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Can defendants avoid or limit their liability through contractual provisions?

Can defendants avoid or limit their liability through contractual provisions?

The following article was contributed by Valerie Blacker and Jon Na, of Piper Alderman. Applicants often confront the proposition, which respondents typically use in their defense, that terms in consumer contracts will effectively exclude or restrict the claims that have been brought. The High Court of Australia recently weighed in on this issue, deciding that a mortgage contained an enforceable promise by the borrowers not to raise a statutory limitation defense in relation to a claim by the lenders, which was commenced out of time. Price v Spoor [2021] HCA 20 In a slight twist to the typical scenario, the lenders were the plaintiffs who brought recovery proceedings after the expiry of the period stipulated in Queensland’s Limitation of Actions Act 1974. The borrowers argued no monies were owed because the claim was well and truly statute barred. Proceedings should have been brought by 2011, but the lender did not file a claim until 2017. In reply, the lender relied on this clause in the contract: “The Mortgagor covenants with the Mortgage[e] that the provisions of all statutes now or hereafter in force whereby or in consequence whereof any o[r] all of the powers rights and remedies of the Mortgagee and the obligations of the Mortgagor hereunder may be curtailed, suspended, postponed, defeated or extinguished shall not apply hereto and are expressly excluded insofar as this can lawfully be done.” The effect of which was said to be a promise not to take the limitation point. The lender’s argument failed at first instance (before Dalton J) but was overturned on appeal (by Gotterson JA on behalf of Sofronoff P and Morrison JA) and then ultimately vindicated by the High Court (Kiefel CJ and Edelman J, with whom Gageler, Gordon and Steward JJ agreed). The public policy principle Part of their Honours’ reasoning was that what is conferred by a limitations statute is a right on a defendant to plead as a defense the expiry of a limitation period. A party may contract for consideration not to exercise that right, or to waive it, as a defendant. That is not contrary to public policy. This, in our view, is akin to agreements frequently entered between prospective parties to a litigation to toll a limitation period (suspend time running) for an agreed amount of time. That can be contrasted with a clause in an agreement that imposes a three- year time limit instead of six, for bringing a claim for misleading and deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law.[1] Clauses of that kind are unenforceable based on a well-established principle that such clauses impermissibly seek to restrict a party’s recourse to his or her statutory rights and remedies, contrary to law and public policy. The “public policy principle” was first identified by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Henjo Investments Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd (No 1) (1988) 39 FCR 546. Henjo has been referred to and applied in numerous cases since, and cited with approval in the High Court.[2] This is not to say that contractual limitations can never be effective in limited circumstances – this much was shown in Price v Spoor. The question of whether commercial parties to a contract can negotiate and agree on temporal or monetary limits while not completely excluding the statutory remedies for misleading and deceptive conduct claims under section 18 of the ACL remains debatable[3]  – but those specific circumstances do not arise here. About the Authors: Valerie Blacker is a commercial litigator focusing on funded litigation. Valerie has been with Piper Alderman Lawyers for over 12 years. With a background in class actions, Valerie also prosecutes funded commercial litigation claims. She is responsible for a number of high value, multi-party disputes for the firm’s major clients. Jon Na is a litigation and dispute resolution lawyer at Piper Alderman with a primary focus on corporate and commercial disputes. Jon is involved in a number of large, complex matters in jurisdictions across Australia. For queries or comments in relation to this article please contact Kat Gieras | T: +61 7 3220 7765 | E:  kgieras@piperalderman.com.au[1] For example in Brighton Australia Pty Ltd v Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd [2018] VSC 246 [2] For example in IOOF Australia Trustees (NSW) Ltd v Tantipech [1998] FCA 924 at 479-80; Scarborough v Klich [2001] NSWCA 436 at [74]; MBF Investments Pty Ltd v Nolan [2011] VSCA 114 at [217]; JJMR Pty Ltd v LG International Corp [2003] QCA 519 at [10]; JM & PM Holdings Pty Ltd v Snap-on Tools (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 347 at [55]; Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 17 at [143]. [3] For example in G&S Engineering Services Pty Ltd v Mach Energy Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2020] NSWSC 1721.
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Burford’s Q2 Profits Surge on New Capital

By John Freund |

Burford Capital has delivered its strongest quarterly performance in two years, buoyed by a swelling pipeline of high-value disputes and a fresh infusion of investor cash.

A press release in PR Newswire reveals that the New York- and London-listed funder more than doubled revenue and profitability in the three months to 30 June 2025. CEO Christopher Bogart credited “very substantial levels of new business” for the uptick, noting that demand for non-recourse financing remains “as strong as we’ve ever seen.”

The stellar quarter follows a lightning-quick, two-day debt offering in July that raised $500 million—capital Burford says will be deployed across a growing roster of commercial litigations, international arbitrations, and asset-recovery campaigns. Management also highlighted significant progress in portfolio rotations, underscoring the firm’s ability to monetise older positions while writing new ones at scale. Investors will get a deeper dive when Burford hosts its earnings call today at 9 a.m. EDT.

Burford’s results arrive amid heightened regulatory chatter in Washington and Westminster, yet the numbers suggest the industry’s largest player is unfazed—for now—by talk of disclosure mandates and tax levies. The firm emphasised that its legal-finance, risk-management and asset-recovery businesses remain uncorrelated to broader markets, a pitch that continues to resonate with pension funds and endowments hunting for alternative yield.

For litigation-finance insiders, Burford’s capital-raising prowess and improving margins could have ripple effects: rival funders may face stiffer competition for marquee cases, while law-firm partners might leverage the firm’s deeper pockets to negotiate richer portfolio deals.

Australian High Court Ruling Strengthens Class-Action Funders

By John Freund |

Australia’s litigation-funding industry just received the judicial certainty it has craved.

Clayton Utz reports that the High Court, in Kain v R&B Investments [2025] HCA 26, unanimously held that the Federal Court may impose common-fund orders (CFOs) or funding-equalisation orders at settlement or judgment—ensuring all class members, not just those who signed funding agreements, contribute to a funder’s commission.

The Court reaffirmed Brewster’s bar on early-stage CFOs but found late-stage CFOs fall within the “just” powers of ss 33V(2) and 33Z(1)(g) of the Federal Court Act. Crucially, the bench rejected “solicitor common-fund orders,” ruling that any CFO benefiting plaintiff firms would contravene the national ban on contingency fees outside Victoria.

For funders, the decision cements the enforceability of commissions in nationwide class actions and removes a major pricing risk that had lingered since Brewster. For plaintiff firms, however, the ruling slams the door on a hoped-for new revenue channel.

The Court’s reasoning—tying funding commissions to equitable cost-sharing rather than contingency returns—will likely embolden funders to back larger opt-out claims, knowing a CFO safety-net is available at settlement. Meanwhile, plaintiff firms may redouble lobbying efforts for contingency-fee reform, particularly in New South Wales and Queensland, to reclaim ground lost in today’s judgment. Whether lawmakers move on that front will shape Australia’s funding market in the years ahead.

Locke Capital Backs Sarama in US $120 Million ICSID Claim Against Burkina Faso

By John Freund |

A junior gold explorer is turning to third-party capital to fight what it calls the expropriation of a multi-million-ounce deposit.

According to a press release on ACCESS Newswire, ASX- and TSX-listed Sarama Resources has drawn down a four-year, US $4.4 million non-recourse facility from specialist funder Locke Capital II LLC. The proceeds will pay Boies Schiller Flexner’s fees and expert costs in Sarama’s arbitration against Burkina Faso at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).

Sarama alleges the government retroactively revoked its Tankoro 2 exploration permit in 2023, halting development of the flagship Sanutura project. An arbitral tribunal chaired by Prof. Albert Jan van den Berg held its first procedural hearing on 25 July; Sarama’s memorial is due 31 October, and the company is seeking no less than US $120 million in damages.

Under the Litigation Funding Agreement, Locke’s recourse is limited to arbitration proceeds and the ownership chain of Sanutura; Sarama’s other assets remain ring-fenced. Repayment occurs only on a successful award or settlement, with Locke’s return calculated on a multiple-of-invested-capital basis and adjusted for timing.

The deal underscores the continued appetite of specialist funders for investor-state claims, particularly in the mining sector where treaty protections offer a clear legal framework and potential nine-figure payouts.