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What Lloyd v. Google Means for UK Class Actions and Litigation Funders

July 18, 2022

What Lloyd v. Google Means for UK Class Actions and Litigation Funders

The Lloyd v. Google claim has given rise to some thought-provoking questions:
  • Has Google breached its duties as a data controller? If so, have class members of the ensuing collective action suffered quantifiable damages?
  • How exactly should “same interest” be determined in a case regarding the misuse of data?
  • Do individual members of a class have to demonstrate material harm in order to receive recompense?
In the following article, we will explore the answers to these and other questions that have arisen from Case UKSC 2019/0213, otherwise known as Lloyd v. Google. What Exactly Happened? Richard Lloyd, sought to file a claim against tech giant Google, asking for compensation pursuant to section 13 of the Data Protection Act of 1998. The accusation involves the use of cookies in a ‘Safari workaround’ that ultimately collected, then disseminated, user data into metrics that were then used to employ targeted advertising to users. This alleged misuse ostensibly impacted over four million iPhone users in England and Wales, whose data was unlawfully accessed by Google. Google’s use of the data was found to be a breach of DPA1998. Lloyd sued not only on his own behalf, but on behalf of others whose data was treated similarly. Google fought the suit, saying that class members could not demonstrate material harm from the misuse of data. In a case like this one, ‘material harm’ could include monetary losses or mental anguish stemming from the illegal harvesting or dissemination of data. Lloyd’s claim was backed by Therium, a prominent litigation funder specializing in tech-related cases. Lloyd’s legal team argued that the ‘same interest’ mandate had been satisfied, and that awarding all class members the same sum in damages is reasonable—without a need to delve into the personal circumstances of every individual claimant. The Decision  Initially, the High Court ruled in favor of Google. When the court of appeal reversed the ruling, Google appealed again to the Supreme Court. In the majority decision, Lord Leggatt determined the following:
  • The determination of “damage” must include verifiable, material damages such as financial or mental anguish. Mere illegality of an action is not enough to necessitate financial recompence.
  • Damages must be demonstrated.
Why are the Facts Here so Important? Obviously, there is reason to be concerned when a tech company in control of an extremely large amount of user data is accused of illegally managing that data. In this instance, Google allegedly sold or used user data for commercial/money-making purposes. This was done without the knowledge or consent of its users. One could argue that any user who utilized Google on an Apple iPhone has reason to be dismayed (indeed, a similar case settled before going to trial). The case also illustrates the importance of opt-in versus opt-out models, as well as what can happen when the majority of class members choose to abstain from involvement in the case proceedings. Under Lord Leggatt’s ruling, an opt-out model is not feasible in any instance requiring that class members be able to show tangible losses. Ultimately, tech giants like Google are required to abide by their own user agreements. However, users must prove suffering beyond the violation of their right to privacy. Ironically, one area of doubt in such a case arises over how shares of a payout (to litigation funders, for example) can properly be calculated without consent of all class members. Just as many class members in an opt-out proceeding may not know the details of the case, they also may be totally unaware of the claim, or of how any proceeds are to be divided. What Do These Developments Mean for Litigation Funders and Potential Claimants? The idea that a claimant must demonstrate damages in order to receive compensation is neither new nor controversial. But it does put a damper on collective actions with high class member counts. Especially when looking at cases against huge companies like Visa/Mastercard, Apple, or Google. Many would argue that it’s simply not feasible to collect information about losses from millions of potential claimants. So, while this line of thinking is reasonable under English law, it may well discourage litigation funders from taking on cases requiring that all class members demonstrate individual losses. This, in turn, will make the pursuit of justice more difficult for potential members of a wronged class. For litigation funders, the difference between one potential claimant in a case and the millions who could have been class members in Lloyd v Google is significant. While we know that funders ultimately back cases to increase access to justice and give claimants a day in court—we also know that this relies on investors, whose motivation to invest is profit-driven. In short, litigation finance only works in the long term, when it’s financially advantageous to investors. The question of privacy rights is a tricky one. Having one’s privacy violated is, as the phrase suggests, a violation. But as it typically has no financial component beyond the negative feelings associated, it is unlikely to serve as a demonstrable loss in a case involving user data (unless, of course, a further demonstrable loss can be proven). At the same time, it is clear that Google misused user data, intentionally and without consent—with an eye toward financial gain. Surely it makes sense that Google should share some of that income with the users whose data was breached? Not according to the UK Supreme Court, apparently. A Missed Opportunity  Had Lloyd vs. Google succeeded in the way Lloyd intended, it could have changed the way class actions in data cases were handled by the courts. Essentially, opt-out class actions could have flourished as individual class members wouldn’t be required to demonstrate financial damages. This has particular relevance to data cases, because when data companies use information in ways that are not in keeping with their own TOS, users may not be damaged financially. But this lack of demonstrable damages doesn’t necessarily mean a) data companies don’t have a moral obligation to offer users recompense, or b) that users aren’t deserving of a payout when they are wronged. Had Lloyd’s legal team instead used a bifurcated approach to the proceedings, a smaller opt-in class could perhaps have enabled a stronger case through the gathering of evidence—specifically evidence of damages. Similarly, a Group Litigation Order (GLO), which, despite what some see as high administrative costs, would have better determined eligibility for class members. This, in turn, would have allowed for a better test of the case’s merits. In Conclusion Lloyd vs. Google demonstrates the importance of several aspects of class action litigation, including how opt-in versus opt-out impacts the collection, as well as ability to bring evidence of damages. This promises to be a factor in future tech cases—not just in the UK, but globally. Will the failure to secure damages for those whose data was misused embolden Big Tech? Will it serve as a warning? Could it discourage litigation funders from backing such cases? We’ll have to wait and see. For now, it’s clear that Lloyd vs. Google has left its mark on the UK legal and litigation funding worlds—and on Big Tech as a whole.

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Commercial

Litigation Funding Ethics: What Attorneys Must Weigh Before Saying Yes

By John Freund |

Third party litigation funding has evolved from a niche financing option into a mainstream tool for law firms seeking to manage risk and pursue complex or capital intensive cases. As funding becomes more accessible, attorneys are increasingly evaluating whether outside capital can support growth, extend runway, or enable representation of clients who might otherwise lack resources. However, the expansion of litigation finance has also brought renewed scrutiny to the ethical considerations lawyers must address before entering into funding arrangements.

An article in JD Supra outlines several critical issues attorneys should consider when evaluating third party funding. One of the most significant distinctions is between contingent funding arrangements and traditional non recourse loans. In contingent structures, funders receive a percentage of any recovery, which can raise concerns under long standing prohibitions against fee sharing with non lawyers and doctrines such as champerty. While a handful of jurisdictions have relaxed these rules, most states continue to prohibit arrangements that resemble equity participation in legal fees. Attorneys operating across jurisdictions must be particularly cautious to ensure compliance with applicable professional conduct rules.

Even traditional funding structures can present ethical challenges. Although non recourse loans are generally more widely accepted, conflicts can arise if a funder’s financial interests diverge from those of the client. For example, a lender may prefer an earlier settlement that ensures repayment, while a client may wish to pursue prolonged litigation in hopes of a larger recovery. The article emphasizes that lawyers must retain full independence in decision making and ensure that funding agreements do not give funders control over litigation strategy or settlement decisions.

Client consent and transparency are also central considerations. Attorneys should disclose funding arrangements where required, obtain informed client consent before sharing any information with funders, and remain mindful of evolving court disclosure requirements.

Announcements Case Developments Commercial

High Court Refuses BHP Permission to Appeal Landmark Mariana Liability Judgment 

By John Freund |

Pogust Goodhead welcomes the decision of Mrs Justice O’Farrell DBE refusing BHP’s application for permission to appeal the High Court’s judgment on liability in the Mariana disaster litigation. The ruling marks a major step forward in the pursuit of justice for over 620,000 Brazilian claimants affected by the worst environmental disaster in the country’s history. 

The refusal leaves the High Court’s findings undisturbed at first instance: that BHP is liable under Brazilian law for its role in the catastrophic collapse of the Fundão dam in 2015. In a landmark ruling handed down last November, the Court found the collapse was caused by BHP’s negligence, imprudence and/or lack of skill, confirmed that all claimants are in time and stated that municipalities can pursue their claims in England. 

In today’s ruling, following the consequentials hearing held last December, the court concluded that BHP’s proposed grounds of appeal have “no real prospect of success”. 

In her judgment, Mrs Justice O’Farrell stated:  “In summary, despite the clear and careful submissions of Ms Fatima KC, leading counsel for the defendants, the appeal has no real prospect of success. There is no other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard. Although the Judgment may be of interest to other parties in other jurisdictions, it is a decision on issues of Brazilian law established as fact in this jurisdiction, together with factual and expert evidence. For the above reasons, permission to appeal is refused”. 

At the December hearing, the claimants - represented by Pogust Goodhead - argued that BHP’s application was an attempt to overturn detailed findings of fact reached after an extensive five-month trial, by recasting its disagreement with the outcome as alleged procedural flaws. The claimants submitted that appellate courts do not re-try factual findings and that BHP’s approach was, in substance, an attempt to secure a retrial. 

Today’s judgment confirmed that the liability judgment involved findings of Brazilian law as fact, based on extensive expert and factual evidence, and rejected the defendants’ arguments, who now have 28 days to apply to the Court of Appeal.  

Jonathan Wheeler, Partner at Pogust Goodhead and lead of the Mariana litigation, said:  “This is a major step forward. Today’s decision reinforces the strength and robustness of the High Court’s findings and brings hundreds of thousands of claimants a step closer to redress for the immense harm they have suffered.” 

“BHP’s application for permission to appeal shows it continues to treat this as a case to be managed, not a humanitarian and environmental disaster that demands a just outcome. Every further procedural manoeuvre brings more delay, more cost and more harm for people who have already waited more than a decade for proper compensation.” 

Mônica dos Santos, a resident of Bento Rodrigues (a district in Mariana) whose house was buried by the avalanche of tailings, commented:  "This is an important victory. Ten years have passed since the crime, and more than 80 residents of Bento Rodrigues have died without receiving their new homes. Hundreds of us have not received fair compensation for what we have been through. It is unacceptable that, after so much suffering and so many lives interrupted, the company is still trying to delay the process to escape its responsibility." 

Legal costs 

The Court confirmed that the claimants were the successful party and ordered the defendants to pay 90% of the claimants’ Stage 1 Trial costs, subject to detailed assessment, and to make a £43 million payment on account. The Court also made clear that the order relates to Stage 1 Trial costs only; broader case costs will depend on the ultimate outcome of the proceedings. 

The costs award reflects the scale and complexity of the Mariana case and the way PG has conducted this litigation for more than seven years on a no-win, no-fee basis - funding an unprecedented claimant cohort and extensive client-facing infrastructure in Brazil without charging clients. This recovery is separate from any damages award and does not reduce, replace or affect the compensation clients may ultimately receive. 

Case Developments Commercial

Homebuyers Prepare Competition Claims Against Major UK Housebuilders

By John Freund |

A group of UK homebuyers is preparing to bring competition law claims against some of the country’s largest housebuilders, alleging anti competitive conduct that inflated new home prices. The prospective litigation represents another significant test of collective redress mechanisms in the UK and is expected to rely heavily on third party funding to move forward.

An announcement from Hausfeld outlines plans for claims alleging that leading residential developers exchanged commercially sensitive information and coordinated conduct in a way that restricted competition in the housing market. The proposed claims follow an investigation by the UK competition regulator, which raised concerns about how housebuilders may have shared data on pricing, sales rates, and incentives through industry platforms. According to the claimant lawyers, this conduct may have reduced competitive pressure and led to higher prices for consumers.

The claims are being framed as follow on damages actions, allowing homebuyers to rely on regulatory findings as a foundation for civil recovery. The litigation is expected to target multiple large developers and could involve tens of thousands of affected purchasers, given the scale of the UK new build market during the relevant period. While damages per claimant may be relatively modest, the aggregate exposure could be substantial.

From a procedural perspective, the case highlights the continued evolution of collective competition claims in the UK. Bringing complex, multi defendant actions on behalf of large consumer groups requires significant upfront investment, both financially and operationally. Litigation funding is therefore likely to be central, covering legal fees, expert economic analysis, and the administration required to manage large claimant cohorts.