The Impact of Insurance on the Litigation Finance Market

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A new empirical study by Brian Fitzpatrick of Vanderbilt Law School challenges a widely held assumption in class action litigation: that incentive payments are necessary to recruit named plaintiffs. The research, published in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, analyzed federal class-action filings from January 2017 through May 2024, using data drawn from the legal-tech platform Lex Machina. It leveraged a natural experiment created by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s 2020 ruling that barred incentive payments in the 11th Circuit (Florida, Georgia, Alabama) while other circuits continued permitting them.
An article in Reuters states that according to the analysis, the volume of class-actions filed in the 11th Circuit did not meaningfully decline relative to other circuits after the ban on incentive payments. In other words, the absence of such payments did not appear to impair the ability of plaintiffs’ counsel to find willing named plaintiffs.
Fitzpatrick and his co-author, graduate student Colton Cronin, observed that although courts routinely approve modest incentive awards (averaging about $7,500 in non-securities class actions) to compensate the named plaintiff’s extra effort post-settlement, the data suggest that payments may not be a driving factor in recruitment.
Fitzpatrick emphasizes that this is not to say incentive payments have no role. He notes that there remains a moral argument for compensating named plaintiffs who shoulder additional burdens. These include depositions, discovery responses, trial participation, and public exposure. Yet the study’s finding is notable. Motivation for class-representation may be rooted more in altruism, reputation or justice-seeking than in straightforward financial gain.
For the legal-funding industry and class-action litigators, the findings are significant. They suggest that reliance on incentive payments to secure named plaintiffs may be less critical than previously assumed, potentially lowering a transactional cost input in structuring class settlements. On the other hand, third-party funders and litigation financiers should consider how the supply of willing named plaintiffs might remain stable even in jurisdictions restricting such payments.
Walter Merricks, the class representative behind the landmark Mastercard case, has publicly criticized the use of confidential arbitration clauses in litigation funding agreements tied to collective proceedings.
According to Legal Futures, Merricks spoke at an event where he argued that such clauses can leave class representatives exposed and unsupported, particularly when disputes arise with funders. He emphasized that disagreements between funders and class representatives should be heard in open proceedings before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), not behind closed doors.
His comments come in the wake of the £200 million settlement in the Mastercard claim—significantly lower than the original £14 billion figure cited in early filings. During the settlement process, Merricks became the target of an arbitration initiated by his funder, Innsworth Capital. The arbitration named him personally, prompting Mastercard to offer an indemnity of up to £10 million to shield him from personal financial risk.
Merricks warned that the confidentiality of arbitration allows funders to exert undue pressure on class representatives, who often lack institutional backing or leverage. He called on the CAT to scrutinize and reject funding agreements that designate arbitration as the sole forum for dispute resolution. In his view, transparency and public accountability are vital in collective actions, especially when funders and claimants diverge on strategy or settlement terms.
His remarks highlight a growing debate in the legal funding industry over the proper governance of funder-representative relationships. If regulators move to curtail arbitration clauses, it could force funders to navigate public scrutiny and recalibrate their contractual protections in UK group litigation.
Rightmove is facing a landmark £1 billion collective action in the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal, targeting the online property platform’s fee structure and alleged abuse of market dominance. The case is being brought on behalf of thousands of estate agents, who claim Rightmove’s listing fees were “excessive and unfair,” potentially violating UK competition law.
An article in Reuters outlines the case, which is being spearheaded by Jeremy Newman, a former panel member of the UK’s competition regulator. The legal action is structured as an opt-out class-style suit, meaning any eligible estate agent in the UK is automatically included unless they choose otherwise. The claim is being funded by Innsworth Capital, one of Europe’s largest litigation funders, and the legal team includes Scott + Scott UK and Kieron Beal KC of Blackstone Chambers.
Rightmove has responded to the legal filing by stating it believes the claim is “without merit” and emphasized the “value we provide to our partners.” However, news of the action caused a sharp drop in its share price, falling as much as 3.4% on the day of the announcement. The suit comes at a sensitive time for Rightmove, which has already warned of slower profit growth ahead due to increased investment spending and a softening housing market.
The case underscores the potential of collective actions to challenge entrenched market practices, particularly in digital platform sectors where power imbalances with small business users are pronounced. For litigation funders, this marks another high-profile entry into platform-related disputes, with significant financial upside if successful. It may also signal a growing appetite for funding large opt-out claims targeting dominant firms in other concentrated markets.