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Can defendants avoid or limit their liability through contractual provisions?

March 15, 2022

Can defendants avoid or limit their liability through contractual provisions?

The following article was contributed by Valerie Blacker and Jon Na, of Piper Alderman. Applicants often confront the proposition, which respondents typically use in their defense, that terms in consumer contracts will effectively exclude or restrict the claims that have been brought. The High Court of Australia recently weighed in on this issue, deciding that a mortgage contained an enforceable promise by the borrowers not to raise a statutory limitation defense in relation to a claim by the lenders, which was commenced out of time. Price v Spoor [2021] HCA 20 In a slight twist to the typical scenario, the lenders were the plaintiffs who brought recovery proceedings after the expiry of the period stipulated in Queensland’s Limitation of Actions Act 1974. The borrowers argued no monies were owed because the claim was well and truly statute barred. Proceedings should have been brought by 2011, but the lender did not file a claim until 2017. In reply, the lender relied on this clause in the contract: “The Mortgagor covenants with the Mortgage[e] that the provisions of all statutes now or hereafter in force whereby or in consequence whereof any o[r] all of the powers rights and remedies of the Mortgagee and the obligations of the Mortgagor hereunder may be curtailed, suspended, postponed, defeated or extinguished shall not apply hereto and are expressly excluded insofar as this can lawfully be done.” The effect of which was said to be a promise not to take the limitation point. The lender’s argument failed at first instance (before Dalton J) but was overturned on appeal (by Gotterson JA on behalf of Sofronoff P and Morrison JA) and then ultimately vindicated by the High Court (Kiefel CJ and Edelman J, with whom Gageler, Gordon and Steward JJ agreed). The public policy principle Part of their Honours’ reasoning was that what is conferred by a limitations statute is a right on a defendant to plead as a defense the expiry of a limitation period. A party may contract for consideration not to exercise that right, or to waive it, as a defendant. That is not contrary to public policy. This, in our view, is akin to agreements frequently entered between prospective parties to a litigation to toll a limitation period (suspend time running) for an agreed amount of time. That can be contrasted with a clause in an agreement that imposes a three- year time limit instead of six, for bringing a claim for misleading and deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law.[1] Clauses of that kind are unenforceable based on a well-established principle that such clauses impermissibly seek to restrict a party’s recourse to his or her statutory rights and remedies, contrary to law and public policy. The “public policy principle” was first identified by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Henjo Investments Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd (No 1) (1988) 39 FCR 546. Henjo has been referred to and applied in numerous cases since, and cited with approval in the High Court.[2] This is not to say that contractual limitations can never be effective in limited circumstances – this much was shown in Price v Spoor. The question of whether commercial parties to a contract can negotiate and agree on temporal or monetary limits while not completely excluding the statutory remedies for misleading and deceptive conduct claims under section 18 of the ACL remains debatable[3]  – but those specific circumstances do not arise here. About the Authors: Valerie Blacker is a commercial litigator focusing on funded litigation. Valerie has been with Piper Alderman Lawyers for over 12 years. With a background in class actions, Valerie also prosecutes funded commercial litigation claims. She is responsible for a number of high value, multi-party disputes for the firm’s major clients. Jon Na is a litigation and dispute resolution lawyer at Piper Alderman with a primary focus on corporate and commercial disputes. Jon is involved in a number of large, complex matters in jurisdictions across Australia. For queries or comments in relation to this article please contact Kat Gieras | T: +61 7 3220 7765 | E:  kgieras@piperalderman.com.au — [1] For example in Brighton Australia Pty Ltd v Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd [2018] VSC 246 [2] For example in IOOF Australia Trustees (NSW) Ltd v Tantipech [1998] FCA 924 at 479-80; Scarborough v Klich [2001] NSWCA 436 at [74]; MBF Investments Pty Ltd v Nolan [2011] VSCA 114 at [217]; JJMR Pty Ltd v LG International Corp [2003] QCA 519 at [10]; JM & PM Holdings Pty Ltd v Snap-on Tools (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 347 at [55]; Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 17 at [143]. [3] For example in G&S Engineering Services Pty Ltd v Mach Energy Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2020] NSWSC 1721.

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Commercial

Legal-Bay Urges Caution on Quick-Pay Option in Proposed $800 Million Archdiocese of New York Settlement

Pre-settlement funder Legal-Bay has welcomed the proposed $800 million abuse settlement involving the Archdiocese of New York while warning claimants that the plan's fast-track payment option may undervalue their claims.

As reported by The Mountaineer, the proposal would be paid in two installments — roughly $615 million up front and a further $185 million within about 15 months — covering an estimated 1,300 claims brought under New York's Child Victims Act. Claimants would be able to accept a flat quick-pay amount of $250,000 or submit to an individual evaluation under a points-based matrix that has not yet been released publicly.

Legal-Bay chief executive Chris Janish said the figure represents meaningful progress. "For survivors who have waited years to be heard, an $800 million proposal is an important step toward resolution," he said. He cautioned, however, that the quick-pay election may not deliver fair value for claimants whose circumstances would score higher under individual review, and noted that the matrix remains unpublished, leaving claimants to weigh a certain sum against an unknown alternative.

Janish added that non-recourse funding advances can help plaintiffs avoid accepting an early payment for liquidity reasons alone. Legal-Bay provides pre-settlement advances that are repaid only if the underlying claim resolves successfully.

The company has tracked the Archdiocese proceedings closely, having flagged in April that the case had reached what it described as a critical crossroads for claimants awaiting resolution.

Commercial

Aperture Portfolio Manager Says Litigation Finance Has Reached an Institutional Inflection Point

Litigation finance is moving from a niche alternative allocation to a recognised corner of specialty private credit, according to Luke Darkow, a portfolio manager at Aperture Investors.

As reported by ABF Journal, Darkow argues that institutional investors are no longer treating legal assets as an exotic curiosity but as a potential source of returns uncorrelated with public markets. "Litigation finance is no longer merely an alternative curiosity," he writes. "It is increasingly viewed as a potential diversifier within their current portfolios."

The case rests partly on the sheer size of the underlying market. U.S. legal services generated roughly $375.7 billion in revenue in 2024 and are projected to reach $427.9 billion by 2029, a compound annual growth rate of 2.64%. Darkow, who says he has personally deployed more than $1.25 billion into litigation finance over his career, frames that spend as a large and persistent financing need rather than a cyclical opportunity.

Aperture's own approach is built around lending to law firms rather than backing individual cases. The firm structures direct loans secured by diversified pools of legal fee receivables, blending post-settlement receivables with near-settlement matters. Darkow contends that this structure reduces the binary outcome risk that has historically made single-case investments difficult for institutional allocators to underwrite, because repayment depends on the performance of a portfolio of claims rather than one verdict.

Aperture, which reported roughly $600 million in litigation finance assets under management earlier this year, is among a group of credit managers positioning law firm lending as a distinct private credit strategy.

Commercial

New York’s Usury Cap Still Shadows Litigation Funders Despite the State’s New Consumer Funding Statute

New York's new consumer litigation funding statute has not removed the risk that a funding agreement will be recharacterised as a usurious loan, according to a commentary published this week by three lawyers at Glenn Agre Bergman & Fuentes.

As reported by Bloomberg Law, partners Reid Skibell and Joseph Gallagher, with associate Colleen Piasenti, argue that the Consumer Litigation Funding Act — effective 17 June 2026 — gives funders a statutory framework but not a safe harbour. The Act defines consumer litigation funding as non-recourse and caps the funder's total recovery at 25% of the claimant's proceeds. Non-recourse treatment is what keeps a funding agreement outside New York's 16% civil usury ceiling, and the authors contend that courts will look past the label to the economics of the deal.

They point to the July 2026 decision in *Denemark v. New Chapter Capital, Inc.* as the cautionary example. There, a funder advanced legal fees to a party in a matrimonial dispute at a stated 12% interest rate, secured by a UCC-1 lien on marital property and supported by a guaranty that triggered repayment if the spouses reconciled or if either spouse died. The court concluded the structure left the funder recovering in virtually every realistic scenario, making the arrangement a loan in substance at an effective rate of roughly 19%, and voided it.

The practical lesson, the authors suggest, is that risk-reduction devices meant to protect a funder's downside can be the very features that strip away non-recourse status.