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Is the Supreme Court ruling in PACCAR really clashing with the Litigation Finance industry? An overview of the PACCAR decision and its potential effects

The following is a contributed article from Ana Carolina Salomão, Micaela Ossio Maguiña and Sarah Voulaz of Pogust Goodhead

On 26 September 2023, a new case was filed in the High Court of England and Wales on behalf of a claimant who, despite having received damages from a successful lawsuit, refused to pay litigation funders for funding previously sought. Legal representatives of the Claimants in this case are seeking a declaration from the Court that the clients’ LFAs “fall under the PACCAR regime as non-compliant DBAs” and have added that in reaching its decision in R (on the application of PACCAR Inc & Ors) v Competition Appeal Tribunal & Ors [2023] UKSC 28 (“PACCAR”), the Supreme Court has recognised “the importance of statutory protections for clients.” Is this the case?

On 26 July 2023, the English Supreme Court (the “SC”) ruled in the widely awaited decision of PACCAR that litigation funding agreements (“LFAs”) where the litigation funder’s remuneration is calculated by reference to a share of the damages recovered by claimants classify as damages-based agreements (“DBAs”).

DBAs are defined within s.58AA of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (the “1990 Act”) as agreements “between a person providing either advocacy services, litigation services or claims management services” and are subject to statutory conditions, including the requirement to comply with the Damages-Based Agreements Regulations 2013 (the “2013 Regulations”). DBAs that do not observe those conditions are held to be unenforceable.

By ruling that the Respondents’ LFAs would fall within the express definition of “claims management services,” the SC in PACCAR extended the statutory condition relevant to the DBAs to the LFAs that provide a percentage of damages to the funder. As the funding agreements used in PACCAR were generally not drafted to meet those conditions, the Court essentially rendered unenforceable all LFAs linking the return to a percentage of the compensation recovered by the client.

This article seeks to provide a critical analysis of the PACCAR decision by considering, firstly, the stance taken by the SC in its statutory interpretation of the definition of what amounts to a DBA and an LFA. Secondly, this article focuses on how the market will likely react to the PACCAR decision, including whether it will adjust and adapt to the changes that this decision brings to the table.

Background to PACCAR

Issues in PACCAR have arisen in the context of collective proceedings being brought against truck manufacturers for breaches of competition law. By way of a decision dated 19 July 2016, the European Commission had found that five major European truck manufacturing groups, including DAF Trucks N.V. (“DAF”), infringed competition law. Based on this decision the Road Haulage Association Limited (“RHA”) and UK Trucks Claim Limited (“UKTC”) (together, the “Respondents”) each sought an order from the Competition Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”) authorising them to bring separate collective claims for damages on behalf of persons who acquired trucks from DAF and other manufacturers.

As both RHA and UKTC had LFAs in place by which the funder’s remuneration would be calculated by reference to a share of the damages ultimately recovered in the litigation, DAF contended that such LFAs p amounted to being “claims management services” constituting DBAs. As RHA’s and UKTC’s LFAs constituted DBAs, these would consequently become unenforceable, as such LFAs did not meet the DBAs’ statutory requirements set out in s.58AA of the 1990 Act.

DAF’s argument was rejected by the CAT and the Divisional Court (Henderson, Singh and Carr LJJ)[1] and the truck manufacturing groups (the “Appellants”) sought to file an appeal. The appeal was leapfrogged to the SC to assess whether LFAs in which a funder is entitled to recover a percentage of any damages would fall within the meaning of the legislation regulating DBAs.

The Supreme Court decision in PACCAR

The relevant issue regarding the definition of DBAs related to whether the Respondents’ LFAs would involve the provision of “claims management services” as defined in s.4 of the Compensation Act 2006 (the “2006 Act”).[2] s.4 of the 2006 Act defines “claims management services” as services which are “advice or other services in relation to the making of a claim” (emphasis added). Within this definition, “other services” would also include a reference to “the provision of financial services or assistance.”

The appeal was allowed by a 4-1 majority (Lord Sales, Reed, Leggatt and Stephens). Lord Sales gave leading judgment, ruling that the terms “claims management services” as read according to their natural meaning were capable to cover LFAs. Lord Sales argued that this was based on the definition of “claims management services” being wide and “not tied to any concept of active management of a claim.”[3] In her dissenting judgment, Lady Rose agreed with the approach taken by the CAT and the Divisional Court, who had instead interpreted the terms “claims management services” as only applicable to someone providing such services within the ordinary meaning of the term.[4] Lady Rose did not however explicitly state what she interpreted to amount as “ordinary meaning”.

Although the SC’s decision in PACCAR affects litigation funded by damage based LFAs, it more pronouncedly impacts opt-out competition claims in the CAT. In CAT’s opt-out collective proceedings DBAs are unenforceable pursuant to s.47C(8) of the Competition Act 1998, which states that “[a] damages-based agreement is unenforceable if it relates to opt-out collective proceedings.” This may be more problematic for ongoing litigation which was allowed to proceed in the CAT and Collective Proceedings Orders granted in such cases will have to be revised for funding to be permitted.

Notwithstanding the particular consequences of this decision for competition claims, this article delves on its role in shaping a crescent market.

  1. The SC’s interpretation of LFAs as “claims management services”: a way for the law to shape a new market

By ruling on a widely accepted definition of what constitutes an LFA, the SC is presenting a new statutory interpretation of what amounts to an LFA that provides a percentage of damages to the funder. Historically, common law has been hostile to arrangements where third parties would finance litigation between others. Such arrangements were generally considered as being contrary to public policy according to the doctrines of champerty and maintenance.[5]

However, the last 30 years have seen a major increase in the development of instruments whereby a third party agrees to finance litigation between different parties. With an initial increase in popularity of Conditional Fee Agreements (CFAs) when these were firstly introduced in the 1990s, a major growth of the litigation funding industry followed, together with the more recent introduction of DBAs. Could it then be argued that the PACCAR decision represents a response by the courts to deliberately bring certainty to an area and a market that is growing and continuously changing?

In PACCAR Lord Sales held that, as Henderson LJ also observed, “funding of litigation by third parties is now a substantial industry which, although driven by commercial motives, is widely acknowledged to play a valuable role in furthering access to justice.”[6] To this he further added that the “old common law restrictions on the enforceability of third party funding arrangements have been relaxed in various ways, with the result that this industry has developed.”[7] There is thus a clear understanding from the Supreme Court of the lack of restrictions surrounding third party funding, and an awareness of the role which litigation funding plays in furthering access to justice. If this was the background leading to the decision, how could one assess the impacts of a new statutory interpretation of what constitutes an LFA?

In the PACCAR judgment, Lord Sales also referred to Parliament’s intention when legislating on Part 2 of the 2006 Act, which relates to claims management services. He held that what Parliament intended to do was “to create a broadly framed power for the Secretary of State to regulate in this area.”[8] This would entail the Secretary of State being able to “decide what targeted regulatory response might be required from time to time as information emerged about what was then a new and developing field of service provision to encourage or facilitate litigation, where the business structures were opaque and poorly understood at the time of enactment.”[9]

In accordance with Parliament’s intention when legislating on Part 2 of the 2006 Act, the SC’s interpretation of LFAs as “claims management services” also broadens the powers of Parliament to “regulate” in this area. Lord Sales stated that although participants in the third-party funding market may have assumed that the LFA arrangements in the case were not equivalent to DBAs, “this would not justify the court in changing or distorting the meaning of ‘claims management services’ as it is defined in the 2006 Act and in section 419A of FSMA.”[10]

  1. Will the litigation finance market adjust and adapt?

As Shepherd & Stone have put it “litigation financiers provide capital that allows law firms to litigate plaintiff-side cases that they otherwise would be reluctant to pursue on a purely contingent fee basis.”[11] This is because, as also specified by Bed and C Marra in The Shadows of Litigation Finance, litigation finance starts from the premise that a legal claim can also be framed as an asset, as litigation finance “allows claimholders, or law firms with contingent fee interests in claims, to secure financing against those assets.”[12]

The value of a legal claim as an asset is a function of the amount in dispute, the likelihood that this amount will be awarded and the ability to recover the award, all discounted by certain risk metrics.

It can be argued that the rise of litigation finance as an asset class has provided funding specifically dedicated to addressing claimholders’ liquidity and risk constraints. Claimholders who had previously been unable to obtain various other forms of third-party funding may now obtain other forms of litigation funding.[13] This logic of sharing risk between claimholders and funder, while passing liquidity from funders to claimholders, has improved access to justice, as the scarcity of liquid funds are not an unsurmountable obstacle to litigate a meritorious claim.

The PACCAR decision will certainly influence litigation funders’ choices when designing their funding arrangements, but it is unlikely that it that it will “throw litigation funders under a truck”[14] or prevent the funding of meritorious claims or the pursuit for liquidating those financial assets. To the contrary, the PACCAR decision could be interpreted as a trigger for this market to adjust, adapt and thrive.

Litigation funders may explore new ways to structure funding agreements to ensure compliance with this decision and a more secure return on investment. The new interpretation of LFAs falling within the definition of “claims management services” will likely force all players in litigation finance to take into consideration the drafting of agreements not only for recovery and execution of judgments, but also when contracting and/or thinking of potentially defaulting an agreement.

Litigation funders may and should interpret the PACCAR decision as a natural development for the industry. This decision, which has been widely awaited, can now also bring more clarity to the negotiation tables. Interested stakeholders who have been preparing for how PACCAR would impact the industry will now be provided with more confidence and guidance on entering LFAs.

This leads to conclude that the PACCAR decision, whether it will be overruled or not, is a milestone to the growing relevance of litigation finance in England and Wales rather than a “blow”[15] to this industry. The mere existence of a Supreme Court decision in this niche area of law and finance marks per se the relevance of litigation finance as an asset class.

Additionally, the PACCAR decision also shows that regulating on this alternative asset class can drive the behaviour of the contracting parties. Imposing further regulation may close the gap on information asymmetries and reduce entry barriers for funders and their investors, fostering competition and promoting a more balanced financial ecosystem.

Conclusion 

The PACCAR decision does not entail that access to third party funding will necessarily be hampered in England and Wales. As set out in this article, litigation funding is maturing in the country, and a rapidly growing market. Although this decision will mean further compliance with DBA regulations, it should not undermine access to justice and the pace of litigation funding growth.

Nonetheless, as the decision does impose a new statutory interpretation of the law, law firms, claimants and litigation funders will all inevitably face additional scrutiny when entering into funding agreements and they will be compelled to revise their current LFAs to make sure they do not fall within the definition of a DBA and, therefore, become unenforceable. These revisions are expected to be easily cured in most cases, with restructured compliant agreements when needed.

Citations:

[1] [2021] EWCA Civ 299, 1 WLR 3648.

[2] s.58AA of the 1990 Act incorporates the definition of “claims management services”2 set out in the 2006 Act (and subsequently the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“FSMA 2000”)).

[3] PACCAR [63].

[4] PACCAR [254].

[5] PACCAR [11]. See also PACCAR [55] which provides that in “the Arkin decision in 2005 the Court of Appeal confirmed that an arrangement whereby a third party funder who financed a claim in the expectation of receiving a share of any recovery, under an arrangement which left the claimant in control of the litigation, was non-champertous and hence was enforceable.” Note that whilst the doctrines of maintenance and champerty are now obsolete in England and Wales, in countries such as Ireland there is a continuing prohibition on maintenance and champerty, which has meant an effective prohibition on third party funding of litigation in those jurisdictions, save in limited circumstances.

[6] PACCAR [11].

[7] PACCAR [11].

[8] PACCAR [61].

[9] PACCAR [723]

[10] PACCAR [91]

[11] Joanna M. Shepherd & Judd E. Stone II, Economic Conundrums in Search of a Solution: The Functions of Third Party Litigation Finance, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 919 (2015) at 929-30.

[12] Suneal Bedi and William C. Marra, The Shadows of Litigation Finance, Vanderbilt Law Review, Vo. 74 Number 3 (April 2021) at 571.

[13] Suneal Bedi and William C. Marra, The Shadows of Litigation Finance, Vanderbilt Law Review, Vo. 74 Number 3 (April 2021) at 586.

[14] PACCAR – Supreme Court throws Litigation Funders under a truck, Simmons+Simmons, 26 July 2023.

[15]  UK’s Supreme Court Strikes Blow to Litigation Funding, Law International, 26 July 2023.

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Therium Cuts UK Jobs as Part of Strategic Reorganisation

By Harry Moran |

Recent years have been described as a time of substantial growth and expansion in the global litigation funding market, yet new reporting suggests that one of the industry’s most well-known funders is downsizing its workforce.

An article in The Law Society Gazette provides a brief insight into ongoing changes being made at litigation funder Therium, reporting that the company is undertaking a number of layoffs as part of plans to restructure the business. The article states that these job cuts have been made to Therium’s UK workforce, with the business claiming the cuts are motivated by strategic reorganisation rather than financial pressures. 

There are no details currently available as to which employees have been let go, with Therium having removed the ‘Our People’ section of its website. The Gazette also discovered the incorporation of a new company called Therium Capital Advisors LLP on 15 April 2025, through a review of Companies House records. The new entity’s records list Therium’s chief investment officer, Neil Purslow, and investment manager, Harry Stockdale, as its two designated members. 

Companies House records also show that Therium filed a ‘termination of appointment of secretary’ for Martin Middleton on 19 March 2025. Mr Middleton’s LinkedIn profile currently lists his position as Therium’s chief financial officer, having first joined the funder as a financial controller over 15 years ago.

At the time of reporting, Therium has not responded to LFJ’s request for comment.

Litigation Funding in GCC Arbitration

By Obaid Mes’har |

The following piece was contributed by Obaid Saeed Bin Mes’har, Managing Director of WinJustice.

Introduction

A Practical Overview

Third-party litigation funding (TPF)—where an external financier covers a claimant’s legal fees in exchange for a share of any resulting award—has gained significant traction in arbitration proceedings across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Historically, TPF was not widely used in the Middle East, but recent years have seen a notable increase in its adoption, particularly in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The economic pressures introduced by the COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with the high costs of complex arbitrations, have prompted many parties to view TPF as an effective risk-management strategy. Meanwhile, the entry of global funders and evolving regulatory frameworks highlight TPF’s emergence as a key feature of the GCC arbitration landscape.

Growing Adoption

Although the initial uptake was gradual, TPF is now frequently employed in high-value disputes across the GCC. Observers in the UAE have noted a discernible rise in funded cases following recent legal developments in various jurisdictions. Major international funders have established a presence in the region, reflecting the growing acceptance and practical utility of TPF. Similar growth patterns are evident in other GCC countries, where businesses have become increasingly aware of the advantages offered by third-party financing.

By providing claimants with the financial resources to pursue meritorious claims, third-party funding is reshaping the dispute-resolution landscape. As regulatory frameworks evolve and more funders enter the market, it is anticipated that TPF will continue to gain prominence, offering both claimants and legal professionals an alternative means of managing arbitration costs and mitigating financial risk.

Types of Cases

Funders are chiefly drawn to large commercial and international arbitration claims with significant damages at stake. The construction sector has been a key source of demand in the Middle East, where delayed payments and cost overruns lead to disputes; contractors facing cash-flow strain are increasingly turning to third-party funding to pursue their claims. High-stakes investor–state arbitrations are also candidates – for instance, in investment treaty cases where a government’s alleged expropriation deprives an investor of its main asset, funding can enable the claim to move forward . In practice, arbitration in GCC hubs like Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and others is seeing more funded claimants, leveling the field between smaller companies and deep-pocketed opponents.

Practical Utilization

Law firms in the region are adapting by partnering with funders or facilitating introductions for their clients. Many firms report that funding is now considered for cases that clients might otherwise abandon due to cost. While precise data on usage is scarce (as most arbitrations are confidential), anecdotal evidence and market activity indicate that third-party funding, once rare, is becoming a common feature of significant arbitration proceedings in the GCC. This trend is expected to continue as awareness grows and funding proves its value in enabling access to justice.

Regulatory Landscape and Restrictions on Third-Party Funding

UAE – Onshore vs. Offshore

The United Arab Emirates illustrates the region’s mixed regulatory landscape. Onshore (civil law) UAE has no specific legislation prohibiting or governing litigation funding agreements . Such agreements are generally permissible, but they must not conflict with Sharia principles – for example, funding arrangements should avoid elements of excessive uncertainty (gharar) or speculation . Parties entering funding deals for onshore cases are cautioned to structure them carefully in line with UAE law and good faith obligations. In contrast, the UAE’s common-law jurisdictions – the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) and Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM) – explicitly allow third-party funding and have established clear frameworks.

The DIFC Courts issued Practice Direction No. 2 of 2017, requiring any funded party to give notice of the funding and disclose the funder’s identity to all other parties . The DIFC rules also clarify that while the funding agreement itself need not be disclosed, the court may consider the existence of funding when deciding on security for costs applications and retains power to order costs against a funder in appropriate cases. Similarly, the ADGM’s regulations (Article 225 of its 2015 Regulations) and Litigation Funding Rules 2019 set out requirements for valid funding agreements – they must be in writing, the funded party must notify other parties and the court of the funding, and the court can factor in the funding arrangement when issuing cost orders . The ADGM rules also impose criteria on funders (e.g. capital adequacy) and safeguard the funded party’s control over the case .

In sum, the UAE’s offshore jurisdictions provide a modern, regulated environment for third-party funding, whereas onshore UAE allows it in principle but without detailed regulation.

Other GCC Countries

Elsewhere in the GCC, explicit legislation on litigation funding in arbitration remains limited, but recent developments signal growing acceptance. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait do not yet have dedicated statutes or regulations on third-party funding . However, leading arbitral institutions in these countries have proactively addressed funding in their rules. Notably, the Saudi Center for Commercial Arbitration (SCCA) updated its Arbitration Rules in 2023 to acknowledge third-party funding: Article 17(6) now mandates that any party with external funding disclose the existence of that funding and the funder’s identity to the SCCA, the tribunal, and other parties . This ensures transparency and allows arbitrators to check for conflicts. 

Likewise, the Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution (BCDR) included provisions in its 2022 Arbitration Rules requiring a party to notify the institution of any funding arrangement and the funder’s name,, which the BCDR will communicate to the tribunal and opponents . The BCDR Rules further oblige consideration of whether any relationship between the arbitrators and the funder could compromise the tribunal’s independence. These rule changes in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain align with international best practices and indicate regional momentum toward formal recognition of third-party funding in arbitration.

Disclosure and Transparency

A common thread in the GCC regulatory approach is disclosure. Whether under institutional rules (as in DIAC, SCCA, BCDR) or court practice directions (DIFC, ADGM), funded parties are generally required to disclose that they are funded and often to reveal the funder’s identity . For instance, the new DIAC Arbitration Rules 2022 expressly recognize third-party funding – Article 22 obliges any party who enters a funding arrangement to promptly inform all other parties and the tribunal, including identifying the funder. DIAC’s rules even prohibit entering a funding deal after the tribunal is constituted if it would create a conflict of interest with an arbitrator. This emphasis on transparency aims to prevent ethical issues and later challenges to awards. It also reflects the influence of global standards (e.g. 2021 ICC Rules and 2022 ICSID Rules) which likewise introduced funding disclosure requirements.

Overall, while no GCC jurisdiction outright bans third-party funding, the patchwork of court practices and arbitration rules means parties must be mindful of the specific disclosure and procedural requirements in the seat of arbitration or administering institution. In jurisdictions rooted in Islamic law (like Saudi Arabia), there is an added layer of ensuring the funding arrangement is structured in a Sharia-compliant way (avoiding interest-based returns and excessive uncertainty. We may see further regulatory development – indeed, regional policymakers are aware of litigation funding’s growth and are considering more formal regulation to provide clarity and confidence for all participants .

The GCC region has seen several important developments and trends related to third-party funding in arbitration:

  • Institutional Rule Reforms: As detailed earlier, a number of arbitral institutions in the GCC have updated their rules to address third-party funding, marking a significant trend. The Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) 2022 Rules, the Saudi SCCA 2023 Rules, and the Bahrain BCDR 2022 Rules all include new provisions on funding disclosures. This wave of reforms in 2022–2023 reflects a recognition that funded cases are happening and need basic ground rules. By explicitly referencing TPF, these institutions legitimize the practice and provide guidance to arbitrators and parties on handling it (primarily through mandatory disclosure and conflict checks). The adoption of such rules brings GCC institutions in line with leading international forums (like ICC, HKIAC, ICSID, etc. that have also moved to regulate TPF).
  • DIFC Court Precedents: The DIFC was one of the first in the region to grapple with litigation funding. A few high-profile cases in the DIFC Courts in the mid-2010s involved funded claimants, which prompted the DIFC Courts to issue Practice Direction 2/2017 as a framework. This made the DIFC one of the pioneers in the Middle East to formally accommodate TPF. Since then, the DIFC Courts have continued to handle cases with funding, and their decisions (for example, regarding cost orders against funders) are building a body of regional precedent on the issue. While most of these cases are not public, practitioners note that several DIFC proceedings have featured litigation funding, establishing practical know-how in dealing with funded parties. The DIFC experience has likely influenced other GCC forums to be more accepting of TPF.
  • Funders’ Increased Presence: Another trend is the growing confidence of international funders in the Middle East market. Over the last couple of years, top global litigation financiers have either opened offices in the GCC or actively started seeking cases from the region. Dubai has emerged as a regional hub – beyond Burford, other major funders like Omni Bridgeway (a global funder with roots in Australia) and IMF Bentham (now Omni) have been marketing in the GCC, and local players or boutique funders are also entering the fray . This increased competition among funders is good news for claimants, as it can lead to more competitive pricing and terms for funding. It also indicates that funders perceive the GCC as a growth market with plenty of high-value disputes and a legal environment increasingly open to their business.
  • Types of Arbitrations Being Funded : In terms of case trends, funded arbitrations in the GCC have often involved big-ticket commercial disputes – for example, multi-million dollar construction, energy, and infrastructure cases. These are sectors where disputes are frequent and claims sizable, but claimants (contractors, subcontractors, minority JV partners, etc.) may have limited cash after a project soured. Third-party funding has started to play a role in enabling such parties to bring claims. There have also been instances of investor-state arbitrations involving GCC states or investors that utilized funding (though specific details are usually confidential). The Norton Rose Fulbright report notes that funding is especially helpful in investor-treaty cases where an investor’s primary asset was taken by the state, leaving them dependent on external financing to pursue legal remedies.

As GCC countries continue to attract foreign investment and enter into international treaties, one can expect more ICSID or UNCITRAL arbitrations connected to the region – and many of those claimants may turn to funders, as is now common in investment arbitration globally.

  • Emerging Sharia-Compliant Funding Solutions: A unique trend on the horizon is the development of funding models that align with Islamic finance principles. Given the importance of Sharia law in several GCC jurisdictions, some industry experts predict the rise of Sharia-compliant litigation funding products. These might structure the funder’s return as a success fee in the form of profit-sharing or an award-based service fee rather than “interest” on a loan, and ensure that the arrangement avoids undue uncertainty. While still nascent, such innovations could open the door for greater use of funding in markets like Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, by removing religious/legal hesitations. They would be a notable evolution, marrying the concept of TPF with Islamic finance principles – a blend particularly suitable for the Gulf.

Overall, the trajectory in the GCC arbitration market is clear: third-party funding is becoming mainstream. There have not been many publicly reported court challenges or controversies around TPF in the region – which suggests that, so far, its integration has been relatively smooth. On the contrary, the changes in arbitration rules and the influx of funders point to a growing normalization. Businesses and law firms operating in the GCC should take note of these trends, as they indicate that funding is an available option that can significantly impact how disputes are fought and financed.

Conclusion

Litigation funding in the GCC’s arbitration arena has evolved from a novelty to a practical option that businesses and law firms ignore at their peril. With major arbitration centers in the region embracing third-party funding and more funders entering the Middle Eastern market, this trend is likely to continue its upward trajectory. 

For businesses, it offers a chance to enforce rights and recover sums that might otherwise be forgone due to cost constraints. For law firms, it presents opportunities to serve clients in new ways and share in the upside of successful claims. Yet, as with any powerful tool, it must be used wisely: parties should stay mindful of the legal landscape, comply with disclosure rules, and carefully manage relationships to avoid ethical snags. 

By leveraging litigation funding strategically – balancing financial savvy with sound legal practice – stakeholders in the GCC can optimize their dispute outcomes while effectively managing risk and expenditure. In a region witnessing rapid development of its dispute resolution mechanisms, third-party funding stands out as an innovation that, when properly harnessed, aligns commercial realities with the pursuit of justice.

At WinJustice.com, we take pride in being the UAE’s pioneering litigation funding firm. We are dedicated to providing innovative funding solutions that enable our clients to overcome financial hurdles and pursue justice without compromise. By leveraging third-party litigation funding strategically—balancing financial acumen with sound legal practices—stakeholders in the GCC can optimize their dispute outcomes while effectively managing risk and expenditure.

If you are looking to maximize your dispute resolution strategy through expert litigation funding, contact WinJustice.com today. We’re here to help you navigate the evolving landscape and secure the justice you deserve.

European Commission Fines Apple €500m and Meta €200m for DMA Breaches

By Harry Moran |

Antitrust and competition claims brought against large multinational corporations often represent lucrative opportunities for litigation funders, and the announcement of a new series of fines being imposed on two of the world’s largest technology companies could set the stage for more of these claims being brought in Europe.

Reporting by Reuters covers a major antitrust development as the European Commission has handed down multimillion dollar fines to both Apple and Meta over their breaches of the Digital Markets Act (DMA). These fines follow non-compliance investigations that began in March 2024, with Apple receiving a €500 million fine for breaching its anti-steering obligation through the App Store, and Meta being fined €200 million for breaching the DMA obligation to allow consumers the option to choose a service that uses less of their personal data.

Teresa Ribera, Executive Vice-President for Clean, Just and Competitive Transition at the European Commission, said that the fines “send a strong and clear message”, and that the enforcement action should act as a reminder that “all companies operating in the EU must follow our laws and respect European values.”

In a post on LinkedIn, Gabriela Merino, case manager at LitFin, explained that these fines “mark the first non-compliance decisions issued by the Commission under the new regulatory framework.” As LFJ covered earlier this month, LitFin is funding a €900 million claim against Google in the Netherlands over its anti-competitive practices that were first brought to light by another European Commission investigation. Merino said that “these latest rulings are a welcome boost” to LitFin’s own case.

Statements from both Apple and Meta decried the fines, with the former arguing that the decision was “yet another example of the European Commission unfairly targeting Apple”. 

The full press release from the European Commission detailing the investigations and associated fines can be read here.