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Managing Duration Risk in Litigation Finance (Part 2 of 2)

Managing Duration Risk in Litigation Finance (Part 2 of 2)

The following is the second of a two-part series (Part 1 can be found here), contributed by Ed Truant, founder of Slingshot Capital, Executive Summary
  • Duration risk is one of the top risks in litigation finance
  • Duration is impossible to determine, even for litigation experts
  • Risk management tools are available and investors should make themselves aware of the tools and their costs prior to making their first investment
  • Diversification is critical in litigation finance
Slingshot Insights:
  • Duration management begins prior to making an investment by determining which areas of litigation finance have attractive duration risks
  • Avoidance can be more powerful than management when it comes to duration in litigation finance
  • There is likely a correlation between duration risk and binary risk (i.e. the longer a case proceeds, the higher the likelihood of binary risk associated with a judicial/arbitral outcome)
In the first article of this two-part series, I provided an overview of some of the issues related to duration in the litigation finance asset class.  In this article, I discuss some of the ways in which investors can manage duration risk, both before they invest and after they have invested. Managing Duration Risk The good news is that there are many ways to manage duration risk in litigation finance and you can use the various alternatives in combination to create your own portfolio to mitigate the risk. Before we look at how we can manage duration through an exit of an investment, let’s first explore how we can avoid duration risk before we even start investing.  That is to say which investments have lower levels of duration risk to begin with so we can avoid duration risk going into an investment. Case Type Selection On the commercial side, post-settlement cases have a low degree of duration risk as the litigation risk has mainly been dealt with through the settlement agreement and the resulting risks relate to procedural (generally timing) and collection risk.  Similarly, appeals finance is generally involved with cases that have less litigation risk as the issue at play is usually a specific point of law and the timeline for appeals tends to be relatively certain and short while the costs are fairly well defined. Consumer litigation cases (think personal injury cases, other than mass torts) tend to have relatively dependable timelines and so this can be a very attractive area in which to invest with less duration uncertainty, but it does come with some ‘headline’ and regulatory risk.  Mass tort cases, which technically are consumer cases, have different dynamics because of the sheer size of the claims and the complexity of the multi-jurisdictional process which require test cases to prove out the merits and values of the cases.  So, I would view these as being similar to large commercial cases in terms of their dynamics with respect to duration. Other case types such as international arbitration and intellectual property disputes tend to have much longer durations in general and so avoiding these case types is a way to mitigate duration risk within a portfolio. Case Sizes Based on some statistical analysis I had prepared from funder results (my demarcation point between small and large was based on one million in financing) and on review of a large number of case outcomes of different sizes, there appears to be some correlation between the size of the financing and the duration of the case. Smaller financings (and presumably, but not necessarily, smaller cases) tend to have shorter durations than larger financings.  The correlation could result from the fact that litigation finance is more effective in smaller cases or that there is generally less at risk in smaller cases and hence rational parties tend to resolve things more quickly when there is less to squabble over.  The exact reason will never be known, but there does appear to be some statistical correlation to support the finding.  Accordingly, one way to manage duration risk would be to focus on smaller sized cases. Case Jurisdiction Selection Not all jurisdictions are created equal in terms of speed to resolution.  Accordingly, one might want to investigate the best venue for their cases given their portfolio attributes to ensure they are in jurisdictions where duration risk is lower than others.  Of course, jurisdictions don’t offer duration risk in isolation and so you will need to know what you are trading off by investing in cases in jurisdictions with a faster resolution mechanism as there will likely be trade-offs with economic consequences.  This could involve different countries, different states within a given country, and different judicial venues (arbitration vs. court).  There are even certain judges that progress through cases at a quicker clip and are less prone to allow for unnecessary delays.  Of course, you may not be able to pick your judge and even if you can there is no guarantee you will end up with the same one you started. Case Entry Point  If you are a fund manager, another way to manage duration risk on the front end, aside from case type selection, is to focus on those cases that are already in progress and therefore should have a shorter life cycle because you are entering them later in their life cycle.  While this doesn’t deal with the situation where the case goes on longer than anticipated, it does decrease the overall length of the case by deciding to enter it at a later stage, but then you don’t always have a choice when you enter a case as it may be presented to you at a particular point in time and then you may never get the opportunity to invest in it again.  In this sense you could suffer from adverse selection if you only selected late-stage cases as you are only investing into a subset of the broader market of available cases. Liquid Investments Another way to mitigate duration risk is to focus on a liquid alternative that provides similar exposure through the publicly-listed markets, which is a topic I covered recently in a two-part article which can be found here and here under the heading of Event Driven Litigation Centric (“EDLC”) investing.  EDLC has the distinct advantage of being liquid through a hedge fund structure that provides redemption rights which allows the investor to somewhat control duration although ultimate duration is typically dictated by the timing of the event itself.  Of course, as investors move into the public markets, they start to add correlation to their portfolio which may be at odds with your duration/liquidity objectives. While it is beneficial to deal with duration risk on the front end through the case selection options outlined above, once an investor has concluded their investments, there are some options still available to deal with duration risk as outlined below. Secondary Sales  As the litigation finance industry has evolved, so to have the number of solutions in the marketplace.  While secondaries have been taking place informally for years (hedge funds, litigation funders, family offices, etc.) there has only recently been a formalizing of the secondary market and I am very keen to see how the early market entrant, Gerchen Capital, ultimately performs. Nevertheless, for managers and investors seeking liquidity and an end to duration risk entering into a secondary transaction may be a very viable solution. I believe it will be more economically viable in the context of a portfolio sale than a single case investment, but I am sure there will be some level of appetite and valuation for both.  It may be the case that the investor does not obtain 100% liquidity for their position but rather risk shares alongside another investor who doesn’t want to suffer from adverse selection and thus makes it a condition of their secondary offer that the primary investor retain an ownership position.  Other situations may allow for complete liquidity, but that will likely come at an economic cost.  And there are even other times when the case is moving along exactly as planned and the primary investor is able to sell a portion of its investment at such a high valuation that it produces a return on its entire investment, which is the case with Burford and its Petersen/Eton Park claims, despite the fact that no money has exchanged hands between the plaintiff and the defendant and there is still no clear path to liquidity. While selling a portion of an investment allows the manager to obtain some liquidity for its investors, it also serves to validate the value of the investment/portfolio to its own investors, which may in turn allow that manager to write-up its portfolio to the value inherent in the secondary sale transaction (again, this assumes that the transaction is completed with a third party investor).  As an investor, you really need to assess whether any secondary transaction is being undertaken for the intended purpose (liquidity or duration management) or whether there are alternative motivations at play (i.e. for the manager to post good return numbers to allow them to increase their chances of success at raising another fund).  And while third party validation may be comforting, too much comfort should not be derived by someone’s ability to sell an investment to another party, it could have more to do with sales acumen than the value of the underlying investment. Insurance Any discussion regarding litigation finance wouldn’t be complete without mentioning its close cousin, insurance.  In the early days of applying insurance to litigation finance, the focus was more on offsetting the risk of loss.  While that is still true today, there is an increasing focus being put on insurance as a way to deal with duration.  The thinking is that investors don’t want to get stuck in funds that take years beyond their original term to pay out and so they are prepared to accept the duration risk if there is a safety valve in place. The safety valve is the insurance which will pay out at the end of a defined term, which provides the investor with assurances that they will at the very least get their original principal repaid (and possibly a nominal return).  In essence, the insurance functions as a risk transfer mechanism between investor and insurer until the case is finally resolved. While it is more common to put insurance in place on making the investment, one could place insurance after the fact as well. Slingshot Insights   Duration management in litigation finance is almost as critical as manager selection and case selection.  I believe duration management starts prior to making any investments by pairing your investment strategy and its inherent duration expectations with the duration characteristics of your investments.  From there, you should ensure your portfolio is diversified and you should be actively assessing duration and liquidity throughout your hold period.  You should also assess the various tools available to you both on entry and along the hold period to determine your optimum exit point. As always, I welcome your comments and counterpoints to those raised in this article.  Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc. and an investor in the consumer and commercial litigation finance industry.  Slingshot Capital inc. is involved in the origination and design of unique opportunities in legal finance markets, globally, advising and investing with and alongside institutional investors.

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Third Party Funding 3.0: Exploring Litigation Funding’s Correlation with the Broader Economy

By Gian Marco Solas |

The following article was contributed by Dr. Avv. Gian Marco Solas[1], founder of Sustainab-Law and author of Third Party Funding, New Technologies and the Interdisciplinary Methodology as Global Competition Litigation Driving Forces (Global Competition Litigation Review, 1/25).  Dr. Solas is also the author of Third Party Funding, Law Economics an Policy (Cambridge Press).

There is an inaccurate and counterproductive belief in the litigation funding market, that the asset class would be uncorrelated from the global economy. That was in fact due to a much bigger scientific legal problem, that the law itself was not considered as physical factor of correlation, as instrument to measure and determine cause and effects of economic events in legal systems.

This problem has been solved, in both theoretical and mathematical terms, and in fact – thanks to technology available to date such as AI and blockchain – it looks much better for litig … ehm … legal third-party funders. 

Third Party Funding 3.0© opens three new lines of opportunities:

  1. AI allows to detect and file claims that would otherwise not have been viable / brought forward, such as unlocked competition law claims[2], which represent the largest chunk of the market for competition claims. See funding proposal.
  2. Human law as factor of correlation allows to calculate the unexpressed value of the global economy. Everything that, in fact, can be unlocked with litigation, allowing then a public-private IPO type of process to optimize legal systems[3].
  3. Physical modeling of the law also allows to transform debt / liabilities into new investments, thus allowing to settle litigation earlier and with less legal costs, leaving more room to creativity to optimize the investments[4].

While it may be true that the outcome of one single judgement does not depend on the fluctuations of the financial economy, legal reality certainly determines the ups and downs of the litigation funding (and any other) market. Otherwise, we could not explain the rise of litigation funding in the post-financial crisis for instance, or the shockwaves propagated by judgements like PACCAR.

The flip side is that understanding and measuring legal reality, as well as leveraging on modern technologies and innovative legal instruments, the market for legal claims and legal assets is much bigger and sizeable than with the standard litigation financial model.

In order to test Litigation Funding 3.0, I am presenting the following proposal:

10 MILLION EUR in the form of a series A venture capital type of investment to cover one test case's litigation costs, tech, book-building and expert costs aimed at targeting three already identified global or multi-jurisdictional mass anticompetitive claims in the scale of multi-billion dollars, whose details will be provided upon request.

Funder(s) get:

  • Percentage of claims' return as per agreement with parties involved;
  • Property of the AI / blockchain algorithm;
  • License of TPF 3.0.

The funding does not cover: additional legal / litigation / expert / etc. costs.

Below is the full proposal:

THIRD PARTY FUNDING 3.0© & COMPETITION LAW CLAIMS Dr2. Avv. Gian Marco Solas gmsolas@sustainab-law.eu ; gianmarcosolas@gmail.com ; +393400966871 
AI: Artificial Intelligence                  ML: Machine Learning                    TPF: Third Party Funding
GENERAL SCENARIO FOR COMPETITION LAW DAMAGE CLAIMS – IN SHORT
Competition authorities around the globe are rapidly developing AI / ML tools to scan markets / economy and prosecute anti-competitive practices. This suggests a steep increase in competition claims in the coming years, in both volume and scope.  AI also reduces the costs and time of litigation and ML allows to better assess its risks and merit, prompting for a re-modelling of the TPF economic model in competition claims considering empirical evidence of the first wave(s) of funded litigation.
CODIFICATION© IN PHENOGRAPHY© AND TPF 3.0©
New technology and ‘mathematical-legal language’, a combination of digital & quantum where the IT code is the applicable law modelled as - and interrelated with - the law(s) of nature (‘codification©’ in ‘phenography©’). On this basis, an ML / AI legal-tech algorithm has been built in prototype to learn, build and enforce anticompetitive claims in scale, to be guided by lawyers / experts / managers, with a process tracked with and certified in blockchain. New investment thesis (TPF 3.0©) for an asset class correlated to the global real economy, including the mathematical basis for the development of a complex sciences-based / empirical damage calculation to be built by experts. 
LEGAL / LITIGATION TECH INVESTMENT, COMMITMENT AND PROSPECT RETURN
10 MILLION EUR in the form of a series A venture capital type of investment with real assets as collateral for funding to any competition litigation filed with and through this algorithm, that becomes proprietary also of the funder(s). It aims at covering a first test case (already identified), full-time IT engineer, quantum experts and book-building costs. The funder(s) is(are) expected to provide also global litigation management expertise and own the algorithm. Three global or anyway multi-jurisdictional mass anticompetitive claims in the scale of multi-billion in value have already been identified. Details will be provided upon request. Funder(s) also gets license of the TPF 3.0© thesis.

Below is the abstract and table of contents from my research:

Abstract

This article aims at fostering competition litigation and market analysis by integrating concepts borrowed from physics science from an historical legal and evolutionary perspective, taking the third party funding (TPF) market as benchmark. To do so, it first combines historical legal data and trends related to the legal and litigation markets, discussing three macro historical trends or “states”: Industrial revolution(s) and globalisation; enlargement of the legal world; digital revolution and liberalisation of the legal profession. It then proposes the multidisciplinary methodology to assess the market for TPF: mainstream economic models, historical “cyclical” data and concepts borrowed from physics, particularly from mechanics of fluids and thermodynamics. On this basis, it discusses the potential implication of such methodology on the global competition litigation practice, for instance in market analysis and damage theory, also by considering the impact of modern technologies. The article concludes that physics models and the interdisciplinary methodology seem to add value to market assessment and considers whether there should be a case for a wider adoption in (competition) litigation and asset management practices.  

Table of Contents

Introduction. I. Evolution of the legal services, litigation and third party funding market(s) 1.1. Industrial revolution(s) and globalisation 1.2. Enlargement of the legal world and privatisation of justice 1.3. Digital revolution and liberalisation of the legal profession II. Modelling the market(s) with economics, historical and physics models. Third Party Funding as benchmark 2.1. Economic models for legal services, legal claims and third party funding markets 2.2. Does history repeat itself? Litigation finance cycles 2.3. Mechanics of fluids and thermodynamics to model legal markets? III. Impact on global competition litigation 3.1. Market analysis and damage theory 3.2. Economics of competition litigation and new technologies. Conclusions. Third Party Funding 3.0© and competitiveness.

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1. Italian / EU qualified lawyer and legal scientist. Leading Expert at BRICS Competition Law & Policy Centre (Higher School of Economics, Moscow). Ph.D.2 (Maastricht Law School, Economic Analysis of Law; University of Cagliari, Comparative Law) – LL.M. (College of Europe, EU competition Law). Visiting Fellow at Fordham Law School (US Antitrust), NYU (US Legal finance and civil procedure).

2. G. M. Solas, ‘Third Party Funding, new technologies and the interdisciplinary methodology as global competition litigation driving forces’ (2025) Global Competition Litigation Review, 1.

3. G. M. Solas, ‘Interrelation of Human Laws and Laws of Nature? Codification of Sustainable Legal Systems’ (2025) Journal of Law, Market & Innovation, 2.

4. ‘Law is Love’, at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5694423, par. 3.3.

Personal Injury Firms Want Private Equity Investment

By John Freund |

US personal injury law firms are leading a push to open the doors to private equity investment in the legal sector, even in the face of long-standing regulatory opposition to outside ownership of law practices.

According to the Financial Times, a growing number of US firms that built their practices around high-volume, billboard-driven mass tort and injury representation are quietly exploring capital injections from private equity firms. The motivation is fast growth, increased leverage, and the ability to scale operations rapidly, something traditional partner-owned firms have found difficult in a consolidating market.

The move represents a departure from the conventional owner-operator model historically favored by the legal profession, where practicing attorneys hold equity in their firms. Private capital could provide aggressive funding for marketing, case acquisition, litigation infrastructure, and operational expansion, enabling firms to ramp up nationwide acquisition of cases. Critics, however, warn that outside investors prioritizing returns could create pressure to maximize volume over client outcomes.

Private equity’s entrance into legal services is not entirely new, but the aggressive push by personal injury firms may mark a tipping point. If regulators and bar associations ease restrictions on non-lawyer ownership or passive investment, this could fundamentally reshape how US law firms are structured and financed.

For the legal funding industry, this trend signals a potential increase in demand for third-party litigation financing and capital partners. As firms leverage outside investments for growth and case volume, funding providers may find new opportunities or face increased competition.

AmTrust Sues Sompo Over £59M in Legal Funding Losses

By John Freund |

A high-stakes dispute between insurers AmTrust and Sompo is unfolding in UK court, centered on a failed litigation funding scheme that left AmTrust facing an estimated £59 million in losses. At the heart of the case is whether Sompo, as the professional indemnity insurer of two defunct law firms, Pure Legal and HSS, is liable for the damages stemming from their alleged misconduct in the operation of the scheme.

An article in Law360 reports that AmTrust had insured the litigation funding program and is now pursuing Sompo for reimbursement, arguing that the liabilities incurred by Pure and HSS are covered under Sompo’s policies. The two law firms entered administration, leaving AmTrust to shoulder the financial burden. AmTrust contends that the firms breached their professional duties, triggering coverage under the indemnity policies.

Sompo, however, disputes both the factual and legal underpinnings of the claim. The insurer denies that any breach occurred and further argues that even if the law firms had acted improperly, their conduct would not be covered under the terms of the policies issued.

This case follows AmTrust’s recent resolution of a parallel legal battle with Novitas, another financial party entangled in the scheme. That settlement narrows the current dispute to AmTrust’s claim against Sompo.