cash flow. It’s about supporting a complex legal strategy over years of litigation.

Funds can cover attorney fees, expert witnesses, discovery costs, and even corporate operations while a case drags on. The financing enables companies to pursue claims they might otherwise abandon because of the sheer cost and duration of litigation.

Audience and Impact

The audience for an orchestra is often more formal, more elite, and more willing to pay for a grand performance. Commercial Litigation Financing likewise serves a specialized, high-stakes audience: multinational corporations, hedge funds, and sophisticated investors. The outcomes affect entire industries and markets, not just individual households.

While a rock band might play in bars or stadiums, an orchestra plays in concert halls before an audience expecting refinement. That’s the difference in scale between Consumer Legal Funding and Commercial Litigation Financing.

Attorney Portfolio Financing: The Gospel Choir

Collective Strength and Community

If Consumer Legal Funding is a rock band and Commercial Litigation Financing is a symphony orchestra, then Attorney Portfolio Financing is a gospel choir. It’s powerful, collective, and rooted in the idea of strength in numbers.

Attorney Portfolio Financing provides capital to law firms by pooling together multiple cases—often personal injury or contingency fee cases—into one financing arrangement. Instead of betting on a single case, the funding spreads across a portfolio, much like the voices of a choir blend to create a unified sound.

Stability and Predictability

A gospel choir doesn’t rely on one soloist to carry the performance. If one voice falters, the rest keep singing. Similarly, portfolio financing reduces risk because the outcome of any one case doesn’t determine the success of the financing. The strength lies in the collective performance of many cases.

This allows law firms to take on more clients, expand their practices, and better withstand the financial ups and downs of litigation. For clients, it means their attorneys have the resources to see their cases through rather than being pressured into quick settlements.

Purpose and Spirit

Gospel choirs aren’t just about music—they’re about inspiration, resilience, and community. Attorney Portfolio Financing carries a similar spirit. It’s designed not only to provide financial stability for law firms but also to empower them to serve clients more effectively.

While the audience for a gospel choir is often the community itself, the “audience” for portfolio financing is law firms and, indirectly, the clients who benefit from better-resourced representation.

Comparing the Three Sounds

To appreciate the differences, let’s put the three side by side:

Type of FundingMusical AnalogyAudienceScalePurpose
Consumer Legal FundingRock BandIndividuals waiting for case resolutionSmall-scale, personalHelps consumers cover living expenses while awaiting settlement
Commercial Litigation FinancingSymphony OrchestraCorporations, investors, large law firmsLarge-scale, complexFunds high-stakes commercial disputes over years
Attorney Portfolio FinancingGospel ChoirLaw firms (and indirectly their clients)Medium-to-large scaleProvides stability by funding multiple cases at once

Why These Distinctions Matter

Understanding these distinctions isn’t just an academic exercise—it has real implications for policy, regulation, and public perception. Too often, critics conflate Consumer Legal Funding with Commercial Litigation Financing or assume Attorney Portfolio Financing operates the same way as individual case advances.

But regulating a rock band as if it were an orchestra—or treating a gospel choir as if it were a solo act—would miss the point entirely. Each type of legal funding has its own purpose, structure, and audience.

  • Consumer Legal Funding keeps people afloat in times of crisis.
  • Commercial Litigation Financing enables corporations to fight complex battles on equal footing.
  • Attorney Portfolio Financing stabilizes law firms and expands access to justice.

All three are part of the broader “music” of legal finance, but they are distinct genres with distinct contributions.

Conclusion: Harmony Through Diversity

Music would be dull if every performance sounded the same. The same is true for legal finance. A rock band, a symphony orchestra, and a gospel choir all create music, but their sounds, audiences, and purposes differ dramatically.

Similarly, Consumer Legal Funding, Commercial Litigation Financing, and Attorney Portfolio Financing are all forms of legal finance, but each plays a unique role. Recognizing these differences is crucial for policymakers, industry professionals, and the public.

When we appreciate the rock band, the orchestra, and the choir for what they are, we begin to see the full richness of the legal finance “soundtrack.” Together, they form a diverse ecosystem that, when balanced correctly, ensures both individuals and institutions can pursue justice without being silenced by financial pressure.

Express Legal Funding Re-Ups Ethics Signal With ARC Membership

By John Freund |

Express Legal Funding announced it has reached its fifth year as a member of the Alliance for Responsible Consumer Legal Funding (ARC), underscoring a commitment to best practices in an often-polarized pre-settlement space. For a company that brands itself around transparent pricing and consumer education, the ARC imprimatur doubles as a marketing and compliance asset—especially as statehouses revisit disclosure, APR caps and contract clarity.

An announcement in PR Newswire positions the milestone within a “rapidly growing” lawsuit-cash-advance market. While the release is light on metrics, the message tracks with the broader U.S. consumer-funding narrative: pressure from insurers and tort-reform groups on one side; advocates and funders emphasizing access to liquidity and non-recourse safety on the other.

For plaintiff firms, vendor due diligence remains a reputational imperative; for consumers, independent accreditation—however voluntary—can serve as a quick proxy for baseline standards when shopping funding offers. The strategic subtext is clear: as more states contemplate rules around discoverability, disclosures and rate structures, firms that can point to consistent adherence to codes like ARC’s may enjoy smoother law-firm relationships and fewer regulatory headwinds.

With regulatory skirmishes likely to continue at the state level, recurring membership signals (ARC or otherwise) will matter more.

Editor's Note: An earlier version of this article stated that Express Legal Funding reached its fifth consecutive year as a member of the Alliance for Responsible Consumer Legal Funding. Express Legal Funding reached its fifth year, but not consecutively. We regret the error.