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Access to Justice for Developing Countries: Third Party Funding for Sovereigns in WTO Disputes

Guest Post by Mauritius Nagelmueller, who has been involved in the litigation finance industry for more than 10 years.

Access to justice remains one of the prevailing issues within the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), especially for developing countries. To enforce the promise of a fairer trading system, developing country participation in the DSB must be improved, given that relationships between WTO members are predicated on power dynamics, rather than adherence to the rule of law.

Third party funding has provided access to justice for claimants with meritorious claims, but with limited financial capacity in the private sector, as well as in investor-state disputes. The industry is also capable of leveling the playing field in the DSB, as it can be utilized by developing countries to finance a WTO dispute.

An expansion of the current third party funding business model to include financing sovereigns in WTO disputes would create a win-win situation, by allowing developing countries to bring claims which they otherwise could not afford, and by granting third party funders the opportunity to adopt a more neutral stance towards sovereigns by providing their services in support, rather than in mere contention (as is the case today). And demand is significant, given that most obstacles to developing country participation in the DSB are related to costs, such as high-priced experts that must be brought on to account for a lack of expertise, the fear of economic pressure from the opposing state, and the lengthy proceedings which often place a strain on a developing country’s resources (member states estimate a time frame of 15 months from the request for consultations to the report of the Appellate Body. A period of at least 6 to 14 months should be added to this, as a reasonable period for the implementation of recommendations. Although this time frame is short in comparison to other international procedures, the financial hardship for developing countries can be fatal). The costs of initiating a dispute of medium complexity in the WTO are in the region of $500,000, however legal fees can sometimes exceed $10,000,000. In many cases, developing countries are forced to rely on the financial support of local industries affected by the dispute.

This begs the question, why hasn’t there been an influx of third party funders into WTO dispute resolution?

There are two chief concerns which seem to keep funders shying away. The first involves the typical remedies in WTO disputes, which regularly circumvent a direct financial compensation that the funder could benefit from. Still, complainants seek monetary benefits, be it through concessions (the losing country compensates the winning country with additional concessions equal to the original breach), or retaliation (the winning country withdraws concessions in that amount). A simple solution to this issue is for the winning party to provide a share of those benefits to the funder. One possibility is to assess the level of harm caused by the illegal measure challenged in the dispute, and accept that as a basis for the compensation of the funder. If the WTO Panel decisions are implemented, and the disputed measures that were found to be inconsistent with the WTO are withdrawn, a certain value of trade is not affected by those measures anymore and can be realized again. Affected industries, or the affected country, can set aside part of the gain to compensate the funder. In the case of compensation or the suspension of concessions, the complainant gains from increased tariff revenue, and is able to compensate the financing entity from a portion of the same. In any event, financial benefits of a winning party can be measured, and any compensation for the funder will represent only a minor percentage of the gained value of trade.

The second main concern surrounds the area of enforceability, and whether WTO mechanisms would allow financing agreements. But those would have to be enforced in local courts, and the WTO DSB technically cannot rule on non-WTO agreement issues. However, there are provisions that allow the DSB to engage in arbitration if the parties both agree. A practical solution would therefore be to include an arbitration or dispute settlement provision in the financing agreement that operates outside of the DSB.

Based on the aforementioned demand, as well as the practical solutions which can mitigate possible concerns, it is clear that external funding of WTO disputes can provide a flexible, independent and powerful alternative for developing countries to increase access to justice, as well as for developed countries to “outsource the risk” of a WTO dispute.

It’s only a matter of time before third party funding makes its way into the WTO.

** A version of this article first appeared in International Economic Law and Policy Blog

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Commercial Regulatory Issues

Burford Capital CEO: Government Inaction on PACCAR is Harming London Market

By Harry Moran |

As we approach the beginning of summer, the litigation funding industry is growing impatient in waiting for the outcome of the Civil Justice Council’s (CJC) review of litigation funding, with funders anxious to see the government provide a solution to the uncertainty created by the Supreme Court’s ruling in PACCAR.

An article in The Law Society Gazette provides an overview of an interview with Christopher Bogart, CEO of Burford Capital; who spoke at length about the ongoing impact of the UK government’s failure to introduce legislation to solve issues created by the PACCAR ruling. Bogart highlighted the key correlation between funders’ reluctance to allocate more capital to the London legal market and “the government non-response” to find a quick and effective solution to PACCAR.

Comparing the similarities in effect of the government inaction over funding legislation to the Trump administration’s tariff policy, Bogart said simply, “markets and businesses don’t like such uncertainty.” He went on to describe the London market as “not as healthy as you would like it to be”, pointing to statistics showing a decrease in capital allocation and the examples of major funders like Therium making job cuts.

One particular pain point that Bogart pointed to was Burford’s newfound hesitancy to name London as an arbitral seat and choose English law for international contracts, saying that the company has moved those contracts to jurisdictions including Singapore, Paris or New York. Bogart said that it was “unfortunate because this is one of the major global centres for litigation and arbitration”, but argued that the strategic jurisdictional shift was a result of having “a less predictable dynamic here in this market”.

As for what Bogart would like to see from the upcoming CJC’s review of litigation funding, the Burford CEO emphasised the longstanding view of the funding industry that there is “no need for a big regulatory apparatus here.” Instead, Bogart suggested that an ideal outcome would be for the CJC to encourage Westminster “to restore a degree of predictability and stability into the market.”

Commercial Deals

Insurance CEO Ceases Trading with Firms Linked to Litigation Finance

By Harry Moran |

The tensions between the insurance industry and litigation finance are well established, with insurance industry groups often at the forefront of lobbying efforts calling for tighter regulations of third-party funding. In one of the most significant examples of this tension, the CEO of a speciality insurance company has declared that his company will cease doing business with any firm that is linked to litigation funding activity.

An article in Insurance Business highlights recent comments made by Andrew Robinson, chairman and CEO of Skyward Specialty Insurance Group, where he said that the company would no longer do business with companies who have any ties to litigation finance. Citing the uptick in the use of third-party funding as one of the primary contributors to social inflation, increasing product costs and reduced availability; Robinson declared that Skyward are “not going to trade with anybody who's involved in this”.

According to the article, Robinson’s decision was triggered by the company’s discovery that an asset manager it worked with was involved in litigation funding. Skyward then “shut off” its business relationship with the asset manager and is in the process of redeeming any remaining assets with the firm. Robinson said that the idea of Skyward having ties to firms involved with litigation finance “is wrong at all levels”, saying that he told his executive leadership team that “we can’t have that anywhere near us”.

Aside from the asset manager, Skyward was trading with a company involved in contingent insurance whose work included litigation finance, but Robinson stated that the unnamed company is reducing its already minor presence in the funding space.

Despite targeting his ire primarily at litigation funding, Robinson suggested that the wider issue stems from a “broken” tort system and that “you have to get to the root cause and toward reform”.  

Commercial Regulatory Issues

Bell Gully Report: New Zealand Courts are “Enablers of Litigation Funding”

By Harry Moran |

Following a 2022 report from New Zealand’s Law Commission, there has been a distinct lack of action by successive governments to introduce a Class Actions Act or any forms of oversight for the use of third-party funding in large group claims.

A new report released by Bell Gully looks at the current state of class actions in New Zealand, examining the rise of large group claims  and the role of litigation funding as a key driver. In ‘The Big Picture: Class Actions’, Bell Gully says that “in the past five years class actions have moved from being a threat on the horizon to a regular feature in New Zealand’s courts”. 

The introduction to the report appears to paint litigation funders as the prime moving force behind this trend, saying that the swell in class actions is “being driven by the availability of third-party litigation funding rather than a groundswell of consumer action.” Identifying the most prominent funders at work in New Zealand, Bell Gully points to LPF Group as the dominant local funder, Omni Bridgeway for its strong market reach from Australia, and Harbour for its global strength across litigation and arbitration funding. 

Without any legislative measures regulating funding and with no established industry association like Australia’s AALF, Bell Gully highlights the courts as the main mechanism of control over funding activity. The report goes further and suggests that “funder-friendly court decisions have contributed to the growing influence of litigation funders in New Zealand”, noting the admission of opt-out class actions and courts’ willingness to make common fund orders.

In its review of the need for a Class Actions Act in New Zealand, Bell Gully argues that the current lack of oversight on funding has led to a situation where the courts are acting as “enablers of litigation funding” rather than regulators of the practice.

The full report can be accessed here.