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The McLaren case – A Step Forward, or a Step Backward for the UK Class Action?

The McLaren case – A Step Forward, or a Step Backward for the UK Class Action?

The following article was contributed by Mikolaj Burzec, a litigation finance advisor and broker. He is also a content writer for Sentry Funding. The Competition Appeal Tribunal, London’s specialist competition court, has confirmed that a special purpose company led by Mark McLaren, formerly of The Consumers’ Association, will act as the Class Representation. McLaren represents millions of motorists and businesses who bought or leased a new car between October 2006 and September 2015 against five shipping companies that imported cars into Europe. The European Commission has already found that the car carriers fixed prices, manipulated bids, and divided the market for roll-on roll-off transport by sea. According to the Commission, the carriers had agreed to maintain the status quo in the market and to respect each other’s ongoing business on certain routes, or with certain customers by offering artificially high prices or not bidding at all in tenders for vehicle manufacturers. The class action follows the EC decision. It is one of the first actions of its kind in the UK and damages for car buyers are estimated at around £150 million. The class representative Mark McLaren has set up a non-for-profit company – Mark McLaren Class Representative Limited – specifically to bring this claim. Mark is the sole director and only member of the company and therefore has full control over it. In a collective action, the class representative is responsible for conducting the action on behalf of the class. His duties include:
  • instructing specialist lawyers and experts
  • deciding whether to proceed with the claim and, in particular, deciding whether to refer an offer of settlement to the Competition Appeal Tribunal for approval
  • communicating with the class and issuing formal notices to class members by various means, including posting notices on this website.
An independent advisory committee will be appointed to assist in the decision-making process. The claim From 2006 to 2012, five major shipping companies were involved in a cartel that affected prices for the sea transport of new motor vehicles, including cars and vans. During the period of the cartel, the shipping companies exchanged confidential information, manipulated tenders and prices, and reduced overall capacity in the market for the carriage of cars and vans. The cartel resulted in car manufacturers paying too much to transport new vehicles from their factories around the world to the UK and Europe. Customers who bought a new car or van between 18 October 2006 and 6 September 2015 probably also paid too much for the delivery. This is because when a manufacturer sets the price of its new cars or vans, it takes into account the total cost of delivery, including shipping costs. For simplicity, car manufacturers usually divide their total delivery costs equally among all the cars and/or vans they sell. When a customer buys a new car or van, he pays for “delivery”, either separately or as part of the on-road price. Although the car manufacturers themselves have done nothing wrong, customers who bought a new car or van between 18 October 2006 and 6 September 2015 are likely to have paid an increased delivery charge. The European Commission has already decided to impose fines of several hundred million euros on the shipping companies. The lawsuit seeks to recover these extra costs from the shipping companies who were involved in the cartel. The Competition Appeal Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal has authorised the claims to proceed as a class action. This means that millions of motorists and businesses could be entitled to compensation and these individuals and companies will now automatically be represented in court unless they choose to leave (opt-out) the claim. McLaren is the first Collective Proceeding Order judgment in which the Tribunal has explicitly considered the position of larger corporates within an opt-out class with the defendants having argued that big businesses should be removed and treated on an opt-in basis. The Tribunal’s refusal to treat larger businesses in the class differently to smaller corporates and consumers is noteworthy, and these aspects of the judgment will no doubt be of interest for the future proposed collective actions which feature businesses. McLaren further explored the appropriate legal test applied to the methodology in order to establish a class-wide loss at the certification stage. The Tribunal denied the defendants’ strike out request, which was based on purported inadequacies in the claimant’s methodology. The Tribunal concluded that its job at the certification stage is not to analyse the expert methodology’s merits and robustness; rather, the Tribunal will determine whether the methodology provides a “realistic chance of evaluating loss on a class-wide basis.” It further stressed that this does not imply that the Tribunal must be convinced that the approach will work, or that the methodology must be proven to work. The Tribunal emphasized the critical role of third-party funding in collective actions, as well as confirmed that the potential take-up rate by the class is not the only measure of benefit derived from the proceedings, with another benefit being the role of collective claims in deterring wrongful conduct. Despite the fact that the sums involved per class member may be little, the Tribunal focused on the fact that the total claim value is significant and that the majority of class members would be able to retrieve information about vehicle purchases. In the end, the Tribunal managed two issues that have been discussed in earlier decisions: inclusion of deceased consumers in the class and compound interest. Corresponding to the previous, McLaren was not allowed to change his case to incorporate potential class individuals who had died before procedures being given, because of the expiry of the limitation period. Regarding the latter, in contrast to the judgment in Merricks last year, the Tribunal was ready to certify compound interest as a standard issue even though it is common just to a part of the class who had bought vehicles using finance agreements. The Tribunal’s decision is conditional upon McLaren making adjustments to his methodology to account for the ruling on these points, and any determination as to the need for sub-classes. Case name and number: 1339/7/7/20 Mark McLaren Class Representative Limited v MOL (Europe Africa) Ltd and Others The whole judgment is available here: https://www.catribunal.org.uk/judgments/13397720-mark-mclaren-class-representative-limited-v-mol-europe-africa-ltd-and-others
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A Framework for Measuring Tech ROI in Litigation Finance

This article was contributed by Ankita Mehta, Founder, Lexity.ai - a platform that helps litigation funds automate deal execution and prove ROI.

How do litigation funders truly quantify the return on investment from adopting new technologies? It’s the defining question for any CEO, CTO or internal champion. The potential is compelling: for context, according to litigation funders using Lexity’s AI-powered workflows, ROI figures of up to 285% have been reported.

The challenge is that the cost of doing nothing is invisible. Manual processes, analyst burnout, and missed deals rarely appear on a balance sheet — but they quietly erode yield every quarter.

You can’t manage what you can’t measure. This article introduces a pragmatic framework for quantifying the true value of adopting technology solutions, replacing ‘low-value’ manual tasks and processes with AI and freeing up human capital to focus on ‘high-value’ activities that drive bottom line results  .

A Pragmatic Framework for Measuring AI ROI

A proper ROI calculation goes beyond simple time savings. It captures two distinct categories:

  1. Direct Cost Savings – what you save
  2. Increased Value Generation – what you gain

The ‘Cost’ Side (What You Save)

This is the most straightforward calculation, focused on eliminating “grunt work” and mitigating errors.

Metric 1: Direct Time Savings — Eliminating Manual Bottlenecks 

Start by auditing a single, high-cost bottleneck. For many funds, this is the Preliminary Case Assessment, a process that often takes two to three days of an expert analyst's time.

The calculation here is straightforward. By multiplying the hours saved per case by the analyst's blended cost and the number of cases reviewed, a fund can reveal a significant hard-dollar saving each month.

Consider a fund reviewing 20 cases per month. If a 2-day manual assessment can be cut to 4 hours using an AI-powered workflow, the fund reallocates hundreds of analyst-hours every month. That time is now moved from low-value data entry to high-value judgment and risk analysis.

Metric 2: Cost of Inconsistent Risk — Reducing Subjectivity 

This metric is more complex but just as critical. How much time is spent fixing inconsistent or error-prone reviews? More importantly, what is the financial impact of a bad deal slipping through screening, or a good deal being rejected because of a rushed, subjective review?

Lexity’s workflows standardise evaluation criteria and accelerate document/data extraction, converting subjective evaluations into consistent, auditable outputs. This reduces rework costs and helps mitigate hidden costs of human error in portfolio selection.

The ‘Benefit’ Side (What You Gain)

This is where the true strategic upside lies. It’s not just about saving time—it’s about reinvesting that time into higher-value activities that grow the fund.

Metric 3: Increased Deal Capacity — Scaling Without Headcount Growth

What if your team could analyze more deals with the same staff? Time saved from automation becomes time reallocated to new higher value opportunities, dramatically increasing the value of human contributions.

One of the funds working with Lexity have reported a 2x to 3x increase in deal review capacity without a corresponding increase in overhead. 

Metric 4: Cost of Capital Drag — Reducing Duration Risk 

Every month a case extends beyond its expected closing, that capital is locked up. It is "dead" capital that could have been redeployed into new, IRR-generating opportunities.

By reducing evaluation bottlenecks and creating more accurate baseline timelines from inception, a disciplined workflow accelerates the entire pipeline. 

This figure can be quantified by considering the amount of capital locked up, the fund's cost of capital, and the length of the delay. This conceptual model turns a vague risk ("duration risk") into a hard number that a fund can actively manage and reduce.

An ROI Model Is Useless Without Adoption

Even the most elegant ROI model is meaningless if the team won't use the solution. This is how expensive technology becomes "shelf-ware."

Successful adoption is not about the technology; it's about the process. It starts by:

  1. Establish Clear Goals and Identify Key Stakeholders: Set measurable goals and a baseline. Identify stakeholders, especially the teams performing the manual tasks- they will be the first to validate efficiency gains.
  2. Targeting "Grunt Work," Not "Judgment": Ask “What repetitive task steals time from real analysis?” The goal is to augment your experts, not replace them.
  3. Starting with One Problem: Don't try to "implement AI." Solve one high-value bottleneck, like Preliminary Case Assessment. Prove the value, then expand. 
  4. Focusing on Process Fit: The right technology enhances your workflow; it doesn’t complicate it.

Conclusion: From Calculation to Confidence

A high ROI isn't a vague projection; it’s what happens when a disciplined process meets intelligent automation.

By starting to measure what truly matters—reallocated hours, deal capacity, and capital drag—fund managers can turn ROI from a spreadsheet abstraction into a tangible, strategic advantage.

By Ankita Mehta Founder, Lexity.ai — a platform that helps litigation funds automate deal execution and prove ROI.

Burford Capital’s $35 M Antitrust Funding Claim Deemed Unsecured

By John Freund |

In a recent ruling, Burford Capital suffered a significant setback when a U.S. bankruptcy court determined that its funding agreement was not secured status.

According to an article from JD Journal, Burford had backed antitrust claims brought by Harvest Sherwood, a food distributor that filed for bankruptcy in May 2025, via a 2022 financing agreement. The capital advance was tied to potential claims worth about US$1.1 billion in damages against meat‑industry defendants.

What mattered most for Burford’s recovery strategy was its effort to treat the agreement as a loan with first‑priority rights. The court, however, ruled the deal lacked essential elements required to create a lien, trust or other secured interest. Instead, the funding was classified as an unsecured claim, meaning Burford now joins the queue of general creditors rather than enjoying priority over secured lenders.

The decision carries major consequences. Unsecured claims typically face a much lower likelihood of full recovery, especially in estates loaded with secured debt. Here, key assets of the bankrupt estate consist of the antitrust actions themselves, and secured creditors such as JPM Chase continue to dominate the repayment waterfall. The ruling also casts a spotlight on how litigation‑funding agreements should be structured and negotiated when bankruptcy risk is present. Funders who assumed they could elevate their status via contractual design may now face greater caution and risk.

Manolete Partners PLC Posts Flat H1 as UK Insolvency Funding Opportunity Grows

By John Freund |

The UK‑listed litigation funder Manolete Partners PLC has released its interim financial results for the half‑year ended 30 September 2025, revealing a stable but subdued performance amid an expanding insolvency funding opportunity.

According to the company announcement, total revenue fell to £12.7 million (down 12 % from £14.4 million a year earlier), while realised revenue slipped to £14.0 million (down 7 % from £15.0 million). Operating profit dropped sharply to £0.1 million, compared to £0.7 million in the prior period—though excluding fair value write‑downs tied to the company’s truck‑cartel portfolio, underlying profit stood at £2.0 million.

The business completed 146 cases during the period (up 7 % year‑on‑year) and signed 146 new case investments (up nearly 16 %). Live cases rose to 446 from 413 a year earlier, and the total estimated settlement value of new cases signed in the period was claimed to be 31 % ahead of the prior year. Cash receipts were flat at about £14.5 million, while net debt improved to £10.8 million (down from £11.9 million). The company’s cash balance nearly doubled to £1.1 million.

In its commentary, Manolete emphasises the buoyant UK insolvency backdrop — particularly the rise of Creditors’ Voluntary Liquidations and HMRC‑driven petitions — as a tailwind for growth. However, the board notes the first half was impacted by a lower‑than‑average settlement value and a “quiet summer”, though trading picked up in September and October. The firm remains confident of stronger average settlement values and a weighting of realised revenues toward the second half of the year.