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Valuing Indemnity Protection Investment Returns in Litigation Finance

Valuing Indemnity Protection Investment Returns in Litigation Finance

The following article is part of an ongoing column titled ‘Investor Insights.’  Brought to you by Ed Truant, founder and content manager of Slingshot Capital, ‘Investor Insights’ will provide thoughtful and engaging perspectives on all aspects of investing in litigation finance.  Executive Summary
  • Indemnities are not costless instruments; they are akin to securities options, but without a stated option value
  • Approaches to determining cost of indemnity include: Probability weighted outcome approach, Opportunity Cost Approach and Approach based on empirical evidence
  • Implications for Portfolio Returns are that improper assessment of indemnity returns may materially skew return results of a portfolio
Investor Insights
o   Indemnities have a cost and their cost should be used to determine investor returnso   Depending on how indemnity performance is measured, it has the ability to skew portfolio performance
Some litigation finance providers offer a product called indemnity protection (please don’t call it insurance), which is a product designed to protect plaintiffs against adverse costs in certain jurisdictions (Canada, Australia and the UK, for example) where the plaintiff may be found liable for defense costs should the defendant win the case.  Indemnity protection is prevalent in product class action and securities class action cases. What makes indemnity protection challenging is the process of estimating the returns inherent to providing the protection.  Indemnities differ from traditional litigation finance, in that the latter requires the funder to finance hard costs (legal counsel, court costs, expert witness costs, etc.), while the former only pays out once a case is lost by the plaintiff, and subject to the court’s determination regarding the application of adverse costs.  In the event the plaintiff is successful, the indemnity provider shares in the contingent proceeds and is not liable for any payout. However, in the event the defendant is successful, the indemnity provider must pay the indemnity amount and forego any prospective proceeds.  In a normal rate of return calculation, the numerator (i.e. gains or proceeds) and denominator (dollars deployed to finance costs) help determine a Return on Invested Capital (“ROIC”) or Multiple of Invested Capital (“MOIC”). However, with indemnities there is no denominator; in the event the plaintiff wins the case and hence there is no “cost”. Or is there? I think most people in finance would argue strongly, and rightly so, that there is indeed a cost.  I liken the analysis to that of a securities option.  In the context of a securities option (a put or call option, for example) one pays an upfront amount (i.e. the option price) to attain the right to benefit in either the reduction or increase in the underlying stock price.  The value of the option is based on the market’s view of the weighted average probability of the event taking place (i.e. achieving the strike price in a given period of time). In the case of an indemnity, there is no cost to providing the indemnity (other than out of-pocket contracting costs) even though the opportunity has value to the indemnity provider.  The value of the indemnity for the investor is inherent in the pay-out they expect to receive on success, which is offset by the likelihood of having to pay out under the indemnity.  Essentially, it is a costless option.  The upside produces infinite returns, while the downside produces a total loss. Approaches to Valuing the Indemnity Protection As we all know, nothing is “costless”. Instead, I would suggest that an investor in an indemnity needs to determine a theoretical cost for that investment. One approach is to look at the litigation funder’s underwriting report and economic analysis to determine the probabilities associated with various negative outcomes pertaining to the case, and probability-weight the negative outcomes to determine a theoretical cost of capital. Of course, these need to be looked at in the context of the risks of the various case types in the relevant jurisdiction, in addition to the risks of the case through the various stages of the case, as adverse costs can have multiple pay-out points throughout the case.  As an example, securities class actions in Australia and Canada, when certified by a court, have an extremely high success rate (meaning that they typically settle quickly after the certification). Another approach might be to look at the alternative to utilizing that same capital in an investment with a similar risk profile, where the potential outcome could be the same and the risk of loss is similar.  As an example, if the opportunity cost of providing an indemnity was to buy a securities option with a similar risk profile, then you could use the market cost of the option as a proxy for the cost of the indemnity. Yet another alternative would be to study the outcomes of a large sample of identical indemnities to try and determine the probability of a negative outcome and apply it to the indemnity amount to determine a notional cost.  Unfortunately, much of this information remains in the private domain, as most cases which use indemnity protection tend to settle.  In time, it may be that there is sufficient data to make this approach realistic, but as it stands, there is insufficient data to make this a viable alternative. While approaches will differ by fund manager and investor, the important point is to eschew the concept that an indemnity is a costless financial instrument, as to do so would skew the results inherent in a fund manager’s track record where indemnities are an important part of their strategy.  This same result can also occur in more traditional litigation finance cases where there is a settlement shortly after the funding contract has been entered into, and which did not necessitate the drawing of capital.  In this case, the returns are also infinite, but perhaps there should have been a theoretical cost of capital based on the probability of the funding contract being drawn upon. Investor Insights: When assessing the rates of return on an indemnity, my approach is to determine a weighted average probability of loss outcomes and apply them to the Indemnity amount in order to determine a notional cost for the indemnity.  This analysis becomes extremely important when assessing portfolio performance because most often fund managers do not assign a notional cost to their indemnities when providing their investment track records, and hence positive indemnity outcomes make their overall portfolio performance seem more impressive than one might otherwise assess.  A simplified example of the potential for an indemnity to skew portfolio performance based on approach is as follows: Assumptions: Case Type:                             Security Class Action Indemnity Amount:             $1,000,000 Damage Claim:                      $10,000,000 Contingent Interest:              10% Contingent Interest Award:  $1,000,000 Probability of Loss                $ Loss* Loss at Summary Judgement:                  10%                     $100,000 Loss at Certification:                                   5%                       $50,000 Loss at Trial:                                                 25%                     $250,000 Notional Cost of Indemnity:                                                  $400,000 * calculated as probability of loss multiplied by Indemnity Amount.
  1. Return Calculation applying a theoretical cost to the Indemnity in a win scenario:
ROIC: =       $600,000 ($1,000,0000-$400,000) = 150% $400,000 MOIC:                  $1,000,000 = 2.5 $400,000
  1. Return Calculation applying no cost to the indemnity in a win scenario:
MOIC & ROIC:          $1,000,000 = Infinite $0 Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc. and an investor in the consumer and commercial litigation finance industry. Slingshot’s blog posts can be accessed at www.slingshotcap.com.

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Institute for Legal Reform Urges EU Clampdown on Litigation Funding

By John Freund |

As debate over third-party litigation funding (TPLF) continues to intensify globally, new pressure is being applied at the European level from business and industry groups calling for tighter oversight. A recent submission from a U.S.-based advocacy organization urges EU policymakers to take coordinated action, framing litigation funding as a growing risk to legal certainty and economic competitiveness across the bloc.

An article from Institute for Legal Reform outlines a formal letter sent to senior EU officials calling for harmonized, EU-wide regulation of third-party litigation funding. The Institute argues that the rapid expansion of TPLF—particularly in collective actions and mass claims—has outpaced existing regulatory frameworks, creating what it characterizes as opportunities for abuse. According to the submission, funders’ economic incentives may distort litigation strategy, encourage speculative claims, and exert undue influence over claimants and counsel.

The letter specifically urges institutions such as the European Commission and the European Parliament to introduce transparency and disclosure requirements around funding arrangements. The Institute also advocates for safeguards addressing funder control, conflicts of interest, and capital adequacy, suggesting that inconsistent national approaches risk regulatory arbitrage. In its view, the EU’s Representative Actions Directive and broader access-to-justice initiatives should not be allowed to become conduits for what it calls “profit-driven litigation.”

The submission reflects a familiar narrative advanced by business groups in the U.S. and Europe, linking litigation funding to rising litigation costs, forum shopping, and pressure on corporate defendants. While the Institute positions its recommendations as pro-consumer and pro-rule-of-law, the letter has already drawn criticism from funding advocates who argue that TPLF improves access to justice and levels the playing field against well-resourced defendants.

Siltstone Capital Reaches Settlement with Former General Counsel

By John Freund |

Litigation funder Siltstone Capital and its former general counsel, Manmeet “Mani” Walia, have reached a settlement resolving a trade secrets lawsuit that had been pending in Texas state court. The agreement brings an end to a dispute that arose after Walia’s departure from the firm, following allegations that he misused confidential information to establish a competing business in the litigation finance space.

As reported in Law 360, Siltstone filed suit in late 2025, claiming that Walia, who had served as general counsel and was closely involved in the company’s internal operations, improperly accessed and retained proprietary materials after leaving the firm. According to the funder, the information at issue included sensitive business strategies and other confidential data central to Siltstone’s competitive position. The lawsuit asserted claims under Texas trade secrets law, along with allegations of breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty tied to confidentiality and restrictive covenant provisions.

Walia disputed the allegations as the case moved forward, setting the stage for what appeared to be a hard-fought legal battle between the former employer and its onetime senior executive. However, before the dispute could be fully litigated, the parties opted to reach a negotiated resolution. Following the settlement, Siltstone moved to dismiss the case with prejudice, signaling that the matter has been conclusively resolved and cannot be refiled.

The specific terms of the settlement have not been made public, which is typical in cases involving alleged trade secret misappropriation. While details remain confidential, such resolutions often include mutual releases of claims and provisions aimed at protecting sensitive information going forward.

Burford Capital Makes Strategic Entry into South Korea

By John Freund |

Litigation funder Burford Capital is expanding its footprint in Asia with its first senior hire in South Korea, marking a strategic move into a jurisdiction it sees as increasingly important for complex commercial and arbitration disputes. The firm has appointed Elizabeth J. Shin as Senior Vice President and Head of Korea, with responsibility for leading Burford’s activities in the market and developing relationships with Korean corporates and law firms.

Law.com reports that Shin joins Burford from Lee & Ko, where she was a partner in the firm’s international arbitration and global disputes practice. Her background includes advising on high-value cross-border commercial disputes, intellectual property matters, and arbitration proceedings across a range of industries. Burford has positioned her experience as a key asset as it looks to support Korean companies pursuing claims in international forums and managing the cost and risk of major disputes.

The hire reflects Burford’s view that Korea represents a growing opportunity for legal finance, driven by the country’s sophisticated corporate sector and increasing involvement in international arbitration and complex litigation. By establishing a senior presence on the ground in Seoul, Burford aims to provide local market insight alongside its capital and strategic expertise, while also raising awareness of litigation funding as a tool for dispute management.

Korea has traditionally been a more conservative market for third-party funding compared with jurisdictions such as the US, UK, and Australia, but interest in alternative dispute finance has been gradually increasing. Burford’s move signals confidence that demand will continue to grow, particularly as Korean businesses become more active in global disputes and seek flexible ways to finance large claims.