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Key Takeaways from LFJ’s Special Digital Event “Litigation Finance: Investor Perspectives”

Key Takeaways from LFJ’s Special Digital Event “Litigation Finance: Investor Perspectives”

On Thursday April 4th, 2024, Litigation Finance Journal hosted a special digital event titled “Litigation Finance: Investor Perspectives.” The panel discussion featured Bobby Curtis (BC), Principal at Cloverlay, Cesar Bello (CB), Partner at Corbin Capital, and Zachary Krug (ZK), Managing Director at NorthWall Capital. The event was moderated by Ed Truant, Founder of Slingshot Capital. Below are some key takeaways from the event: If you were to pinpoint some factors that you pay particular attention to when analyzing managers & their track records, what would those be? BC: It’s a similar setup to any strategy that you’re looking at–you want to slice and dice a track record as much as possible, to try to get to the answer of what’s driving returns. Within litigation finance, that could be what sub-sectors are they focused on, is it intellectual property? Is it ex-US deals? What’s the sourcing been? How has deployment been historically relative to the capital they’re looking to raise now? It’s an industry that is starting to become data rich. You have publicly-listed companies that have some pretty interesting track record that’s available. I’m constantly consuming track record data and we’re building our internal database to be able to comp against. Within PE broadly, a lot of people are talking about DPI is the new IRR, and I think that’s particularly true in litigation finance. If I’m opening a new investment with a fund I’ve never partnered with before, my eyes are going to ‘how long have they been at it, and what’s the realization activity?’ There is also a qualitative aspect to this–has the team been together for a while, do they have a nice mix of legal acumen, investment and structuring acumen, what’s the overall firm look like? It’s a little bit art and science, but not too dissimilar from any track record analysis with alternative investment opportunities. Zach, you’ve got a bit more of a credit-focus. What are you looking for in your opportunities?  ZK: We want to understand where the realizations are coming from. So if I’m looking at a track record, I want to understand if these realizations are coming through settlements or late-stage trial events. From my perspective as an investor, I’d be more attracted to those late-stage settlements, even if the returns were a little bit lower than a track record that had several large trial wins. And I say that because when you’re looking at the types of cases that you’ll be investing in, you want to invest in cases that will resolve before trial and get away from that binary risk. You want cases that have good merit, make economic sense, and have alignment between claimant and law firm, and ultimately are settleable by defendants. That type of track record is much more replicable than if you have a few outsized trial wins. What are things that managers generally do particularly well in this asset class, and particularly poorly?  CB: I don’t want to paint with a broad brush here. With managers it can be idiosyncratic, but there can be structuring mistakes – not getting paid for extension risks, not putting in IRR provisions. Portfolio construction mistakes like not deploying enough and being undercommitted, which is a killer. Conversely, on the good side, we’ve seen a ton of activity around insurance, which seems to be a bigger part of the landscape. We also welcome risk management optionality with secondaries. Some folks are clearly skating to where the puck is going and doing more innovative things, so it really depends who you’re dealing with. But on the fundamental underwriting, you rarely see a consistent train wreck – it’s more on the other stuff where people get tripped up. How do you approach valuation of litigation finance portfolios? What I’m more specifically interested in is (i) do you rely on manager portfolio valuations, (ii) do you apply rules of thumb to determine valuations, (iii) do you focus your diligence efforts on a few meaningful cases or review & value the entire portfolio, and (iv) do you use third parties to assist in valuations?  CB: If you’re in a fund, you’re relying on the manager’s marks. What we do is not that – we own the assets directly or make co-investments. We see a lot of people approach this differently. Sometimes we have the same underlying exposure as partners and they’re marking it differently. Not to say that one party is rational and the other is not, it’s just hard to do. So this is one we struggle with. I don’t love mark-to-motion. I know there’s a tug toward trying to fair value things more, but as we’ve experienced in the venture space, you can put a lot of valuations in DPI, but I like to keep it at cost unless there is a material event. Check out the full 1-hour discussion here.
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Pogust Goodhead Secures Landmark Win Against BHP in Brazil Dam Case

By John Freund |

In a major breakthrough for cross-border group litigation, Pogust Goodhead has secured a resounding victory in its long-running claim against mining giant BHP over the 2015 collapse of the Fundão tailings dam in Mariana, Brazil. The UK High Court has ruled BHP liable for the disaster, which killed 19 people and unleashed a wave of toxic sludge through the Rio Doce basin, displacing entire communities and leaving lasting environmental damage.

According to Non-Billable, the ruling confirms BHP’s liability under both Brazilian environmental law and the Brazilian Civil Code. In rejecting the company’s jurisdictional and limitation defenses, the court made clear that English law recognizes the right of over 600,000 Brazilian claimants to pursue redress in UK courts. The judgment underscores BHP’s operational and strategic control over the Samarco joint venture and found that the company was aware of critical dam defects more than a year before the collapse. The attempt to distance itself through the argument of being an indirect polluter was also dismissed.

This outcome is a critical milestone in one of the largest group actions ever brought in the UK. A trial on damages is now scheduled for October 2026, with case management proceedings set to resume in December.

The win comes amid internal turbulence at Pogust Goodhead, including recent leadership changes and reported tensions with its litigation finance backers, but the firm remains on course to press forward with what could be a multibillion-dollar compensation phase.

Incentive Payments Not Essential for Named Plaintiffs, Study Finds

By John Freund |

A new empirical study by Brian Fitzpatrick of Vanderbilt Law School challenges a widely held assumption in class action litigation: that incentive payments are necessary to recruit named plaintiffs. The research, published in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, analyzed federal class-action filings from January 2017 through May 2024, using data drawn from the legal-tech platform Lex Machina. It leveraged a natural experiment created by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s 2020 ruling that barred incentive payments in the 11th Circuit (Florida, Georgia, Alabama) while other circuits continued permitting them.

An article in Reuters states that according to the analysis, the volume of class-actions filed in the 11th Circuit did not meaningfully decline relative to other circuits after the ban on incentive payments. In other words, the absence of such payments did not appear to impair the ability of plaintiffs’ counsel to find willing named plaintiffs.

Fitzpatrick and his co-author, graduate student Colton Cronin, observed that although courts routinely approve modest incentive awards (averaging about $7,500 in non-securities class actions) to compensate the named plaintiff’s extra effort post-settlement, the data suggest that payments may not be a driving factor in recruitment.

Fitzpatrick emphasizes that this is not to say incentive payments have no role. He notes that there remains a moral argument for compensating named plaintiffs who shoulder additional burdens. These include depositions, discovery responses, trial participation, and public exposure. Yet the study’s finding is notable. Motivation for class-representation may be rooted more in altruism, reputation or justice-seeking than in straightforward financial gain.

For the legal-funding industry and class-action litigators, the findings are significant. They suggest that reliance on incentive payments to secure named plaintiffs may be less critical than previously assumed, potentially lowering a transactional cost input in structuring class settlements. On the other hand, third-party funders and litigation financiers should consider how the supply of willing named plaintiffs might remain stable even in jurisdictions restricting such payments.

Merricks Calls for Ban on Secret Arbitrations in Funded Claims

By John Freund |

Walter Merricks, the class representative behind the landmark Mastercard case, has publicly criticized the use of confidential arbitration clauses in litigation funding agreements tied to collective proceedings.

According to Legal Futures, Merricks spoke at an event where he argued that such clauses can leave class representatives exposed and unsupported, particularly when disputes arise with funders. He emphasized that disagreements between funders and class representatives should be heard in open proceedings before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), not behind closed doors.

His comments come in the wake of the £200 million settlement in the Mastercard claim—significantly lower than the original £14 billion figure cited in early filings. During the settlement process, Merricks became the target of an arbitration initiated by his funder, Innsworth Capital. The arbitration named him personally, prompting Mastercard to offer an indemnity of up to £10 million to shield him from personal financial risk.

Merricks warned that the confidentiality of arbitration allows funders to exert undue pressure on class representatives, who often lack institutional backing or leverage. He called on the CAT to scrutinize and reject funding agreements that designate arbitration as the sole forum for dispute resolution. In his view, transparency and public accountability are vital in collective actions, especially when funders and claimants diverge on strategy or settlement terms.

His remarks highlight a growing debate in the legal funding industry over the proper governance of funder-representative relationships. If regulators move to curtail arbitration clauses, it could force funders to navigate public scrutiny and recalibrate their contractual protections in UK group litigation.