Two competition law academics have published a point-by-point examination of the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry's position on collective redress and litigation funding, concluding that several of the central claims advanced in support of tighter restrictions are false, misleading or unsupported.

As set out in a Kluwer Competition Law Blog analysis by Eduardo Silva de Freitas of the Asser Institute and Lena Hornkohl of the University of Vienna, the DIHK statement calls for litigation funders to be brought under supervision comparable to financial market regulation and for funding agreements to be disclosed in full. The authors test five of its underlying assertions.

The DIHK's claim that transparency requirements are lacking is assessed as false: Article 10 of the Representative Actions Directive already establishes disclosure obligations for litigation funding arrangements. The assertion that funders operate in a "nearly unregulated space" is described as misleading, the authors pointing to a European Commission study finding that third-party funding legislation exists in the vast majority of EU member states.

The claim of a widespread consensus that the Directive requires significant improvement is treated as unsupported, with the authors finding no sufficient body of independent studies behind it. The criticism that no minimum registration period applies to qualified entities is called misleading, since Article 4(3)(a) requires 12 months of actual public activity before designation.

The analysis reserves particular attention for the DIHK's figure that funders typically take 20% to 50% of damages. The authors describe this as misleading, noting that German law caps funder remuneration at 10% and that differentiated models operate below that level.

Management services organisations have become a leading route for outside investors to participate in the economics of US law firms without breaching the prohibition on non-lawyer ownership, and the structure is drawing sustained interest from private capital.

As explained in a Nixon Peabody analysis by Allan H. Cohen and Samantha R. Barbere, an MSO is a non-professional entity that provides administrative and support services to a professional practice. The arrangement separates professional ownership from administrative infrastructure: non-licensed investors may own the MSO, while licensed attorneys retain exclusive control of the law firm and all legal work.

The authors identify two principal motivations driving adoption. The first is access to capital, giving firms resources to invest in technology such as artificial intelligence and cybersecurity at a time of escalating client demands for efficiency. The second is partner liquidity — the bifurcated structure allows partners to monetise the value of their ownership through a sale to non-professional investors, expanding options beyond traditional buyouts and transactions between lawyers.

Execution requires care. Firms must transfer non-professional assets to the MSO and enter into an administrative services agreement governing the relationship. Critically, fees paid to the MSO must reflect fair market value for the services provided, rather than a percentage of revenue, in order to comply with the fee-splitting prohibition in ABA Model Rule 5.4(a).

For the litigation finance market, the structure matters because it represents a parallel channel for outside capital to reach the legal services sector — one that competes with, and in some cases complements, case-level and portfolio funding as a means of financing law firm growth.