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Litigation Finance – Lessons Learned from Manager Under-Performance (part 1 of 2)

Litigation Finance – Lessons Learned from Manager Under-Performance (part 1 of 2)

The following article is part of an ongoing column titled ‘Investor Insights.’  Brought to you by Ed Truant, founder and content manager of Slingshot Capital, ‘Investor Insights’ will provide thoughtful and engaging perspectives on all aspects of investing in litigation finance.  Executive Summary
  • Business under-performance in the commercial litigation finance market has typically stemmed from 3 main causes
  • Business partner selection is critical to success & corporate culture
  • Portfolio Construction is critical to success and longevity in commercial litigation finance
  • The application of debt is generally not appropriate in the commercial litigation finance asset class, with some exceptions, but may be appropriate in other areas of legal finance
Slingshot Insights:
  • Spend the time to determine whether your partners are additive to what you are trying to achieve and understand their motivations
  • Debt is a magnifying glass on both ends
  • Portfolio concentration – even when you win, you lose
A number of years have passed since the commercial litigation finance industry was established in the UK, USA & Australia (the more mature markets of the global industry), and so I thought it appropriate to reflect on some of the lessons learned within the industry to extract insights both for investors and fund managers.  Some of these lessons resulted in the wind-down of funders, some resulted in restructurings of the management company and their funds, some represent a “failure to launch,” and some resulted in changes in ownership. Some of the failures have been more public in nature, whereas others have resulted in restructurings and new ownerships (reluctantly) behind the scenes, and while they may now appear to be healthy funders, they underwent some restructuring to get there. This article will not name the specific companies that have failed or faced significant adversity (they know who they are), but through a fair amount of rumour, press and feedback from former employees, one can start to assemble a story around the cause of fund failures related to a number of fund managers in various countries. Sometimes, the pioneers in an industry are those that make the biggest sacrifice for the good of those who follow in their footsteps (assuming they learn, which is why this article has been written). Marius Nasta of Redress Solutions PLC previously wrote an article entitled “Why do litigation funders fail?’ and this is an attempt to take a deeper look into the causes, and extract insights for fund managers and investors. This article will not touch on the various frauds that may have occurred in the industry as those are beyond the scope of this article, but bear scrutiny nonetheless.  For edification, some of the articles that cover those frauds can be found below. Interestingly, a recent case in the UK ended in a fourteen-year jail sentence for one of the founders of Axiom. Commercial Litigation Finance Axiom Legal Finance Argentum Consumer Litigation Finance Cash4Cases LawBuck$ and MFL Case Funding As I reviewed the various fund managers’ experiences in the industry with a focus on distressed situations, some themes started to arise which I have classified into various categories, as outlined below.  Sometimes, the cause is singular in nature and sometimes it is a combination of issues that result in an unexpected outcome resulting in a business setback, which can be fatal.  In any event, I think the following insights are ones that all fund managers and investors should take into consideration as they operate, diligence and invest in the commercial litigation finance market. Insight #1 – Pick Your Partners Slowly & Carefully & Don’t be Afraid to Walk Away There is an adage in human resources, “hire slowly and fire quickly”. The same holds true for any business where partnerships are involved, although the ‘firing’ aspect is much more difficult.  There is another adage that says you don’t really know your partners until you either start working together or until money is involved, and that is true of any venture where partners come together to form a business. In the early days of any asset class, there is a fervor and an anxiousness to ‘get on with it’ in order to capitalize on the opportunity before others beat you to it. As a consequence, partnerships are formed all too quickly and with the wrong partners, and typically among people that have never worked together before.  The first few months can be exhilarating and then reality sets in and eventually people’s ‘true colours’ start to show (both good and bad).  It is important in the early days of assessing the merits of a business partnership to have an open dialogue about business goals and expectations, roles and responsibilities, individual strengths and weaknesses, relative motivations and incentives, distractions (i.e. is one partner independently wealthy and the other living ‘paycheck to paycheck’, as these economic differences will surely result in motivational differences and likely impact the amount of time and effort each will spend on the business), and generally what each party is looking to get out of the business.  As this is a finance business, there are requirements around investor relations and fundraising to consider beyond the business of marketing, originating and deploying capital, and you need to be very clear what the expectations are of the partners in this regard, as it tends to be an ‘all hands on deck’ situation in the early days of establishing a business and some partners may not be comfortable with the fundraising role. Fund managers should be under no illusions, it’s extremely difficult to raise a new fund in a new market with limited liquidity, unknown duration and quasi-binary outcomes …. and all with no track record to show for it.  In fact, if you were to consult the investor playbook, these are often characteristics most investors absolutely avoid.  This is the task at hand for any new manager looking to establish themselves in the litigation finance sector. But the allure of big multiple payouts is often hard for investors to ignore, and that is in essence what has allowed this industry to grow and prosper (hope is a powerful aphrodisiac). Accordingly, the early days of forming a business can be very telling about how the business will perform and where tensions will arise.  In the field of litigation finance, your pool of experienced talent from which to hire is very limited, as the industry has not been around for a long time.  My observation is that some of the best funding teams in the world have a combination of partners with different business backgrounds and experiences. While litigation experience is clearly a desirable skill set to invest in litigation finance opportunities, finance experience is equally critical to the success of a litigation finance fund.  The important thing for partners is to recognize their strengths and weaknesses, and partner up with someone that fills the voids.  Of course, this all means that people need to be self-aware, and that can often be a challenge, especially with individuals who have had some success in their field and who have never been told of their ‘blind spots’ by their peers. The strongest and most effective teams I have come across in the industry have a combination of experience in litigation and finance. The value add of those with litigation experience is self-evident, although many litigators come with their own biases based on their experience which require balancing via a different perspective.  The value of those with finance experience is not only as a second set of eyes on the merits of the case (i.e. keep the biases in check), but perhaps more important are the structural benefits they can bring to the construction of the funding contract and their focus on risk mitigation. This is a subsector of specialty finance, after all. Nevertheless, a business partnership may under-perform for any number of reasons.  At that point, your options are quite limited. Generally, you have four options:
  • you can attempt to restructure your internal operations and economic allocations around the reality of people’s efforts and value they bring to the partnership, so that there are appropriate incentives and procedures in place to deal with issues (good luck with that one),
  • you can exit and start from scratch, with the appropriate exit agreements in place which may make it more difficult to start a new business for the exiting partner in the short term (while more difficult, this may ultimately be the most rewarding (financially and ‘spiritually’) if it can be done successfully),
  • Status Quo – you can attempt to make it work, although the issue is that this may ultimately result in significant resentment, which in turn makes it extremely difficult to create an environment to attract top talent, and generally results in a sub-par business. In essence, you’re just delaying the inevitable, and potentially degrading the value of the business in the interim.
Of course, if one of those three doesn’t work, there is always the nuclear option – blow it up & start over, separately.  This tends to be the ‘scorched earth’ option where the partners decide that if they all aren’t going to benefit, then no one will benefit. While this does nothing for reputations and personal brands, it can be immensely satisfying (albeit short lived) for the partner that has suffered the most. Generally, people should try to avoid this option, if at all possible. Selecting partners (and hiring employees in general) is the single most important value driver for equity creation in the fund management business (secular trends also help, a lot!) yet it is constantly the area where business owners spend the least time and attention. I encourage those looking to form a business to over-invest their time on the people side of the equation early on to avoid missteps. Just like marriages, business partnerships can be difficult even when they are working well. Insight #2 – Concentration is a Killer – Diversify, Diversify, Diversify One of the easiest errors to make in commercial litigation finance is to be inadequately diversified; and diversification should be multi-faceted.  I have covered the benefits of portfolio diversification in a prior article, but for this article, let’s talk about some of the challenges in creating a diversified business. Manager Bias…or Wishful Thinking The first challenge to creating a diversified portfolio is eliminating bias.  I have often heard fund managers refer to cases as “slam dunk cases”, only to be proven otherwise by a judicial decision.  I have also personally reviewed many cases where I thought the balance of probabilities outweighed the plaintiff over the defendant, only to be shown otherwise by a judicial outcome.  In short, no one knows.  What I do know, based on the extensive data I have reviewed, is that litigation finance is successful about 70% of the time (where “success” = profit), across geographies.  With a 70% success rate, I can figure out an appropriate portfolio construction (size, concentration, number of investments, case types, etc.) but if I allow my bias to enter into my decision making, I may make the mistake of putting too much of the fund in one transaction or case type (see below), and this one mistake may be fatal, as it could determine the overall outcome of the fund’s returns, and hence impact that manager’s ability to raise another fund. As your fund grows, you can then look to address bias through attracting different human capital to the business, each of whom will have different experiences (and biases) which will hopefully provide different perspectives that will result in superior decision making. The networks of these additional people will also add a different origination source to the business, which will further serve to diversify the portfolio through other case types, law firms, case sizes, case jurisdictions, etc.  All should serve to diversify and strengthen the business, if executed well. Deployment Risk  The second challenge is portfolio concentration relative to deployment risk.  In an asset class that has double deployment risk, the first level of deployment risk is the risk associated with whether the manager will invest the commitments. The second layer of deployment risk in litigation finance is whether the commitments made by the manager will draw 100% of the commitment, and this layer of risk is almost impossible to quantify, although there are ways to mitigate it. In commercial litigation finance it can be extremely difficult to create a diversified portfolio on a ‘dollars deployed’ basis, simply because you don’t know how much of your fund commitments will ultimately be deployed.  I have seen many limited partnership agreements that have 10% concentration limits.  Those concentration limits are based on funds committed, so on a funds deployed basis, those concentration limits could be well in excess of 10%.  With a 10% concentration limit, as goes those investments, so goes the fund, which is an overly risky position for a fund manager and investor to take.  We also can’t lose sight of the fact that for any given fund, about 15-25% (depending on your management fees & operating costs) of the fund’s commitments will be consumed by management fees and operating expenses, and so the fund manager is really investing seventy-five to eighty-five cent dollars, which makes portfolio concentration even riskier. Accordingly, fund managers should target fund concentration limits in the 5% range (5% of dollars deployed, that is), which would result in about 20 investments in any given fund, thereby giving the manager a reasonable chance at success, statistically speaking.  But, in order to achieve 5% concentration on a dollars deployed basis, they should really be looking at about fifty to seventy-five percent of that rate on a dollar committed basis.  Said differently, the fund manager should be targeting about a 2.5-3.5% concentration limit on a ‘dollars committed’ basis that may ultimately result in something closer to 5% on a dollars deployed basis for some of the investments in the portfolio (the same math does not hold true for managers that focus on investing in portfolio investments, which by their nature are diversified and cross-collateralized).  In part two of this two-part series, we further delve into portfolio construction issues, and then discuss the appropriateness of utilizing debt within the context of commercial litigation finance.   Slingshot Insights Much can be learned from the misfortune of others, and this is what I have attempted to summarize in the article.  To be fair, in the early days of an asset class, establishing a business is much more difficult than in more mature asset classes.  The learning curve, both for managers and investors, is steep, and those that came before were pioneers. There are a lot of unknown unknowns in commercial litigation finance, and things don’t often end up going the way people thought they would go, but we learn from the benefit of hindsight.  In short, establishing a new asset class is very difficult, and everyone can learn from the missteps of others as they build their own successful organizations.  Coupled with the difficulty inherent in establishing a new asset class is the fact that this asset class is unique with many risks that only come to light with the benefit of time – idiosyncratic case risk, double deployment risk, duration risk, quasi-binary risk, etc. Accordingly, the industry owes a debt of gratitude to those that came before as we are now smarter for their experiences. But beware!
Those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it!
                                                              – Winston Churchill (derived from a quote from George Santayana)
As always, I welcome your comments and counter-points to those raised in this article.  Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc. and an investor in the consumer and commercial litigation finance industry.  Slingshot Capital inc. provides capital advisory services to fund managers and institutional investors and is involved in the origination and design of unique opportunities in legal finance markets, globally.

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Omni Bridgeway Posts Record Q3 FY26 Pipeline as A$391 Million in New Commitments Drives 2.5x Returns

By John Freund |

Omni Bridgeway has reported its Q3 FY26 portfolio update, headlined by an exclusive term sheet pipeline of more than A$600 million — roughly twice the firm's average quarterly pipeline — alongside A$391.8 million in new commitments contracted across 27 investments year-to-date. The Sydney-listed funder, which manages A$5.5 billion in assets across ten funds and operates from more than 20 offices in 15 countries, framed the update as a sign of accelerating deployment and capital formation.

According to GlobeNewswire, the firm has recorded 59 full and partial completions year-to-date, generating A$268.4 million in cash investment proceeds at a 2.5x multiple on invested capital and a 108% fair value conversion ratio. Operating expenses of A$51.2 million remain on track to land below the firm's A$80 million FY26 budget, while management fees of A$27 million are tracking toward an upgraded A$35 million full-year target.

On the capital side, Omni Bridgeway said the full and final close of Funds 4/5 Series II remains on track for FY26, and that more than A$150 million in additional sidecar and overflow capital structures are at advanced diligence stages. The combination of an unusually deep pipeline, strong realizations, and disciplined cost performance positions the funder to defend its narrative of platform scale at a moment when listed peers are under pressure on both fundraising and case-realization timelines.

Jonathan Sablone Launches Sablone Advisory LLC, a Boutique Law and Advisory Firm Focused on Litigation Finance

By John Freund |

Jonathan Sablone, a commercial disputes attorney with three decades of cross-border, financial services, and litigation finance experience, has launched Sablone Advisory LLC — a Boston-based boutique positioned to serve claimants, funders, and insurers across the legal finance ecosystem under the tagline "at the intersection of law and finance™."

According to Sablone Advisory LLC, the new firm offers underwriting, diligence, monitoring, and asset management services to litigation funders and to insurers offering contingent risk products. On the claimant side, Sablone Advisory works with plaintiffs and their counsel to position cases for funding, including packaging case portfolios for cross-collateralized funding and insurance wrappers — services that have become increasingly central as funders and insurers structure deals across multiple matters and risk layers.

"I founded Sablone Advisory to assist clients with the most intractable problems and issues facing the legal finance industry," said Sablone in announcing the launch. "'At the intersection of law and finance' is not just a slogan, but a practical, commercial approach to legal problem-solving that I have practiced for decades."

The launch reflects a continuing trend in the litigation finance industry: senior practitioners with capital-markets and complex-litigation backgrounds spinning out of large institutional platforms to offer specialized, independent advisory and underwriting services. As funders increasingly structure portfolio-level deals, layer ATE and contingent risk insurance into capital stacks, and pursue cross-border recoveries, demand for senior independent diligence and asset management — particularly from professionals fluent in both legal strategy and structured finance — has grown.

For claimants and their counsel, the firm's case-positioning services are likely to resonate in a market where funders are increasingly selective about case quality, structure, and counsel pedigree. For funders and insurers, an independent boutique offering monitoring and asset management — separate from origination — represents the kind of service-provider infrastructure that more mature alternative-asset markets typically develop as they scale.

Inquiries can be directed to Jonathan Sablone at jsablone@sabloneadvisory.com or via www.sabloneadvisory.com.

Colorado HB 1421 Targets PE and Non-Attorney Funding of Law Firms in Bipartisan Push

By John Freund |

Colorado lawmakers have introduced HB 1421, a bill that would sharply restrict the ability of state law firms to enter financial or contractual arrangements with alternative business structures (ABS) and any entity in which non-attorneys hold ownership stakes or exert direction over legal practice. The bill is notable both for the reach of its restrictions and for the unusual coalition behind it.

As reported by The Sum and Substance, the legislation is sponsored by Democratic Rep. Javier Mabrey of Denver and Republican House Minority Leader Jarvis Caldwell of Monument, with active support from the Colorado Chamber of Commerce and the Colorado Trial Lawyers Association — typically opposing forces in business-litigation policy debates. The bill was scheduled for its first hearing before the House Judiciary Committee on April 29.

HB 1421 would prohibit Colorado law firms from entering arrangements with ABS-style structures relating to legal services, practicing in professional companies where non-lawyers own interests or direct lawyer judgment, or compensating any party where compensation depends on a percentage of legal fees or case recoveries. The bill would also empower courts to halt offending arrangements, order fee reimbursement to clients, and disgorge ABS profits derived from prohibited activities. The article specifically references Burford Capital's litigation funding presence in framing the bill's broader policy concern with non-lawyer financial stakes in legal outcomes.

The legislation lands at a moment when private equity ownership of legal services is expanding rapidly in jurisdictions that permit it — Arizona, Utah, and the District of Columbia — and where PE-backed national platforms are increasingly partnering with firms in non-ABS jurisdictions to extend their operating reach. The Colorado bill, if enacted, would cut against that expansion model by restricting how Colorado firms can collaborate with out-of-state, non-attorney-owned platforms.

For the litigation finance community, the bill is a meaningful data point. Although disclosure-based reform has dominated state-level TPLF debate in 2025-26, HB 1421 reflects a parallel and somewhat different policy thrust: not transparency about funding, but structural limits on the ownership and economic relationships that surround legal practice. The convergence of plaintiffs' bar and chamber-of-commerce support behind a single bill is itself rare, and may presage similar coalitions in other non-ABS states facing PE-driven consolidation pressure.