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Operating Costs inherent in the Commercial Litigation Finance Asset Class (Part 1 of 2)

October 28, 2020

Operating Costs inherent in the Commercial Litigation Finance Asset Class (Part 1 of 2)

The following article is part of an ongoing column titled ‘Investor Insights.’  Brought to you by Ed Truant, founder and content manager of Slingshot Capital, ‘Investor Insights’ will provide thoughtful and engaging perspectives on all aspects of investing in litigation finance.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
  • Article draws comparisons between commercial litigation finance and private equity (leverage buy-out) asset classes
  • Similarities and differences exist between private equity and litigation finance operating costs, but there are some significant jurisdictional differences to consider
  • Value creation is front-end loaded in litigation finance vs. back-end loaded in private equity
  • Litigation finance can be a difficult investment to scale while ensuring the benefits of portfolio theory
INVESTOR INSIGHTS
  • The ‘2 and 20’ model is an appropriate baseline to apply to litigation finance, but investors need to understand the potential for misalignment of interests
  • As with most asset classes, scale plays an important role in fund operating costs
  • Deployment risk and tail risk are not insignificant in this asset class
  • Investor should be aware of potential differences in the reconciliation of gross case returns to net fund returns
  • Up-front management fees may have implications for long-term manager solvency
My overarching objective for Slingshot is to educate potential investors about the litigation finance asset class and to improve industry transparency, as I believe increased transparency will ultimately lead to increased investor interest and increased access to capital for fund managers.  In this light, I was asked to write an article a few months back about management fees in the commercial litigation finance sector, and my immediate reaction was that it would be a controversial topic that may not even be in my own best interests—and so I parked the idea.  However, the seed was germinating and I began to think about an interesting discussion of the various operating costs, including management fees, inherent in and specific to the asset class, including geographic differences therein. While I always attempt to provide a balanced point of view in my articles, I should first point out my conflict of interest as it relates to this article.  As a general partner of a commercial litigation finance fund-of-funds, and being in the design stages of my next fund offering, my compensation model is based on a combination of management fees and performance fees no different than litigation finance fund managers.  Accordingly, my personal bias is to ensure that I structure my own compensation to strike a balance between investor and manager so that each feels they are deriving value from the relationship.  If I overstep my bounds by charging excessive fees, I believe that a competitive market will recognize the issue and prevent me from raising sufficient capital to make my fund proposition viable.  I am also kept in check by a variety of other managers in the same and similar asset classes who are also out raising money which help to establish the “market” for compensation. I further believe a smart allocator, of which there are many, will know what fee levels are acceptable and appropriate based on the strategy being employed and the resources required to deploy capital into acceptable investments (they see hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals every year, and are focused on the compensation issue).  On the other hand, the litigation finance market is a nascent and evolving market with many different economic models, specific requirements and unique participants, and so a ‘market standard’ does not exist, therefore it is common to look at similar asset classes (leveraged buy-out, private credit, etc.) to triangulate an appropriate operating cost model. At the end of the day, the most compelling philosophy of compensation is rooted in fairness.  If a manager charges excessive fees and their returns suffer as a result, that manager will likely not live to see another fund. However, if  a manager takes a fair approach that is more “LP favourable” in the short-term (as long as the compensation doesn’t impair its ability to invest appropriately), it can move its fees upward over time in lock-step with its performance as there will always be adequate demand to get into a strong-performing fund.  There are many examples in the private equity industry of managers who have been able to demand higher performance fees based on their prior performance.  So, if you have a long-term view of the asset class and your fund management business, there really is no upside in charging excessive fees relative to performance, but there is clear downside. With my conflict disclosed, let’s move on to the issues at hand which are more encompassing than just fees. Litigation Finance as a Private Equity Asset Class For fund managers operating in the commercial litigation finance asset class, many view themselves as a form of private equity manager, and for the most part, the analogy is accurate.  Litigation finance managers are compensated for finding attractive opportunities (known as “origination”), undertaking due diligence on the opportunities (or “underwriting”, to use credit terminology) and then stewarding their investments to a successful resolution over a period of time while ensuring collection of proceeds. Similarly, Private Equity (“PE”) investors (for purposes of this article I refer to “Private Equity” as being synonymous with “leveraged buy-outs”, although use of the term has been broadened over the years to encompass many private asset classes) spend most of their time on origination and diligence on the front-end of a transaction, and increasingly, on value creation and the exit plan during the hold period and back-end of the transaction, respectively. In the early days of the PE industry, the value creation plan was more front-end loaded and centered around buying at X and selling at a multiple of X (known as “multiple arbitrage”), usually by taking advantage of market inefficiency, and accentuated through the use of financial leverage and organic growth in the business.  Over time, the multiple arbitrage strategy disappeared as competitors entered the market and squeezed out the ‘easy money’ by bidding up prices of private businesses.  Today, PE firms are more focused on operational excellence and business strategy than ever before (during the hold period of the transaction).  Having been a private equity investor for two decades I have seen a significant change in the PE value creation strategy.  While organic and acquisition growth still feature prominently in PE portfolio company growth strategies, the extent to which PE managers will go to uncover value opportunities is unprecedented. This highlights a key difference between private equity and litigation finance.  In PE, the majority of the value creation happens after the acquisition starts, and ends when a realization event takes place.  In litigation finance, the fund manager, in most jurisdictions, is limited from “intermeddling” in the case once an investment has been made, so as to ensure the plaintiff remains in control of the outcome of the case and that the funder does not place undue influence on the outcome of the case.  Nonetheless, some litigation funders add value during their hold period by providing ongoing perspectives based on decades of experience, participating in mock trials, reviewing and commenting on proceedings to provide valuable insight, reviewing precedent transactions during the hold period to determine their impact on the value of their case, case management cost/budget reviews, etc. Accordingly, it is easy to see that relative to private equity, the litigation finance manager’s ability to add value during the hold period is somewhat limited, legally and otherwise.  One could use this differential in “value add” to justify a difference in management fees, but a counter-argument would be that in contrast to private equity, litigation finance adds value at the front-end of the investment process by weeding out the less desirable prospects and focusing their time and attention on the ‘diamonds in the rough’.  Of course, private equity would make the same argument, the key difference being that in private equity there is much more transparency in pricing through market back-channeling (many of the same lenders, management consultants and industry experts know the status and proposed valuations of a given private equity deal) than what is found in the litigation finance industry. An argument can be made that inherent in litigation finance is a market inefficiency that is predicated on confidentiality, although I don’t believe that has been tested yet. The other issue that differentiates litigation finance from PE is the scale of investing.  PE scales quite nicely in that you can have a team of 10 professionals investing in a $500 million niche fund and the same-sized firm investing $2B in larger transactions, while your operating cost base does not change much, which is what allows PE operations to achieve “economies of scale”.  In litigation finance, the number of very large investments is limited, and those investments typically have a different set of return characteristics (duration, return volatility, multiples of invested capital, IRR, etc.), so even if you could fund a large number of large cases, you may not want to construct such a portfolio, as large case financings will likely have a more volatile set of outcomes, so the fund would have to be large enough to allow diversification in the large end of the financing market during the fund’s investment period.  Accordingly, litigation finance firms typically have to invest in a larger number of transactions in order to scale their business, and doing so requires technology, people or both.  At this stage of the evolution of the litigation finance market, scale has been achieved mainly by adding people.  Accordingly, as the PE industry has been able to achieve economies of scale through growth, it is reasonable for investors to benefit from those economies of scale by expecting to be charged less in management fees per dollar invested.  The same may not hold true for litigation finance due to its scaling challenges, although there are niches within litigation finance that can achieve scale (i.e. portfolio financings & mass tort cases, as two examples) for which the investor should benefit. The Deployment Problem A third significant issue that litigation finance and investors therein have to contend with is deployment risk.  In private equity, managers typically deploy most of their capital in the investment on ‘day one’ when they make the investment.  They may increase or decrease their investment over time depending on the strategy and the needs of the business and the shareholders, but they generally deploy a large percentage of their investment the day they close on their portfolio acquisition.  Further, it is not uncommon for a PE fund manager to deploy between 85% and 100% of their overall fund commitments through the course of the fund. Litigation Finance on the other hand rarely deploys 100% of its case commitment at the beginning of the investment, as it would not be prudent or value maximizing to do so.  Accordingly, it is not uncommon for litigation finance managers to ‘drip’ their investment in over time (funding agreements typically provide the manager with the ability to cease funding in certain circumstances in order to react to the litigation process and ‘cut their losses’).  The problem with this approach is that investors are being charged management fees based on committed capital, while the underlying investment is being funded on a deployed capital basis, which has the effect of multiplying the effective management fee, as I will describe in the following example.  This, of course, is in addition to the common issue of committing to a draw down type fund that has an investment period of between 2-3 (for litigation finance) and 5 (for private equity) years, for which an investor is paying management fees on committed capital even though capital isn’t expected to be deployed immediately.  Litigation finance adds a strategy-specific layer of deployment risk. For purposes of this simplistic example, let’s contrast the situation of a private equity firm that invests $10 million on the basis of a 2% management fee model with that of a litigation finance manager that also invests $10 million, but does so in equal increments over a 3-year period.   Private Equity (PE) Model (based on a $10 million investment)
 Year 1Year 2Year 3
Capital Deployed1$10,000,000$10,000,000$10,000,000
2% Management Fee$200,000$200,000$200,000
Expressed as % of deployed capital (B)2%2%2%
  Litigation Finance Model (based on a $10 million investment evenly over 3 years)
 Year 1Year 2Year 3
Capital Deployed1$3,333,333$6,666,666$10,000,000
2% Management Fee$200,000$200,000$200,000
Expressed as %1 of deployed capital (A)6%3%2%
  Differences in Fees in relation to Capital Deployed
Absolute Difference(A-B)4%1%0%
Difference as a multiple of fees in PE ((A-B)/2%)2X0.5X0X
1 Calculated assuming the capital is deployed at the beginning of the year. The difference highlighted above can be taken to extremes when you have a relatively quick litigation finance resolution shortly after making a commitment.  In this situation, you have deployed a relatively small amount of capital that hasn’t been invested for long, but has produced a strong return – this typically results in large gross IRRs, but a relatively low multiple of capital (although the outcome very much depends on the terms of the funding agreement).  While this phenomenon produces very strong gross IRRs, when the investor factors in the total operating costs of the fund, the negative impact of those costs can significantly affect net IRRs.  Accordingly, investors should be aware that this asset class may have significant ‘gross to net’ IRR differentials (as well as multiples of invested capital), and one could conclude erroneously that strong gross IRRs will contribute directly to strong Net IRRs, but the ultimate net returns will vary with capital deployment, case duration. extent of operating costs and timing thereof. I wouldn’t want this observation to discourage anyone from investing in litigation finance, but awareness of this phenomenon is important and very much dependent on the strategy of the manager, the sizes and types of cases in which they invest, and of course, is in part a consequence of the uncertain nature of litigation.  As an investor, I do think it is appropriate and fair where a fund manager obtains a quick resolution, that the commitment underlying the resolution be recycled to allow the Investor a chance to re-deploy the capital into another opportunity and achieve its original portfolio construction objectives  – recycling is beneficial to all involved. However, I would argue that it is not necessarily fair to charge the investor twice for the same capital, as that capital has already attracted and earned a management fee. Stage of Lifecycle of Litigation Finance Perhaps litigation finance is at the same stage of development as private equity experienced 20 years ago in terms of finding the “multiple arbitrage” opportunities, but a key difference is that the success rates in litigation finance are lower and the downside is typically a complete write-off of the investment, whereas private equity has many potential outcomes between zero and a multiple of their initial investment.  Of course, the home runs in litigation finance can be quite spectacular.  The quasi-binary nature of the asset class does present a dilemma in terms of compensation for managers and the costs inherent in running the strategy. The scale and deployment issues raised above are other issues that need to be addressed by fund managers and their compensation systems. Notwithstanding the aforementioned, it takes highly competent and well-compensated people to execute on this particular strategy which sets a floor on management fee levels. A well-run and diversified litigation finance fund should win about 70% of their cases, and if they underwrite to a 3X multiple for pre-settlement single cases, then they should produce gross MOICs of about 2X (i.e. ~70% of 3X) and net about 1.75X (after performance fees and costs).  This would be the type of performance that is deserving of a ‘2 and 20’ model as long as those returns are delivered in a reasonable time period.  Conversely, if the majority of a manager’s portfolio is focused on portfolio finance investing, there may have to be a different compensation scheme to reflect the different risk/reward characteristics inherent in the diversification, scale and cross-collateralized nature of this segment of the market. One size does not fit all. Let’s also not forget that litigation finance is delivering non-correlated returns, and one could easily assess a significant premium to non-correlation, especially in today’s market. In Part 2 of this two-part series, I will explore the application of the ‘2 and 20’ model to litigation finance in comparison to private equity, the implication of the private partnership terms of some of the publicly-listed fund managers, and other operating costs specific to litigation finance. Investor Insights Any fund operating model needs to be designed taking into consideration all of the operating costs inherent in the manager’s operational model in the context of expected returns and timing thereof.  Investors care about being treated fairly, sharing risk and sharing the upside performance in order to foster long-term relationships that reflect positively on their organizations’ ability to perpetuate returns.  Professional investors rely on data to make decisions, and in the absence of data which might get them comfortable with a manager’s performance, they will default to mitigating risk. Tail risk in this asset class is not insignificant, which makes investing that much more difficult.  A performing manager that does a good job of sharing risk and reward with investors will have created a sustainable fund management business that will ultimately create equity value for its shareholders beyond the gains inherent in its performance fees.  Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc., and an investor in the litigation finance industry (consumer and commercial).  Ed is currently designing a new fund focused on institutional investors who are seeking to make allocations to the commercial litigation finance asset class.
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Commercial Legal Innovation

Getting Work Done: The Simpler, Smarter Way to Grow Your Firm

By Kris Altiere |

The following article was contributed by Kris Altiere, US Head of Marketing for Moneypenny.

Law firms are busier than ever. With new systems, dashboards, and automation tools launched in the name of efficiency, you’d think productivity would be soaring. Yet for many, the opposite is true. Complexity creeps in, admin increases, and clients still end up waiting for answers.

At Moneypenny, we’ve learned that true progress doesn’t come from doing more, it comes from doing what matters. Our philosophy is simple: Get work done, don’t just perform, don’t just present. Instead deliver, clearly, quickly, and with care.

Whether it’s a client seeking reassurance, a paralegal managing a mounting caseload, or a partner steering firm strategy through change, the goal should always be the same: solve the problem and move forward.

Efficiency might be driven by data, but in law, trust and momentum are still powered by people.

The Trust Factor

Clients don’t just want results; they want to know their matter is in good hands. The best partnerships, whether between a legal firm and its clients or between colleagues, are built on accountability and trust.

Getting work done isn’t about checking boxes or sending updates for the sake of optics. It’s about ownership. Doing what you say you’ll do, every single time. Following through with integrity. In short: treat people how you’d like to be treated. That’s how client confidence is built and why trust remains a competitive differentiator for firms now and in the future.

Focus on What Only You Can Do

Law firms today face growing operational pressures: administrative backlogs, client onboarding delays, endless meetings. Many assume the answer is to do more in-house, hire more people but the most successful firms know when to outsource to a trusted partner.

That doesn’t mean losing control, however. It means surrounding your firm with trusted partners who amplify your capabilities and free your team to do what only they can do, advise clients and win cases. When done right, it creates focus.

At Moneypenny, we see this daily. We handle client calls, live chats, and digital communications for thousands of businesses in the legal industry. We take care of the admin that slows teams down so they can accelerate the work that matters most: serving clients and growing their firm. It’s partnership in its purest form: freeing their people to deliver their best.

Pragmatism Over Perfection

Grand digital transformation projects often sound impressive, but the real progress comes from consistent, pragmatic improvement. The best firms are selective about innovation. They adopt technology not for the headlines, but for the results.

These are the firms that deliver, time and again, because they know progress isn’t about chasing every new idea, it’s about using the right ones well.

They ask simple, powerful questions:
• What’s the work that needs to be done?
• Who’s best to do it?
• How can we do it well?

It’s a balanced approach, blending smart innovation with everyday pragmatism and one that turns productivity from a KPI into a true competitive advantage.

Tech That Enables, Not Overcomplicates

Technology has enormous potential to streamline legal operations but only when used intentionally. Too often, new systems add friction instead of removing it.

The smartest firms blend automation with human oversight, letting technology enable people rather than replace them. For example, at Moneypenny, our AI Receptionist handles routine client inquiries with speed and accuracy. But when a conversation requires empathy, nuance, or reassurance, one of our experienced receptionists steps in seamlessly. 

The result is humans and AI together, each doing what they do best. Because in the end, emotional intelligence, the ability to listen, reassure, and build trust, remains a uniquely human strength, even as AI continues to evolve at a rapid rate.

Four Rules for Getting Work Done

This philosophy isn’t about going backwards or simplifying for the sake of it. It’s about cutting through the noise, building with intention, and putting resources where they’ll have the most impact.

It’s about following four simple objectives:

  1. Focus on what only you can do.
    Concentrate on the work that truly requires your expertise.
  2. Outsource with trust.
    Partner with people who treat your clients as their own.
  3. Use technology to enable, not to replace.
    Automation is a tool — not a solution in itself.
  4. Measure outcomes, not optics.
    Progress is about results, not noise.

Clarity Over Complexity

Getting work done isn’t flashy but it is how great firms grow. One resolved issue, one clear decision, one satisfied client at a time.

Because when brilliant legal teams are supported by smart technology and the distractions fall away, exceptional things happen. Clients feel the difference, teams perform at their best, and the firm builds a reputation for service and sustained excellence. 

For law firms navigating the fast-changing landscape, success will come from what matters most. Clarity over complexity. Trust over busyness. Action over appearance. And that is how law firms will truly move forward and stay ahead of the crowd.

Case Developments Commercial

Pogust Goodhead Defeats BHP Bid To Block Deposition Of Former Renova Chief

The High Court has rejected mining giant BHP’s application for an anti-suit injunction (ASI) that sought to prevent Pogust Goodhead from pursuing lawful evidence-gathering measures in the United States against the former president of the Brazilian redress scheme foundation set up after the Mariana dam collapse.

The Court found no basis to characterise Pogust Goodhead’s use of Section 1782 to seek a deposition of Mr André de Freitas, former CEO of the Renova Foundation[i] as vexatious, oppressive, or unconscionable, as argued by BHP.

In November 2024, Pogust Goodhead filed the §1782 application in the District Court of Arkansas seeking limited testimony from Mr de Freitas in relation to Pogust Goodhead’s claim arguing that BHP unlawfully interfered with Pogust Goodhead’s retainer rights and the compensation due to its Brazilian clients.  The U.S. court granted the subpoenas in January 2025.

Since then, BHP has sought to block the deposition by filing motions to quash the subpoenas in April 2025 and seeking an ASI in the High Court. A ruling from the Arkansas court is pending.

In Wednesday’s judgment, Mr Justice Waksman rejected BHP’s request for an injunction that would have halted the U.S. evidence-gathering process, finding no basis to prevent Pogust Goodhead from continuing with its §1782 discovery efforts.

Justice Waksman wrote in his decision: “I agree with PG that the depositions serve a distinct and legitimate purpose, being to better understand Renova’s role in relation to the various settlements and their form.”

Alicia Alinia, CEO at Pogust Goodhead commented: “We welcome the Court’s clear judgment. BHP has repeatedly attempted to obstruct legitimate investigations into its conduct. Mr de Freitas’s testimony is central to understanding how our clients’ rights may have been undermined. It is essential that he gives evidence. Only by hearing directly from those involved can our clients’ rights be properly safeguarded and the full truth established.”

Key Findings

  • The court held that English courts do not control how parties lawfully obtain evidence abroad, and that the U.S. court is the appropriate authority to decide the scope and propriety of discovery sought under Section 1782.
  • The Court also highlighted BHP’s significant delay in bringing the ASI application — nearly four months after learning of the U.S. subpoenas — which weighed against granting any injunctive relief.
  • Any concerns about the scope of the subpoenas, alleged misstatements, or burden on the witness are squarely matters for the U.S. District Court, which has already engaged with the issues in detailed hearings.

As a result, BHP cannot use the English courts to derail the ongoing U.S. process. The parties now await the District Court of Arkansas’s decision on whether BHP’s motions to quash the subpoenas will succeed.

Commercial Special Features

Third Party Funding 3.0: Exploring Litigation Funding’s Correlation with the Broader Economy

By Gian Marco Solas |

The following article was contributed by Dr. Avv. Gian Marco Solas[1], founder of Sustainab-Law and author of Third Party Funding, New Technologies and the Interdisciplinary Methodology as Global Competition Litigation Driving Forces (Global Competition Litigation Review, 1/25).  Dr. Solas is also the author of Third Party Funding, Law Economics an Policy (Cambridge Press).

There is an inaccurate and counterproductive belief in the litigation funding market, that the asset class would be uncorrelated from the global economy. That was in fact due to a much bigger scientific legal problem, that the law itself was not considered as physical factor of correlation, as instrument to measure and determine cause and effects of economic events in legal systems.

This problem has been solved, in both theoretical and mathematical terms, and in fact – thanks to technology available to date such as AI and blockchain – it looks much better for litig … ehm … legal third-party funders. 

Third Party Funding 3.0© opens three new lines of opportunities:

  1. AI allows to detect and file claims that would otherwise not have been viable / brought forward, such as unlocked competition law claims[2], which represent the largest chunk of the market for competition claims. See funding proposal.
  2. Human law as factor of correlation allows to calculate the unexpressed value of the global economy. Everything that, in fact, can be unlocked with litigation, allowing then a public-private IPO type of process to optimize legal systems[3].
  3. Physical modeling of the law also allows to transform debt / liabilities into new investments, thus allowing to settle litigation earlier and with less legal costs, leaving more room to creativity to optimize the investments[4].

While it may be true that the outcome of one single judgement does not depend on the fluctuations of the financial economy, legal reality certainly determines the ups and downs of the litigation funding (and any other) market. Otherwise, we could not explain the rise of litigation funding in the post-financial crisis for instance, or the shockwaves propagated by judgements like PACCAR.

The flip side is that understanding and measuring legal reality, as well as leveraging on modern technologies and innovative legal instruments, the market for legal claims and legal assets is much bigger and sizeable than with the standard litigation financial model.

In order to test Litigation Funding 3.0, I am presenting the following proposal:

10 MILLION EUR in the form of a series A venture capital type of investment to cover one test case's litigation costs, tech, book-building and expert costs aimed at targeting three already identified global or multi-jurisdictional mass anticompetitive claims in the scale of multi-billion dollars, whose details will be provided upon request.

Funder(s) get:

  • Percentage of claims' return as per agreement with parties involved;
  • Property of the AI / blockchain algorithm;
  • License of TPF 3.0.

The funding does not cover: additional legal / litigation / expert / etc. costs.

Below is the full proposal:

THIRD PARTY FUNDING 3.0© & COMPETITION LAW CLAIMS Dr2. Avv. Gian Marco Solas gmsolas@sustainab-law.eu ; gianmarcosolas@gmail.com ; +393400966871 
AI: Artificial Intelligence                  ML: Machine Learning                    TPF: Third Party Funding
GENERAL SCENARIO FOR COMPETITION LAW DAMAGE CLAIMS – IN SHORT
Competition authorities around the globe are rapidly developing AI / ML tools to scan markets / economy and prosecute anti-competitive practices. This suggests a steep increase in competition claims in the coming years, in both volume and scope.  AI also reduces the costs and time of litigation and ML allows to better assess its risks and merit, prompting for a re-modelling of the TPF economic model in competition claims considering empirical evidence of the first wave(s) of funded litigation.
CODIFICATION© IN PHENOGRAPHY© AND TPF 3.0©
New technology and ‘mathematical-legal language’, a combination of digital & quantum where the IT code is the applicable law modelled as - and interrelated with - the law(s) of nature (‘codification©’ in ‘phenography©’). On this basis, an ML / AI legal-tech algorithm has been built in prototype to learn, build and enforce anticompetitive claims in scale, to be guided by lawyers / experts / managers, with a process tracked with and certified in blockchain. New investment thesis (TPF 3.0©) for an asset class correlated to the global real economy, including the mathematical basis for the development of a complex sciences-based / empirical damage calculation to be built by experts. 
LEGAL / LITIGATION TECH INVESTMENT, COMMITMENT AND PROSPECT RETURN
10 MILLION EUR in the form of a series A venture capital type of investment with real assets as collateral for funding to any competition litigation filed with and through this algorithm, that becomes proprietary also of the funder(s). It aims at covering a first test case (already identified), full-time IT engineer, quantum experts and book-building costs. The funder(s) is(are) expected to provide also global litigation management expertise and own the algorithm. Three global or anyway multi-jurisdictional mass anticompetitive claims in the scale of multi-billion in value have already been identified. Details will be provided upon request. Funder(s) also gets license of the TPF 3.0© thesis.

Below is the abstract and table of contents from my research:

Abstract

This article aims at fostering competition litigation and market analysis by integrating concepts borrowed from physics science from an historical legal and evolutionary perspective, taking the third party funding (TPF) market as benchmark. To do so, it first combines historical legal data and trends related to the legal and litigation markets, discussing three macro historical trends or “states”: Industrial revolution(s) and globalisation; enlargement of the legal world; digital revolution and liberalisation of the legal profession. It then proposes the multidisciplinary methodology to assess the market for TPF: mainstream economic models, historical “cyclical” data and concepts borrowed from physics, particularly from mechanics of fluids and thermodynamics. On this basis, it discusses the potential implication of such methodology on the global competition litigation practice, for instance in market analysis and damage theory, also by considering the impact of modern technologies. The article concludes that physics models and the interdisciplinary methodology seem to add value to market assessment and considers whether there should be a case for a wider adoption in (competition) litigation and asset management practices.  

Table of Contents

Introduction. I. Evolution of the legal services, litigation and third party funding market(s) 1.1. Industrial revolution(s) and globalisation 1.2. Enlargement of the legal world and privatisation of justice 1.3. Digital revolution and liberalisation of the legal profession II. Modelling the market(s) with economics, historical and physics models. Third Party Funding as benchmark 2.1. Economic models for legal services, legal claims and third party funding markets 2.2. Does history repeat itself? Litigation finance cycles 2.3. Mechanics of fluids and thermodynamics to model legal markets? III. Impact on global competition litigation 3.1. Market analysis and damage theory 3.2. Economics of competition litigation and new technologies. Conclusions. Third Party Funding 3.0© and competitiveness.

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1. Italian / EU qualified lawyer and legal scientist. Leading Expert at BRICS Competition Law & Policy Centre (Higher School of Economics, Moscow). Ph.D.2 (Maastricht Law School, Economic Analysis of Law; University of Cagliari, Comparative Law) – LL.M. (College of Europe, EU competition Law). Visiting Fellow at Fordham Law School (US Antitrust), NYU (US Legal finance and civil procedure).

2. G. M. Solas, ‘Third Party Funding, new technologies and the interdisciplinary methodology as global competition litigation driving forces’ (2025) Global Competition Litigation Review, 1.

3. G. M. Solas, ‘Interrelation of Human Laws and Laws of Nature? Codification of Sustainable Legal Systems’ (2025) Journal of Law, Market & Innovation, 2.

4. ‘Law is Love’, at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5694423, par. 3.3.