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Litigation Finance – Lessons Learned from Manager Under-Performance (part 1 of 2)

Litigation Finance – Lessons Learned from Manager Under-Performance (part 1 of 2)

The following article is part of an ongoing column titled ‘Investor Insights.’  Brought to you by Ed Truant, founder and content manager of Slingshot Capital, ‘Investor Insights’ will provide thoughtful and engaging perspectives on all aspects of investing in litigation finance.  Executive Summary
  • Business under-performance in the commercial litigation finance market has typically stemmed from 3 main causes
  • Business partner selection is critical to success & corporate culture
  • Portfolio Construction is critical to success and longevity in commercial litigation finance
  • The application of debt is generally not appropriate in the commercial litigation finance asset class, with some exceptions, but may be appropriate in other areas of legal finance
Slingshot Insights:
  • Spend the time to determine whether your partners are additive to what you are trying to achieve and understand their motivations
  • Debt is a magnifying glass on both ends
  • Portfolio concentration – even when you win, you lose
A number of years have passed since the commercial litigation finance industry was established in the UK, USA & Australia (the more mature markets of the global industry), and so I thought it appropriate to reflect on some of the lessons learned within the industry to extract insights both for investors and fund managers.  Some of these lessons resulted in the wind-down of funders, some resulted in restructurings of the management company and their funds, some represent a “failure to launch,” and some resulted in changes in ownership. Some of the failures have been more public in nature, whereas others have resulted in restructurings and new ownerships (reluctantly) behind the scenes, and while they may now appear to be healthy funders, they underwent some restructuring to get there. This article will not name the specific companies that have failed or faced significant adversity (they know who they are), but through a fair amount of rumour, press and feedback from former employees, one can start to assemble a story around the cause of fund failures related to a number of fund managers in various countries. Sometimes, the pioneers in an industry are those that make the biggest sacrifice for the good of those who follow in their footsteps (assuming they learn, which is why this article has been written). Marius Nasta of Redress Solutions PLC previously wrote an article entitled “Why do litigation funders fail?’ and this is an attempt to take a deeper look into the causes, and extract insights for fund managers and investors. This article will not touch on the various frauds that may have occurred in the industry as those are beyond the scope of this article, but bear scrutiny nonetheless.  For edification, some of the articles that cover those frauds can be found below. Interestingly, a recent case in the UK ended in a fourteen-year jail sentence for one of the founders of Axiom. Commercial Litigation Finance Axiom Legal Finance Argentum Consumer Litigation Finance Cash4Cases LawBuck$ and MFL Case Funding As I reviewed the various fund managers’ experiences in the industry with a focus on distressed situations, some themes started to arise which I have classified into various categories, as outlined below.  Sometimes, the cause is singular in nature and sometimes it is a combination of issues that result in an unexpected outcome resulting in a business setback, which can be fatal.  In any event, I think the following insights are ones that all fund managers and investors should take into consideration as they operate, diligence and invest in the commercial litigation finance market. Insight #1 – Pick Your Partners Slowly & Carefully & Don’t be Afraid to Walk Away There is an adage in human resources, “hire slowly and fire quickly”. The same holds true for any business where partnerships are involved, although the ‘firing’ aspect is much more difficult.  There is another adage that says you don’t really know your partners until you either start working together or until money is involved, and that is true of any venture where partners come together to form a business. In the early days of any asset class, there is a fervor and an anxiousness to ‘get on with it’ in order to capitalize on the opportunity before others beat you to it. As a consequence, partnerships are formed all too quickly and with the wrong partners, and typically among people that have never worked together before.  The first few months can be exhilarating and then reality sets in and eventually people’s ‘true colours’ start to show (both good and bad).  It is important in the early days of assessing the merits of a business partnership to have an open dialogue about business goals and expectations, roles and responsibilities, individual strengths and weaknesses, relative motivations and incentives, distractions (i.e. is one partner independently wealthy and the other living ‘paycheck to paycheck’, as these economic differences will surely result in motivational differences and likely impact the amount of time and effort each will spend on the business), and generally what each party is looking to get out of the business.  As this is a finance business, there are requirements around investor relations and fundraising to consider beyond the business of marketing, originating and deploying capital, and you need to be very clear what the expectations are of the partners in this regard, as it tends to be an ‘all hands on deck’ situation in the early days of establishing a business and some partners may not be comfortable with the fundraising role. Fund managers should be under no illusions, it’s extremely difficult to raise a new fund in a new market with limited liquidity, unknown duration and quasi-binary outcomes …. and all with no track record to show for it.  In fact, if you were to consult the investor playbook, these are often characteristics most investors absolutely avoid.  This is the task at hand for any new manager looking to establish themselves in the litigation finance sector. But the allure of big multiple payouts is often hard for investors to ignore, and that is in essence what has allowed this industry to grow and prosper (hope is a powerful aphrodisiac). Accordingly, the early days of forming a business can be very telling about how the business will perform and where tensions will arise.  In the field of litigation finance, your pool of experienced talent from which to hire is very limited, as the industry has not been around for a long time.  My observation is that some of the best funding teams in the world have a combination of partners with different business backgrounds and experiences. While litigation experience is clearly a desirable skill set to invest in litigation finance opportunities, finance experience is equally critical to the success of a litigation finance fund.  The important thing for partners is to recognize their strengths and weaknesses, and partner up with someone that fills the voids.  Of course, this all means that people need to be self-aware, and that can often be a challenge, especially with individuals who have had some success in their field and who have never been told of their ‘blind spots’ by their peers. The strongest and most effective teams I have come across in the industry have a combination of experience in litigation and finance. The value add of those with litigation experience is self-evident, although many litigators come with their own biases based on their experience which require balancing via a different perspective.  The value of those with finance experience is not only as a second set of eyes on the merits of the case (i.e. keep the biases in check), but perhaps more important are the structural benefits they can bring to the construction of the funding contract and their focus on risk mitigation. This is a subsector of specialty finance, after all. Nevertheless, a business partnership may under-perform for any number of reasons.  At that point, your options are quite limited. Generally, you have four options:
  • you can attempt to restructure your internal operations and economic allocations around the reality of people’s efforts and value they bring to the partnership, so that there are appropriate incentives and procedures in place to deal with issues (good luck with that one),
  • you can exit and start from scratch, with the appropriate exit agreements in place which may make it more difficult to start a new business for the exiting partner in the short term (while more difficult, this may ultimately be the most rewarding (financially and ‘spiritually’) if it can be done successfully),
  • Status Quo – you can attempt to make it work, although the issue is that this may ultimately result in significant resentment, which in turn makes it extremely difficult to create an environment to attract top talent, and generally results in a sub-par business. In essence, you’re just delaying the inevitable, and potentially degrading the value of the business in the interim.
Of course, if one of those three doesn’t work, there is always the nuclear option – blow it up & start over, separately.  This tends to be the ‘scorched earth’ option where the partners decide that if they all aren’t going to benefit, then no one will benefit. While this does nothing for reputations and personal brands, it can be immensely satisfying (albeit short lived) for the partner that has suffered the most. Generally, people should try to avoid this option, if at all possible. Selecting partners (and hiring employees in general) is the single most important value driver for equity creation in the fund management business (secular trends also help, a lot!) yet it is constantly the area where business owners spend the least time and attention. I encourage those looking to form a business to over-invest their time on the people side of the equation early on to avoid missteps. Just like marriages, business partnerships can be difficult even when they are working well. Insight #2 – Concentration is a Killer – Diversify, Diversify, Diversify One of the easiest errors to make in commercial litigation finance is to be inadequately diversified; and diversification should be multi-faceted.  I have covered the benefits of portfolio diversification in a prior article, but for this article, let’s talk about some of the challenges in creating a diversified business. Manager Bias…or Wishful Thinking The first challenge to creating a diversified portfolio is eliminating bias.  I have often heard fund managers refer to cases as “slam dunk cases”, only to be proven otherwise by a judicial decision.  I have also personally reviewed many cases where I thought the balance of probabilities outweighed the plaintiff over the defendant, only to be shown otherwise by a judicial outcome.  In short, no one knows.  What I do know, based on the extensive data I have reviewed, is that litigation finance is successful about 70% of the time (where “success” = profit), across geographies.  With a 70% success rate, I can figure out an appropriate portfolio construction (size, concentration, number of investments, case types, etc.) but if I allow my bias to enter into my decision making, I may make the mistake of putting too much of the fund in one transaction or case type (see below), and this one mistake may be fatal, as it could determine the overall outcome of the fund’s returns, and hence impact that manager’s ability to raise another fund. As your fund grows, you can then look to address bias through attracting different human capital to the business, each of whom will have different experiences (and biases) which will hopefully provide different perspectives that will result in superior decision making. The networks of these additional people will also add a different origination source to the business, which will further serve to diversify the portfolio through other case types, law firms, case sizes, case jurisdictions, etc.  All should serve to diversify and strengthen the business, if executed well. Deployment Risk  The second challenge is portfolio concentration relative to deployment risk.  In an asset class that has double deployment risk, the first level of deployment risk is the risk associated with whether the manager will invest the commitments. The second layer of deployment risk in litigation finance is whether the commitments made by the manager will draw 100% of the commitment, and this layer of risk is almost impossible to quantify, although there are ways to mitigate it. In commercial litigation finance it can be extremely difficult to create a diversified portfolio on a ‘dollars deployed’ basis, simply because you don’t know how much of your fund commitments will ultimately be deployed.  I have seen many limited partnership agreements that have 10% concentration limits.  Those concentration limits are based on funds committed, so on a funds deployed basis, those concentration limits could be well in excess of 10%.  With a 10% concentration limit, as goes those investments, so goes the fund, which is an overly risky position for a fund manager and investor to take.  We also can’t lose sight of the fact that for any given fund, about 15-25% (depending on your management fees & operating costs) of the fund’s commitments will be consumed by management fees and operating expenses, and so the fund manager is really investing seventy-five to eighty-five cent dollars, which makes portfolio concentration even riskier. Accordingly, fund managers should target fund concentration limits in the 5% range (5% of dollars deployed, that is), which would result in about 20 investments in any given fund, thereby giving the manager a reasonable chance at success, statistically speaking.  But, in order to achieve 5% concentration on a dollars deployed basis, they should really be looking at about fifty to seventy-five percent of that rate on a dollar committed basis.  Said differently, the fund manager should be targeting about a 2.5-3.5% concentration limit on a ‘dollars committed’ basis that may ultimately result in something closer to 5% on a dollars deployed basis for some of the investments in the portfolio (the same math does not hold true for managers that focus on investing in portfolio investments, which by their nature are diversified and cross-collateralized).  In part two of this two-part series, we further delve into portfolio construction issues, and then discuss the appropriateness of utilizing debt within the context of commercial litigation finance.   Slingshot Insights Much can be learned from the misfortune of others, and this is what I have attempted to summarize in the article.  To be fair, in the early days of an asset class, establishing a business is much more difficult than in more mature asset classes.  The learning curve, both for managers and investors, is steep, and those that came before were pioneers. There are a lot of unknown unknowns in commercial litigation finance, and things don’t often end up going the way people thought they would go, but we learn from the benefit of hindsight.  In short, establishing a new asset class is very difficult, and everyone can learn from the missteps of others as they build their own successful organizations.  Coupled with the difficulty inherent in establishing a new asset class is the fact that this asset class is unique with many risks that only come to light with the benefit of time – idiosyncratic case risk, double deployment risk, duration risk, quasi-binary risk, etc. Accordingly, the industry owes a debt of gratitude to those that came before as we are now smarter for their experiences. But beware!
Those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it!
                                                              – Winston Churchill (derived from a quote from George Santayana)
As always, I welcome your comments and counter-points to those raised in this article.  Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc. and an investor in the consumer and commercial litigation finance industry.  Slingshot Capital inc. provides capital advisory services to fund managers and institutional investors and is involved in the origination and design of unique opportunities in legal finance markets, globally.
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A Framework for Measuring Tech ROI in Litigation Finance

This article was contributed by Ankita Mehta, Founder, Lexity.ai - a platform that helps litigation funds automate deal execution and prove ROI.

How do litigation funders truly quantify the return on investment from adopting new technologies? It’s the defining question for any CEO, CTO or internal champion. The potential is compelling: for context, according to litigation funders using Lexity’s AI-powered workflows, ROI figures of up to 285% have been reported.

The challenge is that the cost of doing nothing is invisible. Manual processes, analyst burnout, and missed deals rarely appear on a balance sheet — but they quietly erode yield every quarter.

You can’t manage what you can’t measure. This article introduces a pragmatic framework for quantifying the true value of adopting technology solutions, replacing ‘low-value’ manual tasks and processes with AI and freeing up human capital to focus on ‘high-value’ activities that drive bottom line results  .

A Pragmatic Framework for Measuring AI ROI

A proper ROI calculation goes beyond simple time savings. It captures two distinct categories:

  1. Direct Cost Savings – what you save
  2. Increased Value Generation – what you gain

The ‘Cost’ Side (What You Save)

This is the most straightforward calculation, focused on eliminating “grunt work” and mitigating errors.

Metric 1: Direct Time Savings — Eliminating Manual Bottlenecks 

Start by auditing a single, high-cost bottleneck. For many funds, this is the Preliminary Case Assessment, a process that often takes two to three days of an expert analyst's time.

The calculation here is straightforward. By multiplying the hours saved per case by the analyst's blended cost and the number of cases reviewed, a fund can reveal a significant hard-dollar saving each month.

Consider a fund reviewing 20 cases per month. If a 2-day manual assessment can be cut to 4 hours using an AI-powered workflow, the fund reallocates hundreds of analyst-hours every month. That time is now moved from low-value data entry to high-value judgment and risk analysis.

Metric 2: Cost of Inconsistent Risk — Reducing Subjectivity 

This metric is more complex but just as critical. How much time is spent fixing inconsistent or error-prone reviews? More importantly, what is the financial impact of a bad deal slipping through screening, or a good deal being rejected because of a rushed, subjective review?

Lexity’s workflows standardise evaluation criteria and accelerate document/data extraction, converting subjective evaluations into consistent, auditable outputs. This reduces rework costs and helps mitigate hidden costs of human error in portfolio selection.

The ‘Benefit’ Side (What You Gain)

This is where the true strategic upside lies. It’s not just about saving time—it’s about reinvesting that time into higher-value activities that grow the fund.

Metric 3: Increased Deal Capacity — Scaling Without Headcount Growth

What if your team could analyze more deals with the same staff? Time saved from automation becomes time reallocated to new higher value opportunities, dramatically increasing the value of human contributions.

One of the funds working with Lexity have reported a 2x to 3x increase in deal review capacity without a corresponding increase in overhead. 

Metric 4: Cost of Capital Drag — Reducing Duration Risk 

Every month a case extends beyond its expected closing, that capital is locked up. It is "dead" capital that could have been redeployed into new, IRR-generating opportunities.

By reducing evaluation bottlenecks and creating more accurate baseline timelines from inception, a disciplined workflow accelerates the entire pipeline. 

This figure can be quantified by considering the amount of capital locked up, the fund's cost of capital, and the length of the delay. This conceptual model turns a vague risk ("duration risk") into a hard number that a fund can actively manage and reduce.

An ROI Model Is Useless Without Adoption

Even the most elegant ROI model is meaningless if the team won't use the solution. This is how expensive technology becomes "shelf-ware."

Successful adoption is not about the technology; it's about the process. It starts by:

  1. Establish Clear Goals and Identify Key Stakeholders: Set measurable goals and a baseline. Identify stakeholders, especially the teams performing the manual tasks- they will be the first to validate efficiency gains.
  2. Targeting "Grunt Work," Not "Judgment": Ask “What repetitive task steals time from real analysis?” The goal is to augment your experts, not replace them.
  3. Starting with One Problem: Don't try to "implement AI." Solve one high-value bottleneck, like Preliminary Case Assessment. Prove the value, then expand. 
  4. Focusing on Process Fit: The right technology enhances your workflow; it doesn’t complicate it.

Conclusion: From Calculation to Confidence

A high ROI isn't a vague projection; it’s what happens when a disciplined process meets intelligent automation.

By starting to measure what truly matters—reallocated hours, deal capacity, and capital drag—fund managers can turn ROI from a spreadsheet abstraction into a tangible, strategic advantage.

By Ankita Mehta Founder, Lexity.ai — a platform that helps litigation funds automate deal execution and prove ROI.

Burford Capital’s $35 M Antitrust Funding Claim Deemed Unsecured

By John Freund |

In a recent ruling, Burford Capital suffered a significant setback when a U.S. bankruptcy court determined that its funding agreement was not secured status.

According to an article from JD Journal, Burford had backed antitrust claims brought by Harvest Sherwood, a food distributor that filed for bankruptcy in May 2025, via a 2022 financing agreement. The capital advance was tied to potential claims worth about US$1.1 billion in damages against meat‑industry defendants.

What mattered most for Burford’s recovery strategy was its effort to treat the agreement as a loan with first‑priority rights. The court, however, ruled the deal lacked essential elements required to create a lien, trust or other secured interest. Instead, the funding was classified as an unsecured claim, meaning Burford now joins the queue of general creditors rather than enjoying priority over secured lenders.

The decision carries major consequences. Unsecured claims typically face a much lower likelihood of full recovery, especially in estates loaded with secured debt. Here, key assets of the bankrupt estate consist of the antitrust actions themselves, and secured creditors such as JPM Chase continue to dominate the repayment waterfall. The ruling also casts a spotlight on how litigation‑funding agreements should be structured and negotiated when bankruptcy risk is present. Funders who assumed they could elevate their status via contractual design may now face greater caution and risk.

Manolete Partners PLC Posts Flat H1 as UK Insolvency Funding Opportunity Grows

By John Freund |

The UK‑listed litigation funder Manolete Partners PLC has released its interim financial results for the half‑year ended 30 September 2025, revealing a stable but subdued performance amid an expanding insolvency funding opportunity.

According to the company announcement, total revenue fell to £12.7 million (down 12 % from £14.4 million a year earlier), while realised revenue slipped to £14.0 million (down 7 % from £15.0 million). Operating profit dropped sharply to £0.1 million, compared to £0.7 million in the prior period—though excluding fair value write‑downs tied to the company’s truck‑cartel portfolio, underlying profit stood at £2.0 million.

The business completed 146 cases during the period (up 7 % year‑on‑year) and signed 146 new case investments (up nearly 16 %). Live cases rose to 446 from 413 a year earlier, and the total estimated settlement value of new cases signed in the period was claimed to be 31 % ahead of the prior year. Cash receipts were flat at about £14.5 million, while net debt improved to £10.8 million (down from £11.9 million). The company’s cash balance nearly doubled to £1.1 million.

In its commentary, Manolete emphasises the buoyant UK insolvency backdrop — particularly the rise of Creditors’ Voluntary Liquidations and HMRC‑driven petitions — as a tailwind for growth. However, the board notes the first half was impacted by a lower‑than‑average settlement value and a “quiet summer”, though trading picked up in September and October. The firm remains confident of stronger average settlement values and a weighting of realised revenues toward the second half of the year.