‘Secondary’ Investing in Litigation Finance: Why, why now, and how to approach investing in Lit Fin Secondaries

The following article is part of an ongoing column titled ‘Investor Insights.’ 

Brought to you by Ed Truant, founder and content manager of Slingshot Capital, ‘Investor Insights’ will provide thoughtful and engaging perspectives on all aspects of investing in litigation finance. 

Executive Summary

  • Evolution of Litigation Finance necessitates the need for a secondary market
  • Investing in Litigation Finance secondaries is much more difficult than other forms of private equity due to the inherent difficulty in valuing the ‘tail’
  • Experts should be utilized to assess case merits and valuation
  • Life cycle of litigation finance suggests timing is right for secondaries

Slingshot Insights:

  • Investing in the ‘tail’ of a portfolio, where most secondary transactions will take place, can be more difficult than primary investing
  • Dynamics of the ‘tail’ of a portfolio are inherently riskier than a whole portfolio, which is partially offset by enhanced information related to the underlying cases
  • Secondary portfolios are best reviewed by experts in the field and each significant investment should be reviewed extensively
  • Derive little comfort from portfolios that have been marked-to-market by the underlying manager
  • Investing in secondaries requires a discount to market value to offset the implied volatility associated with the tail

In my discussions with litigation finance institutional investors, the topic of secondary investments has been raised a number of times by those who understand the economics of the asset class and are seeking to take advantage of some of the longer duration cases and portfolios in existence.  In this article, I explore why there is interest in the secondary market, why now, and how best to approach investing in secondary investments, as well as some watch-outs.

The concept of secondaries has been well established in the private equity world, specifically leveraged buy-out private equity, and, having been in existence for a couple of decades now, represents a mature strategy not only within leveraged buy-out, but also infrastructure, real estate, venture capital, growth equity, etc.  So, it is not surprising to see the concept applied to litigation finance. As David Ross, Managing Director & Head of Private Credit at Northleaf Capital Partners, notes

“Having been active in private equity secondaries for close to twenty years, Northleaf has extended its secondaries expertise over the past few years to include investments in litigation finance, which is an area that provides attractive and uncorrelated returns for our investors. Executing investments in litigation finance requires dedicated expertise but can provide attractive transaction dynamics for both existing investors seeking liquidity and prospective investors capable of underwriting and structuring an attractive secondary.”

To begin with, let’s first define what constitutes a “secondary” transaction.  Essentially, a secondary is any transaction where one party is acquiring the interests from the original investor (the ‘primary’ investor) in an investment opportunity.  In the case of litigation finance, this could take the form of a single case investment, portfolios or LP interests in funds, among other opportunities.  In this sense, they are the ‘second’ investor to own the investment, as they have acquired their interest from the first investor through the acquisition transaction.

Types of Secondaries

In order for a secondary market to make sense, at least for institutional investors, there needs to be a sufficient number of opportunities that are adequately aged to allow for one party to sell at typically, but not always, a discount to either their original cost or their current fair market value of the investment.  These opportunities can arise for a number of reasons, as outlined below.

For fund managers, they may be looking to raise a new, larger fund, and in order to do so they will have to demonstrate that they are good stewards of capital and that they can produce attractive returns to investors relative to the risk they assume.  If these managers do not have a sufficient number of realizations in their predecessor portfolios, they will have to create a track record by selling off interests in single cases or entire portfolios.  In this way, they will receive arm’s length validation that their portfolio has intrinsic value, with the idea that other potential investors should take comfort in the fact that a third party has assessed the attractiveness of opportunities and decided to invest at a value that is, hopefully, in excess of their original cost, or matches their internal assessment of fair market value.  Of course, this assumes that the purchaser is a knowledgeable purchaser of litigation finance assets and an expert at valuing litigation finance investments, of which few exist in the world, as valuation is perhaps more art than science.

A relatively recent public example of this is Burford’s multiple secondary sales of interests in their Petersen case, which was sold in several tranches at increasing valuations as Burford continued to de-risk their investment through positive case developments during its hold period.  According to the Petersen article hyperlinked above, Burford generated $236 million in cash from selling off interests in the claim, which significantly benefited its reported profitability and cashflow, and evidently, fueled its stock price at the time.  All in all, a smart move by Burford to hedge its bets and de-risk its investment by selling down to other investors.  However, it remains to be seen whether those who acquired the secondary interests in Peterson were as astute as the sellers, time will tell.

For investors, they may be in a situation where they are in a liquidity squeeze, and could be frustrated with the duration of the litigation finance portfolio and therefore wish to exit the remainder of their investment to redeploy capital into a new fund or a new strategy. They could also have had a change in management which created a shift in strategy, or any number of other causes.  For investors in individual cases or funds, they currently face a difficult task in finding a secondary investor to acquire their interests, which can be made more difficult by the fact that the manager may not be motivated to find them a purchaser, as there is no economic incentive to do so. The fate of these investors remains in the hands of the manager.  However, if there are enough investors clamoring for liquidity, then the manager may be forced to hire an investment bank or another intermediary expert to solicit the markets’ appetite and obtain bids for the portfolio; but this will come at a cost which is typically assumed by the selling investor.

But is a secondary a “realization”?

The short answer is NO!

While a secondary can be an indication of perceived value in the market, it is simply a point-in-time estimate of value by the new, prospective owner that makes a series of assumptions to underlie their valuation. As such, it has no bearing on whether the case is more or less likely to settle or win, whether the defendant has the resources to pay, and whether it could take two years or ten years to collect.

Litigation is well known to have a binary outcome.  In the context of large cases where there are significant dollars at risk, it may be in the best interests of the defendant to take the trial risk and deal with the consequences by ultimately settling for a fraction of the damages after the court decision is handed down.  In the Petersen case referenced above, it has been felt by some in the market that an award could still be years away (in the absence of collection frustration tactics that the Argentinian government may pursue); and even then, there is some concern that the decision may allow for damages denominated in Argentine pesos, which have been significantly devalued since the case began.  In addition, the Argentine government has defaulted on its sovereign debt a few times over the last numbers of years and is currently in default on its International Monetary Fund loans, so it is difficult to assess the risk of collectability.

Just because you win a case, doesn’t mean you get to collect the spoils. Collection is a whole other issue and perhaps a topic for another article.  Suffice it to say, that a case is not completely de-risked until the ‘cash is in the bank’ (your bank account, not the lawyer’s trust account). So, I personally would take very little comfort in the fact that another party has looked at a case and made a decision that it has value – you would have to have a deep understanding of that buyer’s motivations (are they merely incentivized to get money invested? Are they motivated by Litigation Finance FOMO?) and that buyer’s ability to value litigation, which is difficult to do with accuracy because of the number of variables & uncertainties involved.

Why are litigation finance secondaries interesting?

Perhaps the better question is, “Are litigation finance secondaries interesting?” And the answer is, “It depends”.

When you look at a portfolio of litigation finance single cases, there are a number of individual investments that typically resolve early in the fund’s life, and this usually gives rise to attractive internal rates of return (“IRR”), but low multiples of  invested capital (“MOIC”); then, there are those that resolve in and around the 30 month mark, which is a fairly typical duration, which should result in stronger MOICs and perhaps somewhat lower IRRs; and then, there is the ‘tail’ of the portfolio (see chart below).  The ‘tail’ of a portfolio refers to those cases that are outside of the normalized expectation for case realizations in terms of duration that reside in the portfolio near the end of, or perhaps even outside of, the investment vehicle’s life.  These cases could be outside the normal time distribution because the cases are highly complex, the defendant has tried to procedurally frustrate & delay the litigation, the case is going through a long drawn out trial or arbitral process, or the nature of the case simply takes longer (intellectual property, international arbitration, etc.) among other explanations. Often, when an investor is provided with a secondary opportunity, they are quite likely looking at investing in the ‘tail’ of the portfolio because the early part of the portfolio has already been resolved, and the proceeds have either been paid out or used to fund the cases remaining in the tail.  Investing in the tail has many implications for expected outcomes. The potential tail outcomes, as depicted with red arrows in the chart below, indicate the uncertainty in both quantum and duration of the tail.

In part 2 of this article, I will explore some of the intricacies of ‘investing in the tail’ and explore considerations for investing in secondary transactions in litigation finance investments.

Slingshot Insights 

For those investors interested in the litigation finance secondary market, I think it is important to approach the investment with caution and a high level of expert diligence to offset the implied volatility that the ‘tail’ of the portfolio offers.  It is also important to understand the motivations of the seller – a manager looking to create a track record will have different motivations than an investor who needs liquidity.  The seller’s motivations may also offer insight into the extent price can be negotiated. It is important not to lose sight of the typical loss rate of the industry and the fact that the tail should exhibit enhanced volatility (more losses) as compared to a whole portfolio, and so an investor should model their returns, and hence their entry price, accordingly. Should you choose to make a secondary investment, consider a variety of options to de-risk the investment by sharing risks and rewards with others (i.e. insurance providers or the vendor of the asset). Above all else, make sure your secondaries are diversified or part of a larger diversified pool of assets.

As always, I welcome your comments and counter-points to those raised in this article.

Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc. and an investor in the consumer and commercial litigation finance industry.  Slingshot Capital inc. is involved in the origination and design of unique opportunities in legal finance markets, globally, investing with and alongside institutional investors

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Community Spotlights

Community Spotlight: Dr. Detlef A. Huber, Managing Director, AURIGON LRC

By John Freund |

Detlef is a German attorney, former executive of a Swiss reinsurance company and as head of former Carpentum Capital Ltd. one of the pioneers of litigation funding in Latin America. Through his activities as executive in the insurance claims area and litigation funder he gained a wealth of experience in arbitrations/litigations in various businesses. He is certified arbitrator of ARIAS US and ARIAS UK (AIDA Reinsurance and Insurance Arbitration Society) and listed on the arbitrators panel of DIS (German Arbitration Institute).

He studied law in Germany and Spain, obtained a Master in European Law (Autónoma Madrid) and doctorate in insurance law (University of Hamburg).

Detlef speaks German, Spanish, English fluently and some Portuguese.

Company Name and Description:  AURIGON LRC (Litigation Risk Consulting) is at home in two worlds: dispute funding and insurance. They set up the first European litigation fund dedicated to Latin America many years ago and operate as consultants in the re/insurance sector since over a decade.

Both worlds are increasingly overlapping with insurers offering ever more litigation risk transfer products and funders recurring to insurance in order to hedge their risks. Complexity is increasing for what is already a complex product.

Aurigon acts as intermediary in the dispute finance sector and offers consultancy on relevant insurance matters.

Company Website: www.aurigon-lrc.ch

Year Founded: 2011, since 2024 offering litigation risk consulting  

Headquarters: Alte Steinhauserstr. 1, 6330 Cham/Zug Switzerland

Area of Focus:  Litigation funding related to Latin America and re/insurance disputes

Member Quote: “It´s the economy, stupid. Not my words but fits our business well. Dont focus on merits, focus on maths.”

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Manolete Partners Releases Half-Year Results for the Six Months Ended 30 September 2024

By Harry Moran |

Manolete (AIM:MANO), the leading UK-listed insolvency litigation financing company, today announces its unaudited results for the six months ended 30 September 2024. 

Steven Cooklin, Chief Executive Officer, commented: 

“These are a strong set of results, particularly in terms of organic cash generation. In this six-month period, gross cash collected rose 63% to a new record at £14.3m. That strong organic cash generation comfortably covered all cash operating costs, as well as all cash costs of financing the ongoing portfolio of 413 live cases, enabling Manolete to reduce net debt by £1.25m to £11.9m as at 30 September 2024. 

As a consequence of Manolete completing a record number of 137 case completions, realised revenues rose by 60% to a further record high of £15m. That is a strong indicator of further, and similarly high levels, of near-term future cash generation. A record pipeline of 437 new case investment opportunities were received in this latest six month trading period, underpinning the further strong growth prospects for the business. 

The record £14.3.m gross cash was collected from 253 separate completed cases, highlighting the highly granular and diversified profile of Manolete’s income stream. 

Manolete has generated a Compound Average Growth Rate of 39% in gross cash receipts over the last five H1 trading periods: from H1 FY20 up to and including the current H1 FY25. The resilience of the Manolete business model, even after the extraordinary pressures presented by the extended Covid period, is now clear to see. 

This generated net cash income of £7.6m in H1 FY25 (after payment of all legal costs and all payments made to the numerous insolvent estates on those completed cases), an increase of 66% over the comparative six-month period for the prior year. Net cash income not only exceeded by £4.5m all the cash overheads required to run the Company, it also exceeded all the costs of running Manolete’s ongoing 413 cases, including the 126 new case investments made in H1 FY25. 

The Company recorded its highest ever realised revenues for H1 FY25 of £15.0m, exceeding H1 FY24 by 60%. On average, Manolete receives all the cash owed to it by the defendants of completed cases within approximately 12 months of the cases being legally completed. This impressive 60% rise in realised revenues therefore provides good near-term visibility for a continuation of Manolete’s strong, and well-established, track record of organic, operational cash generation. 

New case investment opportunities arise daily from our wide-ranging, proprietary, UK referral network of insolvency practitioner firms and specialist insolvency and restructuring solicitor practices. We are delighted to report that the referrals for H1 FY25 reached a new H1 company record of 437. A 27% higher volume than in H1 FY24, which was itself a new record for the Company this time last year. That points to a very healthy pipeline as we move forward into the second half of the trading year.” 

Financial highlights: 

  • Total revenues increased by 28% to £14.4m from H1 FY24 (£11.2m) as a result of the outstanding delivery of realised revenues generated in the six months to 30th September 2024.
    • Realised revenues achieved a record level of £15.0m in H1 FY25, a notable increase of 60% on H1 FY24 (£9.4m). This provides good visibility of near-term further strong cash generation, as on average Manolete collects all cash on settled cases within approximately 12 months of the legal settlement of those cases
    • Unrealised revenue in H1 FY25 was £(633k) compared to £1.8m for the comparative H1 FY24. This was due to: (1) the record number of 137 case completions in H1 FY25, which resulted in a beneficial movement from Unrealised revenues to Realised revenues; and (2) the current lower average fair value of new case investments made relative to the higher fair value of the completed cases. The latter point also explains the main reason for the marginally lower gross profit reported of £4.4m in this period, H1 FY25, compared to £5.0m in H1 FY24. 
  • EBIT for H1 FY25 was £0.7m compared to H1 FY24 of £1.6m. As well as the reduced Gross profit contribution explained above, staff costs increased by £165k to £2.3m and based on the standard formula used by the Company to calculate Expected Credit Losses, (“ECL”), generated a charge of £140k (H1 3 FY24: £nil) due to trade debtors rising to £26.8m as at 30 September 2024, compared to £21.7m as at 30 September 2023. The trade debtor increase was driven by the outstanding record level of £15.0m Realised revenues achieved in H1 FY25.
  • Loss Before Tax was (£0.2m) compared to a Profit Before Tax of £0.9m in H1 FY24, due to the above factors together with a lower corporation tax charge being largely offset by higher interest costs. 
  • Basic earnings per share (0.5) pence (H1 FY24: 1.4 pence).
  • Gross cash generated from completed cases increased 63% to £14.3m in the 6 months to 30 September 2024 (H1 FY24: £8.7m). 5-year H1 CAGR: 39%.
  • Cash income from completed cases after payments of all legal costs and payments to Insolvent Estates rose by 66% to £7.6m (H1 FY24: £4.6m). 5-year H1 CAGR: 46%.
  • Net cashflow after all operating costs but before new case investments rose by 193% to £4.5m (H1 FY24: £1.5m). 5-year H1 CAGR: 126%.
  • Net assets as at 30 September 2024 were £40.5m (H1 FY24: £39.8m). Net debt was reduced to £11.9m and comprises borrowings of £12.5m, offset by cash balances of £0.6m. (Net debt as 31 March 2024 was £12.3m.)
  • £5m of the £17.5m HSBC Revolving Credit Facility remains available for use, as at 30 September 2024. That figure does not take into account the Company’s available cash balances referred to above.

Operational highlights:

  • Ongoing delivery of record realised returns: 137 case completions in H1 FY25 representing a 18% increase (116 case realisations in H1 FY24), generating gross settlement proceeds receivable of £13.9m for H1 FY25, which is 51% higher than the H1 FY24 figure of £9.2m. This very strong increase in case settlements provides visibility for further high levels of cash income, as it takes the Company, on average, around 12 months to collect in all cash from previously completed cases.
  • The average realised revenue per completed case (“ARRCC”) for H1 FY25 was £109k, compared to the ARRCC of £81k for H1 FY24. That 35% increase in ARRCC is an important and an encouraging Key Performance Indicator for the Company. Before the onset and impact of the Covid pandemic in 2020, the Company was achieving an ARRCC of approximately £200k. Progress back to that ARRCC level, together with the Company maintaining its recent high case acquisition and case completion volumes, would lead to a material transformation of Company profitability.
  • The 137 cases completed in H1 FY25 had an average case duration of 15.7 months. This was higher than the average case duration of 11.5 months for the 118 cases completed in H1 FY24, because in H1 FY25 Manolete was able to complete a relatively higher number of older cases, as evidenced by the Vintages Table below.
  • Average case duration across Manolete’s full lifetime portfolio of 1,064 completed cases, as at 30 September 2024 was 13.3 months (H1 FY24: 12.7 months).
  • Excluding the Barclays Bounce Back Loan (“BBL”) pilot cases, new case investments remained at historically elevated levels of 126 for H1 FY25 (H1 FY24: 146 new case investments).
  • New case enquiries (again excluding just two Barclays BBL pilot cases from the H1 FY24 figure) achieved another new Company record of 437 in H1 FY25, 27% higher than the H1 FY24 figure of 343. This excellent KPI is a strong indicator of future business performance and activity levels.
  • Stable portfolio of live cases: 413 in progress as at 30 September 2024 (417 as at 30 September 2023) which includes 35 live BBLs.
  • Excluding the Truck Cartel cases, all vintages up to and including the 2019 vintage have now been fully, and legally completed. Only one case remains ongoing in the 2020 vintage. 72% of the Company’s live cases have been signed in the last 18 months.
  • The Truck Cartel cases continue to progress well. As previously reported, settlement discussions, to varying degrees of progress, continue with a number of Defendant manufacturers. Further updates will be provided as concrete outcomes emerge.
  • The Company awaits the appointment of the new Labour Government’s Covid Corruption Commissioner and hopes that appointment will set the clear direction of any further potential material involvement for Manolete in the Government’s BBL recovery programme.
  • The Board proposes no interim dividend for H1 FY25 (H1 FY24: £nil).

The full report of Manolete’s half-year results can be read here.

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LegalPay’s CIO Highlights the Opportunities and Challenges for Defense-Side Funding

By Harry Moran |

As the legal funding industry has matured and become a mainstream feature of many jurisdictions’ legal systems, funders are increasingly looking at ways to diversify their activities.

In an article for Insolvency Tracker, Tanya Prasad, CIO of LegalPay, addresses the niche topic of defense-side funding and examines whether there is potential for this type of legal funding to grow in the same way that plaintiff funding has over recent years. Prasad notes that in an environment where “the demand for risk management tools in litigation grows”, large corporations may look to third-party funders to help supplement legal budgets “while potentially achieving favourable outcomes”.

Prasad acknowledges that compared to traditional plaintiff-side funding, defense-side funding “comes with unique challenges”. Whilst claimants may seek to maximise their financial returns in the form of damages and compensation, a defendant will “generally focus on minimizing loss exposure.” As a result of this difference in goals, Prasad suggests that funders would need to not only “employ creative pricing structures”, but would also need to find new metrics to define success.

The latter point is one that Prasad argues is key to creating a viable defense-side funding ecosystem, noting that “establishing a clear definition of success” may have different parameters for different defendants. Examples of this could include structuring funding agreements to incorporate “avoided loss” measures, which would define success based on “achieving a favorable settlement or dismissal at a lower financial cost than anticipated.”

If these difficulties that Prasad highlights can be overcome, she suggests that “defense-side litigation funding has the potential to redefine legal finance, supporting fair representation for both plaintiffs and defendants and expanding access to justice across the board.” Additionally, Prasad points to a handful of examples where defense-side funding has been successfully employed, such as the Gillette v. ShaveLogic case, where Burford Capital provided funding for the defendant to successfully oppose Gillette’s claims of trades secret misappropriation and unfair competition.