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Beyond the Mastercard Dispute: Why Class Action Funding Needs a Structural Revolution

By Alberto Thomas |

Beyond the Mastercard Dispute: Why Class Action Funding Needs a Structural Revolution

The following is contributed by Alberto Thomas, co-founder and managing partner of Fideres Partners LLP, an economic consulting firm specializing in litigation-related services.

Innsworth Capital’s opposition to the Competition Appeal Tribunal’s fee award in the Mastercard settlement has dominated headlines, with the litigation funder arguing that inadequate compensation threatens the future of UK class actions. But this dispute misses the fundamental issue. The real threat to collective redress isn’t judicial attitudes toward fee awards—it’s the structural limitations of how litigation funding operates.

The stakes couldn’t be higher. Without structural reform, the UK class action system risks permanent ineffectiveness, leaving millions of consumers without practical access to justice while allowing corporate wrongdoing to continue unchecked. The changes proposed here would dramatically increase the volume of viable class actions, reduce funding costs, and create a genuinely functional collective redress system. Failing to act now means perpetuating a dysfunctional market where only a tiny fraction of meritorious claims ever see the light of day.

Rather than debating whether courts provide adequate compensation to funders, we should ask: why does the success of the entire UK class action regime depend on the economics of individual cases? The current model represents a classic case of capital misallocation, where resources are inefficiently concentrated rather than distributed optimally across the market.

The Flawed Foundation of Current Funding

The current model forces funders to make large, concentrated investments in individual cases while hoping their due diligence can identify certain winners. This approach is fundamentally unsound, regardless of fee awards.

Diversification is essential, but it is often impossible due to capital limitations. The UK market remains fragmented, with small funds lacking sufficient capital for diversification. Many of these funds share common investors, further exacerbating concentration problems and reducing overall market capacity. Individual class actions require millions in upfront investment over the years, so most funds can finance only a handful of class action cases simultaneously. Funders spend vast resources attempting the impossible: predicting with certainty how complex legal proceedings will unfold.

This strategy fails because litigation outcomes depend on uncontrollable variables. The Merricks case illustrates this perfectly—despite being strong on allegations of anticompetitive conduct, Innsworth’s £45 million investment produced disappointing results. This isn’t a failure of due diligence but the inherent unpredictability of litigation.

The Mathematics of Portfolio Necessity

The solution lies in recognizing that litigation funding should operate like every other investment class: through diversified portfolios designed to achieve consistent returns across aggregate investments, not individual successes.

Successful venture capital funds expect most investments to fail, some to break even, and a small percentage to generate exceptional returns that compensate for losses. The mathematics work because diversification allows the law of large numbers to operate, reducing portfolio risk while maintaining attractive returns.

Litigation funding should follow identical principles, but this requires making tens or hundreds of investments across diverse cases, jurisdictions, and legal theories.

Market Structure as the Primary Constraint

This capital limitation creates a destructive cycle that no fee restructuring can resolve. Limited diversification forces funders to be extremely selective, reducing meritorious cases that receive backing. Meanwhile, defendants observe that only the most obvious cases receive funding, escaping accountability for misconduct below this artificially elevated threshold.

The Mastercard outcome exacerbates these dynamics not because of inadequate fee awards, but because it highlights the vulnerability of concentrated portfolios. When funders experience significant losses on promising investments, rational capital allocation demands that they either exit the market or require substantially higher returns to compensate for concentration risk.

Beyond Traditional Funding Models

Solving this challenge requires moving beyond incremental reforms toward fundamental structural change. The key insight involves separating litigation risk from funding through proven approaches that have already transformed other markets.

The optimal structure would place litigation risk—the possibility that cases fail entirely—in the After-the-Event (ATE) insurance market, where specialized insurers possess deep expertise in risk assessment, diversification, and pricing across large portfolios. A fully insured investment vehicle could then access capital through traditional financial markets: banking facilities, mutual funds, pension funds, and institutional investors.

This separation would transform the economics entirely, using methods already well-established in insurance and capital markets. Insurance companies could price litigation risk using actuarial methods across diversified books of business. Meanwhile, the funding vehicle—protected by comprehensive insurance—could attract liquidity from other investment channels, such as mutual funds and the financial sector, at attractive interest rates. This type of bifurcation of  risk  would likely shorten due diligence times, significantly increase the amount of litigation funding available while simultaneously reduce its cost.

Learning from Financial Evolution

This transformation would mirror the evolution witnessed in credit markets with the development of risk transfer mechanisms like credit default swaps in the 1990s. Prior to these, banks faced severe limitations because they had to hold credit risk on their balance sheets. Risk transfer mechanisms allowed separation of credit origination from risk bearing, dramatically expanding lending capacity.

The parallels to litigation funding are exact. Currently, funders must simultaneously assess legal merit, manage litigation risk, and provide capital—constraining both capacity and efficiency. Separating these functions would deliver identical efficiency gains.

European Market Opportunities

The emergence of collective action regimes across Europe presents a significant opportunity to address these diversification challenges. As markets develop in the Netherlands, Portugal, and potentially Spain, they create additional avenues for portfolio diversification.

Rather than viewing these regimes as facing identical constraints, we should recognize their potential contribution to risk mutualization. A larger, diversified pool of cases across multiple jurisdictions would enable the portfolio approach that current market fragmentation prevents.

Time for Transformation

What’s needed is recognition that effective collective redress requires sustainable funding models built on proper risk diversification rather than case-by-case selection. This requires applying established financial approaches that separate litigation risk from funding, enabling access to the vast capital pools necessary for portfolio-scale operations.

The time has come for bold innovation in UK litigation funding—bringing entrepreneurial spirit to what the City of London does best: creating imaginative solutions to complex financial problems. The City’s unrivalled expertise in structuring sophisticated financial products and insurance markets makes it perfectly positioned to develop these new models. Such innovation would not only transform access to justice but could create an entirely new growth sector within the UK’s service economy, establishing global leadership in a rapidly evolving field.

The transformation in litigation funding won’t come from courts awarding higher fees to disappointed funders. It will come from applying the same proven structural approaches that have successfully developed every other sophisticated investment market. The question isn’t whether this transformation will occur, but whether the UK will lead it or be forced to follow others who seize this opportunity first.

About the author

Alberto Thomas

Alberto Thomas

Alberto Thomas is the co-founder and managing partner of Fideres Partners LLP, an economic consulting firm specializing in litigation-related services. Established in 2009 in the aftermath of the financial crisis, Fideres focuses on providing economic analysis and expert testimony in complex legal disputes, particularly in areas such as antitrust, securities, and financial litigation. His views are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of Fideres.

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Malaysia’s New Arbitration Funding Rules Follow Collapse of Therium-Backed Sulu Claim

Two Malaysian jurists have published a retrospective on the Sulu arbitration, drawing a direct line from the failure of the funded US$15 billion claim against Malaysia to the statutory framework the country has since built around third-party funding of arbitration.

As reported by The Edge Malaysia, the piece is written by Tan Sri Zainun Ali, a former Federal Court judge, and barrister J J Chan. They note that the claim brought by parties describing themselves as heirs of the Sultan of Sulu "was reportedly backed by third-party litigation funding, attributed in public reports to Therium Capital Management," on the usual basis that the funder would take a return if the claim succeeded.

It did not. The Paris Court of Appeal annulled the award in full on 9 December 2025, holding that no valid arbitration agreement capable of binding Malaysia existed. The claimants were ordered to pay Malaysia €200,000 in costs, and separately lost costs orders in proceedings before the Netherlands Supreme Court.

The legislative response is the part with the longest reach. Malaysia's Arbitration (Amendment) Act 2024 took effect on 1 January 2026 and, in the authors' description, "brings third-party funding of arbitration within a clear statutory framework," requiring disclosure of both the funding arrangement and the identity of the funder.

For funders, the sequence is instructive: a single high-profile enforcement campaign against a sovereign produced a disclosure regime that will now apply to every funded arbitration seated in the jurisdiction.

New York Poll Finds Nearly 80% of Voters Would End Third-Party Litigation Funding

A statewide survey of likely New York voters has found that close to four in five would do away with third-party litigation funding altogether, placing the practice among the least popular items in a broad tort reform poll.

According to the Empire Center for Public Policy, which commissioned the survey from Cygnal and published the results on 2 September, 79.7% said they support ending the arrangement under which outside investors finance lawsuits in return for a share of any recovery.

Litigation funding did not stand alone. The poll found 94.5% supporting prosecution of staged-accident fraud, 83.4% favouring limits on pain-and-suffering awards, 79.7% backing changes to workplace-injury liability rules, 77% supporting reforms aimed at frivolous lawsuits, and 66.6% in favour of amending the Scaffold Law, New York's absolute-liability statute for elevation-related construction injuries.

The clustering matters as much as the individual figures. Funding is being tested here alongside fraud and damages caps rather than as a discrete question about access to capital, and the framing offered to respondents describes investors financing lawsuits for a portion of the proceeds without reference to claimants who could not otherwise bring a case.

New York enacted consumer legal funding protections earlier this year, and the state has no disclosure statute covering commercial funding. Polling of this kind is likely to be cited in Albany as the next session approaches, and funders should expect the 79.7% figure to travel well beyond the survey it came from.

DIFC Court Orders Defendant to Reveal Who Is Funding His Legal Team in $456M TrueUSD Case

A Dubai court has given a defendant in a $456 million stablecoin dispute until 7 September to swear an affidavit identifying who has been paying his lawyers, in an unusually direct judicial demand for the source of a litigant's legal funding.

As reported by CryptoSlate, the Dubai International Financial Centre Courts made the order in *Techteryx Ltd v Aria Commodities DMCC and others*, the proceedings over $456 million transferred out of the reserves backing the TrueUSD token. Matthew William Brittain, one of the respondents, must disclose by 4pm Gulf Standard Time.

The order is specific about what is wanted. Brittain must give the amounts, dates and bank accounts behind fees paid to Quinn Emanuel, Horizons, Gall, Campbells and FTI Consulting, identify the original sources and ultimate beneficial owners of those funds, explain how the accounts were funded and produce supporting documents. It singles out $1,083,912.49 paid by Aria Bio Industries FZE on 31 October 2025.

Compliance is required "to the best of his ability," and the court indicated that further adjournments would need "the most extreme circumstances" backed by strong evidence. Sanctions are not automatic; Techteryx would have to apply. A committal hearing with a four-day estimate is listed for 26 October.

Most disclosure fights concern claimant-side funding. This one runs the other way, and shows a court treating the defence's funding chain as a matter it is entitled to see.