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Litigation Finance – Lessons Learned from Manager Under-Performance (part 1 of 2)

The following article is part of an ongoing column titled ‘Investor Insights.’ 

Brought to you by Ed Truant, founder and content manager of Slingshot Capital, ‘Investor Insights’ will provide thoughtful and engaging perspectives on all aspects of investing in litigation finance. 

Executive Summary

  • Business under-performance in the commercial litigation finance market has typically stemmed from 3 main causes
  • Business partner selection is critical to success & corporate culture
  • Portfolio Construction is critical to success and longevity in commercial litigation finance
  • The application of debt is generally not appropriate in the commercial litigation finance asset class, with some exceptions, but may be appropriate in other areas of legal finance

Slingshot Insights:

  • Spend the time to determine whether your partners are additive to what you are trying to achieve and understand their motivations
  • Debt is a magnifying glass on both ends
  • Portfolio concentration – even when you win, you lose

A number of years have passed since the commercial litigation finance industry was established in the UK, USA & Australia (the more mature markets of the global industry), and so I thought it appropriate to reflect on some of the lessons learned within the industry to extract insights both for investors and fund managers.  Some of these lessons resulted in the wind-down of funders, some resulted in restructurings of the management company and their funds, some represent a “failure to launch,” and some resulted in changes in ownership. Some of the failures have been more public in nature, whereas others have resulted in restructurings and new ownerships (reluctantly) behind the scenes, and while they may now appear to be healthy funders, they underwent some restructuring to get there.

This article will not name the specific companies that have failed or faced significant adversity (they know who they are), but through a fair amount of rumour, press and feedback from former employees, one can start to assemble a story around the cause of fund failures related to a number of fund managers in various countries. Sometimes, the pioneers in an industry are those that make the biggest sacrifice for the good of those who follow in their footsteps (assuming they learn, which is why this article has been written). Marius Nasta of Redress Solutions PLC previously wrote an article entitled “Why do litigation funders fail?’ and this is an attempt to take a deeper look into the causes, and extract insights for fund managers and investors.

This article will not touch on the various frauds that may have occurred in the industry as those are beyond the scope of this article, but bear scrutiny nonetheless.  For edification, some of the articles that cover those frauds can be found below. Interestingly, a recent case in the UK ended in a fourteen-year jail sentence for one of the founders of Axiom.

Commercial Litigation Finance

Axiom Legal Finance

Argentum

Consumer Litigation Finance

Cash4Cases

LawBuck$ and MFL Case Funding

As I reviewed the various fund managers’ experiences in the industry with a focus on distressed situations, some themes started to arise which I have classified into various categories, as outlined below.  Sometimes, the cause is singular in nature and sometimes it is a combination of issues that result in an unexpected outcome resulting in a business setback, which can be fatal.  In any event, I think the following insights are ones that all fund managers and investors should take into consideration as they operate, diligence and invest in the commercial litigation finance market.

Insight #1 – Pick Your Partners Slowly & Carefully & Don’t be Afraid to Walk Away

There is an adage in human resources, “hire slowly and fire quickly”. The same holds true for any business where partnerships are involved, although the ‘firing’ aspect is much more difficult.  There is another adage that says you don’t really know your partners until you either start working together or until money is involved, and that is true of any venture where partners come together to form a business.

In the early days of any asset class, there is a fervor and an anxiousness to ‘get on with it’ in order to capitalize on the opportunity before others beat you to it. As a consequence, partnerships are formed all too quickly and with the wrong partners, and typically among people that have never worked together before.  The first few months can be exhilarating and then reality sets in and eventually people’s ‘true colours’ start to show (both good and bad).  It is important in the early days of assessing the merits of a business partnership to have an open dialogue about business goals and expectations, roles and responsibilities, individual strengths and weaknesses, relative motivations and incentives, distractions (i.e. is one partner independently wealthy and the other living ‘paycheck to paycheck’, as these economic differences will surely result in motivational differences and likely impact the amount of time and effort each will spend on the business), and generally what each party is looking to get out of the business.  As this is a finance business, there are requirements around investor relations and fundraising to consider beyond the business of marketing, originating and deploying capital, and you need to be very clear what the expectations are of the partners in this regard, as it tends to be an ‘all hands on deck’ situation in the early days of establishing a business and some partners may not be comfortable with the fundraising role.

Fund managers should be under no illusions, it’s extremely difficult to raise a new fund in a new market with limited liquidity, unknown duration and quasi-binary outcomes …. and all with no track record to show for it.  In fact, if you were to consult the investor playbook, these are often characteristics most investors absolutely avoid.  This is the task at hand for any new manager looking to establish themselves in the litigation finance sector. But the allure of big multiple payouts is often hard for investors to ignore, and that is in essence what has allowed this industry to grow and prosper (hope is a powerful aphrodisiac).

Accordingly, the early days of forming a business can be very telling about how the business will perform and where tensions will arise.  In the field of litigation finance, your pool of experienced talent from which to hire is very limited, as the industry has not been around for a long time.  My observation is that some of the best funding teams in the world have a combination of partners with different business backgrounds and experiences. While litigation experience is clearly a desirable skill set to invest in litigation finance opportunities, finance experience is equally critical to the success of a litigation finance fund.  The important thing for partners is to recognize their strengths and weaknesses, and partner up with someone that fills the voids.  Of course, this all means that people need to be self-aware, and that can often be a challenge, especially with individuals who have had some success in their field and who have never been told of their ‘blind spots’ by their peers.

The strongest and most effective teams I have come across in the industry have a combination of experience in litigation and finance. The value add of those with litigation experience is self-evident, although many litigators come with their own biases based on their experience which require balancing via a different perspective.  The value of those with finance experience is not only as a second set of eyes on the merits of the case (i.e. keep the biases in check), but perhaps more important are the structural benefits they can bring to the construction of the funding contract and their focus on risk mitigation. This is a subsector of specialty finance, after all.

Nevertheless, a business partnership may under-perform for any number of reasons.  At that point, your options are quite limited. Generally, you have four options:

  • you can attempt to restructure your internal operations and economic allocations around the reality of people’s efforts and value they bring to the partnership, so that there are appropriate incentives and procedures in place to deal with issues (good luck with that one),
  • you can exit and start from scratch, with the appropriate exit agreements in place which may make it more difficult to start a new business for the exiting partner in the short term (while more difficult, this may ultimately be the most rewarding (financially and ‘spiritually’) if it can be done successfully),
  • Status Quo – you can attempt to make it work, although the issue is that this may ultimately result in significant resentment, which in turn makes it extremely difficult to create an environment to attract top talent, and generally results in a sub-par business. In essence, you’re just delaying the inevitable, and potentially degrading the value of the business in the interim.

Of course, if one of those three doesn’t work, there is always the nuclear option – blow it up & start over, separately.  This tends to be the ‘scorched earth’ option where the partners decide that if they all aren’t going to benefit, then no one will benefit. While this does nothing for reputations and personal brands, it can be immensely satisfying (albeit short lived) for the partner that has suffered the most. Generally, people should try to avoid this option, if at all possible.

Selecting partners (and hiring employees in general) is the single most important value driver for equity creation in the fund management business (secular trends also help, a lot!) yet it is constantly the area where business owners spend the least time and attention. I encourage those looking to form a business to over-invest their time on the people side of the equation early on to avoid missteps. Just like marriages, business partnerships can be difficult even when they are working well.

Insight #2 – Concentration is a Killer – Diversify, Diversify, Diversify

One of the easiest errors to make in commercial litigation finance is to be inadequately diversified; and diversification should be multi-faceted.  I have covered the benefits of portfolio diversification in a prior article, but for this article, let’s talk about some of the challenges in creating a diversified business.

Manager Bias…or Wishful Thinking

The first challenge to creating a diversified portfolio is eliminating bias.  I have often heard fund managers refer to cases as “slam dunk cases”, only to be proven otherwise by a judicial decision.  I have also personally reviewed many cases where I thought the balance of probabilities outweighed the plaintiff over the defendant, only to be shown otherwise by a judicial outcome.  In short, no one knows.  What I do know, based on the extensive data I have reviewed, is that litigation finance is successful about 70% of the time (where “success” = profit), across geographies.  With a 70% success rate, I can figure out an appropriate portfolio construction (size, concentration, number of investments, case types, etc.) but if I allow my bias to enter into my decision making, I may make the mistake of putting too much of the fund in one transaction or case type (see below), and this one mistake may be fatal, as it could determine the overall outcome of the fund’s returns, and hence impact that manager’s ability to raise another fund.

As your fund grows, you can then look to address bias through attracting different human capital to the business, each of whom will have different experiences (and biases) which will hopefully provide different perspectives that will result in superior decision making. The networks of these additional people will also add a different origination source to the business, which will further serve to diversify the portfolio through other case types, law firms, case sizes, case jurisdictions, etc.  All should serve to diversify and strengthen the business, if executed well.

Deployment Risk 

The second challenge is portfolio concentration relative to deployment risk.  In an asset class that has double deployment risk, the first level of deployment risk is the risk associated with whether the manager will invest the commitments. The second layer of deployment risk in litigation finance is whether the commitments made by the manager will draw 100% of the commitment, and this layer of risk is almost impossible to quantify, although there are ways to mitigate it.

In commercial litigation finance it can be extremely difficult to create a diversified portfolio on a ‘dollars deployed’ basis, simply because you don’t know how much of your fund commitments will ultimately be deployed.  I have seen many limited partnership agreements that have 10% concentration limits.  Those concentration limits are based on funds committed, so on a funds deployed basis, those concentration limits could be well in excess of 10%.  With a 10% concentration limit, as goes those investments, so goes the fund, which is an overly risky position for a fund manager and investor to take.  We also can’t lose sight of the fact that for any given fund, about 15-25% (depending on your management fees & operating costs) of the fund’s commitments will be consumed by management fees and operating expenses, and so the fund manager is really investing seventy-five to eighty-five cent dollars, which makes portfolio concentration even riskier.

Accordingly, fund managers should target fund concentration limits in the 5% range (5% of dollars deployed, that is), which would result in about 20 investments in any given fund, thereby giving the manager a reasonable chance at success, statistically speaking.  But, in order to achieve 5% concentration on a dollars deployed basis, they should really be looking at about fifty to seventy-five percent of that rate on a dollar committed basis.  Said differently, the fund manager should be targeting about a 2.5-3.5% concentration limit on a ‘dollars committed’ basis that may ultimately result in something closer to 5% on a dollars deployed basis for some of the investments in the portfolio (the same math does not hold true for managers that focus on investing in portfolio investments, which by their nature are diversified and cross-collateralized). 

In part two of this two-part series, we further delve into portfolio construction issues, and then discuss the appropriateness of utilizing debt within the context of commercial litigation finance.

 

Slingshot Insights

Much can be learned from the misfortune of others, and this is what I have attempted to summarize in the article.  To be fair, in the early days of an asset class, establishing a business is much more difficult than in more mature asset classes.  The learning curve, both for managers and investors, is steep, and those that came before were pioneers. There are a lot of unknown unknowns in commercial litigation finance, and things don’t often end up going the way people thought they would go, but we learn from the benefit of hindsight.  In short, establishing a new asset class is very difficult, and everyone can learn from the missteps of others as they build their own successful organizations.  Coupled with the difficulty inherent in establishing a new asset class is the fact that this asset class is unique with many risks that only come to light with the benefit of time – idiosyncratic case risk, double deployment risk, duration risk, quasi-binary risk, etc. Accordingly, the industry owes a debt of gratitude to those that came before as we are now smarter for their experiences. But beware!

Those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it!
                                                              – Winston Churchill (derived from a quote from George Santayana)

As always, I welcome your comments and counter-points to those raised in this article.

 Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc. and an investor in the consumer and commercial litigation finance industry.  Slingshot Capital inc. provides capital advisory services to fund managers and institutional investors and is involved in the origination and design of unique opportunities in legal finance markets, globally.

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Community Spotlight: Dean Gresham, Managing Director, Certum Group

Dean Gresham is a Managing Director who oversees the evaluation, underwriting, and risk management of all the company’s risk transfer solutions, including litigation finance and contingent risk insurance. With 25 years of experience in complex litigation and legal risk analysis, Dean ensures rigorous underwriting standards and strategic risk mitigation across the company’s risk transfer solutions.

Before joining Certum Group, Dean was a trial lawyer for more than 21 years handling complex commercial, catastrophic injury, qui tam, and class action litigation across the country. While practicing, Dean litigated on both sides of the docket and developed a keen ability to analyze and assess risk from both the plaintiff’s and defendant's unique perspectives.

In 2020, Dean was awarded the Elite Trial Lawyer of the Year award by the National Law Journal for his trailblazing work on a complicated wrongful adoption case. Dean is consistently chosen by his peers as a Texas Super Lawyer (2009-2024); one of the Best Lawyers in Dallas by D Magazine (2009-2024), one of the Top 100 Trial Lawyers in Texas by the National Association of Trial Lawyers (2011-2024), and in the Nation’s Top One Percent by the National Association of Distinguished Counsel (2019-2024).

Dean is the 2025 Chair of the Dallas Bar Association's prestigious Business Litigation Section and sits on the DBA’s Judiciary Committee.

Company Name and Description: Certum Group offers a next-generation litigation risk transfer platform that provides bespoke solutions for companies, law firms, and funders facing the uncertainty of litigation. Latin for “certainty,” Certum represents the core benefit the company delivers to its clients across its entire suite of risk transfer solutions.  Certum is the full-service funding and insurance partner for law firms and their business clients.

Company Website: www.certumgroup.com

Year Founded: 2014 

Headquarters:  Plano, Texas

Area of Focus: Member: Head of Underwriting and Chair of the Investment Committee.

Member Quote: “Litigation funding doesn’t just fuel cases—it fuels justice. Power should never trump merit.”

Highlights from LFJ’s Virtual Town Hall: Investor Perspectives

By John Freund and 4 others |

On March 27th, LFJ hosted a virtual town hall featuring key industry stakeholders giving their perspectives on investment within the legal funding sector. Our esteemed panelists included Chris Capitanelli (CC), Partner at Winston and Strawn, LLP, Joel Magerman (JM), CEO of Bryant Park Capital, Joe Siprut (JSi), Founder and CEO of Kerberos Capital, and Jaime Sneider (JSn), Managing Director at Fortress Investment Group. The panel was moderated by Ed Truant (ET), Founder of Slingshot Capital.

Below are highlights from the discussion:

One thing that piqued my interest recently was the recent Georgia jury that awareded a single plaintiff $2.1 billion in one of 177 lawsuits against Monsanto. What is your perspective on the health of the mass tort litigation market in general?

JSn: Well, I think nuclear verdicts get way more attention than they probably deserve. That verdict is going to end up getting reduced significantly because the punitive damages that were awarded were unconstitutionally excessive. I think it was a 30 to 1 ratio. I suspect that will just easily be reduced, and there will probably be very little attention associated with that reduction, even though that's a check that's already in place to try to prevent outsized judgments that aren't tied as much to compensatory damages. I expect Monsanto will also likely challenge the verdict on other grounds as well, which is its right to do.

The fact is, there are a whole number of checks that are in place to ensure the integrity of our verdicts in the US legal system, and it's already extraordinarily costly and difficult for a person that files a case who has to subject himself to discovery, prevail on motions to dismiss, prevail on motions for summary judgment, win various expert rulings related to the expert evidence. And even if a plaintiff does prevail like this one has before a jury, they face all sorts of post-trial briefing remedies that could result in a reduction or setting aside the verdict, and then they face appeals. The fact is, I think corporate defendants have a lot of ways of protecting themselves if they choose to go to trial or if they choose to litigate the case.

And I think, oftentimes when people talk about the mass tort space, their disagreement really isn't with a specific case, but with the US Constitution itself, which protects the right to juries, even in civil litigation in this country. The fact is that there is a rich tradition in the United States that recognizes tort is essential to deterring wrongdoing. And ensuring people are fairly compensated for the injuries that they sustained due to unsafe products or other situations. So, broadly speaking, we don't think in any systematic a way that reform is required, although I suspect around the margins there could be modest changes that might make sense.

Omni has made a number of recent moves involving secondary sales and private credit to improve their earnings and cash flow. What is your sense of how much pressure the industry is under to produce cash flow for its investors?

JM: I think there is some pressure for sure, but more than pressure, I think it's a natural thing for self-interested managers to want to give their investors realizations so that they can raise more capital, right?

So, even if no one had ever told me, boy, it would be nice to get money back at some point in the future, that would obviously still be what I'm incentivized to do because the sooner I can get realizations and get cash back, the sooner people can have confidence that, wow, this actually really works, and then they give you 2x the investment for the next vehicle.

So the pressure is, I think, part of it. But for a relatively new asset class like litigation finance, which is still in middle innings, I think, at most, you want realizations. You want to turn things over as quickly as you can, and you want to get capital back.

In terms of what ILFA is doing, do you feel like they're doing enough for the industry to counter some of the attacks that are coming from the US Chamber of Commerce and others?

CC: I think there has been a focus from ILFA on trying to prevent some of the state court legislation from kind of acting as a test case, so to speak, for additional litigation. So there's been, you know, they've been involved in the big stuff, but also the little stuff, so it's not used against us, so to speak.

So I think in that regard, it's good. I wonder at what point is there some sort of proposal, as to if there's something that's amenable, is there something that we can all get behind, if that's what's needed in order to kind of stop these broad bills coming into both state legislatures and Congress. But I think overall, the messaging has been clear that this is not acceptable and is not addressing the issue.

Pretium, a relative newcomer to the market, just announced a $500 million raise. At the same time, it's been rumored that Harvard Endowment, which has traditionally been a significant investor in the commercial litigation finance market, is no longer allocating capital to the Litfin space. What is your sense of where this industry continues to be in favor with investors, and what are some of the challenges?

JSi: On the whole, I think the answer is yes, it continues to be in favor with investors, probably increasing favor with investors. From our own experience, we talk to LPs or new LPs quite frequently where we are told that just recently that institution has internally decided that they are now green lighting initiatives in litigation finance or doing a manager search. Whereas for the past three or four years, they've held off and it's just kind of been in the queue. So the fact that that is happening seems to me that investors are increasingly interested.

Probably part of the reason for that is that as the asset class on the whole matures, individual managers have longer track records. Maybe certain managers are on their third or fourth vintage. And there are realized results that can be put up and analyzed that give investors comfort. It's very hard to do that on day one. But when you're several years into it, or at this point longer for many people, it becomes a lot easier. And so I think we are seeing some of that.

One of the inherent challenge to raising capital in the litigation finance asset class is that even just the term litigation finance itself is sort of shrouded in mystery. I mean, it's very unclear what that even means and it turns out that it means many different things. The media on the whole, not including LFJ obviously, but the media on the whole has not done us many favors in that regard because they often use the term litigation finance to mean one specific thing, oftentimes case finance, specific equity type risk on a single case, when in fact, there are many of us who do all kinds of different things: law firm lending, the credit stuff, the portfolio finance stuff. There's all kinds of different slivers. And so the effect of that is that an LP or factions within an LP may have a preconceived notion about what litigation finance is, which is completely wrong. And they may have a preconceived notion of what a particular manager's strategy is. That's completely wrong.

I also think that litigation finance provokes an almost emotional reaction sometimes. It's often the case that investments get shot down because someone on the IC says that they hate lawyers, or they got sued once, and so they hate lawyers. And so they want nothing to do with litigation finance. And so whether that's fair or unfair is irrelevant. I think it is something that is a factor and that doesn't help. But I'd like to think that on the whole, the good strategies and the good track records will win the day in the end.

The discussion can be viewed in its entirety here.

Manolete Partners Announces New Revolving Credit Facility with HSBC Bank

By Harry Moran and 4 others |

Manolete Partners Plc (AIM:MANO), the leading UK-listed insolvency litigation financing company, is pleased to announce it has signed a new Revolving Credit Facility ("RCF") with its existing provider, HSBC UK Bank Plc ( "HSBC"). 

The new RCF provides Manolete with the same level of facility as the previous arrangement, at £17.5m. However, the margin charged to Manolete by HSBC on the new RCF is at a reduced rate of 4.0% (previously 4.7%) over the Sterling Overnight Index Average (SONIA) and has a reduced non-utilisation fee, from 1.88% to 1.40%. 

The new RCF is a 3.25-year facility with an initial maturity of 27 June 2028. Manolete has the option to further extend the facility on its current terms by an additional year. 

The covenants remain unchanged except for the Asset Cover covenant which has been relaxed for the next six months. 

Steven Cooklin, CEO commented: "We are delighted to have secured a new long-term commitment to the business from HSBC, which is testament to the strong partnership we have established since 2018. The improved terms of the facility demonstrate confidence in the Manolete business." 

This announcement contains inside information as defined in Article 7 of the Market Abuse Regulation No. 596/2014 ("MAR").