Trending Now
  • An LFJ Conversation with Lauren Harrison, Co-Founder & Managing Partner of Signal Peak Partners

Litigation Funding – Section 107 Needs Amending

By Ken Rosen |

Litigation Funding – Section 107 Needs Amending

The following was contributed by Ken Rosen Esq, Founder of Ken Rosen P.C. Ken is a frequent contributor to legal journals on current topics of interest to the bankruptcy and restructuring industry.

The necessity of disclosing litigation funding remains contentious. In October 2024, the federal judiciary’s rules committee decided to create a litigation finance subcommittee after 125 big companies argued that transparency of litigation funding is needed. 

Is there a problem in need of a fix?

Concerns include (a) Undisclosed funding may lead to unfair advantages in litigation. Allegedly if one party is backed by significant financial resources, it could affect the dynamics of the case. (b) Potential conflicts of interest may arise from litigation funding arrangements. Parties and the court may question whether funders could exert influence over the litigation process or settlement decisions, which could compromise the integrity of the judicial process. (c) The presence of litigation funding can alter the strategy of both parties in negotiations. Judges may be concerned that funders might push for excessive settlements or prolong litigation to maximize their returns. While litigation funding can enhance access to justice for under-resourced plaintiffs, judges may also be wary of the potential for exploitative practices where funders prioritize profit over the plaintiffs’ best interests.

A litigant’s financial wherewithal is irrelevant. A litigant’s balance sheet also addresses financial resources and the strength of one’s balance sheet may affect the dynamics of the litigation but there is no rationale for a new rule that a litigant’s balance sheet be disclosed. What matters is the law and the facts. Disclosure of litigation funding is a basis on which to argue that anything offered in settlement by the funded litigant is unreasonable and to blame it on litigation funding. 

Ethics rules

The concerns about litigation funding are adequately dealt with by The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as various state ethical rules and state bar associations. An attorney’s obligation is to act in the best interests of their client. Among other things, attorneys must (a) adhere to the law and ethical standards, ensuring that their actions do not undermine the integrity of the legal system, (b)  avoid conflicts of interest and should not represent clients whose interests are directly adverse to those of another client without informed consent, (c) fully explain to clients potential risks and implications of various options and (d) explain matters to the extent necessary for clients to make informed decisions. 

These rules are designed to ensure that attorneys act in the best interests of their clients while maintaining the integrity of the legal profession and the justice system. Violations of these ethical obligations can result in disciplinary action, including disbarment, sanctions, or reprimand. Disclosure of litigation funding is unnecessary because the ethics rules adequately govern an attorney’s behavior and their obligations to the court. New rules to enforce existing rules are redundant and unnecessary. Plus, disclosure of litigation funding can be damaging to the value of a litigation claim.

Value maximization and preservation

Preserving and enhancing the value of the estate are critical considerations in a Chapter 11 case. Preservation and enhancement are fundamental to the successful reorganization, as they directly impact the recovery available to creditors and the feasibility of the debtor’s reorganization efforts. Often, a litigation claim is a valuable estate asset. A Chapter 11 debtor may seek DIP financing in the form of litigation funding when it faces financial distress that could impede its ability to pursue valuable litigation. However, disclosure of litigation funding- like disclosure of a balance sheet in a non-bankruptcy case- can devalue the litigation asset if it impacts an adversary’s case strategy and dynamics.

The ”364” process

In bankruptcy there is an additional problem. Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the conditions under which litigation funding – a form of “DIP” financing- may be approved by the court. 

When a Chapter 11 debtor seeks DIP financing, several disclosures are made. Some key elements of DIP financing that customarily are disclosed include (a) Why DIP financing is necessary. (b) The specific terms of the DIP financing, including the amount, interest rate, fees, and repayment terms. (c) What assets will secure DIP financing and the priority of the DIP lender’s claims. (d) How DIP financing will affect existing creditors. (e) How the proposed DIP financing complies with relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 

Litigation funding in a bankruptcy case requires full disclosure of all substantive terms and conditions of the funding- more than just whether litigation funding exists and whether the funder has control in the case. Parties being sued by the debtor seek to understand the terms of the debtor’s litigation funding to gauge the debtor’s capability to sustain litigation and to formulate their own case strategy.

Section 107 needs revision

Subsection (a) of section 107 provides that except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) and subject to section 112, a paper filed in a case and on the docket are public records. Subsection (b) (1) provides thaton request of a party in interest, the bankruptcy court shall protect an entity with respect to a trade secret or confidential research, development, or commercial information.Applications for relief that involve commercial information are candidates for sealing or redaction by the bankruptcy court. 

But the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly define “commercial information.” 

The interpretation of “commercial information” has been developed through case law. For instance, in In re Orion Pictures Corp., 21 F.3d at 27, the Second Circuit defined “commercial information” as information that would cause an unfair advantage to competitors.This definition has been applied in various cases to include information that could harm or give competitors an unfair advantage, and it has been held to include information that, if publicly disclosed, would adversely affect the conduct of the bankruptcy case. (In re Purdue Pharma LP, SDNY 2021). In such instances allowing public disclosure also would diminish the value of the bankruptcy estate. (In re A.G. Financial Service Center, Inc.395 F.3d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 2005)). 

Additionally, courts have held that “commercial information” need not rise to the level of a trade secret to qualify for protection under section 107(b), but it must be so critical to the operations of the entity seeking the protective order that its disclosure will unfairly benefit the entity’s competitors. (In re Barney’s, Inc., 201 B.R. 703, 708–09 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing In re Orion Pictures Corp., 21 F.3d at 28)). 

Knowledge of litigation funding and, especially, the terms and conditions of the funding can give an adversary a distinct advantage. In effect the adverse party is a “competitor” of the debtor. They pull at opposite ends of the same rope. Furthermore, disclosure would adversely affect the conduct of the case- which should be defined to include diminution of the value of the litigation claim. 

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure should be amended to clarify that information in an application for litigation funding may, subject to approval by the bankruptcy court, be deemed “confidential information” subject to sealing or redaction if the court authorizes it.

Conclusion

A new rule requiring disclosure of litigation funding is unnecessary and can damage the value of a litigation claim. If the rules committee nevertheless recommend disclosure there should be a carve out for bankruptcy cases specifically enabling bankruptcy judges to authorize redaction or sealing pleadings related to litigation funding. 

About the author

Ken Rosen

Ken Rosen

Commercial

View All

France Issues Decree Regulating Third-Party Funded Collective Actions

By John Freund |

France has taken a significant step in codifying oversight of third-party financed collective actions with the issuance of Decree No. 2025-1191 on December 10, 2025.

An article in Legifrance outlines the new rules, which establish the procedure for approving entities and associations authorized to lead both domestic and cross-border collective actions—referred to in French as “actions de groupe.” The decree brings long-anticipated regulatory clarity following the April 2025 passage of the DDADUE 5 law, which modernized France’s collective redress framework in line with EU Directive 2020/1828.

The decree grants authority to the Director General of Competition, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (DGCCRF) to process applications for approval. Final approval is issued by ministerial order and is valid for five years, subject to renewal.

Approved organizations must meet specific governance and financial transparency criteria. A central provision of the new rules is a requirement for qualifying entities to publicly disclose any third-party funding arrangements on their websites. This includes naming the financiers and specifying the amounts received, with the goal of safeguarding the independence of collective actions and protecting the rights of represented parties.

Paul de Servigny, Head of litigation funding at French headquartered IVO Capital said: “As part of the transposition of the EU’s Representative Actions Directive, the French government announced a decree that sets out the disclosure requirements for the litigation funding industry, paving the way for greater access to justice for consumers in France by providing much welcomed clarity to litigation funders, claimants and law firms.

"This is good news for French consumers seeking justice and we look forward to working with government, the courts, claimants and their representatives and putting this decree into practice by supporting meritorious cases whilst ensuring that the interests of consumers are protected.”

By codifying these requirements, the French government aims to bolster public trust in group litigation and ensure funders do not exert improper influence on the course or outcome of legal actions.

Privy Council to Hear High-Profile Appeal on Third-Party Funding

By John Freund |

The United Kingdom's Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is set to hear a closely watched appeal that could have wide-ranging implications for third-party litigation funding in international arbitration. The case stems from a dispute between OGD Services Holdings, part of the Essar Group, and Norscot Rig Management over the enforcement of a Mauritius-based arbitral award. The Supreme Court of Mauritius had previously upheld the award in favor of Norscot, prompting OGD to seek review from the Privy Council.

An article in Bar & Bench reports that the appeal is scheduled for next year and will feature two prominent Indian senior advocates: Harish Salve KC, representing Norscot, and Nakul Dewan KC, representing OGD. At issue is whether the use of third-party funding in the underlying arbitration renders the enforcement of the award improper under Mauritius law, where third-party litigation funding remains a legally sensitive area.

The case is drawing significant attention because of its potential to shape the international enforceability of funding agreements, particularly in light of the UK Supreme Court's 2023 PACCAR decision. That ruling dramatically altered the legal landscape by classifying many litigation funding agreements as damages-based agreements, thereby subjecting them to stricter statutory controls. The PACCAR decision has already triggered calls for legislative reform in the UK to preserve the viability of litigation funding, especially in the class action and arbitration contexts.

The Privy Council appeal will test the legal boundaries of funder involvement in arbitration and may help clarify whether such arrangements compromise enforceability when judgments cross borders. The outcome could influence how funders structure deals in jurisdictions with differing attitudes toward third-party involvement in legal claims.

Banks Win UK Supreme Court Victory in $3.6B Forex Lawsuit

By John Freund |

Several major global banks, including JPMorgan, UBS, Citigroup, Barclays, MUFG, and NatWest, have successfully blocked a £2.7 billion ($3.6 billion) opt-out collective action in the UK’s Supreme Court. The proposed lawsuit, led by Phillip Evans, aimed to represent thousands of investors, pension funds, and institutions impacted by alleged foreign exchange (forex) market manipulation.

An article in Yahoo Finance reports that the case stemmed from earlier European Commission findings that fined multiple banks over €1 billion for operating cartels in forex trading. Evans’ action, filed under the UK’s collective proceedings regime, sought to recover damages on behalf of a wide investor class. However, the Supreme Court upheld a lower tribunal’s decision that the claim could not proceed on an opt-out basis, requiring instead that individual claimants opt in.

The judgment emphasized the insufficient participation rate among potential class members and found that an opt-out mechanism was not appropriate given the specifics of the case. Justice Vivien Rose, delivering the court’s opinion, noted that while individual claims might have merit, the representative structure lacked the cohesion and commitment necessary to justify a mass claim. As a result, the banks have succeeded in halting what would have been one of the largest collective actions in the UK to date.