The following was contributed by Eric K. Schuller, President, The Alliance for Responsible Consumer Legal Funding (ARC).
The Real-World Consequences of Over-Regulation and Misclassification
State lawmakers across the country are increasingly focused on how to regulate third-party financial activity connected to litigation. That attention is appropriate and necessary. However, when Consumer Legal Funding (CLF) is misclassified as a loan, conflicted with commercial litigation finance, or subjected to regulatory structures designed for fundamentally different financial products, the consequences fall not on providers, but on consumers who need it the most.
Consumer Legal Funding, Funding Lives, Not Litigation, exists to help individuals with pending legal claims meet basic household needs while their cases move through the legal system. These consumers are often recovering from serious injuries, unable to work, and facing mounting financial pressure. When CLF disappears due to over-regulation or misclassification, those consumers do not suddenly become financially secure. Instead, they are pushed into worse, more dangerous alternatives, or forced into decisions that undermine both their legal rights and their long-term financial stability.
Who Uses Consumer Legal Funding and Why
Consumers who turn to CLF are not seeking to finance their litigation. They are seeking financial stability. On average, CLF transactions range between $3,000 and $5,000. These monies are used for rent, mortgage payments, utilities, groceries, childcare, transportation, and medical co-pay. In many cases, it is differences between maintaining housing or facing eviction, between keeping a car or losing the ability to get to medical appointments or work.
CLF is non-recourse. If the consumer does not recover in their legal claim, they owe nothing. That structure places all financial risk on the provider, not the consumer. It is precisely this risk allocation that distinguishes CLF from loans and traditional credit products, and it is why courts and legislatures in numerous states have recognized that CLF is not a loan.
When lawmakers impose loan-based frameworks on CLF, including usury caps, amortization requirements, or repayment obligations disconnected from case outcomes, the product becomes economically impossible to offer. The result is not a cheaper product. The result is no product at all.
The Immediate Impact of CLF Disappearing
When CLF exits a state market, the effects are immediate and measurable.
First, consumer access disappears. Providers cannot operate under regulatory structures that ignore the non-recourse nature of the product. Capital exits the market, and consumers lose an option that previously helped them remain financially afloat during litigation.
Second, consumers are forced into inferior alternatives. Without CLF, injured individuals frequently turn to credit cards, payday lenders, installment loans, or borrowing from friends and family. These options often carry guaranteed repayment obligations, compounding interest, collection risk, and damage to credit. Unlike CLF, these products do not adjust based on whether the consumer recovers anything in their legal claim.
Third, financial pressure forces premature settlements. When consumers cannot meet basic living expenses, they are more likely to accept early, undervalued settlements simply to survive. This undermines the fairness of the civil justice system and benefits defendants and insurers, not injured parties or the courts.
Misclassification Harms the Most Vulnerable Consumers
The consumers most harmed by the elimination of CLF are those with the fewest alternatives. These are individuals with limited savings, limited access to traditional credit, and limited ability to absorb income disruption following an injury.
Ironically, regulations intended to protect consumers often end up harming precisely the consumers they sought to help. When CLF is treated as a loan, the regulatory burden drives responsible providers out of the market while doing nothing to improve consumer outcomes. Consumers do not gain safer options. They lose transparent, regulated, non-recourse funding and are pushed toward products with higher risk and fewer protections.
This is not hypothetical. States that have enacted overly restrictive frameworks or applied inappropriate rate caps have seen providers exit, access shrink, and consumer choice vanish. The lesson is clear. When regulation ignores economic reality, consumers pay the price.
CLF Does Not Drive Litigation or Verdict Inflation
A common concern raised in policy debates is whether CLF encourages litigation, prolongs cases, or contributes to so-called nuclear verdicts. The evidence does not support these claims.
CLF is accessed after a legal claim already exists. It does not finance attorneys’ fees, court costs, or litigation strategy. Providers have no control over legal decisions, settlement timing, or trial outcomes. Their only interest is whether a consumer recovers at all.
Moreover, the small size of typical CLF transactions makes it implausible that they influence case strategy or verdict size. A $3,000 to $5,000 transaction used to pay rent or utilities does not drive multi-million-dollar litigation outcomes. Conflating CLF with commercial litigation finance obscures these realities and leads to policy mistakes.
A Better Path Forward for Policymakers
Legislators can protect consumers without eliminating CLF. States that have enacted thoughtful CLF statutes have focused on disclosure, transparency, contract clarity, and consumer choice, rather than imposing loan-based rate structures that do not fit a non-recourse product.
Effective regulation acknowledges three core principles. First, CLF is not a loan and should not be regulated as one. Second, consumers benefit from access to a regulated, transparent product rather than being pushed into worse alternatives. Third, clear rules provide stability for both consumers and providers.
When policymakers get this balance right, consumers retain access to a product that helps them weather one of the most difficult periods of their lives without distorting the justice system or creating unintended harm.
Conclusion
The issue confronting lawmakers is not whether Consumer Legal Funding should be subject to oversight, but whether existing and future frameworks accurately reflect how the product operates and whom it serves. When CLF is swept into regulatory regimes designed for loans or commercial litigation finance, the result is not improved consumer protection. It is the quiet elimination of a non-recourse option that many injured consumers rely on to remain financially stable while their legal claims are resolved.
Careful, informed policymaking requires recognizing that Consumer Legal Funding is distinct, limited in size, non-recourse, and consumer-facing. Regulation that acknowledges those characteristics preserves transparency and accountability without stripping consumers of choice or forcing them into riskier financial alternatives. When rules are tailored to economic reality rather than broad assumptions, consumers are better protected, markets remain stable, and the civil justice system functions as intended.
