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Litigation Funding – Section 107 Needs Amending

By Ken Rosen |

Litigation Funding – Section 107 Needs Amending

The following was contributed by Ken Rosen Esq, Founder of Ken Rosen P.C. Ken is a frequent contributor to legal journals on current topics of interest to the bankruptcy and restructuring industry.

The necessity of disclosing litigation funding remains contentious. In October 2024, the federal judiciary’s rules committee decided to create a litigation finance subcommittee after 125 big companies argued that transparency of litigation funding is needed. 

Is there a problem in need of a fix?

Concerns include (a) Undisclosed funding may lead to unfair advantages in litigation. Allegedly if one party is backed by significant financial resources, it could affect the dynamics of the case. (b) Potential conflicts of interest may arise from litigation funding arrangements. Parties and the court may question whether funders could exert influence over the litigation process or settlement decisions, which could compromise the integrity of the judicial process. (c) The presence of litigation funding can alter the strategy of both parties in negotiations. Judges may be concerned that funders might push for excessive settlements or prolong litigation to maximize their returns. While litigation funding can enhance access to justice for under-resourced plaintiffs, judges may also be wary of the potential for exploitative practices where funders prioritize profit over the plaintiffs’ best interests.

A litigant’s financial wherewithal is irrelevant. A litigant’s balance sheet also addresses financial resources and the strength of one’s balance sheet may affect the dynamics of the litigation but there is no rationale for a new rule that a litigant’s balance sheet be disclosed. What matters is the law and the facts. Disclosure of litigation funding is a basis on which to argue that anything offered in settlement by the funded litigant is unreasonable and to blame it on litigation funding. 

Ethics rules

The concerns about litigation funding are adequately dealt with by The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as various state ethical rules and state bar associations. An attorney’s obligation is to act in the best interests of their client. Among other things, attorneys must (a) adhere to the law and ethical standards, ensuring that their actions do not undermine the integrity of the legal system, (b)  avoid conflicts of interest and should not represent clients whose interests are directly adverse to those of another client without informed consent, (c) fully explain to clients potential risks and implications of various options and (d) explain matters to the extent necessary for clients to make informed decisions. 

These rules are designed to ensure that attorneys act in the best interests of their clients while maintaining the integrity of the legal profession and the justice system. Violations of these ethical obligations can result in disciplinary action, including disbarment, sanctions, or reprimand. Disclosure of litigation funding is unnecessary because the ethics rules adequately govern an attorney’s behavior and their obligations to the court. New rules to enforce existing rules are redundant and unnecessary. Plus, disclosure of litigation funding can be damaging to the value of a litigation claim.

Value maximization and preservation

Preserving and enhancing the value of the estate are critical considerations in a Chapter 11 case. Preservation and enhancement are fundamental to the successful reorganization, as they directly impact the recovery available to creditors and the feasibility of the debtor’s reorganization efforts. Often, a litigation claim is a valuable estate asset. A Chapter 11 debtor may seek DIP financing in the form of litigation funding when it faces financial distress that could impede its ability to pursue valuable litigation. However, disclosure of litigation funding- like disclosure of a balance sheet in a non-bankruptcy case- can devalue the litigation asset if it impacts an adversary’s case strategy and dynamics.

The ”364” process

In bankruptcy there is an additional problem. Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the conditions under which litigation funding – a form of “DIP” financing- may be approved by the court. 

When a Chapter 11 debtor seeks DIP financing, several disclosures are made. Some key elements of DIP financing that customarily are disclosed include (a) Why DIP financing is necessary. (b) The specific terms of the DIP financing, including the amount, interest rate, fees, and repayment terms. (c) What assets will secure DIP financing and the priority of the DIP lender’s claims. (d) How DIP financing will affect existing creditors. (e) How the proposed DIP financing complies with relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 

Litigation funding in a bankruptcy case requires full disclosure of all substantive terms and conditions of the funding- more than just whether litigation funding exists and whether the funder has control in the case. Parties being sued by the debtor seek to understand the terms of the debtor’s litigation funding to gauge the debtor’s capability to sustain litigation and to formulate their own case strategy.

Section 107 needs revision

Subsection (a) of section 107 provides that except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) and subject to section 112, a paper filed in a case and on the docket are public records. Subsection (b) (1) provides thaton request of a party in interest, the bankruptcy court shall protect an entity with respect to a trade secret or confidential research, development, or commercial information.Applications for relief that involve commercial information are candidates for sealing or redaction by the bankruptcy court. 

But the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly define “commercial information.” 

The interpretation of “commercial information” has been developed through case law. For instance, in In re Orion Pictures Corp., 21 F.3d at 27, the Second Circuit defined “commercial information” as information that would cause an unfair advantage to competitors.This definition has been applied in various cases to include information that could harm or give competitors an unfair advantage, and it has been held to include information that, if publicly disclosed, would adversely affect the conduct of the bankruptcy case. (In re Purdue Pharma LP, SDNY 2021). In such instances allowing public disclosure also would diminish the value of the bankruptcy estate. (In re A.G. Financial Service Center, Inc.395 F.3d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 2005)). 

Additionally, courts have held that “commercial information” need not rise to the level of a trade secret to qualify for protection under section 107(b), but it must be so critical to the operations of the entity seeking the protective order that its disclosure will unfairly benefit the entity’s competitors. (In re Barney’s, Inc., 201 B.R. 703, 708–09 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing In re Orion Pictures Corp., 21 F.3d at 28)). 

Knowledge of litigation funding and, especially, the terms and conditions of the funding can give an adversary a distinct advantage. In effect the adverse party is a “competitor” of the debtor. They pull at opposite ends of the same rope. Furthermore, disclosure would adversely affect the conduct of the case- which should be defined to include diminution of the value of the litigation claim. 

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure should be amended to clarify that information in an application for litigation funding may, subject to approval by the bankruptcy court, be deemed “confidential information” subject to sealing or redaction if the court authorizes it.

Conclusion

A new rule requiring disclosure of litigation funding is unnecessary and can damage the value of a litigation claim. If the rules committee nevertheless recommend disclosure there should be a carve out for bankruptcy cases specifically enabling bankruptcy judges to authorize redaction or sealing pleadings related to litigation funding. 

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Ken Rosen

Ken Rosen

Commercial

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Pogust Goodhead Secures Landmark Win Against BHP in Brazil Dam Case

By John Freund |

In a major breakthrough for cross-border group litigation, Pogust Goodhead has secured a resounding victory in its long-running claim against mining giant BHP over the 2015 collapse of the Fundão tailings dam in Mariana, Brazil. The UK High Court has ruled BHP liable for the disaster, which killed 19 people and unleashed a wave of toxic sludge through the Rio Doce basin, displacing entire communities and leaving lasting environmental damage.

According to Non-Billable, the ruling confirms BHP’s liability under both Brazilian environmental law and the Brazilian Civil Code. In rejecting the company’s jurisdictional and limitation defenses, the court made clear that English law recognizes the right of over 600,000 Brazilian claimants to pursue redress in UK courts. The judgment underscores BHP’s operational and strategic control over the Samarco joint venture and found that the company was aware of critical dam defects more than a year before the collapse. The attempt to distance itself through the argument of being an indirect polluter was also dismissed.

This outcome is a critical milestone in one of the largest group actions ever brought in the UK. A trial on damages is now scheduled for October 2026, with case management proceedings set to resume in December.

The win comes amid internal turbulence at Pogust Goodhead, including recent leadership changes and reported tensions with its litigation finance backers, but the firm remains on course to press forward with what could be a multibillion-dollar compensation phase.

Incentive Payments Not Essential for Named Plaintiffs, Study Finds

By John Freund |

A new empirical study by Brian Fitzpatrick of Vanderbilt Law School challenges a widely held assumption in class action litigation: that incentive payments are necessary to recruit named plaintiffs. The research, published in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, analyzed federal class-action filings from January 2017 through May 2024, using data drawn from the legal-tech platform Lex Machina. It leveraged a natural experiment created by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s 2020 ruling that barred incentive payments in the 11th Circuit (Florida, Georgia, Alabama) while other circuits continued permitting them.

An article in Reuters states that according to the analysis, the volume of class-actions filed in the 11th Circuit did not meaningfully decline relative to other circuits after the ban on incentive payments. In other words, the absence of such payments did not appear to impair the ability of plaintiffs’ counsel to find willing named plaintiffs.

Fitzpatrick and his co-author, graduate student Colton Cronin, observed that although courts routinely approve modest incentive awards (averaging about $7,500 in non-securities class actions) to compensate the named plaintiff’s extra effort post-settlement, the data suggest that payments may not be a driving factor in recruitment.

Fitzpatrick emphasizes that this is not to say incentive payments have no role. He notes that there remains a moral argument for compensating named plaintiffs who shoulder additional burdens. These include depositions, discovery responses, trial participation, and public exposure. Yet the study’s finding is notable. Motivation for class-representation may be rooted more in altruism, reputation or justice-seeking than in straightforward financial gain.

For the legal-funding industry and class-action litigators, the findings are significant. They suggest that reliance on incentive payments to secure named plaintiffs may be less critical than previously assumed, potentially lowering a transactional cost input in structuring class settlements. On the other hand, third-party funders and litigation financiers should consider how the supply of willing named plaintiffs might remain stable even in jurisdictions restricting such payments.

Merricks Calls for Ban on Secret Arbitrations in Funded Claims

By John Freund |

Walter Merricks, the class representative behind the landmark Mastercard case, has publicly criticized the use of confidential arbitration clauses in litigation funding agreements tied to collective proceedings.

According to Legal Futures, Merricks spoke at an event where he argued that such clauses can leave class representatives exposed and unsupported, particularly when disputes arise with funders. He emphasized that disagreements between funders and class representatives should be heard in open proceedings before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), not behind closed doors.

His comments come in the wake of the £200 million settlement in the Mastercard claim—significantly lower than the original £14 billion figure cited in early filings. During the settlement process, Merricks became the target of an arbitration initiated by his funder, Innsworth Capital. The arbitration named him personally, prompting Mastercard to offer an indemnity of up to £10 million to shield him from personal financial risk.

Merricks warned that the confidentiality of arbitration allows funders to exert undue pressure on class representatives, who often lack institutional backing or leverage. He called on the CAT to scrutinize and reject funding agreements that designate arbitration as the sole forum for dispute resolution. In his view, transparency and public accountability are vital in collective actions, especially when funders and claimants diverge on strategy or settlement terms.

His remarks highlight a growing debate in the legal funding industry over the proper governance of funder-representative relationships. If regulators move to curtail arbitration clauses, it could force funders to navigate public scrutiny and recalibrate their contractual protections in UK group litigation.