Trending Now
  • Court of Appeal Shuts Down BHP's Attempt to Overturn Mariana Liability Judgment

Value in Litigation & Implications for Litigation Finance

Value in Litigation & Implications for Litigation Finance

The following article is part of an ongoing column titled ‘Investor Insights.’  Brought to you by Ed Truant, founder and content manager of Slingshot Capital, ‘Investor Insights’ will provide thoughtful and engaging perspectives on all aspects of investing in litigation finance.  Executive Summary
  • 3 Phases of Risk:
    • De-Risking
    • Optimum Resolution
    • Re-Risking
  • Optimum risk-adjusted zone is when information is maximized and trial has yet to begin
  • Once a trial begins, outcomes become binary in the absence of a settlement
  • Diversification is critical to investing in the litigation finance sector
Investor Insights
  • In assessing portfolio performance, it’s crucial to determine the extent of trial outcomes
  • Assess settlement performance in the context of industry settlement rates
  • Generally, a high percentage of cases are settled
  • Certain case types have lower settlement rates, so there is not a ‘one size fits all’ approach to analyzing portfolio performance
I was speaking recently with a local litigation finance manager about the value of a piece of litigation in the context of litigation finance.  As I thought more about the discussion and the implications for settlements and maximizing outcomes, I felt compelled to relay the thoughts in an article for other industry participants to consider and argue.  Keep in mind that this is a simplistic view of a piece of litigation, as most litigation has layers of complexity that influence valuation, not to mention precedents in other jurisdictions. Value The intrinsic value of a piece of litigation is made up of a number of components that lawyers, plaintiffs and litigation finance managers assess as they underwrite their investment decision, which typically consist of the following:
merits of the casedefense counsel effectiveness
collectability of damagesdefendant’s conduct re: previous litigation
quantum of damagesplaintiff counsel effectiveness
justice considerations (judiciary and jurisdiction)
For the purposes of this article, we will mainly reference early stage, pre-settlement cases. Editor’s note– the following contribution appears with illustrative graphs and charts here.   Value is not a static concept in litigation.  Nevertheless, litigation fund managers have to determine approximate value; or a value range at the very early stages of a case when there is a relatively high degree of uncertainty, relatively few facts and little to nothing in terms of judicial proceedings.  In the context of litigation, value varies with time (while time may add value in the short term by virtue of contributing to the amount of information that can be gathered on the case, the longer a case drags on past the point where maximum information is available, the less valuable time becomes due to the time value of money). Value also varies proportionately – or perhaps disproportionately – with risk, which is in turn influenced by information. That is to say, unknown data may come to light that becomes beneficial or harmful to the merits of your case and may influence its outcome and/or quantum. As an example, the ‘certification’ process of a class action in certain jurisdictions has a meaningful impact on whether the class proceeds with the action, and ultimately is a strong determinant of success, typically through settlement. Of course, in all jurisdictions, another major contributing factor is access to capital so plaintiffs can finance the pursuit of their meritorious claims to the point of collection of damages – enter litigation finance. We will assume for the remainder of this article that all cases have the appropriate amount of financing. As discussed, the value of a case is determined by two factors: risk and time.  All cases start where risk is at a maximum, as there is relatively little information known about the case and hence a great degree of uncertainty about its outcome. As plaintiff and counsel build their case and proceed through discovery, the case generally becomes ‘de-risked’ as the plaintiff team grows more comfortable about the merits of their case and the quantum of damages. As we move through the case, we enter the zone of ‘optimum resolution’. However, ‘optimum resolution’ is not necessarily a value maximizing concept, but rather a concept of risk-adjusted value maximization.  The risk-adjusted aspect stems from the fact that both sides have about equal information concerning the dispute, and are now able to make a rational decision as to the possible outcomes and damage quantification. At the point where the process moves past the Optimum Resolution phase, the parties enter into a new phase of risk which is reflective of the binary risk nature of litigation, whereby the outcome is determined by a third party judiciary. As the plaintiff gathers more information regarding his or her case, the case generally increases in value as risk diminishes.  However, at the point where a judicial process commences (and assuming a settlement doesn’t occur between the start of the process and the decision), the investment bifurcates into two potential outcomes on the assumption that there is no resolution after the start of the trial – generally, either a win or a loss outcome.  In certain jurisdictions where they have “adverse costs” or “loser pays” rules, the plaintiff will have to pay the defense costs, and so there is a real financial cost in addition to the lost opportunity associated with a positive outcome.  Implications The purpose of this analysis is to focus the plaintiff on the fact that on a risk-adjusted basis, the zone of Optimum Resolution is the most advantageous point in the litigation process to resolve the case, as it reflects the point of most knowledge and least risk.  This is the point in time to cast aside all emotional elements of the case and the impact of damages incurred, and focus on a realistic outcome that can be achieved through negotiation and settlement, regardless of whether it makes the plaintiff “whole” or not.  Of course, as the old saying goes, “it takes two to tango”, and so, if the defense is not of the same opinion, or their analysis is skewed, they may have a very different perspective on the appropriate settlement amount.  In the case of insurance companies as defendants in cases, they may have other considerations such as statutory reserve requirements or corporate strategic reasons to delay as long as possible (time value of money and the impact on their insurance reserves and investment returns).  Nevertheless, the concept applies to both defense and plaintiff, which is the reason for high settlement rates in most litigation in all jurisdictions. From an investor’s perspective, there should be a recognition that as each case in their portfolio extends beyond the zone of Optimum Resolution, the risk to their portfolio increases.  Accordingly, if you are an institutional investor buying a secondary pool of litigation finance assets, you want to be sure you are not buying a series of old cases where the binary risk is high and you are not getting an appropriate discount to assume the risk.  Of course, there are always exceptions to this rule.  The reason a case has extended for a long period of time may be because the plaintiff has had successive wins at various levels of judiciary and the risk has started to shift away from binary litigation risk toward collection and enforcement risk (Burford’s investment in the ‘Petersen claim’ is a prime example of this phenomenon). Needless to say, litigation is not a formulaic science, and because of the large degree of human interaction and case complexity, it will be relegated into the “arts” category for the time being.  Perhaps artificial intelligence can add a scientific element to determining value and litigation outcomes, but until the vast knowledge of settlement data becomes publicly available, the industry will depend on ‘gut instinct’ and litigation experience in making its decisions.  From an investment perspective, the important point is that diversification is critical to capture the upside inherent in the asset class, while minimizing the downside inherent in the inevitable losses that will be experienced. Important Considerations  Other important factors to consider are the use of contingent fee arrangements and litigation finance, and the impact those characteristics have on the ultimate value of a piece of litigation.  Some in the litigation finance community will argue that they will only consider providing financing to cases where the lawyer is providing their services on a 100% contingent basis (there could be jurisdiction specific constraints to the use of contingent fee arrangements), as this fosters alignment between plaintiff and lawyer to maximize the value of the claim.  Certainly, the alignment argument makes intuitive sense.  However, not every funder is convinced of this fact, and unfortunately, there is not a broad set of data that is definitive in this regard.  Accordingly, until the data determines there is a strong correlation between contingent fee arrangements and outcomes, it remains to be seen.  On one of the panels at the September 2019 LF Dealmakers conference, a litigation funder stated that the company’s empirical data suggests there is no correlation, and hence contingency fee arrangements are not a significant feature to their underwriting process. Yet it’s worth pointing out that many funders feel strongly that the alignment argument is a good one, so they refuse to invest in a case without at least some level of legal counsel fee contingency. Then there is the existence and use of litigation funding itself.  One could argue that the very existence of a plaintiff’s use of a litigation funder to pursue its case will shift the balance of power and ‘level the playing field’ between the plaintiff and the defendant, especially in a David v. Goliath situation where the defendant is ‘deep pocketed’ and the plaintiff relatively impecunious.  As an investor in the industry, not only do I subscribe to the theory, I have seen the results.  While many would suggest it is difficult to parse the effect of litigation funding from the effect of good legal representation and a meritorious claim, I look at the results of relatively small financings and I can see a correlation between success and short duration, which I, in large part, ascribe to the existence of litigation finance. Investor Insights: As a consequence of the above, when I review track records for fund managers one of the metrics I look at is how often the realized outcomes are dependent on a judicial decision (bench, trial or arbitral) as compared to an outcome determined through settlement.  Overall, the data concerning litigation outcomes illustrates that a high percentage of cases (90%+) are settled prior to a judicial decision and so we need to view the results in the context of industry settlement rates. Generally speaking, and depending on the case type and jurisdiction, I have a strong preference for fund managers that have a disproportionate number of settlements in their realized portfolios as opposed to outcomes that were derived from a judicial decision, given the binary nature of those outcomes.  In certain jurisdictions, litigation funders are able to have some influence on the settlement discussions which may tend to favour higher settlement rates, so this issue and my approach to it is not identical in every jurisdiction.  Another influencing factor on settlement rates is case types and case sizes.  Generally speaking, I have noticed that outcomes dependent on judicial/arbitral decisions are correlated with larger cases and certain case types (as an example, International Arbitration cases would be one area where settlement is less likely and hence arbitral outcomes more prevalent). Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc., and an investor in the consumer and commercial litigation finance industry.

Commercial

View All

Third-Party Funding Reshapes Post-M&A Arbitration in Spain

By John Freund |

Third-party funding is increasingly shaping the strategic landscape of post-M&A arbitration, according to discussions at the OPEN de Arbitraje 2026 conference held in Madrid. Practitioners and arbitrators examined how external capital is altering the calculus for claimants pursuing disputes that arise from share purchase agreements, earn-out clauses, and post-closing indemnity claims.

As reported by Iberian Lawyer, panelists framed third-party funding as a viable alternative for parties navigating the often-protracted and capital-intensive nature of M&A arbitrations. The discussion emphasized that funding agreements are no longer reserved for distressed claimants but are increasingly deployed by well-capitalized parties seeking to manage risk, free up balance sheet capacity, or align outside investors with the success of a claim.

Spain has emerged as one of Europe's more receptive jurisdictions for funded arbitration, with both the Spanish Court of Arbitration and the Madrid International Arbitration Center requiring disclosure of third-party funding arrangements. That regulatory clarity has helped institutional funders deepen their involvement in the Iberian market while giving counterparties greater visibility into the financing of claims.

The panel highlighted that post-M&A arbitration presents particular structural features that make funding attractive: claims tend to be discrete, liability-driven, and supported by extensive transactional documentation, all of which improve underwriting predictability. As funders refine their models for valuing M&A disputes, the conference signaled that capital is poised to play a more visible role in shaping which claims are pursued and how they are resolved.

Funded Class Action Delivers NZ$125 Million Win Against ANZ in New Zealand High Court

By John Freund |

Litigation funding played a decisive role in a landmark New Zealand High Court ruling that has left ANZ Bank New Zealand facing potential liability of up to NZ$125 million. The class action, brought on behalf of approximately 17,000 borrowers, would not have been viable without backing from funders LPF Group and CASL, which financed the proceedings against the country's largest bank.

As reported by LawFuel, Justice Geoffrey Venning delivered summary judgment against ANZ on May 4, 2026, finding the bank in breach of disclosure obligations under the Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 2003 (CCCFA). The case turned on a coding error in ANZ's loan systems that affected variation letters issued between June 2015 and May 2016. Although the bank argued the underpayments averaged just NZ$2 per customer per month, the court held that "technical errors in disclosure, no matter how small the financial impact, trigger automatic statutory penalties."

ANZ was ordered to refund the lead plaintiffs NZ$32,728.42, establishing a benchmark that, when extrapolated across the class, produces the NZ$125 million exposure figure. The judgment rejected ANZ's "no harm" defense, confirming that Section 22 of the CCCFA imposes strict liability regardless of actual financial harm.

ANZ chief executive Antonia Watson described the consequences as "disproportionate." The bank reported after-tax New Zealand profit of roughly NZ$1.4 billion last year. The decision underscores how funded class actions are reshaping consumer redress in jurisdictions where individual claims would be uneconomic to pursue.

EU Court of Justice to Weigh Litigation Funding’s Impact on Antitrust Enforcement

By John Freund |

The Court of Justice of the European Union is set to examine whether certain forms of litigation financing risk undermining the effectiveness of the bloc's antitrust laws, in a referral that could reshape the funding landscape for cross-border consumer class actions. The case originates from Portugal and centers on the funding arrangements supporting Ius Omnibus, a non-profit consumer protection association that has emerged as a prominent claimant in European competition litigation.

As reported by MLex, the CJEU will determine whether class actions backed by particular funding structures pose a risk to the public-interest objectives of EU antitrust enforcement. The referral asks the court to assess whether economic incentives embedded in third-party funding can coexist with the bloc's competition rules or whether they create conflicts that compromise enforcement quality.

The decision is expected to carry significant implications for consumer associations and class representatives across Europe, many of which rely on outside capital to pursue mass claims against companies accused of anticompetitive conduct. A ruling that restricts certain funding models could narrow the financial pathways available to non-profit claimants, while a ruling that affirms flexible structures would reinforce that alternative finance is compatible with robust enforcement.

The case arrives as European policymakers continue to debate the boundaries of permissible litigation funding under the Representative Actions Directive and as national courts in Germany, the Netherlands, and Portugal develop divergent approaches to funder disclosure and control. The CJEU's eventual judgment is poised to set a binding precedent across all 27 member states.