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Can defendants avoid or limit their liability through contractual provisions?

Can defendants avoid or limit their liability through contractual provisions?

The following article was contributed by Valerie Blacker and Jon Na, of Piper Alderman. Applicants often confront the proposition, which respondents typically use in their defense, that terms in consumer contracts will effectively exclude or restrict the claims that have been brought. The High Court of Australia recently weighed in on this issue, deciding that a mortgage contained an enforceable promise by the borrowers not to raise a statutory limitation defense in relation to a claim by the lenders, which was commenced out of time. Price v Spoor [2021] HCA 20 In a slight twist to the typical scenario, the lenders were the plaintiffs who brought recovery proceedings after the expiry of the period stipulated in Queensland’s Limitation of Actions Act 1974. The borrowers argued no monies were owed because the claim was well and truly statute barred. Proceedings should have been brought by 2011, but the lender did not file a claim until 2017. In reply, the lender relied on this clause in the contract: “The Mortgagor covenants with the Mortgage[e] that the provisions of all statutes now or hereafter in force whereby or in consequence whereof any o[r] all of the powers rights and remedies of the Mortgagee and the obligations of the Mortgagor hereunder may be curtailed, suspended, postponed, defeated or extinguished shall not apply hereto and are expressly excluded insofar as this can lawfully be done.” The effect of which was said to be a promise not to take the limitation point. The lender’s argument failed at first instance (before Dalton J) but was overturned on appeal (by Gotterson JA on behalf of Sofronoff P and Morrison JA) and then ultimately vindicated by the High Court (Kiefel CJ and Edelman J, with whom Gageler, Gordon and Steward JJ agreed). The public policy principle Part of their Honours’ reasoning was that what is conferred by a limitations statute is a right on a defendant to plead as a defense the expiry of a limitation period. A party may contract for consideration not to exercise that right, or to waive it, as a defendant. That is not contrary to public policy. This, in our view, is akin to agreements frequently entered between prospective parties to a litigation to toll a limitation period (suspend time running) for an agreed amount of time. That can be contrasted with a clause in an agreement that imposes a three- year time limit instead of six, for bringing a claim for misleading and deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law.[1] Clauses of that kind are unenforceable based on a well-established principle that such clauses impermissibly seek to restrict a party’s recourse to his or her statutory rights and remedies, contrary to law and public policy. The “public policy principle” was first identified by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Henjo Investments Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd (No 1) (1988) 39 FCR 546. Henjo has been referred to and applied in numerous cases since, and cited with approval in the High Court.[2] This is not to say that contractual limitations can never be effective in limited circumstances – this much was shown in Price v Spoor. The question of whether commercial parties to a contract can negotiate and agree on temporal or monetary limits while not completely excluding the statutory remedies for misleading and deceptive conduct claims under section 18 of the ACL remains debatable[3]  – but those specific circumstances do not arise here. About the Authors: Valerie Blacker is a commercial litigator focusing on funded litigation. Valerie has been with Piper Alderman Lawyers for over 12 years. With a background in class actions, Valerie also prosecutes funded commercial litigation claims. She is responsible for a number of high value, multi-party disputes for the firm’s major clients. Jon Na is a litigation and dispute resolution lawyer at Piper Alderman with a primary focus on corporate and commercial disputes. Jon is involved in a number of large, complex matters in jurisdictions across Australia. For queries or comments in relation to this article please contact Kat Gieras | T: +61 7 3220 7765 | E:  kgieras@piperalderman.com.au — [1] For example in Brighton Australia Pty Ltd v Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd [2018] VSC 246 [2] For example in IOOF Australia Trustees (NSW) Ltd v Tantipech [1998] FCA 924 at 479-80; Scarborough v Klich [2001] NSWCA 436 at [74]; MBF Investments Pty Ltd v Nolan [2011] VSCA 114 at [217]; JJMR Pty Ltd v LG International Corp [2003] QCA 519 at [10]; JM & PM Holdings Pty Ltd v Snap-on Tools (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 347 at [55]; Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 17 at [143]. [3] For example in G&S Engineering Services Pty Ltd v Mach Energy Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2020] NSWSC 1721.

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Burford-Backed Kindleworth Opens New York Office With Two Senior Hires

Kindleworth, the UK legal consultancy backed by litigation funder Burford Capital, has opened an office in New York and appointed two senior figures to lead its expansion into the United States market.

As reported by Non-Billable, the firm has hired Maryana Kodner as Partner and Head of US Operations. Kodner is a former Clifford Chance litigator who has spent more than 20 years in senior operational roles at boutique New York law firms. Joining her as Strategic Advisor is Anand David, who previously oversaw the recruitment and integration of more than 300 partners and partner-led teams at Hogan Lovells, White & Case and Morrison Foerster.

Kindleworth provides infrastructure and support to lawyer-led firm launches, covering financing, strategy, recruitment, technology and operations. The business now has 60 professionals and has supported the launch of more than 50 law firms and offices globally, including the US launches of Three Crowns in Washington, DC and Pallas Partners in New York.

Burford Capital took a strategic minority investment in Kindleworth in 2025, backing the consultancy's international expansion. The New York opening marks the first substantial deployment of that capital in the US market.

Chief executive James Hacking said the firm has had "a front-row seat to one of the most significant shifts in the legal industry, as leading partners choose to build focused, entrepreneurial firms rather than remain within traditional structures."

The move reflects a broader pattern of litigation funders extending their capital beyond individual case investments and into the infrastructure of the legal services market itself.

UK Tribunal Refuses Amazon Bid to Move Largest Sellers Into Opt-In Class, Citing Funding Terms

The Competition Appeal Tribunal has rejected Amazon's attempt to carve roughly 1,000 of its largest marketplace sellers out of an opt-out collective action and require them to opt in, leaving the full merchant class to proceed on an opt-out basis.

As reported by Law News, Amazon applied under rule 85(1) of the CAT Rules 2015 to vary the collective proceedings order so that merchants with more than £10 million in Gross Merchandise Sales would be excluded from the opt-out class. Although those merchants represent only about 1,000 of approximately 214,000 class members, they account for just over 40% of total marketplace sales. The Tribunal declined to create the resulting hybrid opt-out and opt-in structure in its judgment, cited as [2026] CAT 84.

Funding arrangements featured directly in the Tribunal's reasoning. The judgment noted that the litigation funding agreement and the after-the-event insurance policy backing the claim covered only opt-out proceedings, a point that bore on the practicality of Amazon's proposed restructuring.

The claim is brought by class representative Professor Andreas Stephan and is valued at approximately £2.7 billion. The collective proceedings order was made in November 2025. Kieron Beal KC and Christopher Monaghan of Geradin Partners act for the class representative, while Daniel Piccinin KC and Kristina Lukacova of Covington & Burling LLP act for Amazon.

The first trial is scheduled to begin on 25 April 2028 and run for approximately eight weeks, addressing market definition, dominance and abuse. A second trial will deal with causation, quantum and pass-on.

Litigation Capital Management Writes Off £5.0m Investment After Appeal Permission Refused

Litigation Capital Management has confirmed that the funded party in one of its commercial litigation investments has been refused permission to appeal, bringing the matter to a close and forcing the funder to write off the full carrying value of the position.

As reported by Investegate, the company disclosed in a regulatory announcement on 9 November 2026 that the investment had been carried at £5.0 million (A$9.5 million) as at 30 June 2026. With the appeal route now exhausted, that value will be written off in full, crystallising an impairment that reduces the funder's assets and is expected to weigh on both profit and net asset value.

The disclosure follows a difficult period for the Australian-headquartered funder. In July 2026, LCM reported that permission to appeal had been refused in a separate competition claim, resulting in a smaller write-off of £0.8 million (A$1.5 million). The company's full-year results for FY26 recorded a net realised loss of A$63.9 million, reversing a A$22.2 million gain in the prior year, alongside a negative fair value movement of A$54.1 million.

LCM has also been operating under financial constraints tied to its borrowing arrangements, having secured an extension of a covenant waiver from lender Northleaf Capital Partners to 13 November 2026. The funder announced a strategic review in July 2026 and is scheduled to hold its annual general meeting in Sydney on 30 November 2026.

The announcement illustrates the binary nature of litigation finance returns, where an adverse judgment and a subsequent refusal of appeal permission can eliminate an entire position's carrying value in a single step.