Valuing Indemnity Protection Investment Returns in Litigation Finance

The following article is part of an ongoing column titled ‘Investor Insights.’ 

Brought to you by Ed Truant, founder and content manager of Slingshot Capital, ‘Investor Insights’ will provide thoughtful and engaging perspectives on all aspects of investing in litigation finance. 

Executive Summary

  • Indemnities are not costless instruments; they are akin to securities options, but without a stated option value
  • Approaches to determining cost of indemnity include: Probability weighted outcome approach, Opportunity Cost Approach and Approach based on empirical evidence
  • Implications for Portfolio Returns are that improper assessment of indemnity returns may materially skew return results of a portfolio

Investor Insights

o   Indemnities have a cost and their cost should be used to determine investor returnso   Depending on how indemnity performance is measured, it has the ability to skew portfolio performance

Some litigation finance providers offer a product called indemnity protection (please don’t call it insurance), which is a product designed to protect plaintiffs against adverse costs in certain jurisdictions (Canada, Australia and the UK, for example) where the plaintiff may be found liable for defense costs should the defendant win the case.  Indemnity protection is prevalent in product class action and securities class action cases.

What makes indemnity protection challenging is the process of estimating the returns inherent to providing the protection.  Indemnities differ from traditional litigation finance, in that the latter requires the funder to finance hard costs (legal counsel, court costs, expert witness costs, etc.), while the former only pays out once a case is lost by the plaintiff, and subject to the court’s determination regarding the application of adverse costs.  In the event the plaintiff is successful, the indemnity provider shares in the contingent proceeds and is not liable for any payout.

However, in the event the defendant is successful, the indemnity provider must pay the indemnity amount and forego any prospective proceeds.  In a normal rate of return calculation, the numerator (i.e. gains or proceeds) and denominator (dollars deployed to finance costs) help determine a Return on Invested Capital (“ROIC”) or Multiple of Invested Capital (“MOIC”). However, with indemnities there is no denominator; in the event the plaintiff wins the case and hence there is no “cost”.

Or is there?

I think most people in finance would argue strongly, and rightly so, that there is indeed a cost.  I liken the analysis to that of a securities option.  In the context of a securities option (a put or call option, for example) one pays an upfront amount (i.e. the option price) to attain the right to benefit in either the reduction or increase in the underlying stock price.  The value of the option is based on the market’s view of the weighted average probability of the event taking place (i.e. achieving the strike price in a given period of time).

In the case of an indemnity, there is no cost to providing the indemnity (other than out of-pocket contracting costs) even though the opportunity has value to the indemnity provider.  The value of the indemnity for the investor is inherent in the pay-out they expect to receive on success, which is offset by the likelihood of having to pay out under the indemnity.  Essentially, it is a costless option.  The upside produces infinite returns, while the downside produces a total loss.

Approaches to Valuing the Indemnity Protection

As we all know, nothing is “costless”. Instead, I would suggest that an investor in an indemnity needs to determine a theoretical cost for that investment.

One approach is to look at the litigation funder’s underwriting report and economic analysis to determine the probabilities associated with various negative outcomes pertaining to the case, and probability-weight the negative outcomes to determine a theoretical cost of capital. Of course, these need to be looked at in the context of the risks of the various case types in the relevant jurisdiction, in addition to the risks of the case through the various stages of the case, as adverse costs can have multiple pay-out points throughout the case.  As an example, securities class actions in Australia and Canada, when certified by a court, have an extremely high success rate (meaning that they typically settle quickly after the certification).

Another approach might be to look at the alternative to utilizing that same capital in an investment with a similar risk profile, where the potential outcome could be the same and the risk of loss is similar.  As an example, if the opportunity cost of providing an indemnity was to buy a securities option with a similar risk profile, then you could use the market cost of the option as a proxy for the cost of the indemnity.

Yet another alternative would be to study the outcomes of a large sample of identical indemnities to try and determine the probability of a negative outcome and apply it to the indemnity amount to determine a notional cost.  Unfortunately, much of this information remains in the private domain, as most cases which use indemnity protection tend to settle.  In time, it may be that there is sufficient data to make this approach realistic, but as it stands, there is insufficient data to make this a viable alternative.

While approaches will differ by fund manager and investor, the important point is to eschew the concept that an indemnity is a costless financial instrument, as to do so would skew the results inherent in a fund manager’s track record where indemnities are an important part of their strategy.  This same result can also occur in more traditional litigation finance cases where there is a settlement shortly after the funding contract has been entered into, and which did not necessitate the drawing of capital.  In this case, the returns are also infinite, but perhaps there should have been a theoretical cost of capital based on the probability of the funding contract being drawn upon.

Investor Insights: When assessing the rates of return on an indemnity, my approach is to determine a weighted average probability of loss outcomes and apply them to the Indemnity amount in order to determine a notional cost for the indemnity.  This analysis becomes extremely important when assessing portfolio performance because most often fund managers do not assign a notional cost to their indemnities when providing their investment track records, and hence positive indemnity outcomes make their overall portfolio performance seem more impressive than one might otherwise assess.  A simplified example of the potential for an indemnity to skew portfolio performance based on approach is as follows:

Assumptions:

Case Type:                             Security Class Action

Indemnity Amount:             $1,000,000

Damage Claim:                      $10,000,000

Contingent Interest:              10%

Contingent Interest Award:  $1,000,000

Probability of Loss                $ Loss*

Loss at Summary Judgement:                  10%                     $100,000

Loss at Certification:                                   5%                       $50,000

Loss at Trial:                                                 25%                     $250,000

Notional Cost of Indemnity:                                                  $400,000

* calculated as probability of loss multiplied by Indemnity Amount.

  1. Return Calculation applying a theoretical cost to the Indemnity in a win scenario:

ROIC: =       $600,000 ($1,000,0000-$400,000) = 150%
$400,000

MOIC:                  $1,000,000 = 2.5
$400,000

  1. Return Calculation applying no cost to the indemnity in a win scenario:

MOIC &
ROIC:          $1,000,000 = Infinite
$0

Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc. and an investor in the consumer and commercial litigation finance industry. Slingshot’s blog posts can be accessed at www.slingshotcap.com.

Commercial

View All

CAT Finds in Favour of Professor Andreas Stephan in Amazon Claims

By Harry Moran |

Whilst last week saw a flurry of activity in the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) as trials began in multiple collective proceedings, this week has seen the Tribunal hand down a ruling in a carriage dispute between two claims both targeting Amazon for allegations of anticompetitive behaviour.

A press release from Geradin Partners highlights the judgment from the CAT in a carriage dispute, which saw the Tribunal find in favour of Professor Andreas Stephan in collective proceedings being brought against Amazon. The carriage dispute related to the parallel claims brought by Professor Stephan and by the British Independent Retailers Association (BIRA), over allegations that Amazon engaged in anticompetitive practices that harmed third-party sellers on the online marketplace. Professor Stephan’s proceedings had instructed Geradin Partners and secured litigation funding from Innsworth, whilst BIRA had instructed Willkie Farr & Gallagher and agreed to funding from Litigation Capital Management (LCM).

In its ruling, the CAT found that whilst BIRA had an advantage in its suitability to act as the class representative, “this was clearly outweighed by the factors which favour Prof Stephan”, which it identified as “the scope of the claims and the expert methodology.” Although the CAT highlighted that the breadth of Professor Stephan’s claims “would no doubt enlarge the scope of a trial and therefore make it more complicated”, the ruling cited case law in emphasising that his claims “more consistent with the goals of access to justice by capturing more viable claims”.

The published judgment also shed light on the details of the funding arrangements in the claims. Professor Stephan’s litigation funding agreement (LFA) with Innsworth committed a maximum of £32.9 million to cover costs and expenses, with an additional commitment “to pay adverse costs of £5 million until the grant or refusal of a CPO and of £20 million thereafter.” As to the returns outlined in the funding agreement, Professor Stephan’s LFA with Innsworth “provides for a total multiple rising from 4 up to 10 (if the recovery is after the commencement of the substantive trial).” The CAT noted that the returns from Professor Stephan’s LFA were higher than for the funder in the BIRA claim, in the conclusion of its examination the Tribunal noted that “the funding arrangements of the two applications are a neutral factor in choosing between them.”

The CAT’s full judgment in the carriage dispute can be read here.

Additional analysis of the CAT’s ruling and its implications for future carriage disputes for funded proceedings can be found in a LinkedIn post from Matthew Lo, director at Exton Advisors.

Ayse Yazir Appointed Managing Director at Bench Walk Advisors

By Harry Moran |

Ayse Yazir has started a new position as Managing Director at Bench Walk Advisors. This latest promotion comes in the seventh year of Yazir’s tenure at the market-leading litigation funder, having joined the firm in 2018 as a Vice President and most recently having served as Global Head of Origination.

In a post on LinkedIn, Yazir reveals that her work at Bench Walk Advisors incorporates a wide range of matters across the litigation funding industry including international and commercial arbitration, insolvency, class actions and global litigation matters as well as law firm and corporate portfolio arrangements and defense funding.

Yazir also expressed her delight at starting the new role and thanked her fellow Bench Walk Advisors’ managing directors Stuart Grant and Adrian Chopin for the opportunity.

Judge Preska Orders Argentina to Comply with Burford Discovery Request

By Harry Moran |

As we enter yet another year in the story of the $16.1 billion award in the case funded by Burford Capital against the YPF oil and gas company, a US judge has ordered the Argentine government to provide additional information about the country’s financial assets to the funder as part of its efforts to collect on the award.

An article in the Buenos Aires Herald provides an update on the ongoing fight to recover the $16.1 billion award in the YPF lawsuit, as a New York judge ordered Argentina to comply with a discovery request for information around the Argentine Central Bank’s gold reserves. The order handed down by Judge Loretta Preska followed the request made by Burford Capital in October of last year, with the litigation funder citing media reports that Argentina’s Central Bank had moved a portion of its gold reserves overseas.

Lawyers for Argentina’s government had submitted a letter last week arguing against the discovery request on the grounds that the Argentine Republic and Central Bank are legally separate entities, and that any such gold reserves have “special protection from execution under [United States’ Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] and UK law.” Responding to these arguments in her order, Judge Preska stated plainly that “regardless of whether the gold reserves are held by [the Central Bank], the Republic shall produce its own documents concerning the reserves.”

Judge Preska also ordered the Argentine government to provide additional information concerning its SWIFT data on its overseas accounts and for documents from another lawsuit brought against the Republic, saying that all this information could “lead to other executable assets.”