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Key Takeaways from LFJ’s Virtual Town Hall: 2024 Recap & 2025 Outlook

By John Freund |
December 16, 2024

Key Takeaways from LFJ’s Virtual Town Hall: 2024 Recap & 2025 Outlook

Last week, LFJ hosted its final virtual town hall of the year which covered an array of key developments and trends in the legal fundng sector. Panelists included Tets Ishikawa (TI), Managing Director of LionFish, Boris Ziser (BZ), Co-Head of the Finance Group at Schulte Roth and Zabel, William Marra (WM), Director at Certum Group, and Sarah Johnson (SJ), Head of the Litigation Investing Team at The D.E. Shaw Group. The panel was moderated by Rebecca Berrebi (RB), Founder and CEO of Avenue 33, LLC.

Below are the key takeaways from the event.

RB: What are the key changes that have effected the regulatory landscape of litigation finance in 2024, and how do you think those changes have affected deals in the industry this year?

TI: There’s been quite a few symbolic moments over the past two years. There was a proposal [The Voss Report] saying that litigation funding should be regulated and there should be a cap on fees. In the UK, there as a Supreme Court decision in the case of PACCAR that considered litigation funding agreements to be damages-based agreements, basically making a lot of litigation funding agreements unenforceable. And that has triggered an industry-wide review of the litigation funding industry in the UK by the Civil Justice Council. And that is ongoing, with a report expected next year, and the government may act on those recommendations and enact legislation.

In addition to all of that, there was a report written by the European Law Institute, which is probably the most interesting thing to focus on. Rather than the usual high level narratives of what’s good and bad about litigation funding, it actually proposed principles on the back of research and feedback that it got on all sides of the argument. And it was written by some really highly regarded judges and academics. And the report was quite balanced. But what was really interesting about the report was that it set a tone for the direction of how the UK should really be thinking about litigation funding. The key themes coming out of it are that 1) there is no one size fits all solution-litigation funding has many different parts to it, and 2) that regulation is not just something one does, but there needs to be a real identifiable problem that regulation resolves, otherwise there could be a lot of adverse consequences, and that recognition is key. There is also the recognition that funders do run commercial businesses, so there has to be an economically viable solution.

RB: Deal structures evolve as time goes on, and certainly have evolved in our industry. Boris, can you speak to any particular deal structures that have become less popular this year than they were before, or have started to fall by the wayside?

BZ: I wouldn’t say any have fallen by the wayside, I think that there has been a little bit of a shift – if you go back a number of years, you would see there were more debt deals than equity deals, and that was for various reasons, some of it was preference, some was tax-driven, some was based on an analysis of whether you would be splitting legal fees and things like that – and I think over the last couple of years, you have seen more of a shift where more parties are comfortable with equity deals, particularly with the introduction of alternative business structures in Arizona and Utah. So I don’t think that anything has gone by the wayside, but there has been more comfort and more development on the equity side of the business.

RB: Will, do you see that too? What do you think about that?

WM: Yeah I think that’s right. What’s interesting is, there hasn’t been that much development on the question of which provisions in litigation funding contracts may or may not be enforceable, or the big question of tax clarity. I think Boris makes a very good point about Rule 5.4, the debate around that has largely settled. So you do see an increase around law firm deals. I think this question is also tied up with the increasing diversification of products available, and if you start too think about insurance, and insurance-backed debt, and debt plus equity in these deals, we’re seeing a lot of that. We’re also seeing an increase in acquisitions to the extent that claims are alienable and can be acquired. I think that a lot of claim holders are seeing a lot of benefits entering into those sorts of arrangements.

RB: Sarah, what deal structures do you think are growing in popularity, and why do you think that is happening?

SJ: We’ve seen something similar in the shift from debt to equity. I might characterize it though as a move away from debt to law firms, where your collateral is a lot of cases. I think we’ve seen those deals – especially the ones that happened before Covid – there were a lot of different risks that were introduced rather than just the underlying litigation. The amount of OpEx that the law firm needed to survive, and when you’re debt financing for the whole firm, it gets very complicated. So we’ve seen a shift away more to – I won’t say single cases – but perhaps smaller portfolios with a law firm, so you can target your exposure and share more of the risk and OpEx with the law firms themselves.

We’ve also seen a bifurcation in terms of the size of deals. We’re seeing some more very large deals, like $100MM+ deals, and also small single cases, than perhaps we saw in previous years. We’re just seeing a lot of one-off single case deals where funders can share the risk, vs. entire portfolio monetizations.

To view the entire discussion, join the event page on LinkedIn (you must register for the event to view).

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John Freund

John Freund

Commercial

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Case Developments Commercial

Pogust Goodhead Secures Landmark Win Against BHP in Brazil Dam Case

By John Freund |

In a major breakthrough for cross-border group litigation, Pogust Goodhead has secured a resounding victory in its long-running claim against mining giant BHP over the 2015 collapse of the Fundão tailings dam in Mariana, Brazil. The UK High Court has ruled BHP liable for the disaster, which killed 19 people and unleashed a wave of toxic sludge through the Rio Doce basin, displacing entire communities and leaving lasting environmental damage.

According to Non-Billable, the ruling confirms BHP’s liability under both Brazilian environmental law and the Brazilian Civil Code. In rejecting the company’s jurisdictional and limitation defenses, the court made clear that English law recognizes the right of over 600,000 Brazilian claimants to pursue redress in UK courts. The judgment underscores BHP’s operational and strategic control over the Samarco joint venture and found that the company was aware of critical dam defects more than a year before the collapse. The attempt to distance itself through the argument of being an indirect polluter was also dismissed.

This outcome is a critical milestone in one of the largest group actions ever brought in the UK. A trial on damages is now scheduled for October 2026, with case management proceedings set to resume in December.

The win comes amid internal turbulence at Pogust Goodhead, including recent leadership changes and reported tensions with its litigation finance backers, but the firm remains on course to press forward with what could be a multibillion-dollar compensation phase.

Commercial

Incentive Payments Not Essential for Named Plaintiffs, Study Finds

By John Freund |

A new empirical study by Brian Fitzpatrick of Vanderbilt Law School challenges a widely held assumption in class action litigation: that incentive payments are necessary to recruit named plaintiffs. The research, published in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, analyzed federal class-action filings from January 2017 through May 2024, using data drawn from the legal-tech platform Lex Machina. It leveraged a natural experiment created by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s 2020 ruling that barred incentive payments in the 11th Circuit (Florida, Georgia, Alabama) while other circuits continued permitting them.

An article in Reuters states that according to the analysis, the volume of class-actions filed in the 11th Circuit did not meaningfully decline relative to other circuits after the ban on incentive payments. In other words, the absence of such payments did not appear to impair the ability of plaintiffs’ counsel to find willing named plaintiffs.

Fitzpatrick and his co-author, graduate student Colton Cronin, observed that although courts routinely approve modest incentive awards (averaging about $7,500 in non-securities class actions) to compensate the named plaintiff’s extra effort post-settlement, the data suggest that payments may not be a driving factor in recruitment.

Fitzpatrick emphasizes that this is not to say incentive payments have no role. He notes that there remains a moral argument for compensating named plaintiffs who shoulder additional burdens. These include depositions, discovery responses, trial participation, and public exposure. Yet the study’s finding is notable. Motivation for class-representation may be rooted more in altruism, reputation or justice-seeking than in straightforward financial gain.

For the legal-funding industry and class-action litigators, the findings are significant. They suggest that reliance on incentive payments to secure named plaintiffs may be less critical than previously assumed, potentially lowering a transactional cost input in structuring class settlements. On the other hand, third-party funders and litigation financiers should consider how the supply of willing named plaintiffs might remain stable even in jurisdictions restricting such payments.

Commercial Regulatory Issues

Merricks Calls for Ban on Secret Arbitrations in Funded Claims

By John Freund |

Walter Merricks, the class representative behind the landmark Mastercard case, has publicly criticized the use of confidential arbitration clauses in litigation funding agreements tied to collective proceedings.

According to Legal Futures, Merricks spoke at an event where he argued that such clauses can leave class representatives exposed and unsupported, particularly when disputes arise with funders. He emphasized that disagreements between funders and class representatives should be heard in open proceedings before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), not behind closed doors.

His comments come in the wake of the £200 million settlement in the Mastercard claim—significantly lower than the original £14 billion figure cited in early filings. During the settlement process, Merricks became the target of an arbitration initiated by his funder, Innsworth Capital. The arbitration named him personally, prompting Mastercard to offer an indemnity of up to £10 million to shield him from personal financial risk.

Merricks warned that the confidentiality of arbitration allows funders to exert undue pressure on class representatives, who often lack institutional backing or leverage. He called on the CAT to scrutinize and reject funding agreements that designate arbitration as the sole forum for dispute resolution. In his view, transparency and public accountability are vital in collective actions, especially when funders and claimants diverge on strategy or settlement terms.

His remarks highlight a growing debate in the legal funding industry over the proper governance of funder-representative relationships. If regulators move to curtail arbitration clauses, it could force funders to navigate public scrutiny and recalibrate their contractual protections in UK group litigation.