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Litigation Funding – Section 107 Needs Amending

By Ken Rosen |

Litigation Funding – Section 107 Needs Amending

The following was contributed by Ken Rosen Esq, Founder of Ken Rosen P.C. Ken is a frequent contributor to legal journals on current topics of interest to the bankruptcy and restructuring industry.

The necessity of disclosing litigation funding remains contentious. In October 2024, the federal judiciary’s rules committee decided to create a litigation finance subcommittee after 125 big companies argued that transparency of litigation funding is needed. 

Is there a problem in need of a fix?

Concerns include (a) Undisclosed funding may lead to unfair advantages in litigation. Allegedly if one party is backed by significant financial resources, it could affect the dynamics of the case. (b) Potential conflicts of interest may arise from litigation funding arrangements. Parties and the court may question whether funders could exert influence over the litigation process or settlement decisions, which could compromise the integrity of the judicial process. (c) The presence of litigation funding can alter the strategy of both parties in negotiations. Judges may be concerned that funders might push for excessive settlements or prolong litigation to maximize their returns. While litigation funding can enhance access to justice for under-resourced plaintiffs, judges may also be wary of the potential for exploitative practices where funders prioritize profit over the plaintiffs’ best interests.

A litigant’s financial wherewithal is irrelevant. A litigant’s balance sheet also addresses financial resources and the strength of one’s balance sheet may affect the dynamics of the litigation but there is no rationale for a new rule that a litigant’s balance sheet be disclosed. What matters is the law and the facts. Disclosure of litigation funding is a basis on which to argue that anything offered in settlement by the funded litigant is unreasonable and to blame it on litigation funding. 

Ethics rules

The concerns about litigation funding are adequately dealt with by The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as various state ethical rules and state bar associations. An attorney’s obligation is to act in the best interests of their client. Among other things, attorneys must (a) adhere to the law and ethical standards, ensuring that their actions do not undermine the integrity of the legal system, (b)  avoid conflicts of interest and should not represent clients whose interests are directly adverse to those of another client without informed consent, (c) fully explain to clients potential risks and implications of various options and (d) explain matters to the extent necessary for clients to make informed decisions. 

These rules are designed to ensure that attorneys act in the best interests of their clients while maintaining the integrity of the legal profession and the justice system. Violations of these ethical obligations can result in disciplinary action, including disbarment, sanctions, or reprimand. Disclosure of litigation funding is unnecessary because the ethics rules adequately govern an attorney’s behavior and their obligations to the court. New rules to enforce existing rules are redundant and unnecessary. Plus, disclosure of litigation funding can be damaging to the value of a litigation claim.

Value maximization and preservation

Preserving and enhancing the value of the estate are critical considerations in a Chapter 11 case. Preservation and enhancement are fundamental to the successful reorganization, as they directly impact the recovery available to creditors and the feasibility of the debtor’s reorganization efforts. Often, a litigation claim is a valuable estate asset. A Chapter 11 debtor may seek DIP financing in the form of litigation funding when it faces financial distress that could impede its ability to pursue valuable litigation. However, disclosure of litigation funding- like disclosure of a balance sheet in a non-bankruptcy case- can devalue the litigation asset if it impacts an adversary’s case strategy and dynamics.

The ”364” process

In bankruptcy there is an additional problem. Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the conditions under which litigation funding – a form of “DIP” financing- may be approved by the court. 

When a Chapter 11 debtor seeks DIP financing, several disclosures are made. Some key elements of DIP financing that customarily are disclosed include (a) Why DIP financing is necessary. (b) The specific terms of the DIP financing, including the amount, interest rate, fees, and repayment terms. (c) What assets will secure DIP financing and the priority of the DIP lender’s claims. (d) How DIP financing will affect existing creditors. (e) How the proposed DIP financing complies with relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 

Litigation funding in a bankruptcy case requires full disclosure of all substantive terms and conditions of the funding- more than just whether litigation funding exists and whether the funder has control in the case. Parties being sued by the debtor seek to understand the terms of the debtor’s litigation funding to gauge the debtor’s capability to sustain litigation and to formulate their own case strategy.

Section 107 needs revision

Subsection (a) of section 107 provides that except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) and subject to section 112, a paper filed in a case and on the docket are public records. Subsection (b) (1) provides thaton request of a party in interest, the bankruptcy court shall protect an entity with respect to a trade secret or confidential research, development, or commercial information.Applications for relief that involve commercial information are candidates for sealing or redaction by the bankruptcy court. 

But the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly define “commercial information.” 

The interpretation of “commercial information” has been developed through case law. For instance, in In re Orion Pictures Corp., 21 F.3d at 27, the Second Circuit defined “commercial information” as information that would cause an unfair advantage to competitors.” This definition has been applied in various cases to include information that could harm or give competitors an unfair advantage, and it has been held to include information that, if publicly disclosed, would adversely affect the conduct of the bankruptcy case. (In re Purdue Pharma LP, SDNY 2021). In such instances allowing public disclosure also would diminish the value of the bankruptcy estate. (In re A.G. Financial Service Center, Inc.395 F.3d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 2005)). 

Additionally, courts have held that “commercial information” need not rise to the level of a trade secret to qualify for protection under section 107(b), but it must be so critical to the operations of the entity seeking the protective order that its disclosure will unfairly benefit the entity’s competitors. (In re Barney’s, Inc., 201 B.R. 703, 708–09 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing In re Orion Pictures Corp., 21 F.3d at 28)). 

Knowledge of litigation funding and, especially, the terms and conditions of the funding can give an adversary a distinct advantage. In effect the adverse party is a “competitor” of the debtor. They pull at opposite ends of the same rope. Furthermore, disclosure would adversely affect the conduct of the case- which should be defined to include diminution of the value of the litigation claim. 

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure should be amended to clarify that information in an application for litigation funding may, subject to approval by the bankruptcy court, be deemed “confidential information” subject to sealing or redaction if the court authorizes it.

Conclusion

A new rule requiring disclosure of litigation funding is unnecessary and can damage the value of a litigation claim. If the rules committee nevertheless recommend disclosure there should be a carve out for bankruptcy cases specifically enabling bankruptcy judges to authorize redaction or sealing pleadings related to litigation funding. 

About the author

Ken Rosen

Ken Rosen

Commercial

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Legal-Bay Urges Caution on Quick-Pay Option in Proposed $800 Million Archdiocese of New York Settlement

Pre-settlement funder Legal-Bay has welcomed the proposed $800 million abuse settlement involving the Archdiocese of New York while warning claimants that the plan's fast-track payment option may undervalue their claims.

As reported by The Mountaineer, the proposal would be paid in two installments — roughly $615 million up front and a further $185 million within about 15 months — covering an estimated 1,300 claims brought under New York's Child Victims Act. Claimants would be able to accept a flat quick-pay amount of $250,000 or submit to an individual evaluation under a points-based matrix that has not yet been released publicly.

Legal-Bay chief executive Chris Janish said the figure represents meaningful progress. "For survivors who have waited years to be heard, an $800 million proposal is an important step toward resolution," he said. He cautioned, however, that the quick-pay election may not deliver fair value for claimants whose circumstances would score higher under individual review, and noted that the matrix remains unpublished, leaving claimants to weigh a certain sum against an unknown alternative.

Janish added that non-recourse funding advances can help plaintiffs avoid accepting an early payment for liquidity reasons alone. Legal-Bay provides pre-settlement advances that are repaid only if the underlying claim resolves successfully.

The company has tracked the Archdiocese proceedings closely, having flagged in April that the case had reached what it described as a critical crossroads for claimants awaiting resolution.

Aperture Portfolio Manager Says Litigation Finance Has Reached an Institutional Inflection Point

Litigation finance is moving from a niche alternative allocation to a recognised corner of specialty private credit, according to Luke Darkow, a portfolio manager at Aperture Investors.

As reported by ABF Journal, Darkow argues that institutional investors are no longer treating legal assets as an exotic curiosity but as a potential source of returns uncorrelated with public markets. "Litigation finance is no longer merely an alternative curiosity," he writes. "It is increasingly viewed as a potential diversifier within their current portfolios."

The case rests partly on the sheer size of the underlying market. U.S. legal services generated roughly $375.7 billion in revenue in 2024 and are projected to reach $427.9 billion by 2029, a compound annual growth rate of 2.64%. Darkow, who says he has personally deployed more than $1.25 billion into litigation finance over his career, frames that spend as a large and persistent financing need rather than a cyclical opportunity.

Aperture's own approach is built around lending to law firms rather than backing individual cases. The firm structures direct loans secured by diversified pools of legal fee receivables, blending post-settlement receivables with near-settlement matters. Darkow contends that this structure reduces the binary outcome risk that has historically made single-case investments difficult for institutional allocators to underwrite, because repayment depends on the performance of a portfolio of claims rather than one verdict.

Aperture, which reported roughly $600 million in litigation finance assets under management earlier this year, is among a group of credit managers positioning law firm lending as a distinct private credit strategy.

New York’s Usury Cap Still Shadows Litigation Funders Despite the State’s New Consumer Funding Statute

New York's new consumer litigation funding statute has not removed the risk that a funding agreement will be recharacterised as a usurious loan, according to a commentary published this week by three lawyers at Glenn Agre Bergman & Fuentes.

As reported by Bloomberg Law, partners Reid Skibell and Joseph Gallagher, with associate Colleen Piasenti, argue that the Consumer Litigation Funding Act — effective 17 June 2026 — gives funders a statutory framework but not a safe harbour. The Act defines consumer litigation funding as non-recourse and caps the funder's total recovery at 25% of the claimant's proceeds. Non-recourse treatment is what keeps a funding agreement outside New York's 16% civil usury ceiling, and the authors contend that courts will look past the label to the economics of the deal.

They point to the July 2026 decision in *Denemark v. New Chapter Capital, Inc.* as the cautionary example. There, a funder advanced legal fees to a party in a matrimonial dispute at a stated 12% interest rate, secured by a UCC-1 lien on marital property and supported by a guaranty that triggered repayment if the spouses reconciled or if either spouse died. The court concluded the structure left the funder recovering in virtually every realistic scenario, making the arrangement a loan in substance at an effective rate of roughly 19%, and voided it.

The practical lesson, the authors suggest, is that risk-reduction devices meant to protect a funder's downside can be the very features that strip away non-recourse status.