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Value in Litigation & Implications for Litigation Finance

Value in Litigation & Implications for Litigation Finance

The following article is part of an ongoing column titled ‘Investor Insights.’  Brought to you by Ed Truant, founder and content manager of Slingshot Capital, ‘Investor Insights’ will provide thoughtful and engaging perspectives on all aspects of investing in litigation finance.  Executive Summary
  • 3 Phases of Risk:
    • De-Risking
    • Optimum Resolution
    • Re-Risking
  • Optimum risk-adjusted zone is when information is maximized and trial has yet to begin
  • Once a trial begins, outcomes become binary in the absence of a settlement
  • Diversification is critical to investing in the litigation finance sector
Investor Insights
  • In assessing portfolio performance, it’s crucial to determine the extent of trial outcomes
  • Assess settlement performance in the context of industry settlement rates
  • Generally, a high percentage of cases are settled
  • Certain case types have lower settlement rates, so there is not a ‘one size fits all’ approach to analyzing portfolio performance
I was speaking recently with a local litigation finance manager about the value of a piece of litigation in the context of litigation finance.  As I thought more about the discussion and the implications for settlements and maximizing outcomes, I felt compelled to relay the thoughts in an article for other industry participants to consider and argue.  Keep in mind that this is a simplistic view of a piece of litigation, as most litigation has layers of complexity that influence valuation, not to mention precedents in other jurisdictions. Value The intrinsic value of a piece of litigation is made up of a number of components that lawyers, plaintiffs and litigation finance managers assess as they underwrite their investment decision, which typically consist of the following:
merits of the casedefense counsel effectiveness
collectability of damagesdefendant’s conduct re: previous litigation
quantum of damagesplaintiff counsel effectiveness
justice considerations (judiciary and jurisdiction)
For the purposes of this article, we will mainly reference early stage, pre-settlement cases. Editor’s note– the following contribution appears with illustrative graphs and charts here.   Value is not a static concept in litigation.  Nevertheless, litigation fund managers have to determine approximate value; or a value range at the very early stages of a case when there is a relatively high degree of uncertainty, relatively few facts and little to nothing in terms of judicial proceedings.  In the context of litigation, value varies with time (while time may add value in the short term by virtue of contributing to the amount of information that can be gathered on the case, the longer a case drags on past the point where maximum information is available, the less valuable time becomes due to the time value of money). Value also varies proportionately – or perhaps disproportionately – with risk, which is in turn influenced by information. That is to say, unknown data may come to light that becomes beneficial or harmful to the merits of your case and may influence its outcome and/or quantum. As an example, the ‘certification’ process of a class action in certain jurisdictions has a meaningful impact on whether the class proceeds with the action, and ultimately is a strong determinant of success, typically through settlement. Of course, in all jurisdictions, another major contributing factor is access to capital so plaintiffs can finance the pursuit of their meritorious claims to the point of collection of damages – enter litigation finance. We will assume for the remainder of this article that all cases have the appropriate amount of financing. As discussed, the value of a case is determined by two factors: risk and time.  All cases start where risk is at a maximum, as there is relatively little information known about the case and hence a great degree of uncertainty about its outcome. As plaintiff and counsel build their case and proceed through discovery, the case generally becomes ‘de-risked’ as the plaintiff team grows more comfortable about the merits of their case and the quantum of damages. As we move through the case, we enter the zone of ‘optimum resolution’. However, ‘optimum resolution’ is not necessarily a value maximizing concept, but rather a concept of risk-adjusted value maximization.  The risk-adjusted aspect stems from the fact that both sides have about equal information concerning the dispute, and are now able to make a rational decision as to the possible outcomes and damage quantification. At the point where the process moves past the Optimum Resolution phase, the parties enter into a new phase of risk which is reflective of the binary risk nature of litigation, whereby the outcome is determined by a third party judiciary. As the plaintiff gathers more information regarding his or her case, the case generally increases in value as risk diminishes.  However, at the point where a judicial process commences (and assuming a settlement doesn’t occur between the start of the process and the decision), the investment bifurcates into two potential outcomes on the assumption that there is no resolution after the start of the trial – generally, either a win or a loss outcome.  In certain jurisdictions where they have “adverse costs” or “loser pays” rules, the plaintiff will have to pay the defense costs, and so there is a real financial cost in addition to the lost opportunity associated with a positive outcome.  Implications The purpose of this analysis is to focus the plaintiff on the fact that on a risk-adjusted basis, the zone of Optimum Resolution is the most advantageous point in the litigation process to resolve the case, as it reflects the point of most knowledge and least risk.  This is the point in time to cast aside all emotional elements of the case and the impact of damages incurred, and focus on a realistic outcome that can be achieved through negotiation and settlement, regardless of whether it makes the plaintiff “whole” or not.  Of course, as the old saying goes, “it takes two to tango”, and so, if the defense is not of the same opinion, or their analysis is skewed, they may have a very different perspective on the appropriate settlement amount.  In the case of insurance companies as defendants in cases, they may have other considerations such as statutory reserve requirements or corporate strategic reasons to delay as long as possible (time value of money and the impact on their insurance reserves and investment returns).  Nevertheless, the concept applies to both defense and plaintiff, which is the reason for high settlement rates in most litigation in all jurisdictions. From an investor’s perspective, there should be a recognition that as each case in their portfolio extends beyond the zone of Optimum Resolution, the risk to their portfolio increases.  Accordingly, if you are an institutional investor buying a secondary pool of litigation finance assets, you want to be sure you are not buying a series of old cases where the binary risk is high and you are not getting an appropriate discount to assume the risk.  Of course, there are always exceptions to this rule.  The reason a case has extended for a long period of time may be because the plaintiff has had successive wins at various levels of judiciary and the risk has started to shift away from binary litigation risk toward collection and enforcement risk (Burford’s investment in the ‘Petersen claim’ is a prime example of this phenomenon). Needless to say, litigation is not a formulaic science, and because of the large degree of human interaction and case complexity, it will be relegated into the “arts” category for the time being.  Perhaps artificial intelligence can add a scientific element to determining value and litigation outcomes, but until the vast knowledge of settlement data becomes publicly available, the industry will depend on ‘gut instinct’ and litigation experience in making its decisions.  From an investment perspective, the important point is that diversification is critical to capture the upside inherent in the asset class, while minimizing the downside inherent in the inevitable losses that will be experienced. Important Considerations  Other important factors to consider are the use of contingent fee arrangements and litigation finance, and the impact those characteristics have on the ultimate value of a piece of litigation.  Some in the litigation finance community will argue that they will only consider providing financing to cases where the lawyer is providing their services on a 100% contingent basis (there could be jurisdiction specific constraints to the use of contingent fee arrangements), as this fosters alignment between plaintiff and lawyer to maximize the value of the claim.  Certainly, the alignment argument makes intuitive sense.  However, not every funder is convinced of this fact, and unfortunately, there is not a broad set of data that is definitive in this regard.  Accordingly, until the data determines there is a strong correlation between contingent fee arrangements and outcomes, it remains to be seen.  On one of the panels at the September 2019 LF Dealmakers conference, a litigation funder stated that the company’s empirical data suggests there is no correlation, and hence contingency fee arrangements are not a significant feature to their underwriting process. Yet it’s worth pointing out that many funders feel strongly that the alignment argument is a good one, so they refuse to invest in a case without at least some level of legal counsel fee contingency. Then there is the existence and use of litigation funding itself.  One could argue that the very existence of a plaintiff’s use of a litigation funder to pursue its case will shift the balance of power and ‘level the playing field’ between the plaintiff and the defendant, especially in a David v. Goliath situation where the defendant is ‘deep pocketed’ and the plaintiff relatively impecunious.  As an investor in the industry, not only do I subscribe to the theory, I have seen the results.  While many would suggest it is difficult to parse the effect of litigation funding from the effect of good legal representation and a meritorious claim, I look at the results of relatively small financings and I can see a correlation between success and short duration, which I, in large part, ascribe to the existence of litigation finance. Investor Insights: As a consequence of the above, when I review track records for fund managers one of the metrics I look at is how often the realized outcomes are dependent on a judicial decision (bench, trial or arbitral) as compared to an outcome determined through settlement.  Overall, the data concerning litigation outcomes illustrates that a high percentage of cases (90%+) are settled prior to a judicial decision and so we need to view the results in the context of industry settlement rates. Generally speaking, and depending on the case type and jurisdiction, I have a strong preference for fund managers that have a disproportionate number of settlements in their realized portfolios as opposed to outcomes that were derived from a judicial decision, given the binary nature of those outcomes.  In certain jurisdictions, litigation funders are able to have some influence on the settlement discussions which may tend to favour higher settlement rates, so this issue and my approach to it is not identical in every jurisdiction.  Another influencing factor on settlement rates is case types and case sizes.  Generally speaking, I have noticed that outcomes dependent on judicial/arbitral decisions are correlated with larger cases and certain case types (as an example, International Arbitration cases would be one area where settlement is less likely and hence arbitral outcomes more prevalent). Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc., and an investor in the consumer and commercial litigation finance industry.
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Third Party Funding 3.0: Exploring Litigation Funding’s Correlation with the Broader Economy

By Gian Marco Solas |

The following article was contributed by Dr. Avv. Gian Marco Solas[1], founder of Sustainab-Law and author of Third Party Funding, New Technologies and the Interdisciplinary Methodology as Global Competition Litigation Driving Forces (Global Competition Litigation Review, 1/25).  Dr. Solas is also the author of Third Party Funding, Law Economics an Policy (Cambridge Press).

There is an inaccurate and counterproductive belief in the litigation funding market, that the asset class would be uncorrelated from the global economy. That was in fact due to a much bigger scientific legal problem, that the law itself was not considered as physical factor of correlation, as instrument to measure and determine cause and effects of economic events in legal systems.

This problem has been solved, in both theoretical and mathematical terms, and in fact – thanks to technology available to date such as AI and blockchain – it looks much better for litig … ehm … legal third-party funders. 

Third Party Funding 3.0© opens three new lines of opportunities:

  1. AI allows to detect and file claims that would otherwise not have been viable / brought forward, such as unlocked competition law claims[2], which represent the largest chunk of the market for competition claims. See funding proposal.
  2. Human law as factor of correlation allows to calculate the unexpressed value of the global economy. Everything that, in fact, can be unlocked with litigation, allowing then a public-private IPO type of process to optimize legal systems[3].
  3. Physical modeling of the law also allows to transform debt / liabilities into new investments, thus allowing to settle litigation earlier and with less legal costs, leaving more room to creativity to optimize the investments[4].

While it may be true that the outcome of one single judgement does not depend on the fluctuations of the financial economy, legal reality certainly determines the ups and downs of the litigation funding (and any other) market. Otherwise, we could not explain the rise of litigation funding in the post-financial crisis for instance, or the shockwaves propagated by judgements like PACCAR.

The flip side is that understanding and measuring legal reality, as well as leveraging on modern technologies and innovative legal instruments, the market for legal claims and legal assets is much bigger and sizeable than with the standard litigation financial model.

In order to test Litigation Funding 3.0, I am presenting the following proposal:

10 MILLION EUR in the form of a series A venture capital type of investment to cover one test case's litigation costs, tech, book-building and expert costs aimed at targeting three already identified global or multi-jurisdictional mass anticompetitive claims in the scale of multi-billion dollars, whose details will be provided upon request.

Funder(s) get:

  • Percentage of claims' return as per agreement with parties involved;
  • Property of the AI / blockchain algorithm;
  • License of TPF 3.0.

The funding does not cover: additional legal / litigation / expert / etc. costs.

Below is the full proposal:

THIRD PARTY FUNDING 3.0© & COMPETITION LAW CLAIMS Dr2. Avv. Gian Marco Solas gmsolas@sustainab-law.eu ; gianmarcosolas@gmail.com ; +393400966871 
AI: Artificial Intelligence                  ML: Machine Learning                    TPF: Third Party Funding
GENERAL SCENARIO FOR COMPETITION LAW DAMAGE CLAIMS – IN SHORT
Competition authorities around the globe are rapidly developing AI / ML tools to scan markets / economy and prosecute anti-competitive practices. This suggests a steep increase in competition claims in the coming years, in both volume and scope.  AI also reduces the costs and time of litigation and ML allows to better assess its risks and merit, prompting for a re-modelling of the TPF economic model in competition claims considering empirical evidence of the first wave(s) of funded litigation.
CODIFICATION© IN PHENOGRAPHY© AND TPF 3.0©
New technology and ‘mathematical-legal language’, a combination of digital & quantum where the IT code is the applicable law modelled as - and interrelated with - the law(s) of nature (‘codification©’ in ‘phenography©’). On this basis, an ML / AI legal-tech algorithm has been built in prototype to learn, build and enforce anticompetitive claims in scale, to be guided by lawyers / experts / managers, with a process tracked with and certified in blockchain. New investment thesis (TPF 3.0©) for an asset class correlated to the global real economy, including the mathematical basis for the development of a complex sciences-based / empirical damage calculation to be built by experts. 
LEGAL / LITIGATION TECH INVESTMENT, COMMITMENT AND PROSPECT RETURN
10 MILLION EUR in the form of a series A venture capital type of investment with real assets as collateral for funding to any competition litigation filed with and through this algorithm, that becomes proprietary also of the funder(s). It aims at covering a first test case (already identified), full-time IT engineer, quantum experts and book-building costs. The funder(s) is(are) expected to provide also global litigation management expertise and own the algorithm. Three global or anyway multi-jurisdictional mass anticompetitive claims in the scale of multi-billion in value have already been identified. Details will be provided upon request. Funder(s) also gets license of the TPF 3.0© thesis.

Below is the abstract and table of contents from my research:

Abstract

This article aims at fostering competition litigation and market analysis by integrating concepts borrowed from physics science from an historical legal and evolutionary perspective, taking the third party funding (TPF) market as benchmark. To do so, it first combines historical legal data and trends related to the legal and litigation markets, discussing three macro historical trends or “states”: Industrial revolution(s) and globalisation; enlargement of the legal world; digital revolution and liberalisation of the legal profession. It then proposes the multidisciplinary methodology to assess the market for TPF: mainstream economic models, historical “cyclical” data and concepts borrowed from physics, particularly from mechanics of fluids and thermodynamics. On this basis, it discusses the potential implication of such methodology on the global competition litigation practice, for instance in market analysis and damage theory, also by considering the impact of modern technologies. The article concludes that physics models and the interdisciplinary methodology seem to add value to market assessment and considers whether there should be a case for a wider adoption in (competition) litigation and asset management practices.  

Table of Contents

Introduction. I. Evolution of the legal services, litigation and third party funding market(s) 1.1. Industrial revolution(s) and globalisation 1.2. Enlargement of the legal world and privatisation of justice 1.3. Digital revolution and liberalisation of the legal profession II. Modelling the market(s) with economics, historical and physics models. Third Party Funding as benchmark 2.1. Economic models for legal services, legal claims and third party funding markets 2.2. Does history repeat itself? Litigation finance cycles 2.3. Mechanics of fluids and thermodynamics to model legal markets? III. Impact on global competition litigation 3.1. Market analysis and damage theory 3.2. Economics of competition litigation and new technologies. Conclusions. Third Party Funding 3.0© and competitiveness.

--
1. Italian / EU qualified lawyer and legal scientist. Leading Expert at BRICS Competition Law & Policy Centre (Higher School of Economics, Moscow). Ph.D.2 (Maastricht Law School, Economic Analysis of Law; University of Cagliari, Comparative Law) – LL.M. (College of Europe, EU competition Law). Visiting Fellow at Fordham Law School (US Antitrust), NYU (US Legal finance and civil procedure).

2. G. M. Solas, ‘Third Party Funding, new technologies and the interdisciplinary methodology as global competition litigation driving forces’ (2025) Global Competition Litigation Review, 1.

3. G. M. Solas, ‘Interrelation of Human Laws and Laws of Nature? Codification of Sustainable Legal Systems’ (2025) Journal of Law, Market & Innovation, 2.

4. ‘Law is Love’, at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5694423, par. 3.3.

Personal Injury Firms Want Private Equity Investment

By John Freund |

US personal injury law firms are leading a push to open the doors to private equity investment in the legal sector, even in the face of long-standing regulatory opposition to outside ownership of law practices.

According to the Financial Times, a growing number of US firms that built their practices around high-volume, billboard-driven mass tort and injury representation are quietly exploring capital injections from private equity firms. The motivation is fast growth, increased leverage, and the ability to scale operations rapidly, something traditional partner-owned firms have found difficult in a consolidating market.

The move represents a departure from the conventional owner-operator model historically favored by the legal profession, where practicing attorneys hold equity in their firms. Private capital could provide aggressive funding for marketing, case acquisition, litigation infrastructure, and operational expansion, enabling firms to ramp up nationwide acquisition of cases. Critics, however, warn that outside investors prioritizing returns could create pressure to maximize volume over client outcomes.

Private equity’s entrance into legal services is not entirely new, but the aggressive push by personal injury firms may mark a tipping point. If regulators and bar associations ease restrictions on non-lawyer ownership or passive investment, this could fundamentally reshape how US law firms are structured and financed.

For the legal funding industry, this trend signals a potential increase in demand for third-party litigation financing and capital partners. As firms leverage outside investments for growth and case volume, funding providers may find new opportunities or face increased competition.

AmTrust Sues Sompo Over £59M in Legal Funding Losses

By John Freund |

A high-stakes dispute between insurers AmTrust and Sompo is unfolding in UK court, centered on a failed litigation funding scheme that left AmTrust facing an estimated £59 million in losses. At the heart of the case is whether Sompo, as the professional indemnity insurer of two defunct law firms, Pure Legal and HSS, is liable for the damages stemming from their alleged misconduct in the operation of the scheme.

An article in Law360 reports that AmTrust had insured the litigation funding program and is now pursuing Sompo for reimbursement, arguing that the liabilities incurred by Pure and HSS are covered under Sompo’s policies. The two law firms entered administration, leaving AmTrust to shoulder the financial burden. AmTrust contends that the firms breached their professional duties, triggering coverage under the indemnity policies.

Sompo, however, disputes both the factual and legal underpinnings of the claim. The insurer denies that any breach occurred and further argues that even if the law firms had acted improperly, their conduct would not be covered under the terms of the policies issued.

This case follows AmTrust’s recent resolution of a parallel legal battle with Novitas, another financial party entangled in the scheme. That settlement narrows the current dispute to AmTrust’s claim against Sompo.