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Looks Dubious – The Third Ground to Restrain a Lawyer from Acting

April 5, 2023

Looks Dubious – The Third Ground to Restrain a Lawyer from Acting

The following piece was contributed by Valerie Blacker, commercial litigator focusing on funded litigation, and Amelia Atkinson, litigation and dispute resolution lawyer at Piper Alderman. Strata Voting Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Axios IT Pty Ltd and Anor[1] is a funded single plaintiff action. It involved a recent examination of the Court’s power to prevent a lawyer from acting in proceedings for a conflict of interest. The authors represented Strata Voting in its successful defense of the restraint application. The Third Ground Less frequently invoked than the first and second grounds (misuse of confidential information and breach of fiduciary duty), the third category upon which to restrain a lawyer in a position of conflict from acting in a matter is known as the “inherent jurisdiction” ground. The Court can restrain lawyers from acting in a particular case as an incident of its inherent jurisdiction over its officers and control of its processes.[2] The jurisdiction is enlivened where there is an objective perception that a lawyer lacks independence such that the Court is compelled to interfere and remove the lawyer from acting in the matter. In other words, the position of the lawyer makes the Court uneasy. The test for intervention is whether a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the proper administration of justice, including the appearance of justice, requires that a legal practitioner should be prevented from acting.[3] Axios’ failed application The jurisdiction to enjoin a solicitor from acting is to be regarded as exceptional, and to be exercised by the court with caution. That was the basis on which his Honour Judge Dart of the South Australian Supreme Court dismissed the application brought to restrain Piper Alderman from acting for the liquidators. Here, Piper Alderman is acting for the company in relation to a dispute which was in existence before the winding up commenced.  The liquidator retained Piper Alderman to continue acting for the company for the purpose of the litigation, the subject of the existing dispute. The supposed conflict was said to have arisen from a proof of debt which Piper Alderman lodged for about $47,000 in fees incurred prior to the administration. The argument was that Piper Alderman’s impartiality was impaired by the fact that unless the litigation is successful, Piper Alderman will not be paid its outstanding fees because there will be no funds in the winding up to do so. Axios contended that “the conduct of the solicitor was so offensive to common notions of fairness and justice that they should, as officers of the Court, be restrained from acting”. However, his Honour considered the firm’s status as creditor to be unremarkable. Even in a case where a substantial sum (over $830,000) was owed to lawyers by their insolvent client,[4] there was no risk to the proper administration of justice. As everyone knows, solicitors routinely act in matters where they are owed money including conditional costs agreements, risk share arrangements, contingency fee arrangements and agreements that include uplift fees, to name a few. The restraint application in Strata Voting was unsurprisingly and swiftly[5] dismissed with costs. Conclusion If an opposing party asserts that a lawyer should be restrained from acting for the opponent, it is necessary for a clear case to be made that the lawyer is in a position where he is fixed with an interest of such a nature that he may fail in his overriding duty to the court. It requires proof of facts, and not mere speculation as to motive. The risk to the due administration of justice has to be a real one. Otherwise, a litigant ought not to be deprived of the lawyer of his choice. — About the Authors: Valerie Blacker is a commercial litigator focusing on funded litigation. Valerie has been with Piper Alderman for over 12 years. With a background in class actions, Valerie also prosecutes funded commercial litigation claims. Amelia Atkinson is a litigation and dispute resolution lawyer at Piper Alderman with a primary focus on corporate and commercial disputes. Amelia is involved in a number of large, complex matters in jurisdictions across Australia. For queries or comments in relation to this article please contact Amelia Atkinson | T: +61 7 3220 7767 | E:  aatkinson@piperalderman.com.au [1] Unreported, Supreme Court of South Australia, Dart J, 23 January 2023 (Strata Voting). [2] Kallinicos & Anor v Hunt [2005] NSWSC 118 at [76] (Kallinicos). [3] Ibid. [4] Naczek & Dowler [2011] FamCAFC 179, [84]. [5] In a 5-page judgment.

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Commercial Legal Innovation

LSC Showcases Access-to-Justice Tech at San Antonio ITC

By John Freund |

The Legal Services Corporation (LSC) brought the access-to-justice conversation squarely into the technology arena with its 26th annual Innovations in Technology Conference (ITC), held this week in San Antonio. Drawing nearly 750 registered attendees from across the legal, business, and technology communities, the conference highlighted how thoughtfully deployed technology can expand civil legal assistance for low-income Americans while maintaining ethical and practical guardrails.

Legal Services Corporation reports that this year’s ITC convened attorneys, legal technologists, court staff, pro bono leaders, academics, and students at the Grand Hyatt San Antonio River Walk for three days of programming focused on the future of legal services delivery. The conference featured 56 panels—16 streamed online and freely accessible—covering topics ranging from artificial intelligence and cybersecurity to court technology, data-driven decision-making, and pro bono innovation.

LSC President Ron Flagg framed the event as a collaborative effort to ensure technology serves people rather than replaces human judgment. Emphasizing that technology is “not the answer by itself,” Flagg underscored its role as a critical tool when grounded in the real needs of communities seeking civil legal help. The conference opened with a keynote from journalist and author David Pogue, setting the tone for candid discussions about both the promise and limitations of emerging technologies.

A notable evolution this year was the introduction of five structured programming tracks—AI beginner, AI advanced, IT operations, client intake, and self-help tools—allowing attendees to tailor their experience based on technical familiarity and organizational needs. The event concluded with hands-on workshops addressing cybersecurity incident response, improving AI accuracy and reliability, change management for staff resilience, and user experience evaluation in legal tech.

Beyond the conference itself, ITC reinforced LSC’s broader leadership in access-to-justice technology, including its Technology Initiative Grants, AI Peer Learning Lab, and its recent report, The Next Frontier: Harnessing Technology to Close the Justice Gap. Senior program officer Jane Ribadeneyra emphasized the dual focus on informed leadership decisions and practical tools that directly support frontline legal services staff handling matters like eviction, domestic violence, and disaster recovery.

For the litigation funding and legal finance community, ITC’s themes highlight a growing intersection between technology, access to justice, and capital deployment—raising questions about how funders may increasingly support tech-enabled legal service models alongside traditional case funding.

Commercial

Litigation Financiers Organize on Capitol Hill

By John Freund |

The litigation finance industry is mobilizing its defenses after nearly facing extinction through federal legislation last year. In response to Senator Thom Tillis's surprise attempt to impose a 41% tax on litigation finance profits, two attorneys have launched the American Civil Accountability Alliance—a lobbying group dedicated to fighting back against efforts to restrict third-party funding of lawsuits.

As reported in Bloomberg Law, co-founder Erick Robinson, a Houston patent lawyer, described the industry's collective shock when the Tillis measure came within striking distance of passing as part of a major tax and spending package. The proposal ultimately failed, but the close call exposed the $16 billion industry's vulnerability to legislative ambush tactics. Robinson noted that the measure appeared with only five weeks before the final vote, giving stakeholders little time to respond before the Senate parliamentarian ultimately removed it on procedural grounds.

The new alliance represents a shift toward grassroots advocacy, focusing on bringing forward voices of individuals and small parties whose cases would have been impossible without funding. Robinson emphasized that state-level legislation now poses the greater threat, as these bills receive less media scrutiny than federal proposals while establishing precedents that can spread rapidly across jurisdictions.

The group is still forming its board and hiring lobbyists, but its founders are clear about their mission: ensuring that litigation finance isn't quietly regulated out of existence through misleading rhetoric about foreign influence or frivolous litigation—claims Robinson dismisses as disconnected from how funders actually evaluate cases for investment.

Commercial

ISO’s ‘Litigation Funding Mutual Disclosure’ May Be Unenforceable

By John Freund |

The insurance industry has introduced a new policy condition entitled "Litigation Funding Mutual Disclosure" (ISO Form CG 99 11 01 26) that may be included in liability policies starting this month. The condition allows either party to demand mutual disclosure of third-party litigation funding agreements when disputes arise over whether a claim or suit is covered by the policy. However, the condition faces significant enforceability challenges that make it largely unworkable in practice.

As reported in Omni Bridgeway, the condition is unenforceable for several key reasons. First, when an insurer denies coverage and the policyholder commences coverage litigation, the denial likely relieves the policyholder of compliance with policy conditions. Courts typically hold that insurers must demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice from a policyholder's failure to perform a condition, which would be difficult to establish when coverage has already been denied.

Additionally, the condition's requirement for policyholders to disclose funding agreements would force them to breach confidentiality provisions in those agreements, amounting to intentional interference with contractual relations. The condition is also overly broad, extending to funding agreements between attorneys and funders where the insurer has no privity. Most problematically, the "mutual" disclosure requirement lacks true mutuality since insurers rarely use litigation funding except for subrogation claims, creating a one-sided obligation that borders on bad faith.

The condition appears designed to give insurers a litigation advantage by accessing policyholders' private financial information, despite overwhelming judicial precedent that litigation finance is rarely relevant to case claims and defenses. Policyholders should reject this provision during policy renewals whenever possible.