As private equity firms extend their reach into the legal industry, a new commentary argues that the tax code has failed to keep pace with how litigation funders actually earn their returns.

Writing for RealClearMarkets, Michael Toth contends that third-party litigation funders routinely claim favorable capital gains treatment on their returns when that income should be taxed as ordinary income. He notes that the Treasury Department "has never bothered to clarify the proper tax treatment of TPLF returns," leaving a roughly $20 billion industry to structure deals as "derivative contracts" despite funders performing work that closely mirrors that of plaintiffs' attorneys—vetting cases, advising on strategy, and managing litigation budgets.

The piece opens with Fortress's recent $125 million investment in an Arizona personal injury firm, which Toth frames as evidence that funders are shifting from wagering on individual case outcomes toward financing law firms' back-office operations and steadier revenue streams. He argues that the disclosure bills congressional Republicans have introduced since 2019 are "focused on yesterday's market," addressing single-case funding even as investors move toward portfolio and operational models. He also flags that nonresident foreign funders can often avoid federal tax on U.S. litigation gains altogether.

Toth's proposed fix relies on existing authority: he urges Treasury to apply the substance-over-form doctrine and tax funding returns as ordinary business income, while noting that Congress could amend the definition of capital assets to exclude legal claims.

The credibility of the UK's opt-out collective action regime increasingly depends on a stubborn problem: persuading class members to actually claim the damages won on their behalf.

As reported by The Law Society Gazette, Rachel Rothwell, editor of Litigation Funding, examines how little of the money awarded in landmark cases is reaching the consumers it is meant to compensate. In Gutmann v South Western Trains, the boundary fares case, roughly £25 million was awarded—yet take-up was less than 1%, with only about £200,000 distributed to class members and £3.8 million directed to the Access to Justice Foundation. Many passengers, she notes, abandoned their claims once asked to supply bank details, wary of fraud.

The forthcoming Merricks v Mastercard payout will test the regime on a far larger scale. With £100 million of the £200 million settlement ringfenced for as many as 44 million potential claimants—roughly £45 to £70 each—the case has become a referendum on whether opt-out actions can deliver for the public rather than primarily for lawyers and funders.

Rothwell canvasses several proposed fixes: a central public register of claims endorsed by government or the courts; compelling defendants, particularly in the tech and utility sectors, to assist with distribution; and building trust through charities and consumer groups while offering vouchers in place of direct bank transfers. Legitimacy, she argues, hinges on a meaningful share of damages reaching those actually harmed.