Trending Now
  • An LFJ Conversation with Rory Kingan, CEO of Eperoto
  • New York Enacts Landmark Consumer Legal Funding Legislation
Commercial Special Features

What Lloyd v. Google Means for UK Class Actions and Litigation Funders

July 18, 2022

What Lloyd v. Google Means for UK Class Actions and Litigation Funders

The Lloyd v. Google claim has given rise to some thought-provoking questions:
  • Has Google breached its duties as a data controller? If so, have class members of the ensuing collective action suffered quantifiable damages?
  • How exactly should “same interest” be determined in a case regarding the misuse of data?
  • Do individual members of a class have to demonstrate material harm in order to receive recompense?
In the following article, we will explore the answers to these and other questions that have arisen from Case UKSC 2019/0213, otherwise known as Lloyd v. Google. What Exactly Happened? Richard Lloyd, sought to file a claim against tech giant Google, asking for compensation pursuant to section 13 of the Data Protection Act of 1998. The accusation involves the use of cookies in a ‘Safari workaround’ that ultimately collected, then disseminated, user data into metrics that were then used to employ targeted advertising to users. This alleged misuse ostensibly impacted over four million iPhone users in England and Wales, whose data was unlawfully accessed by Google. Google’s use of the data was found to be a breach of DPA1998. Lloyd sued not only on his own behalf, but on behalf of others whose data was treated similarly. Google fought the suit, saying that class members could not demonstrate material harm from the misuse of data. In a case like this one, ‘material harm’ could include monetary losses or mental anguish stemming from the illegal harvesting or dissemination of data. Lloyd’s claim was backed by Therium, a prominent litigation funder specializing in tech-related cases. Lloyd’s legal team argued that the ‘same interest’ mandate had been satisfied, and that awarding all class members the same sum in damages is reasonable—without a need to delve into the personal circumstances of every individual claimant. The Decision  Initially, the High Court ruled in favor of Google. When the court of appeal reversed the ruling, Google appealed again to the Supreme Court. In the majority decision, Lord Leggatt determined the following:
  • The determination of “damage” must include verifiable, material damages such as financial or mental anguish. Mere illegality of an action is not enough to necessitate financial recompence.
  • Damages must be demonstrated.
Why are the Facts Here so Important? Obviously, there is reason to be concerned when a tech company in control of an extremely large amount of user data is accused of illegally managing that data. In this instance, Google allegedly sold or used user data for commercial/money-making purposes. This was done without the knowledge or consent of its users. One could argue that any user who utilized Google on an Apple iPhone has reason to be dismayed (indeed, a similar case settled before going to trial). The case also illustrates the importance of opt-in versus opt-out models, as well as what can happen when the majority of class members choose to abstain from involvement in the case proceedings. Under Lord Leggatt’s ruling, an opt-out model is not feasible in any instance requiring that class members be able to show tangible losses. Ultimately, tech giants like Google are required to abide by their own user agreements. However, users must prove suffering beyond the violation of their right to privacy. Ironically, one area of doubt in such a case arises over how shares of a payout (to litigation funders, for example) can properly be calculated without consent of all class members. Just as many class members in an opt-out proceeding may not know the details of the case, they also may be totally unaware of the claim, or of how any proceeds are to be divided. What Do These Developments Mean for Litigation Funders and Potential Claimants? The idea that a claimant must demonstrate damages in order to receive compensation is neither new nor controversial. But it does put a damper on collective actions with high class member counts. Especially when looking at cases against huge companies like Visa/Mastercard, Apple, or Google. Many would argue that it’s simply not feasible to collect information about losses from millions of potential claimants. So, while this line of thinking is reasonable under English law, it may well discourage litigation funders from taking on cases requiring that all class members demonstrate individual losses. This, in turn, will make the pursuit of justice more difficult for potential members of a wronged class. For litigation funders, the difference between one potential claimant in a case and the millions who could have been class members in Lloyd v Google is significant. While we know that funders ultimately back cases to increase access to justice and give claimants a day in court—we also know that this relies on investors, whose motivation to invest is profit-driven. In short, litigation finance only works in the long term, when it’s financially advantageous to investors. The question of privacy rights is a tricky one. Having one’s privacy violated is, as the phrase suggests, a violation. But as it typically has no financial component beyond the negative feelings associated, it is unlikely to serve as a demonstrable loss in a case involving user data (unless, of course, a further demonstrable loss can be proven). At the same time, it is clear that Google misused user data, intentionally and without consent—with an eye toward financial gain. Surely it makes sense that Google should share some of that income with the users whose data was breached? Not according to the UK Supreme Court, apparently. A Missed Opportunity  Had Lloyd vs. Google succeeded in the way Lloyd intended, it could have changed the way class actions in data cases were handled by the courts. Essentially, opt-out class actions could have flourished as individual class members wouldn’t be required to demonstrate financial damages. This has particular relevance to data cases, because when data companies use information in ways that are not in keeping with their own TOS, users may not be damaged financially. But this lack of demonstrable damages doesn’t necessarily mean a) data companies don’t have a moral obligation to offer users recompense, or b) that users aren’t deserving of a payout when they are wronged. Had Lloyd’s legal team instead used a bifurcated approach to the proceedings, a smaller opt-in class could perhaps have enabled a stronger case through the gathering of evidence—specifically evidence of damages. Similarly, a Group Litigation Order (GLO), which, despite what some see as high administrative costs, would have better determined eligibility for class members. This, in turn, would have allowed for a better test of the case’s merits. In Conclusion Lloyd vs. Google demonstrates the importance of several aspects of class action litigation, including how opt-in versus opt-out impacts the collection, as well as ability to bring evidence of damages. This promises to be a factor in future tech cases—not just in the UK, but globally. Will the failure to secure damages for those whose data was misused embolden Big Tech? Will it serve as a warning? Could it discourage litigation funders from backing such cases? We’ll have to wait and see. For now, it’s clear that Lloyd vs. Google has left its mark on the UK legal and litigation funding worlds—and on Big Tech as a whole.

Commercial

View All
Commercial

Avoiding Pitfalls as Litigation Finance Takes Off

By John Freund |

The litigation finance market is poised for significant activity in 2026 after a period of uncertainty in 2025. A recent JD Supra analysis outlines key challenges that can derail deals in this evolving space and offers guidance on how industry participants can navigate them effectively.

The article explains that litigation finance sits at the intersection of law and finance and presents unique deal complexities that differ from other private credit or investment structures. While these transactions can deliver attractive returns for capital providers, they also carry risks that often cause deals to collapse if not properly managed.

A central theme in the analysis is that many deals fail for three primary reasons: a lack of trust between the parties, misunderstandings around deal terms, and the impact of time. Term sheets typically outline economic and non-economic terms but may omit finer details, leading to confusion if not addressed early. As the diligence and documentation process unfolds, delays and surprises can erode confidence and derail negotiations.

To counter these pitfalls, the piece stresses the importance of building trust from the outset. Transparent communication and good-faith behavior by both the financed party and the funder help foster long-term goodwill. The financed party is encouraged to disclose known weaknesses in the claim early, while funders are urged to present clear economic models and highlight potential sticking points so that expectations align.

Another key recommendation is ensuring all parties fully understand deal terms. Because litigation funding recipients may not regularly engage in such transactions, well-developed term sheets and upfront discussions about obligations like reporting, reimbursements, and cooperation in the underlying litigation can prevent later misunderstandings.

The analysis also underscores that time kills deals. Prolonged negotiations or sluggish responses during diligence can sap momentum and lead parties to lose interest. Setting realistic timelines and communicating clearly about responsibilities and deadlines can keep transactions on track.

Commercial Regulatory Issues

Labour MP Comes Out Swinging Against Litigation Funding

By John Freund |

Litigation funding has become a fixture in modern civil justice systems, designed to open the courts to claimants who lack the means to pursue meritorious claims. But a recent opinion piece by Labour MP Oliver Ryan argues that in the UK, the industry is increasingly drifting from that core purpose and instead serving the financial interests of investors and funders at the expense of real victims.

An article in City A.M. states that while third-party litigation funding has a legitimate role in enabling access to justice, market incentives are now skewing the system. Ryan highlights examples including the UK government’s move to “protect litigation funding” and reverse the Paccar ruling—a Supreme Court decision that had cast doubt on traditional fee structures—arguing that policy solutions must reflect how the market actually operates on the ground, not just how policymakers hope it will.

Ryan points to the handling of the Post Office scandal as a stark case in point. Despite grievous harms suffered by sub-postmasters, he notes that approximately 80 percent of damages paid eventually flowed to funders and lawyers rather than victims—an outcome he says “cannot be right.” He also cites the collapse of a cavity insulation claim and management upheavals in a multi-billion-pound class action against BHP as examples of how funder-centric incentives can undermine claimant outcomes and system integrity.

Rather than calling for an end to litigation funding, Ryan urges reforms centered on capping excessive funder returns, enforcing capital adequacy protections for claimants, tightening marketing oversight, and rebalancing incentives so victims—not investors—are the primary beneficiaries of successful claims.

Case Developments Commercial

Private Investors Eye Profits in L.A. County Sex Abuse Settlements

An investigation reveals that private investors are positioning themselves to profit from the enormous pool of money flowing from Los Angeles County’s historic sex abuse litigation. The county has already agreed to spend nearly $5 billion this year resolving thousands of claims related to alleged sexual abuse in its juvenile detention and foster care systems, including a $4 billion settlement—the largest of its kind in U.S. history.

An article in the Los Angeles Times explains that proponents of this investor involvement argue such financing gives plaintiffs’ attorneys the capital they need to take on deep-pocketed defendants and helps victims who lack resources access justice. Records reviewed by the Times show that several law firms bringing these claims receive financial backing from private investors, often through opaque out-of-state entities and Delaware-based companies.

Backers contend the arrangement can level the legal playing field and expedite case filings and settlements. However, public officials and critics express alarm over the lack of transparency surrounding these investments and the possibility that significant portions of settlement money intended for survivors could instead flow to private financiers. Some county supervisors reported being contacted by investors asking about the potential profitability of the sex abuse suits, raising ethical concerns about treating human trauma as an “evergreen” revenue stream.

The backdrop to this investor interest is a surge in litigation following changes in California law that revived long-dormant abuse claims and spurred widespread advertising by plaintiff firms seeking new clients. Government scrutiny has heightened amid reports of questionable recruitment practices and potential fraud in some claims, and the county’s district attorney has launched an investigation into parts of the settlement process.