Trending Now
  • An LFJ Conversation with Rory Kingan, CEO of Eperoto
  • New York Enacts Landmark Consumer Legal Funding Legislation

Valuing Indemnity Protection Investment Returns in Litigation Finance

Valuing Indemnity Protection Investment Returns in Litigation Finance

The following article is part of an ongoing column titled ‘Investor Insights.’  Brought to you by Ed Truant, founder and content manager of Slingshot Capital, ‘Investor Insights’ will provide thoughtful and engaging perspectives on all aspects of investing in litigation finance.  Executive Summary
  • Indemnities are not costless instruments; they are akin to securities options, but without a stated option value
  • Approaches to determining cost of indemnity include: Probability weighted outcome approach, Opportunity Cost Approach and Approach based on empirical evidence
  • Implications for Portfolio Returns are that improper assessment of indemnity returns may materially skew return results of a portfolio
Investor Insights
o   Indemnities have a cost and their cost should be used to determine investor returnso   Depending on how indemnity performance is measured, it has the ability to skew portfolio performance
Some litigation finance providers offer a product called indemnity protection (please don’t call it insurance), which is a product designed to protect plaintiffs against adverse costs in certain jurisdictions (Canada, Australia and the UK, for example) where the plaintiff may be found liable for defense costs should the defendant win the case.  Indemnity protection is prevalent in product class action and securities class action cases. What makes indemnity protection challenging is the process of estimating the returns inherent to providing the protection.  Indemnities differ from traditional litigation finance, in that the latter requires the funder to finance hard costs (legal counsel, court costs, expert witness costs, etc.), while the former only pays out once a case is lost by the plaintiff, and subject to the court’s determination regarding the application of adverse costs.  In the event the plaintiff is successful, the indemnity provider shares in the contingent proceeds and is not liable for any payout. However, in the event the defendant is successful, the indemnity provider must pay the indemnity amount and forego any prospective proceeds.  In a normal rate of return calculation, the numerator (i.e. gains or proceeds) and denominator (dollars deployed to finance costs) help determine a Return on Invested Capital (“ROIC”) or Multiple of Invested Capital (“MOIC”). However, with indemnities there is no denominator; in the event the plaintiff wins the case and hence there is no “cost”. Or is there? I think most people in finance would argue strongly, and rightly so, that there is indeed a cost.  I liken the analysis to that of a securities option.  In the context of a securities option (a put or call option, for example) one pays an upfront amount (i.e. the option price) to attain the right to benefit in either the reduction or increase in the underlying stock price.  The value of the option is based on the market’s view of the weighted average probability of the event taking place (i.e. achieving the strike price in a given period of time). In the case of an indemnity, there is no cost to providing the indemnity (other than out of-pocket contracting costs) even though the opportunity has value to the indemnity provider.  The value of the indemnity for the investor is inherent in the pay-out they expect to receive on success, which is offset by the likelihood of having to pay out under the indemnity.  Essentially, it is a costless option.  The upside produces infinite returns, while the downside produces a total loss. Approaches to Valuing the Indemnity Protection As we all know, nothing is “costless”. Instead, I would suggest that an investor in an indemnity needs to determine a theoretical cost for that investment. One approach is to look at the litigation funder’s underwriting report and economic analysis to determine the probabilities associated with various negative outcomes pertaining to the case, and probability-weight the negative outcomes to determine a theoretical cost of capital. Of course, these need to be looked at in the context of the risks of the various case types in the relevant jurisdiction, in addition to the risks of the case through the various stages of the case, as adverse costs can have multiple pay-out points throughout the case.  As an example, securities class actions in Australia and Canada, when certified by a court, have an extremely high success rate (meaning that they typically settle quickly after the certification). Another approach might be to look at the alternative to utilizing that same capital in an investment with a similar risk profile, where the potential outcome could be the same and the risk of loss is similar.  As an example, if the opportunity cost of providing an indemnity was to buy a securities option with a similar risk profile, then you could use the market cost of the option as a proxy for the cost of the indemnity. Yet another alternative would be to study the outcomes of a large sample of identical indemnities to try and determine the probability of a negative outcome and apply it to the indemnity amount to determine a notional cost.  Unfortunately, much of this information remains in the private domain, as most cases which use indemnity protection tend to settle.  In time, it may be that there is sufficient data to make this approach realistic, but as it stands, there is insufficient data to make this a viable alternative. While approaches will differ by fund manager and investor, the important point is to eschew the concept that an indemnity is a costless financial instrument, as to do so would skew the results inherent in a fund manager’s track record where indemnities are an important part of their strategy.  This same result can also occur in more traditional litigation finance cases where there is a settlement shortly after the funding contract has been entered into, and which did not necessitate the drawing of capital.  In this case, the returns are also infinite, but perhaps there should have been a theoretical cost of capital based on the probability of the funding contract being drawn upon. Investor Insights: When assessing the rates of return on an indemnity, my approach is to determine a weighted average probability of loss outcomes and apply them to the Indemnity amount in order to determine a notional cost for the indemnity.  This analysis becomes extremely important when assessing portfolio performance because most often fund managers do not assign a notional cost to their indemnities when providing their investment track records, and hence positive indemnity outcomes make their overall portfolio performance seem more impressive than one might otherwise assess.  A simplified example of the potential for an indemnity to skew portfolio performance based on approach is as follows: Assumptions: Case Type:                             Security Class Action Indemnity Amount:             $1,000,000 Damage Claim:                      $10,000,000 Contingent Interest:              10% Contingent Interest Award:  $1,000,000 Probability of Loss                $ Loss* Loss at Summary Judgement:                  10%                     $100,000 Loss at Certification:                                   5%                       $50,000 Loss at Trial:                                                 25%                     $250,000 Notional Cost of Indemnity:                                                  $400,000 * calculated as probability of loss multiplied by Indemnity Amount.
  1. Return Calculation applying a theoretical cost to the Indemnity in a win scenario:
ROIC: =       $600,000 ($1,000,0000-$400,000) = 150% $400,000 MOIC:                  $1,000,000 = 2.5 $400,000
  1. Return Calculation applying no cost to the indemnity in a win scenario:
MOIC & ROIC:          $1,000,000 = Infinite $0 Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc. and an investor in the consumer and commercial litigation finance industry. Slingshot’s blog posts can be accessed at www.slingshotcap.com.

Commercial

View All

Diamond McCarthy Backs Lansdowne Oil Treaty Claim Against Ireland

By John Freund |

US-based litigation funder Diamond McCarthy has agreed to back a high-stakes investment treaty claim brought by Lansdowne Oil and Gas against the Irish state, with the claim reportedly valued at up to $100 million. The dispute arises from Ireland’s policy shift away from offshore oil and gas development, which Lansdowne argues has effectively wiped out the value of its investment in the Barryroe offshore oil field.

According to NewsFile, Lansdowne Oil and Gas, a small exploration company listed in London and Dublin, is pursuing arbitration against Ireland under the Energy Charter Treaty. The company alleges that Ireland’s 2021 decision to halt new licences for offshore oil and gas exploration, followed by regulatory actions affecting existing projects, breached treaty protections afforded to foreign investors. Lansdowne contends that these measures frustrated legitimate expectations and amounted to unfair and inequitable treatment under international law.

Diamond McCarthy’s involvement brings significant financial firepower to a claim that would otherwise be difficult for a junior energy company to pursue. The funder will cover legal and arbitration costs in exchange for a share of any recovery, allowing Lansdowne to advance the case without bearing the full financial risk. The arbitration is expected to be conducted under international investment dispute mechanisms, with proceedings likely to take several years.

Ireland has previously defended its policy changes as part of a broader climate strategy aimed at reducing fossil fuel dependence and meeting emissions targets. Government representatives have indicated that the state will robustly contest the claim, arguing that the measures were lawful, proportionate, and applied in the public interest. Ireland is also in the process of withdrawing from the Energy Charter Treaty, although existing investments may remain protected for a period under sunset provisions.

Tata Steel Hit With €1.4 Billion Dutch Environmental Class Action

By John Freund |

Tata Steel is facing a major legal challenge in Europe after a Dutch environmental foundation launched a large-scale collective action seeking approximately €1.4 billion in damages related to alleged environmental and public health impacts from the company’s steelmaking operations in the Netherlands. The claim targets Tata Steel Nederland and Tata Steel IJmuiden, which operate the sprawling IJmuiden steelworks near Amsterdam.

An article published by MSN reports that the lawsuit has been filed by Stichting Frisse Wind.nu, a nonprofit representing residents living in the vicinity of the IJmuiden plant. The claim alleges that years of harmful emissions, particulate matter, noise, and other pollution from the facility have led to adverse health effects, reduced quality of life, and declining property values for people in surrounding communities. The foundation is seeking compensation on behalf of affected residents under the Netherlands’ collective action regime, which allows representative organizations to pursue mass claims for damages.

According to the report, the lawsuit has been brought under the Dutch Act on the Resolution of Mass Claims in Collective Action, known as WAMCA. This framework requires the court to first assess whether the claim is admissible before any substantive evaluation of liability or damages takes place. If the case proceeds, it could take several years to resolve given the scale of the alleged harm and the number of potential claimants involved.

Tata Steel has strongly rejected the allegations, describing them as speculative and unsupported. The company has stated that it intends to vigorously defend the proceedings and argue that the claims fail to meet the legal standards required under Dutch law. Tata Steel has also pointed to ongoing efforts to reduce emissions and modernize its European operations as part of its broader sustainability strategy.

Pogust Goodhead Seeks Interim Costs Payment

By John Freund |

Pogust Goodhead, the UK law firm leading one of the largest group actions ever brought in the English courts, is seeking an interim costs payment of £113.5 million in the litigation arising from the 2015 Mariana dam collapse in Brazil.

According to an article in Law Gazette, the application forms part of a much larger costs claim that could ultimately reach approximately £189 million. It follows a recent High Court ruling that allowed the claims against BHP to proceed, moving the litigation into its next procedural phase. The case involves allegations connected to the catastrophic failure of the Fundão tailings dam, which resulted in 19 deaths and widespread environmental and economic damage across affected Brazilian communities.

Pogust Goodhead argues that an interim costs award is justified given the scale of the proceedings and the substantial expenditure already incurred. The firm has highlighted the significant resources required to manage a case of this size, including claimant coordination, expert evidence, document review, and litigation infrastructure. With hundreds of thousands of claimants involved, the firm maintains that early recovery of a portion of its costs is both reasonable and proportionate.

BHP has pushed back against the application, disputing both the timing and the magnitude of the costs being sought. The mining company has argued that many of the claimed expenses are excessive and that a full assessment should only take place once the litigation has concluded and overall success can be properly evaluated.

The costs dispute underscores the financial pressures inherent in mega claims litigation, particularly where cases are run on a conditional or funded basis and require sustained upfront investment over many years.