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Valuing Indemnity Protection Investment Returns in Litigation Finance

Valuing Indemnity Protection Investment Returns in Litigation Finance

The following article is part of an ongoing column titled ‘Investor Insights.’  Brought to you by Ed Truant, founder and content manager of Slingshot Capital, ‘Investor Insights’ will provide thoughtful and engaging perspectives on all aspects of investing in litigation finance.  Executive Summary
  • Indemnities are not costless instruments; they are akin to securities options, but without a stated option value
  • Approaches to determining cost of indemnity include: Probability weighted outcome approach, Opportunity Cost Approach and Approach based on empirical evidence
  • Implications for Portfolio Returns are that improper assessment of indemnity returns may materially skew return results of a portfolio
Investor Insights
o   Indemnities have a cost and their cost should be used to determine investor returnso   Depending on how indemnity performance is measured, it has the ability to skew portfolio performance
Some litigation finance providers offer a product called indemnity protection (please don’t call it insurance), which is a product designed to protect plaintiffs against adverse costs in certain jurisdictions (Canada, Australia and the UK, for example) where the plaintiff may be found liable for defense costs should the defendant win the case.  Indemnity protection is prevalent in product class action and securities class action cases. What makes indemnity protection challenging is the process of estimating the returns inherent to providing the protection.  Indemnities differ from traditional litigation finance, in that the latter requires the funder to finance hard costs (legal counsel, court costs, expert witness costs, etc.), while the former only pays out once a case is lost by the plaintiff, and subject to the court’s determination regarding the application of adverse costs.  In the event the plaintiff is successful, the indemnity provider shares in the contingent proceeds and is not liable for any payout. However, in the event the defendant is successful, the indemnity provider must pay the indemnity amount and forego any prospective proceeds.  In a normal rate of return calculation, the numerator (i.e. gains or proceeds) and denominator (dollars deployed to finance costs) help determine a Return on Invested Capital (“ROIC”) or Multiple of Invested Capital (“MOIC”). However, with indemnities there is no denominator; in the event the plaintiff wins the case and hence there is no “cost”. Or is there? I think most people in finance would argue strongly, and rightly so, that there is indeed a cost.  I liken the analysis to that of a securities option.  In the context of a securities option (a put or call option, for example) one pays an upfront amount (i.e. the option price) to attain the right to benefit in either the reduction or increase in the underlying stock price.  The value of the option is based on the market’s view of the weighted average probability of the event taking place (i.e. achieving the strike price in a given period of time). In the case of an indemnity, there is no cost to providing the indemnity (other than out of-pocket contracting costs) even though the opportunity has value to the indemnity provider.  The value of the indemnity for the investor is inherent in the pay-out they expect to receive on success, which is offset by the likelihood of having to pay out under the indemnity.  Essentially, it is a costless option.  The upside produces infinite returns, while the downside produces a total loss. Approaches to Valuing the Indemnity Protection As we all know, nothing is “costless”. Instead, I would suggest that an investor in an indemnity needs to determine a theoretical cost for that investment. One approach is to look at the litigation funder’s underwriting report and economic analysis to determine the probabilities associated with various negative outcomes pertaining to the case, and probability-weight the negative outcomes to determine a theoretical cost of capital. Of course, these need to be looked at in the context of the risks of the various case types in the relevant jurisdiction, in addition to the risks of the case through the various stages of the case, as adverse costs can have multiple pay-out points throughout the case.  As an example, securities class actions in Australia and Canada, when certified by a court, have an extremely high success rate (meaning that they typically settle quickly after the certification). Another approach might be to look at the alternative to utilizing that same capital in an investment with a similar risk profile, where the potential outcome could be the same and the risk of loss is similar.  As an example, if the opportunity cost of providing an indemnity was to buy a securities option with a similar risk profile, then you could use the market cost of the option as a proxy for the cost of the indemnity. Yet another alternative would be to study the outcomes of a large sample of identical indemnities to try and determine the probability of a negative outcome and apply it to the indemnity amount to determine a notional cost.  Unfortunately, much of this information remains in the private domain, as most cases which use indemnity protection tend to settle.  In time, it may be that there is sufficient data to make this approach realistic, but as it stands, there is insufficient data to make this a viable alternative. While approaches will differ by fund manager and investor, the important point is to eschew the concept that an indemnity is a costless financial instrument, as to do so would skew the results inherent in a fund manager’s track record where indemnities are an important part of their strategy.  This same result can also occur in more traditional litigation finance cases where there is a settlement shortly after the funding contract has been entered into, and which did not necessitate the drawing of capital.  In this case, the returns are also infinite, but perhaps there should have been a theoretical cost of capital based on the probability of the funding contract being drawn upon. Investor Insights: When assessing the rates of return on an indemnity, my approach is to determine a weighted average probability of loss outcomes and apply them to the Indemnity amount in order to determine a notional cost for the indemnity.  This analysis becomes extremely important when assessing portfolio performance because most often fund managers do not assign a notional cost to their indemnities when providing their investment track records, and hence positive indemnity outcomes make their overall portfolio performance seem more impressive than one might otherwise assess.  A simplified example of the potential for an indemnity to skew portfolio performance based on approach is as follows: Assumptions: Case Type:                             Security Class Action Indemnity Amount:             $1,000,000 Damage Claim:                      $10,000,000 Contingent Interest:              10% Contingent Interest Award:  $1,000,000 Probability of Loss                $ Loss* Loss at Summary Judgement:                  10%                     $100,000 Loss at Certification:                                   5%                       $50,000 Loss at Trial:                                                 25%                     $250,000 Notional Cost of Indemnity:                                                  $400,000 * calculated as probability of loss multiplied by Indemnity Amount.
  1. Return Calculation applying a theoretical cost to the Indemnity in a win scenario:
ROIC: =       $600,000 ($1,000,0000-$400,000) = 150% $400,000 MOIC:                  $1,000,000 = 2.5 $400,000
  1. Return Calculation applying no cost to the indemnity in a win scenario:
MOIC & ROIC:          $1,000,000 = Infinite $0 Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc. and an investor in the consumer and commercial litigation finance industry. Slingshot’s blog posts can be accessed at www.slingshotcap.com.

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France Issues Decree Regulating Third-Party Funded Collective Actions

By John Freund |

France has taken a significant step in codifying oversight of third-party financed collective actions with the issuance of Decree No. 2025-1191 on December 10, 2025.

An article in Legifrance outlines the new rules, which establish the procedure for approving entities and associations authorized to lead both domestic and cross-border collective actions—referred to in French as “actions de groupe.” The decree brings long-anticipated regulatory clarity following the April 2025 passage of the DDADUE 5 law, which modernized France’s collective redress framework in line with EU Directive 2020/1828.

The decree grants authority to the Director General of Competition, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (DGCCRF) to process applications for approval. Final approval is issued by ministerial order and is valid for five years, subject to renewal.

Approved organizations must meet specific governance and financial transparency criteria. A central provision of the new rules is a requirement for qualifying entities to publicly disclose any third-party funding arrangements on their websites. This includes naming the financiers and specifying the amounts received, with the goal of safeguarding the independence of collective actions and protecting the rights of represented parties.

Paul de Servigny, Head of litigation funding at French headquartered IVO Capital said: “As part of the transposition of the EU’s Representative Actions Directive, the French government announced a decree that sets out the disclosure requirements for the litigation funding industry, paving the way for greater access to justice for consumers in France by providing much welcomed clarity to litigation funders, claimants and law firms.

"This is good news for French consumers seeking justice and we look forward to working with government, the courts, claimants and their representatives and putting this decree into practice by supporting meritorious cases whilst ensuring that the interests of consumers are protected.”

By codifying these requirements, the French government aims to bolster public trust in group litigation and ensure funders do not exert improper influence on the course or outcome of legal actions.

Privy Council to Hear High-Profile Appeal on Third-Party Funding

By John Freund |

The United Kingdom's Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is set to hear a closely watched appeal that could have wide-ranging implications for third-party litigation funding in international arbitration. The case stems from a dispute between OGD Services Holdings, part of the Essar Group, and Norscot Rig Management over the enforcement of a Mauritius-based arbitral award. The Supreme Court of Mauritius had previously upheld the award in favor of Norscot, prompting OGD to seek review from the Privy Council.

An article in Bar & Bench reports that the appeal is scheduled for next year and will feature two prominent Indian senior advocates: Harish Salve KC, representing Norscot, and Nakul Dewan KC, representing OGD. At issue is whether the use of third-party funding in the underlying arbitration renders the enforcement of the award improper under Mauritius law, where third-party litigation funding remains a legally sensitive area.

The case is drawing significant attention because of its potential to shape the international enforceability of funding agreements, particularly in light of the UK Supreme Court's 2023 PACCAR decision. That ruling dramatically altered the legal landscape by classifying many litigation funding agreements as damages-based agreements, thereby subjecting them to stricter statutory controls. The PACCAR decision has already triggered calls for legislative reform in the UK to preserve the viability of litigation funding, especially in the class action and arbitration contexts.

The Privy Council appeal will test the legal boundaries of funder involvement in arbitration and may help clarify whether such arrangements compromise enforceability when judgments cross borders. The outcome could influence how funders structure deals in jurisdictions with differing attitudes toward third-party involvement in legal claims.

Banks Win UK Supreme Court Victory in $3.6B Forex Lawsuit

By John Freund |

Several major global banks, including JPMorgan, UBS, Citigroup, Barclays, MUFG, and NatWest, have successfully blocked a £2.7 billion ($3.6 billion) opt-out collective action in the UK’s Supreme Court. The proposed lawsuit, led by Phillip Evans, aimed to represent thousands of investors, pension funds, and institutions impacted by alleged foreign exchange (forex) market manipulation.

An article in Yahoo Finance reports that the case stemmed from earlier European Commission findings that fined multiple banks over €1 billion for operating cartels in forex trading. Evans’ action, filed under the UK’s collective proceedings regime, sought to recover damages on behalf of a wide investor class. However, the Supreme Court upheld a lower tribunal’s decision that the claim could not proceed on an opt-out basis, requiring instead that individual claimants opt in.

The judgment emphasized the insufficient participation rate among potential class members and found that an opt-out mechanism was not appropriate given the specifics of the case. Justice Vivien Rose, delivering the court’s opinion, noted that while individual claims might have merit, the representative structure lacked the cohesion and commitment necessary to justify a mass claim. As a result, the banks have succeeded in halting what would have been one of the largest collective actions in the UK to date.