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Motor Finance Redress is a Clean-Up, a Compromise, and a Promise Not Quite Kept

By Kevin Prior |

Motor Finance Redress is a Clean-Up, a Compromise, and a Promise Not Quite Kept

The following article was contributed by Kevin Prior, Chief Commercial Officer of Seven Stars Legal Funding.

When the Financial Conduct Authority pushed back its redress consultation deadline to 12 December 2025, its reasoning sounded awfully familiar: the regulator needed more time to ‘get it right’.

What eventually landed in the FCA’s final redress scheme rules in Policy Statement 26/3 on 30 March 2026 was, depending on where you sit, the good, the bad, and the ugly all at once.

  • Good, in that an estimated £7.5 billion will move from lenders to consumers, and the regulator will clean up a historically disorderly market in the process.
  • Bad, in that the final rules are more complicated, conditional, and fairly transparently the product of a protracted negotiation between the FCA and lenders.
  • And ugly, in that the scheme ultimately falls materially short of the full remedy the FCA promised many mis-sold consumers—a point the regulator itself has effectively conceded.

For law firms, claims management companies, and funders, this is a more interesting combination than it may appear at first glance.

The rules introduced:

  • two schemes, not one—albeit there was some logic behind the regulator’s reasoning on this point; 
  • tightened eligibility;
  • a cap on compensation in roughly a third of claims;
  • an APR adjustment that the FCA itself described as a ‘bounded regulatory judgement’; and 
  • rebuttable presumptions on certain agreements.

All of this prompts a question worth asking: what do the FCA’s delays, and the scheme that eventually emerged from them, actually mean for law firms, claims management companies, the funders behind them, and, most importantly, the consumers who are waiting to get their money back?

The drumbeat that never stopped

Between the FCA commencing its investigation into historical car finance mis-selling tied to the use of discretionary commission arrangements on 11 January 2024 and the recent publication of the final rules, motor finance mis-selling has become the biggest consumer finance news in the UK. The Court of Appeal and Supreme Court rulings in the Johnson, Wrench and Hopcraft test cases gave the scandal legal weight. The regulator’s October 2025 proposals provided the redress framework. Every court ruling, extension of the complaint-handling pause, public comments by the FCA, or advice from consumer advocates ensured that motor finance mis-selling was never far from the headlines.

None of this was free publicity for the FCA’s preferred outcome of a tidy, do-it-yourself scheme. In addition to coverage of these events themselves, each development generated further news by prompting additional rounds of lender provisioning and speculation about the industry’s total liabilities.

The FCA estimates that:

  • 79% of motor finance customers know their lenders may owe them compensation;
  • 61% are aware of the redress scheme; and
  • 75% of eligible people will participate in the scheme and receive redress.

The awareness percentages, in particular, still seem lower than you might expect, given the scandal’s extensive coverage. But these numbers did not come from nowhere. They came from over two years of accumulated noise.

And behind the noise—the removal of 800 misleading adverts by FCA-regulated claims management firms, the new joint taskforce to deal with law firms and CMCs failing to adhere to good practice, the regulator’s continued insistence that consumers do not need professional representation—sits the reality the regulator will not admit. 

Professional representation remains in demand and for very good reasons. If it did not, the FCA would not be spending considerable resources on campaigns dedicated to dissuading customers from using it.

Complexity favours expertise

The FCA’s scheme does not inspire confidence that the average consumer will be able to work it out on their own.

Policy Statement 26/3 divides affected agreements into two schemes based on whether the loan began before or after 1 April 2014. Within both schemes, eligibility for redress depends on whether there was a DCA, commission above certain thresholds, or an undisclosed contractual tie. Lenders will calculate consumers’ redress using either a hybrid remedy, which is the average of commission paid and an APR-based estimated loss, or full commission repayment for the estimated 90,000 cases closely aligned with Johnson. Compensatory interest, the Bank of England base rate plus one percentage point, with a 3% annual floor, applies. There are certain inclusions, exclusions, and permissible rebuttals. There are even rules for deceased customers.

The bottom line is that a consumer who took out an agreement 10 years ago and receives a redress offer full of legalese and jargon from their lender probably won’t be able to work out what any of it means over breakfast.

Of course, some people will be able to work it out, or at least receive an offer they deem acceptable, take the money, and get on with their lives. These are exactly the people the FCA has in mind, and the regulator itself even admits that the scheme is more about giving as many eligible people as possible something back rather than fully remedying what has happened.

That is an honest admission, and an uncomfortable one. Getting something back is not the same as getting back what you were owed.

It is right that the FCA has made the scheme as accessible as possible. The problem is that the scheme covers 12.1 million agreements, and our data estimates that most mis-sold consumers will have had at least 2 or 3 motor finance agreements during the relevant period. Expecting millions of people to assess whether their lender has correctly assessed their eligibility or calculated their redress offer is not a realistic view of how consumers engage with financial services. It also paints a picture of an out-of-touch regulator—one that has, separately, decided to let lenders assess the scale of their own wrongdoing. And one whose scheme is now itself the subject of a confirmed legal challenge, which is hardly a vote of confidence in the regulator’s promise of an orderly, do-it-yourself route to compensation. Especially as the challenge is that the FCA’s final rules come down too heavily in favour of lenders. The regulator’s response? To call the challenge ‘disappointing,’ focus on the delay it may cause, and call on those bringing it to explain themselves to their clients. Consumer Voice, which is bringing the challenge with Courmacs Legal, says that the scheme need not be delayed at all, as only specific elements are in dispute.

The FCA wants to kill the category, but it will actually weed out the bad actors

The FCA’s joint taskforce with the Solicitors Regulation Authority, the Information Commissioner’s Office and the Advertising Standards Authority is, on the face of it, a warning shot to professional representatives. Exit fees are under scrutiny. Seven law firms have been closed down by the SRA, with some facing multiple ongoing investigations into their practices, and others have agreed to stop signing up new clients until they can demonstrate compliance with FCA rules. 

This, however, is not going to kill the category. Nor will it discourage consumers who have experienced harm. Many are simply not prepared to take lenders’ word that they’re doing right by them this time. Nor do they want to listen to or unquestioningly trust a regulator that allowed this misconduct to happen on its watch in the first place. Instead, it will ensure that what remains is a disciplined, well-run consumer claims market. The firms that can prove to the various regulatory bodies that they are operating fairly and correctly will be left standing and continue to demonstrate and deliver genuine value over and above the outcome of simply waiting for your lender to tell you what they think is a fair redress offer.

For funders, this is a welcome tidying of the sector. The surviving market will be smaller. It will also be more investable.

Where does this all leave law firms and funders?

Delays have given well-run firms time, something they rarely get. Time to refine their onboarding procedures. Time to build a case-vetting methodology worth the name. Time to prepare for a scheme whose final shape only recently became clear. Time to prime their clients for what’s coming. And time to watch the FCA’s own messaging evolve from confident proclamations that consumers do not need representation to an awareness campaign that implicitly concedes that it knows many will seek it anyway.

The scheme that has emerged is more complex and favourable to lenders than the one initially floated. The public awareness that has built up in the meantime has outgrown the neat category of ‘people who will just claim directly’. And the FCA and SRA’s regulatory housekeeping is doing what it should have been doing all along—removing the bad actors responsible for an entire sector being tarred with the same brush, raising the floor for good practice and operational standards, and giving the industry the credibility it needs to grow.

The FCA wanted to take the time to get things right. But it got some things right, some things wrong, and left others visibly short of the mark.

And in delivering its final motor finance redress scheme rules, it has arguably made the case for professional representation more clearly than any law firm could have.

About the author

Kevin Prior

Kevin Prior

Commercial

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ILFA Urges Government to Clarify Rather Than Rebuild the Opt-Out Collective Actions Regime

The International Legal Finance Association has filed its response to the UK Government's consultation on competition redress, arguing that reforms intended to speed up the opt-out collective actions regime must not add cost or complexity that makes meritorious claims harder to fund.

The submission responds to the Department for Business and Trade's consultation on "Swifter and Simpler Competition Redress, Regulatory Appeals and Competition Enforcement," which opened on 17 July and closed on 25 September. ILFA's central argument is that the Competition Appeal Tribunal and the appellate courts have already developed workable mechanisms for overseeing class representative suitability, and that the Government should deliver clarity through guidance and the formalisation of existing practice rather than new statutory or procedural requirements.

"Third-party litigation funding is the cornerstone of the opt-out collective actions regime," said Neil Purslow, Chairman of the Executive Committee of ILFA. "Without it, consumers and small businesses would have no realistic means of bringing meritorious claims against well-resourced defendants. In our response, we make it clear that any new reforms must not inadvertently introduce cost or complexity, which only serve to make valid claims harder to bring."

ILFA ties the Government's proposal to permit damages-based agreements in collective proceedings to the unresolved question of funder returns. "Crucially, the Government's proposal to permit damages-based agreements in collective proceedings underscores the urgent need to reverse the PACCAR ruling retrospectively," Purslow said. "To keep this regime viable and investable, we must give funders earlier certainty over returns and introduce better cost budgeting to rein in unpredictable, disproportionate costs."

On costs, the association supports mandatory costs budgeting for claimants and defendants alike from certification onwards, and greater use of alternative dispute resolution where it is required early and backed by real costs sanctions. It also backs a central CAT website for claims and settlements, while cautioning that efficiency measures such as reduced panel composition may yield only marginal savings.

"Maintaining a true equality of arms is essential," Purslow said. "Large defendants should not be allowed to weaponise structural hurdles to quash meritorious claims and ordinary businesses and consumers must remain empowered to hold the powerful to account."

Which AI Model Is Best for Legal Work? What 2026 Research Says About Accuracy

Law firms, funders and legal departments are being sold AI for contract review, legal research and citation checking, and the models change every few months. So we looked only at independent studies published in 2026 that tested the current generation of models from OpenAI, Anthropic and Google on real legal tasks. The short version: the best models are now genuinely good at reading and extracting from documents you give them, still unreliable at recalling law from memory, and the commercial legal research tools lag behind the best custom systems.

At a Glance

Best overall model for legal document work: Google's Gemini 3.1 Pro. It was at or near the top in every 2026 study that tested it, and it was usually the fastest and cheapest of the leaders. OpenAI's GPT-5.5 found slightly more errors in contract review, and Anthropic's Claude models were the most careful about not flagging problems that weren't there.

Best accuracy recorded on a full legal task: 92%, on a 50-state statutory research test run by Stanford, achieved by a purpose-built research tool. The lesson is that how the AI is set up matters as much as which model sits underneath it.

Range of accuracy: from under 7% (asking a model to recall exact case citations from memory) to 99–100% (catching a citation to the wrong case when the model can read the source). Most real-world document tasks landed between 60% and 85%.

Westlaw and Lexis AI: 58% and 64% accuracy on a Stanford statutory survey test, below a custom-built tool at 83–92%.

Biggest single improvement: giving the model the actual documents instead of asking it from memory cut fabricated citations from roughly 15–40% to about 4–15%, and to under 0.2% with a well-built retrieval system.

Key Takeaways

The model to use. For contract review and extraction, start with Gemini 3.1 Pro. It matched the top performer on catching contract errors (74% vs. 75%) at about one-seventh of the cost and in 90 seconds instead of nine minutes. If catching every possible issue matters more than time or cost, GPT-5.5 with reasoning turned on found the most. For checking citations in a brief, the best 2026 results came from GPT-5 running as an agent and from Claude Code with Claude Opus, which was the most precise.

How to Use It

  • Give it the documents. Never ask a model to supply case law or citations from memory.
  • Turn on the model's "reasoning" or "thinking" mode for review work. It improved error-catching by 9 to 11 points in contract review.
  • Use it as a first pass and a second reviewer, not the final reviewer.
  • For research, use a tool that pulls from a full, current database of the law, because weak retrieval, not the model, causes many of the errors.

What to Expect

  • Contract extraction (pulling out dates, parties, termination and liability terms): about 80–84% accuracy for the best models.
  • Final contract proofreading (defined terms, cross-references, inconsistent language): the best models catch about three-quarters of errors. On a 60-page agreement, expect it to miss some.
  • Citation checking: nearly all citations to the wrong case get caught, but wrong pinpoint pages slip through 20% to 60% of the time.
  • Research answers grounded in the right documents: roughly 6–11% of answers still contain an unsupported statement.

What to Look Out For

  • Citations from memory. When asked to recall exact citations without sources, even the best model scored under 7 out of 100, and 20 of 21 models gave confident, wrong answers more than 94% of the time.
  • Right case, wrong page. Models tend to approve a citation because the case is on the right topic, even when the cited page doesn't support the point.
  • Questions with a false premise. If your question assumes something that isn't true, models often go along with it.
  • Legal research tools' marketing. Westlaw AI and Lexis+ AI trailed a custom-built tool by 19 to 25 points on a Stanford test.
  • Studies funded by vendors. Some of the best-looking results come from companies selling legal AI. Check who ran the test.

Best Practices

  • Ground every task in source documents, and require the model to quote the passage it relied on.
  • Check every citation yourself at the pinpoint page before filing. Automated checkers help but don't replace this.
  • Turn on reasoning mode for review tasks and accept that it's slower.
  • Test a model on a few of your own documents before rolling it out. Rankings change by task.
  • Re-test when a new model version arrives; this field moves in months, not years.
  • Keep a human reviewer accountable for anything that goes to a court, a client or a counterparty.

What the Studies Found

Contract proofreading. In August 2026, researchers had experienced lawyers plant errors in contracts (misused defined terms, wrong cross-references, wrong party names, contradictions) and tested ten current models on catching them. GPT-5.5 caught 75% of errors, Gemini 3.1 Pro 74%, Claude Sonnet 4.6 69% and Claude Opus 4.7 62%. GPT-5.5 cost $1.38 per contract and took about nine minutes; Gemini 3.1 Pro cost $0.19 and took about 90 seconds. Turning on reasoning mode added 9 to 11 points. Every model was far cheaper than a lawyer, and none was close to perfect.

Contract extraction. A May 2026 study tested models on pulling 26 standard fields out of contracts. Among the major models, Gemini 3.1 Pro scored highest (82%), with Claude Opus 4.6 (82%) and Claude Sonnet 4.6 (80%) close behind and GPT-5.4 at 78%. A smaller legal-specific model built by the study's authors scored 84% at far lower cost. The authors work for Onit, which makes that model.

Made-up citations and facts. A January 2026 study had expert reviewers check 2,700 legal answers from 12 models. Asked without source documents, the best models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3.0 Pro) cited something false about 15–17% of the time, and the worst over 30%. Giving the models the relevant documents cut that to about 4–15%. A more carefully built retrieval system brought it below 0.2% for every model.

Research with sources. A March 2026 study found that when models answer from retrieved legal texts, Gemini 3.1 Pro produced unsupported statements 5.7% of the time versus 11.3% for GPT-5.2, and that the quality of the search step mattered more than the choice of model. Its authors sell the search component that performed best. An August 2026 study of eight research setups found unsupported answers ranging from under 10% for the best to nearly half for the worst, with the worst results on questions built on a false assumption.

Westlaw and Lexis. In a February 2026 Stanford study, researchers tested legal AI tools against a Department of Labor survey of state unemployment insurance laws. Westlaw AI scored 58% and Lexis+ AI 64%, while a custom statutory research tool scored 83%, rising to 92% after the researchers found that some of its "errors" were gaps in the government's own survey.

Citation checking. A June 2026 study found more than 1,000 court filings containing fabricated citations, a number growing every year, and tested AI checkers on catching them. GPT-5, working as an agent that looks up cases, caught 83% of planted errors; Claude Code running Claude Opus 4.8 was the most precise and scored best overall. No model reliably caught wrong pinpoint cites, partly because page numbers often sit behind Westlaw and Lexis paywalls. A separate August 2026 study found models catch 93–100% of citations to the wrong case but miss many citations to the wrong page, and even GPT-5.4 with full reasoning missed 40% of wrong pinpoints in court opinions.

Citations from memory. A May 2026 study built from 1,000 real U.S. judicial opinions asked 21 models to recall exact case citations without any sources. The best, Claude Sonnet 4.5, scored under 7 out of 100.

The Bottom Line

The 2026 research is consistent: today's best models, led by Gemini 3.1 Pro, GPT-5.5 and Claude, are useful and cheap for first-pass contract review and extraction when they work from the documents in front of them. They still invent law when asked from memory and still miss wrong pinpoint citations, so a lawyer has to verify anything that leaves the building.

Sources (All 2026)

  • Bang et al., "ContractScrub: A benchmark for final review of legal contracts" (Aug. 2026), arXiv:2608.20204
  • Lincoln et al., "A Few Good Clauses: Comparing LLMs vs Domain-Trained Small Language Models on Structured Contract Extraction" (May 2026), arXiv:2605.05532
  • Dantart, "Reliability by design: quantifying and eliminating fabrication risk in LLMs" (Jan. 2026), arXiv:2601.15476
  • Butler and Butler, "Legal RAG Bench: an end-to-end benchmark for legal RAG" (Mar. 2026), arXiv:2603.01710
  • Das et al., "How Much Do Legal RAG Systems Still Hallucinate?" (Aug. 2026), arXiv:2608.14210
  • Afane et al., "Benchmarking Legal RAG: The Promise and Limits of AI Statutory Surveys" (Feb. 2026), arXiv:2603.03300
  • Liu, Stammbach and Henderson, "Who Checks the Citations? Benchmarking Legal Hallucination Detection" (June 2026), arXiv:2606.21155
  • Verma, "Is this Citation on Point?" (Aug. 2026), arXiv:2608.12571
  • Chen et al., "LegalCiteBench: Evaluating Citation Reliability in Legal Language Models" (May 2026), arXiv:2605.10186

Second Circuit Affirms Fee Award That Treated Litigation Funding Costs as Firm Overhead

The Second Circuit has upheld a $4.8 million attorneys' fee award in a sex trafficking case, endorsing a district court's decision to strike time counsel spent communicating with its litigation funder.

In Moore v. Rubin, decided on September 4, a panel of Chief Judge Lohier and Judges Parker and Chin affirmed the award to six plaintiffs who won a $3.85 million jury verdict against former bond trader Howard Rubin under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. In rejecting the argument that too many timekeepers had been compensated, the panel noted approvingly that the district court had applied a 15% across-the-board reduction and excluded non-compensable tasks, "such as communications with counsel's litigation funder."

The more consequential ruling for funders came below. In February 2025, Judge Brian Cogan of the Eastern District of New York refused to shift roughly $1.84 million in principal and interest owed to a third-party funder, reasoning that how a lawyer finances a practice is irrelevant to the client and the defendant alike. "Whether it is a bank loan, family loan, personal assets, or a litigation funder," he wrote, "it is overhead."

Judge Cogan also declined to follow the English decision in Essar Oilfield Services v. Norscot Rig Management, which allowed recovery of funding costs, observing that neither the statute nor the local rule hints at such recovery.

The funding cost denial was not before the appellate panel, as Rubin appealed only the fee award. The funder, Pravati Investment Fund IV, later sought unsuccessfully to intervene to protect its interest in the fees after the plaintiffs' firm dissolved.