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Commercial Regulatory Issues

Looks Dubious – The Third Ground to Restrain a Lawyer from Acting

April 5, 2023

Looks Dubious – The Third Ground to Restrain a Lawyer from Acting

The following piece was contributed by Valerie Blacker, commercial litigator focusing on funded litigation, and Amelia Atkinson, litigation and dispute resolution lawyer at Piper Alderman. Strata Voting Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Axios IT Pty Ltd and Anor[1] is a funded single plaintiff action. It involved a recent examination of the Court’s power to prevent a lawyer from acting in proceedings for a conflict of interest. The authors represented Strata Voting in its successful defense of the restraint application. The Third Ground Less frequently invoked than the first and second grounds (misuse of confidential information and breach of fiduciary duty), the third category upon which to restrain a lawyer in a position of conflict from acting in a matter is known as the “inherent jurisdiction” ground. The Court can restrain lawyers from acting in a particular case as an incident of its inherent jurisdiction over its officers and control of its processes.[2] The jurisdiction is enlivened where there is an objective perception that a lawyer lacks independence such that the Court is compelled to interfere and remove the lawyer from acting in the matter. In other words, the position of the lawyer makes the Court uneasy. The test for intervention is whether a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the proper administration of justice, including the appearance of justice, requires that a legal practitioner should be prevented from acting.[3] Axios’ failed application The jurisdiction to enjoin a solicitor from acting is to be regarded as exceptional, and to be exercised by the court with caution. That was the basis on which his Honour Judge Dart of the South Australian Supreme Court dismissed the application brought to restrain Piper Alderman from acting for the liquidators. Here, Piper Alderman is acting for the company in relation to a dispute which was in existence before the winding up commenced.  The liquidator retained Piper Alderman to continue acting for the company for the purpose of the litigation, the subject of the existing dispute. The supposed conflict was said to have arisen from a proof of debt which Piper Alderman lodged for about $47,000 in fees incurred prior to the administration. The argument was that Piper Alderman’s impartiality was impaired by the fact that unless the litigation is successful, Piper Alderman will not be paid its outstanding fees because there will be no funds in the winding up to do so. Axios contended that “the conduct of the solicitor was so offensive to common notions of fairness and justice that they should, as officers of the Court, be restrained from acting”. However, his Honour considered the firm’s status as creditor to be unremarkable. Even in a case where a substantial sum (over $830,000) was owed to lawyers by their insolvent client,[4] there was no risk to the proper administration of justice. As everyone knows, solicitors routinely act in matters where they are owed money including conditional costs agreements, risk share arrangements, contingency fee arrangements and agreements that include uplift fees, to name a few. The restraint application in Strata Voting was unsurprisingly and swiftly[5] dismissed with costs. Conclusion If an opposing party asserts that a lawyer should be restrained from acting for the opponent, it is necessary for a clear case to be made that the lawyer is in a position where he is fixed with an interest of such a nature that he may fail in his overriding duty to the court. It requires proof of facts, and not mere speculation as to motive. The risk to the due administration of justice has to be a real one. Otherwise, a litigant ought not to be deprived of the lawyer of his choice. — About the Authors: Valerie Blacker is a commercial litigator focusing on funded litigation. Valerie has been with Piper Alderman for over 12 years. With a background in class actions, Valerie also prosecutes funded commercial litigation claims. Amelia Atkinson is a litigation and dispute resolution lawyer at Piper Alderman with a primary focus on corporate and commercial disputes. Amelia is involved in a number of large, complex matters in jurisdictions across Australia. For queries or comments in relation to this article please contact Amelia Atkinson | T: +61 7 3220 7767 | E:  aatkinson@piperalderman.com.au [1] Unreported, Supreme Court of South Australia, Dart J, 23 January 2023 (Strata Voting). [2] Kallinicos & Anor v Hunt [2005] NSWSC 118 at [76] (Kallinicos). [3] Ibid. [4] Naczek & Dowler [2011] FamCAFC 179, [84]. [5] In a 5-page judgment.

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Commercial Regulatory Issues

Life After PACCAR: What’s Next for Litigation Funding?

By John Freund |

In the wake of the UK Supreme Court’s landmark R (on the application of PACCAR Inc) v Competition Appeal Tribunal decision, which held that many common litigation funding agreements (LFAs) constituted damages-based agreements (DBAs) and were therefore unenforceable without complying with the Damages-Based Agreements Regulations, the litigation funding market has been in flux.

The ruling upended traditional third-party funding models in England & Wales and sparked a wide range of responses from funders, lawyers and policymakers addressing the uncertainty it created for access to justice and commercial claims. This Life After PACCAR piece brings together leading partners from around the industry to reflect on what has changed and where the market is headed.

An article in Law.com highlights how practitioners are navigating this “post-PACCAR” landscape. Contributors emphasise the significant disruption that followed the decision’s classification of LFAs as DBAs — disruption that forced funders and claimants to rethink pricing structures and contractual frameworks. They also explore recent case law that has begun to restore some stability, including appellate decisions affirming alternative fee structures that avoid the DBA label (such as multiple-of-investment returns) and the ongoing uncertainty pending legislative reform.

Discussion also centres on the UK government’s response: following the Civil Justice Council’s 2025 Final Report, momentum has built behind proposals to reverse the PACCAR effect through legislation and to adopt a light-touch regulatory regime for third-party funders.

Commercial

Litigation Funding Founder Reflects on Building a New Platform

By John Freund |

A new interview offers a candid look at how litigation funding startups are being shaped by founders with deep experience inside the legal system. Speaking from the perspective of a former practicing litigator, Lauren Harrison, founder of Signal Peak Partners, describes how time spent in BigLaw provided a practical foundation for launching and operating a litigation finance business.

An article in Above the Law explains that Harrison views litigation funding as a natural extension of legal advocacy, rather than a purely financial exercise. Having worked closely with clients and trial teams, she argues that understanding litigation pressure points, timelines, and decision making dynamics is critical when evaluating cases for investment. This background allows funders to assess risk more realistically and communicate more effectively with law firms and claimholders.

The interview also touches on the operational realities of starting a litigation funding company from the ground up. Harrison discusses early challenges such as building trust in a competitive market, educating lawyers about non-recourse funding structures, and developing underwriting processes that balance speed with diligence. Transparency around pricing and alignment of incentives emerge as recurring themes, with Harrison emphasizing that long-term relationships matter more than short-term returns.

Another key takeaway is the importance of team composition. While legal expertise is essential, Harrison notes that successful platforms also require strong financial, operational, and compliance capabilities. Blending these skill sets, particularly at an early stage, is presented as one of the more difficult but necessary steps in scaling a sustainable funding business.

Commercial Regulatory Issues

Australian High Court Limits Recovery of Litigation Funding Costs

By John Freund |

The High Court of Australia has delivered a significant decision clarifying the limits of recoverable damages in funded litigation, confirming that claimants cannot recover litigation funding commissions or fees as compensable loss, even where those costs materially reduce the net recovery.

Ashurst reports that the High Court rejected arguments that litigation funding costs should be treated as damages flowing from a defendant’s wrongdoing. The ruling arose from a shareholder class action in which claimants sought to recover the funding commission deducted from their settlement proceeds, contending that the costs were a foreseeable consequence of the underlying misconduct. The court disagreed, holding that litigation funding expenses are properly characterised as the price paid to pursue litigation, rather than loss caused by the defendant.

In reaching its decision, the High Court emphasised the distinction between harm suffered as a result of wrongful conduct and the commercial arrangements a claimant enters into to enforce their rights. While acknowledging that litigation funding is now a common and often necessary feature of large-scale litigation, the court concluded that this reality does not convert funding costs into recoverable damages. Allowing such recovery, the court reasoned, would represent an expansion of damages principles beyond established limits.

The decision provides welcome clarity for defendants facing funded claims, while reinforcing long-standing principles of Australian damages law. At the same time, it confirms that litigation funding costs remain a matter to be borne out of recoveries, subject to court approval regimes and regulatory oversight rather than being shifted onto defendants through damages awards.