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Operating Costs inherent in the Commercial Litigation Finance Asset Class (Part 1 of 2)

The following article is part of an ongoing column titled ‘Investor Insights.’ 

Brought to you by Ed Truant, founder and content manager of Slingshot Capital, ‘Investor Insights’ will provide thoughtful and engaging perspectives on all aspects of investing in litigation finance. 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Article draws comparisons between commercial litigation finance and private equity (leverage buy-out) asset classes
  • Similarities and differences exist between private equity and litigation finance operating costs, but there are some significant jurisdictional differences to consider
  • Value creation is front-end loaded in litigation finance vs. back-end loaded in private equity
  • Litigation finance can be a difficult investment to scale while ensuring the benefits of portfolio theory

INVESTOR INSIGHTS

  • The ‘2 and 20’ model is an appropriate baseline to apply to litigation finance, but investors need to understand the potential for misalignment of interests
  • As with most asset classes, scale plays an important role in fund operating costs
  • Deployment risk and tail risk are not insignificant in this asset class
  • Investor should be aware of potential differences in the reconciliation of gross case returns to net fund returns
  • Up-front management fees may have implications for long-term manager solvency

My overarching objective for Slingshot is to educate potential investors about the litigation finance asset class and to improve industry transparency, as I believe increased transparency will ultimately lead to increased investor interest and increased access to capital for fund managers.  In this light, I was asked to write an article a few months back about management fees in the commercial litigation finance sector, and my immediate reaction was that it would be a controversial topic that may not even be in my own best interests—and so I parked the idea.  However, the seed was germinating and I began to think about an interesting discussion of the various operating costs, including management fees, inherent in and specific to the asset class, including geographic differences therein.

While I always attempt to provide a balanced point of view in my articles, I should first point out my conflict of interest as it relates to this article.  As a general partner of a commercial litigation finance fund-of-funds, and being in the design stages of my next fund offering, my compensation model is based on a combination of management fees and performance fees no different than litigation finance fund managers.  Accordingly, my personal bias is to ensure that I structure my own compensation to strike a balance between investor and manager so that each feels they are deriving value from the relationship.  If I overstep my bounds by charging excessive fees, I believe that a competitive market will recognize the issue and prevent me from raising sufficient capital to make my fund proposition viable.  I am also kept in check by a variety of other managers in the same and similar asset classes who are also out raising money which help to establish the “market” for compensation. I further believe a smart allocator, of which there are many, will know what fee levels are acceptable and appropriate based on the strategy being employed and the resources required to deploy capital into acceptable investments (they see hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals every year, and are focused on the compensation issue).  On the other hand, the litigation finance market is a nascent and evolving market with many different economic models, specific requirements and unique participants, and so a ‘market standard’ does not exist, therefore it is common to look at similar asset classes (leveraged buy-out, private credit, etc.) to triangulate an appropriate operating cost model.

At the end of the day, the most compelling philosophy of compensation is rooted in fairness.  If a manager charges excessive fees and their returns suffer as a result, that manager will likely not live to see another fund. However, if  a manager takes a fair approach that is more “LP favourable” in the short-term (as long as the compensation doesn’t impair its ability to invest appropriately), it can move its fees upward over time in lock-step with its performance as there will always be adequate demand to get into a strong-performing fund.  There are many examples in the private equity industry of managers who have been able to demand higher performance fees based on their prior performance.  So, if you have a long-term view of the asset class and your fund management business, there really is no upside in charging excessive fees relative to performance, but there is clear downside.

With my conflict disclosed, let’s move on to the issues at hand which are more encompassing than just fees.

Litigation Finance as a Private Equity Asset Class

For fund managers operating in the commercial litigation finance asset class, many view themselves as a form of private equity manager, and for the most part, the analogy is accurate.  Litigation finance managers are compensated for finding attractive opportunities (known as “origination”), undertaking due diligence on the opportunities (or “underwriting”, to use credit terminology) and then stewarding their investments to a successful resolution over a period of time while ensuring collection of proceeds.

Similarly, Private Equity (“PE”) investors (for purposes of this article I refer to “Private Equity” as being synonymous with “leveraged buy-outs”, although use of the term has been broadened over the years to encompass many private asset classes) spend most of their time on origination and diligence on the front-end of a transaction, and increasingly, on value creation and the exit plan during the hold period and back-end of the transaction, respectively.

In the early days of the PE industry, the value creation plan was more front-end loaded and centered around buying at X and selling at a multiple of X (known as “multiple arbitrage”), usually by taking advantage of market inefficiency, and accentuated through the use of financial leverage and organic growth in the business.  Over time, the multiple arbitrage strategy disappeared as competitors entered the market and squeezed out the ‘easy money’ by bidding up prices of private businesses.  Today, PE firms are more focused on operational excellence and business strategy than ever before (during the hold period of the transaction).  Having been a private equity investor for two decades I have seen a significant change in the PE value creation strategy.  While organic and acquisition growth still feature prominently in PE portfolio company growth strategies, the extent to which PE managers will go to uncover value opportunities is unprecedented.

This highlights a key difference between private equity and litigation finance.  In PE, the majority of the value creation happens after the acquisition starts, and ends when a realization event takes place.  In litigation finance, the fund manager, in most jurisdictions, is limited from “intermeddling” in the case once an investment has been made, so as to ensure the plaintiff remains in control of the outcome of the case and that the funder does not place undue influence on the outcome of the case.  Nonetheless, some litigation funders add value during their hold period by providing ongoing perspectives based on decades of experience, participating in mock trials, reviewing and commenting on proceedings to provide valuable insight, reviewing precedent transactions during the hold period to determine their impact on the value of their case, case management cost/budget reviews, etc.

Accordingly, it is easy to see that relative to private equity, the litigation finance manager’s ability to add value during the hold period is somewhat limited, legally and otherwise.  One could use this differential in “value add” to justify a difference in management fees, but a counter-argument would be that in contrast to private equity, litigation finance adds value at the front-end of the investment process by weeding out the less desirable prospects and focusing their time and attention on the ‘diamonds in the rough’.  Of course, private equity would make the same argument, the key difference being that in private equity there is much more transparency in pricing through market back-channeling (many of the same lenders, management consultants and industry experts know the status and proposed valuations of a given private equity deal) than what is found in the litigation finance industry. An argument can be made that inherent in litigation finance is a market inefficiency that is predicated on confidentiality, although I don’t believe that has been tested yet.

The other issue that differentiates litigation finance from PE is the scale of investing.  PE scales quite nicely in that you can have a team of 10 professionals investing in a $500 million niche fund and the same-sized firm investing $2B in larger transactions, while your operating cost base does not change much, which is what allows PE operations to achieve “economies of scale”.  In litigation finance, the number of very large investments is limited, and those investments typically have a different set of return characteristics (duration, return volatility, multiples of invested capital, IRR, etc.), so even if you could fund a large number of large cases, you may not want to construct such a portfolio, as large case financings will likely have a more volatile set of outcomes, so the fund would have to be large enough to allow diversification in the large end of the financing market during the fund’s investment period.  Accordingly, litigation finance firms typically have to invest in a larger number of transactions in order to scale their business, and doing so requires technology, people or both.  At this stage of the evolution of the litigation finance market, scale has been achieved mainly by adding people.  Accordingly, as the PE industry has been able to achieve economies of scale through growth, it is reasonable for investors to benefit from those economies of scale by expecting to be charged less in management fees per dollar invested.  The same may not hold true for litigation finance due to its scaling challenges, although there are niches within litigation finance that can achieve scale (i.e. portfolio financings & mass tort cases, as two examples) for which the investor should benefit.

The Deployment Problem

A third significant issue that litigation finance and investors therein have to contend with is deployment risk.  In private equity, managers typically deploy most of their capital in the investment on ‘day one’ when they make the investment.  They may increase or decrease their investment over time depending on the strategy and the needs of the business and the shareholders, but they generally deploy a large percentage of their investment the day they close on their portfolio acquisition.  Further, it is not uncommon for a PE fund manager to deploy between 85% and 100% of their overall fund commitments through the course of the fund.

Litigation Finance on the other hand rarely deploys 100% of its case commitment at the beginning of the investment, as it would not be prudent or value maximizing to do so.  Accordingly, it is not uncommon for litigation finance managers to ‘drip’ their investment in over time (funding agreements typically provide the manager with the ability to cease funding in certain circumstances in order to react to the litigation process and ‘cut their losses’).  The problem with this approach is that investors are being charged management fees based on committed capital, while the underlying investment is being funded on a deployed capital basis, which has the effect of multiplying the effective management fee, as I will describe in the following example.  This, of course, is in addition to the common issue of committing to a draw down type fund that has an investment period of between 2-3 (for litigation finance) and 5 (for private equity) years, for which an investor is paying management fees on committed capital even though capital isn’t expected to be deployed immediately.  Litigation finance adds a strategy-specific layer of deployment risk.

For purposes of this simplistic example, let’s contrast the situation of a private equity firm that invests $10 million on the basis of a 2% management fee model with that of a litigation finance manager that also invests $10 million, but does so in equal increments over a 3-year period.

 

Private Equity (PE) Model (based on a $10 million investment)

 Year 1Year 2Year 3
Capital Deployed1$10,000,000$10,000,000$10,000,000
2% Management Fee$200,000$200,000$200,000
Expressed as % of deployed capital (B)2%2%2%

 

Litigation Finance Model (based on a $10 million investment evenly over 3 years)

 Year 1Year 2Year 3
Capital Deployed1$3,333,333$6,666,666$10,000,000
2% Management Fee$200,000$200,000$200,000
Expressed as %1 of deployed capital (A)6%3%2%

 

Differences in Fees in relation to Capital Deployed

Absolute Difference(A-B)4%1%0%
Difference as a multiple of fees in PE ((A-B)/2%)2X0.5X0X

1 Calculated assuming the capital is deployed at the beginning of the year.

The difference highlighted above can be taken to extremes when you have a relatively quick litigation finance resolution shortly after making a commitment.  In this situation, you have deployed a relatively small amount of capital that hasn’t been invested for long, but has produced a strong return – this typically results in large gross IRRs, but a relatively low multiple of capital (although the outcome very much depends on the terms of the funding agreement).  While this phenomenon produces very strong gross IRRs, when the investor factors in the total operating costs of the fund, the negative impact of those costs can significantly affect net IRRs.  Accordingly, investors should be aware that this asset class may have significant ‘gross to net’ IRR differentials (as well as multiples of invested capital), and one could conclude erroneously that strong gross IRRs will contribute directly to strong Net IRRs, but the ultimate net returns will vary with capital deployment, case duration. extent of operating costs and timing thereof.

I wouldn’t want this observation to discourage anyone from investing in litigation finance, but awareness of this phenomenon is important and very much dependent on the strategy of the manager, the sizes and types of cases in which they invest, and of course, is in part a consequence of the uncertain nature of litigation.  As an investor, I do think it is appropriate and fair where a fund manager obtains a quick resolution, that the commitment underlying the resolution be recycled to allow the Investor a chance to re-deploy the capital into another opportunity and achieve its original portfolio construction objectives  – recycling is beneficial to all involved. However, I would argue that it is not necessarily fair to charge the investor twice for the same capital, as that capital has already attracted and earned a management fee.

Stage of Lifecycle of Litigation Finance

Perhaps litigation finance is at the same stage of development as private equity experienced 20 years ago in terms of finding the “multiple arbitrage” opportunities, but a key difference is that the success rates in litigation finance are lower and the downside is typically a complete write-off of the investment, whereas private equity has many potential outcomes between zero and a multiple of their initial investment.  Of course, the home runs in litigation finance can be quite spectacular.  The quasi-binary nature of the asset class does present a dilemma in terms of compensation for managers and the costs inherent in running the strategy. The scale and deployment issues raised above are other issues that need to be addressed by fund managers and their compensation systems.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned, it takes highly competent and well-compensated people to execute on this particular strategy which sets a floor on management fee levels. A well-run and diversified litigation finance fund should win about 70% of their cases, and if they underwrite to a 3X multiple for pre-settlement single cases, then they should produce gross MOICs of about 2X (i.e. ~70% of 3X) and net about 1.75X (after performance fees and costs).  This would be the type of performance that is deserving of a ‘2 and 20’ model as long as those returns are delivered in a reasonable time period.  Conversely, if the majority of a manager’s portfolio is focused on portfolio finance investing, there may have to be a different compensation scheme to reflect the different risk/reward characteristics inherent in the diversification, scale and cross-collateralized nature of this segment of the market. One size does not fit all.

Let’s also not forget that litigation finance is delivering non-correlated returns, and one could easily assess a significant premium to non-correlation, especially in today’s market.

In Part 2 of this two-part series, I will explore the application of the ‘2 and 20’ model to litigation finance in comparison to private equity, the implication of the private partnership terms of some of the publicly-listed fund managers, and other operating costs specific to litigation finance.

Investor Insights

Any fund operating model needs to be designed taking into consideration all of the operating costs inherent in the manager’s operational model in the context of expected returns and timing thereof.  Investors care about being treated fairly, sharing risk and sharing the upside performance in order to foster long-term relationships that reflect positively on their organizations’ ability to perpetuate returns.  Professional investors rely on data to make decisions, and in the absence of data which might get them comfortable with a manager’s performance, they will default to mitigating risk. Tail risk in this asset class is not insignificant, which makes investing that much more difficult.  A performing manager that does a good job of sharing risk and reward with investors will have created a sustainable fund management business that will ultimately create equity value for its shareholders beyond the gains inherent in its performance fees.

 Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc., and an investor in the litigation finance industry (consumer and commercial).  Ed is currently designing a new fund focused on institutional investors who are seeking to make allocations to the commercial litigation finance asset class.

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Therium Cuts UK Jobs as Part of Strategic Reorganisation

By Harry Moran |

Recent years have been described as a time of substantial growth and expansion in the global litigation funding market, yet new reporting suggests that one of the industry’s most well-known funders is downsizing its workforce.

An article in The Law Society Gazette provides a brief insight into ongoing changes being made at litigation funder Therium, reporting that the company is undertaking a number of layoffs as part of plans to restructure the business. The article states that these job cuts have been made to Therium’s UK workforce, with the business claiming the cuts are motivated by strategic reorganisation rather than financial pressures. 

There are no details currently available as to which employees have been let go, with Therium having removed the ‘Our People’ section of its website. The Gazette also discovered the incorporation of a new company called Therium Capital Advisors LLP on 15 April 2025, through a review of Companies House records. The new entity’s records list Therium’s chief investment officer, Neil Purslow, and investment manager, Harry Stockdale, as its two designated members. 

Companies House records also show that Therium filed a ‘termination of appointment of secretary’ for Martin Middleton on 19 March 2025. Mr Middleton’s LinkedIn profile currently lists his position as Therium’s chief financial officer, having first joined the funder as a financial controller over 15 years ago.

At the time of reporting, Therium has not responded to LFJ’s request for comment.

Litigation Funding in GCC Arbitration

By Obaid Mes’har |

The following piece was contributed by Obaid Saeed Bin Mes’har, Managing Director of WinJustice.

Introduction

A Practical Overview

Third-party litigation funding (TPF)—where an external financier covers a claimant’s legal fees in exchange for a share of any resulting award—has gained significant traction in arbitration proceedings across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Historically, TPF was not widely used in the Middle East, but recent years have seen a notable increase in its adoption, particularly in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The economic pressures introduced by the COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with the high costs of complex arbitrations, have prompted many parties to view TPF as an effective risk-management strategy. Meanwhile, the entry of global funders and evolving regulatory frameworks highlight TPF’s emergence as a key feature of the GCC arbitration landscape.

Growing Adoption

Although the initial uptake was gradual, TPF is now frequently employed in high-value disputes across the GCC. Observers in the UAE have noted a discernible rise in funded cases following recent legal developments in various jurisdictions. Major international funders have established a presence in the region, reflecting the growing acceptance and practical utility of TPF. Similar growth patterns are evident in other GCC countries, where businesses have become increasingly aware of the advantages offered by third-party financing.

By providing claimants with the financial resources to pursue meritorious claims, third-party funding is reshaping the dispute-resolution landscape. As regulatory frameworks evolve and more funders enter the market, it is anticipated that TPF will continue to gain prominence, offering both claimants and legal professionals an alternative means of managing arbitration costs and mitigating financial risk.

Types of Cases

Funders are chiefly drawn to large commercial and international arbitration claims with significant damages at stake. The construction sector has been a key source of demand in the Middle East, where delayed payments and cost overruns lead to disputes; contractors facing cash-flow strain are increasingly turning to third-party funding to pursue their claims. High-stakes investor–state arbitrations are also candidates – for instance, in investment treaty cases where a government’s alleged expropriation deprives an investor of its main asset, funding can enable the claim to move forward . In practice, arbitration in GCC hubs like Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and others is seeing more funded claimants, leveling the field between smaller companies and deep-pocketed opponents.

Practical Utilization

Law firms in the region are adapting by partnering with funders or facilitating introductions for their clients. Many firms report that funding is now considered for cases that clients might otherwise abandon due to cost. While precise data on usage is scarce (as most arbitrations are confidential), anecdotal evidence and market activity indicate that third-party funding, once rare, is becoming a common feature of significant arbitration proceedings in the GCC. This trend is expected to continue as awareness grows and funding proves its value in enabling access to justice.

Regulatory Landscape and Restrictions on Third-Party Funding

UAE – Onshore vs. Offshore

The United Arab Emirates illustrates the region’s mixed regulatory landscape. Onshore (civil law) UAE has no specific legislation prohibiting or governing litigation funding agreements . Such agreements are generally permissible, but they must not conflict with Sharia principles – for example, funding arrangements should avoid elements of excessive uncertainty (gharar) or speculation . Parties entering funding deals for onshore cases are cautioned to structure them carefully in line with UAE law and good faith obligations. In contrast, the UAE’s common-law jurisdictions – the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) and Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM) – explicitly allow third-party funding and have established clear frameworks.

The DIFC Courts issued Practice Direction No. 2 of 2017, requiring any funded party to give notice of the funding and disclose the funder’s identity to all other parties . The DIFC rules also clarify that while the funding agreement itself need not be disclosed, the court may consider the existence of funding when deciding on security for costs applications and retains power to order costs against a funder in appropriate cases. Similarly, the ADGM’s regulations (Article 225 of its 2015 Regulations) and Litigation Funding Rules 2019 set out requirements for valid funding agreements – they must be in writing, the funded party must notify other parties and the court of the funding, and the court can factor in the funding arrangement when issuing cost orders . The ADGM rules also impose criteria on funders (e.g. capital adequacy) and safeguard the funded party’s control over the case .

In sum, the UAE’s offshore jurisdictions provide a modern, regulated environment for third-party funding, whereas onshore UAE allows it in principle but without detailed regulation.

Other GCC Countries

Elsewhere in the GCC, explicit legislation on litigation funding in arbitration remains limited, but recent developments signal growing acceptance. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait do not yet have dedicated statutes or regulations on third-party funding . However, leading arbitral institutions in these countries have proactively addressed funding in their rules. Notably, the Saudi Center for Commercial Arbitration (SCCA) updated its Arbitration Rules in 2023 to acknowledge third-party funding: Article 17(6) now mandates that any party with external funding disclose the existence of that funding and the funder’s identity to the SCCA, the tribunal, and other parties . This ensures transparency and allows arbitrators to check for conflicts. 

Likewise, the Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution (BCDR) included provisions in its 2022 Arbitration Rules requiring a party to notify the institution of any funding arrangement and the funder’s name,, which the BCDR will communicate to the tribunal and opponents . The BCDR Rules further oblige consideration of whether any relationship between the arbitrators and the funder could compromise the tribunal’s independence. These rule changes in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain align with international best practices and indicate regional momentum toward formal recognition of third-party funding in arbitration.

Disclosure and Transparency

A common thread in the GCC regulatory approach is disclosure. Whether under institutional rules (as in DIAC, SCCA, BCDR) or court practice directions (DIFC, ADGM), funded parties are generally required to disclose that they are funded and often to reveal the funder’s identity . For instance, the new DIAC Arbitration Rules 2022 expressly recognize third-party funding – Article 22 obliges any party who enters a funding arrangement to promptly inform all other parties and the tribunal, including identifying the funder. DIAC’s rules even prohibit entering a funding deal after the tribunal is constituted if it would create a conflict of interest with an arbitrator. This emphasis on transparency aims to prevent ethical issues and later challenges to awards. It also reflects the influence of global standards (e.g. 2021 ICC Rules and 2022 ICSID Rules) which likewise introduced funding disclosure requirements.

Overall, while no GCC jurisdiction outright bans third-party funding, the patchwork of court practices and arbitration rules means parties must be mindful of the specific disclosure and procedural requirements in the seat of arbitration or administering institution. In jurisdictions rooted in Islamic law (like Saudi Arabia), there is an added layer of ensuring the funding arrangement is structured in a Sharia-compliant way (avoiding interest-based returns and excessive uncertainty. We may see further regulatory development – indeed, regional policymakers are aware of litigation funding’s growth and are considering more formal regulation to provide clarity and confidence for all participants .

The GCC region has seen several important developments and trends related to third-party funding in arbitration:

  • Institutional Rule Reforms: As detailed earlier, a number of arbitral institutions in the GCC have updated their rules to address third-party funding, marking a significant trend. The Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) 2022 Rules, the Saudi SCCA 2023 Rules, and the Bahrain BCDR 2022 Rules all include new provisions on funding disclosures. This wave of reforms in 2022–2023 reflects a recognition that funded cases are happening and need basic ground rules. By explicitly referencing TPF, these institutions legitimize the practice and provide guidance to arbitrators and parties on handling it (primarily through mandatory disclosure and conflict checks). The adoption of such rules brings GCC institutions in line with leading international forums (like ICC, HKIAC, ICSID, etc. that have also moved to regulate TPF).
  • DIFC Court Precedents: The DIFC was one of the first in the region to grapple with litigation funding. A few high-profile cases in the DIFC Courts in the mid-2010s involved funded claimants, which prompted the DIFC Courts to issue Practice Direction 2/2017 as a framework. This made the DIFC one of the pioneers in the Middle East to formally accommodate TPF. Since then, the DIFC Courts have continued to handle cases with funding, and their decisions (for example, regarding cost orders against funders) are building a body of regional precedent on the issue. While most of these cases are not public, practitioners note that several DIFC proceedings have featured litigation funding, establishing practical know-how in dealing with funded parties. The DIFC experience has likely influenced other GCC forums to be more accepting of TPF.
  • Funders’ Increased Presence: Another trend is the growing confidence of international funders in the Middle East market. Over the last couple of years, top global litigation financiers have either opened offices in the GCC or actively started seeking cases from the region. Dubai has emerged as a regional hub – beyond Burford, other major funders like Omni Bridgeway (a global funder with roots in Australia) and IMF Bentham (now Omni) have been marketing in the GCC, and local players or boutique funders are also entering the fray . This increased competition among funders is good news for claimants, as it can lead to more competitive pricing and terms for funding. It also indicates that funders perceive the GCC as a growth market with plenty of high-value disputes and a legal environment increasingly open to their business.
  • Types of Arbitrations Being Funded : In terms of case trends, funded arbitrations in the GCC have often involved big-ticket commercial disputes – for example, multi-million dollar construction, energy, and infrastructure cases. These are sectors where disputes are frequent and claims sizable, but claimants (contractors, subcontractors, minority JV partners, etc.) may have limited cash after a project soured. Third-party funding has started to play a role in enabling such parties to bring claims. There have also been instances of investor-state arbitrations involving GCC states or investors that utilized funding (though specific details are usually confidential). The Norton Rose Fulbright report notes that funding is especially helpful in investor-treaty cases where an investor’s primary asset was taken by the state, leaving them dependent on external financing to pursue legal remedies.

As GCC countries continue to attract foreign investment and enter into international treaties, one can expect more ICSID or UNCITRAL arbitrations connected to the region – and many of those claimants may turn to funders, as is now common in investment arbitration globally.

  • Emerging Sharia-Compliant Funding Solutions: A unique trend on the horizon is the development of funding models that align with Islamic finance principles. Given the importance of Sharia law in several GCC jurisdictions, some industry experts predict the rise of Sharia-compliant litigation funding products. These might structure the funder’s return as a success fee in the form of profit-sharing or an award-based service fee rather than “interest” on a loan, and ensure that the arrangement avoids undue uncertainty. While still nascent, such innovations could open the door for greater use of funding in markets like Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, by removing religious/legal hesitations. They would be a notable evolution, marrying the concept of TPF with Islamic finance principles – a blend particularly suitable for the Gulf.

Overall, the trajectory in the GCC arbitration market is clear: third-party funding is becoming mainstream. There have not been many publicly reported court challenges or controversies around TPF in the region – which suggests that, so far, its integration has been relatively smooth. On the contrary, the changes in arbitration rules and the influx of funders point to a growing normalization. Businesses and law firms operating in the GCC should take note of these trends, as they indicate that funding is an available option that can significantly impact how disputes are fought and financed.

Conclusion

Litigation funding in the GCC’s arbitration arena has evolved from a novelty to a practical option that businesses and law firms ignore at their peril. With major arbitration centers in the region embracing third-party funding and more funders entering the Middle Eastern market, this trend is likely to continue its upward trajectory. 

For businesses, it offers a chance to enforce rights and recover sums that might otherwise be forgone due to cost constraints. For law firms, it presents opportunities to serve clients in new ways and share in the upside of successful claims. Yet, as with any powerful tool, it must be used wisely: parties should stay mindful of the legal landscape, comply with disclosure rules, and carefully manage relationships to avoid ethical snags. 

By leveraging litigation funding strategically – balancing financial savvy with sound legal practice – stakeholders in the GCC can optimize their dispute outcomes while effectively managing risk and expenditure. In a region witnessing rapid development of its dispute resolution mechanisms, third-party funding stands out as an innovation that, when properly harnessed, aligns commercial realities with the pursuit of justice.

At WinJustice.com, we take pride in being the UAE’s pioneering litigation funding firm. We are dedicated to providing innovative funding solutions that enable our clients to overcome financial hurdles and pursue justice without compromise. By leveraging third-party litigation funding strategically—balancing financial acumen with sound legal practices—stakeholders in the GCC can optimize their dispute outcomes while effectively managing risk and expenditure.

If you are looking to maximize your dispute resolution strategy through expert litigation funding, contact WinJustice.com today. We’re here to help you navigate the evolving landscape and secure the justice you deserve.

European Commission Fines Apple €500m and Meta €200m for DMA Breaches

By Harry Moran |

Antitrust and competition claims brought against large multinational corporations often represent lucrative opportunities for litigation funders, and the announcement of a new series of fines being imposed on two of the world’s largest technology companies could set the stage for more of these claims being brought in Europe.

Reporting by Reuters covers a major antitrust development as the European Commission has handed down multimillion dollar fines to both Apple and Meta over their breaches of the Digital Markets Act (DMA). These fines follow non-compliance investigations that began in March 2024, with Apple receiving a €500 million fine for breaching its anti-steering obligation through the App Store, and Meta being fined €200 million for breaching the DMA obligation to allow consumers the option to choose a service that uses less of their personal data.

Teresa Ribera, Executive Vice-President for Clean, Just and Competitive Transition at the European Commission, said that the fines “send a strong and clear message”, and that the enforcement action should act as a reminder that “all companies operating in the EU must follow our laws and respect European values.”

In a post on LinkedIn, Gabriela Merino, case manager at LitFin, explained that these fines “mark the first non-compliance decisions issued by the Commission under the new regulatory framework.” As LFJ covered earlier this month, LitFin is funding a €900 million claim against Google in the Netherlands over its anti-competitive practices that were first brought to light by another European Commission investigation. Merino said that “these latest rulings are a welcome boost” to LitFin’s own case.

Statements from both Apple and Meta decried the fines, with the former arguing that the decision was “yet another example of the European Commission unfairly targeting Apple”. 

The full press release from the European Commission detailing the investigations and associated fines can be read here.