PACCAR’s tidal wave effects: Understanding the Legal, Financial and Policy impacts of a highly controversial ruling

By Ana Carolina Salomao |

The following is a contributed piece by Ana Carolina Salomão, Leila Zoe-Mezoughi, Micaela Ossio Maguiña and Sarah Voulaz, of Pogust Goodhead.

This article follows our previous publication dated 10 October 2023 regarding the Supreme Court ruling in PACCAR[1] on third-party litigation funding agreements which, very simply put, decided that litigation funding agreements (“LFAs”), permitting funders to recover a percentage of damages, amounted to (“DBAs”) damages-based agreements by virtue of s.58AA of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (the “1990 Act”). As such, all LFAs (including those retrospectively drafted) were consequently required to comply with the Damages-Based Agreements Regulations 2013 (the “2013 Regulations”) or be deemed, unenforceable.

In this article, we explore the three main industry-wide changes that have arisen as a direct result of the PACCAR ruling:

  1. The diverse portfolio of LFA reformulation strategies deployed by litigation finance stakeholders.
  2.  The government response, both in terms of official statements and policy changes, which have ultimately led to the draft bill of 19 March 2024.
  3.  The wave of litigations subsequent to the PACCAR ruling, giving insight into the practical market consequences of the ruling.

Ultimately, the PACCAR impact and its proposed reversal has not undermined the UK litigation finance market, in fact the contrary; it has promoted visibility and adaptation of a litigation finance market that continues to gain significant traction in the UK. As a result, despite the concern shown by most UK industry stakeholders about the negative impacts of the PACCAR ruling, this article argues that proper regulation could indeed be highly advantageous, should it incentivise responsible investment, whilst protecting proper access to justice. However, the question does remain, will we ever get there?

The LFA reformulation storm.

As expected, the first reaction to PACCAR came from the litigation finance market. As anticipated, LFAs (those with an investor return formula based on a percentage of the damages recovered) are being amended by parties to avoid their potential unenforceability.

The majority of amendments being implemented are aimed to design valuation methodologies for the amount recovered, which are not directly related to the damages recovered, but are rather a function of some other metric or waterfall, therefore involving a process of alteration of pricing. The intention is for the agreements to fall out of the scope of the definition of ‘claims management services’ provided by section 58AA of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (CLSA), which stipulates two main criteria: (i) the funder is paid if the litigation succeeds, and (ii) the amount paid back to the funder is a function of the amounts recovered by the claimant in damages. As such, novel pricing structures such as charging the amount granted in third-party funding with accrued interest; a multiple of the funded amount; or even a fixed pre-agreed amount recovered in the form of a success fee, would not meet both criteria and would hence fall outside of the legal definition of claims management services. These options would avoid the risk of an LFA being bound to the same requirements of a DBA and potentially rendered unenforceable.[2]

Another option to render LFAs enforceable following PACCAR is of course to make these compliant to the definition of DBA provided in s.58AA(2) of the 1990 Act. As such, LFAs would be subjected to stringent statutory conditions as per the Damages-Based Agreements Regulations 2013 (the “2013 Regulations”). This option has however not been the most attractive for funders, firstly due to funders not necessarily conducting claims management services and, secondly, because LFAs would automatically become subject to highly stringent rules to structure the agreements and pursue recovery. For example, such LFAs would need to comply with the cap requirements outlined in the 2013 Regulations such as: 25% of damages (excluding damages for future care and loss) in personal injury cases, 35% on employment tribunal cases and 50% in all other cases.

Ultimately, it can be argued that the choice for restructuring a single LFA or a portfolio of LFAs will vary on a case-by-case basis. Those parties who find themselves at more advanced stages of proceedings will be disadvantaged due to the significant challenges they are likely to face in restructuring such LFAs. From the perspective of the legal sector, on the one hand, we can see an increase in law firms’ portfolio lending, whereby the return to funders is not directly related to damages recovered by the plaintiff. On the other hand, there are certain actors who are remaining only superficially affected by the ruling, such as all funding facilities supporting law firms which raise debt capital collateralised by contingent legal fees.

The introduction of the proposed bill by the government (which is discussed below), is a reflection of the enormous burden the Supreme Court ruling has placed on critical litigation funder stakeholders who are likely to have invested disproportionate sums to amend their LFAs and restructure their litigation portfolios. However, the bill has also given momentum to the sector and is helping to highlight the importance of diversification in litigation funding to protect the interests of low-income claimants. The medium-term net balance of the regulation might be rendered positive if redirected at perfecting and not prohibiting third-party funding agreements to protect access to justice.

The UK Government Intervention.

The UK government has raised concerns regarding the legal and financial impacts of PACCAR relatively swiftlyfollowingthe 26 July 2023 judgement. Their first response to PACCAR came from the Department of Business and Trade (DBT) at the end of August 2023. The DBT stated that, being aware of the Supreme Court decision in PACCAR, it would be “looking at all available options to bring clarity to all interested parties.[3]

In the context of opt-out collective proceedings before CAT, the government proposed in November 2023 amendments to the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (DMCC) through the introduction of clause 126, which sought to implement changes to the Competition Act 1998 (CA) to provide that an LFA would not count as a DBA in the context of opt-out collective proceedings in the CAT. This proposal came from the understanding that after PACCAR opt-out collective proceedings would face even greater challenges considering that under c.47C(8) of the CA 1998 DBAs are unenforceable when relating to opt-out proceedings. Proposals for additional amendments to the DMCC soon followed, many of which await final reading and approval by the House of Lords. However, in December 2023 Lord Sandhurst (Guy Mansfield KC) noted that while amendments to the DMCC would mitigate PACCAR’s impact on LFAs for opt-out collective proceedings in the CAT, “the key issue is that the Supreme Court’s PACCAR ruling affects LFAs in all courts, not just in the CAT, and not just, as this clause 126 is designed to address, in so-called opt-out cases.”

As a response to this, the Ministry of Justice announced last March that the government intended to extend the approach taken for opt-out collective proceedings in the CAT to all forms of legal proceedings in England and Wales by removing LFAs from the DBAs category entirely. The statement promised to enact new legislation which would “help people pursuing claims against big businesses secure funding to take their case to court”and“allow third parties to fund legal cases on behalf of the public in order to access justice and hold corporates to account”.[4]

Following this announcement, the Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill was published and introduced to the House of Lords. As promised by the government’s previous statements, the primary purpose of the Bill is to prevent the unenforceability of legitimate LFAs fitting into the amended DBA definition of PACCAR. Indeed, the bill aims to restore the status quo by preventing litigation funding agreements from being caught by s.58AA of the 1990 Act.[5]

The litigation wave.

As parliamentary discussions continue, all eyes are now in the Court system and the pending decisions in litigations arising from PACCAR. Despite the government’s strong stance on this matter, the bill is still in early stages. The second reading took place in April 2024, where issues such as the retrospective nature of the Bill, the Civil Justice Council’s (CJC) forthcoming review of litigation funding, and the need to improve regulations on DBAs, were discussed. Nevertheless, despite the arguable urgency of addressing this issue for funders and the litigation funding market, there is no indication that the bill will be expedited; hence the next step for the bill passage is the Committee stage. The myriad of cases arising from PACCAR may need to stay on standstill for a while, as Courts are likely to await the outcome of the proposed bill before deciding on individual matters.

The UK has a longstanding history of tension between the judiciary power and the two other spheres of the government, the Executive and Parliament. Most of these instances have sparked public debate and have profoundly changed the conditions affecting the market and its players. For example, in the case of R (on the application of Miller and another) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Appellant) [2017] UKSC 5, Gina Miller launched legal proceedings against the Johnson government to challenge the government’s authority to invoke Article 50 of the Treaty of European Union, which would start the process for the UK to leave the EU, without the Parliament’s authorisation. The High Court decided that, given the loss of individual rights that would result from this process, Parliament and not the Executive should decide whether to trigger Article 50, and the Supreme Court confirmed that Parliament’s consent was needed.

Another example is the more recent case of AAA (Syria) & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] UKSC 42 regarding the Rwanda deportation plan. In this case the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the government’s policy of deporting asylum seekers to Rwanda was unlawful – in agreement with the Court of Appeal’s decision which found that the policy would pose a significant risk of refoulement.

Nevertheless, rushing the finalisation of a bill reversing PACCAR would probably be a counterproductive move. The recent developments suggest that policy makers should focus on deploying a regulatory impact assessment on any regulations aimed at improving access to finance in litigation. Regulators and legislators should ensure that, before designing new regulatory frameworks for litigation finance,  actors from the litigation finance industry are consulted, to ensure that such regulations are adequate and align with the practical realities of the market.

As the detrimental impacts of PACCAR become ever more visible, public authorities should prioritise decisions that favour instilling clarity in the market, and most importantly, ensuring proper access to justice remains upheld in order to “strike the right balance between access to justice and fairness for claimants”.  

A deeper look into the post-PACCAR’s litigations and their domino effects

Even though the English court system is yet to rule on any post-PACCAR case, it is important to understand the immediate effects of the decision by looking at a few landmark cases. We provide in this section of the article an overview of the impacts of the rulingin perhaps the three most important ongoing post-PACCAR proceedings: Therium Litigation Funding A IC v. Bugsby Property LLC (the “Therium litigation”), Alex Neill Class Representative Ltd v Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe Ltd [2023] CAT 73 (the “Sony litigation”) and the case of Alan Bates and Others v Post Office Limited [2019] EWHC 3408 (QB), which led to what has been known as the “Post Office scandal” (also referred to as the “Horizon scandal”).

Therium litigation

The Therium litigation is one of the first cases in which an English court considered questions as to whether an LFA amounted to a DBA following the Supreme Court decision in PACCAR. The case concerned the filing of a freezing injunction application by Therium Litigation Funding I AC (“Therium”) who had entered into an LFA with Bugsby Property LLC (“Bugsby”) in relation to a claim against Legal & General Group (“L&G”). The LFA stipulated between Therium and Bugsby entitled Therium to (i) return of the funding it had provided; (ii) three-times multiple of the amount funded; and (iii) 5% of any damages recovered over £37 million, and compelled Bugsby’s solicitors to hold the claim proceeds on trust until distributions had been made in accordance with a waterfall arrangement set out in a separate priorities’ agreement.

Following a settlement reached between Bugsby and L&G, Bugby’s solicitors transferred a proportion of settlement monies to Bugsby’s subsidiary, and notified Therium of the intention to transfer the remaining amount to Bugsby on the understanding that the LFA signed between Therium and Bugsby was unenforceable as it amounted to a DBA following the PACCAR ruling. Therium applied for an interim freezing injunction against Bugsby under s.44 of the Arbitration Act 1996 and argued that, as the payment scheme stipulated by the LFA contained both a multiple-on-investment and a proportion of damage clauses, and the minimum recovery amount to trigger the damage-based recovery had not been reached, no damage-based payment was foreseen.

This meant that the DBA clause within the LFA could be struck off without changing the nature of the original LFA, so that it constituted an “agreement within an agreement”. As legal precedents such as the Court of Appeal ruling in Zuberi v Lexlaw Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 16 allowed for parts of an agreement to be severed so as to render the remainder of the agreement enforceable, the High Court granted the freezing injunction, affirming that a serious question was raised by Therium regarding whether certain parts of the agreement could be severed to keep the rest of the LFA enforceable.

By declaring that there was a serious question to be tried as to whether the non-damage clauses, such as the multiple-based payment clauses, are lawful or not, the High Court opened the possibility of enforceability of existing LFAs through severability of damage-based clauses in instances where PACCAR may also apply. The Therium litigation presents an example of another possible structuring strategy to shape LFAs to prevent them from becoming unenforceable under PACCAR. Nonetheless, as the freezing injunction will now most likely lead to an arbitration, a final Court ruling on the validity of these non-damage-based schemes appears to be unlikely.

Sony litigation

The Sony group litigation is another example of one of the first instances where issues of compliance of a revised LFA have been addressed in the aftermath of PACCAR, this time in the context of CAT proceedings. In this competition case, Alex Neill Class Representative Limited, the Proposed Class Representative (PCR), commenced collective proceedings under section 47B of the CA 1998 against Sony Interactive Entertainment Network Europe Limited and Sony Interactive Entertainment UK Limited (“Sony”). The claimant alleged that Sony abused its dominant market position in compelling publishers and developers to sell their gaming software through the PlayStation store and charging a 30% commission on these sales.

The original LFA entered between Alex Neill and the funder as part of the Sony litigation amounted to a DBA and would have therefore been unenforceable pursuant to PACCAR. On this basis, the PCR and funder negotiated an amended LFA designed to prevent PACCAR enforceability issues. The LFA in place was amended to include references for funders to obtain a multiple of their total funding obligation or a percentage of the total damages and costs recovered, only to the extent enforceable and permitted by applicable law. The LFA was also amended to include a severance clause confirming that damages-based fee provisions could be severed to render the LFA enforceable.

The CAT ultimately agreed with the position of the PCR and confirmed that the revised drafting “expressly recognise[d] that the use of a percentage to calculate the Funder’s Fee will not be employed unless it is made legally enforceable by a change in the law.” In relation to the severance clause, the CAT also expressly provided that such clause enabled the agreement to avoid falling within the statutory definition of a DBA and referred to the test for effective severance clauses.

The CAT’s approach in recognising the PACCAR ruling and yet allowing for new means to render revised LFAs enforceable in light of this decision provides a further example of a Court’s interpretation of the decision, allowing another route for funders to prevent the unenforceability of agreements. Allowing these clauses to exempt litigation funders from PACCAR will in fact allow for such clauses to become market standard for LFAs, and in this case particularly for those LFAs backing opt-out collective proceedings in the CAT.

Post Office scandal  

Although the Post Office scandal occurred in 2019, this case was only recently brought back to light following the successful tv series ‘Mr Bates vs The Post Office’ which recounts the story of the miscarriage of justice suffered by hundreds of sub-postmasters and sub-postmistresses (SPM’s) in the past two decades. In short, the Post Office scandal concerned hundreds of SPM’s being unjustly taken to court for criminal offences such as fraud and false accounting, whilst in reality the Horizon computer system used by Post Office Ltd (POL) was found to contain errors that caused  inaccuracies in the system.

Mr. Bates, leading claimant in the case, brought the case on behalf of all the SMP’s which had been unfairly treated by POL. The issuing of the claim was only made possible thanks to a funding arrangement between litigation funders and the SPM’s, used as a basis for investors to pay up front legal costs. As outlined in a publication by Mr Bates in January 2024, such financing, combined with the strength and defiance of Mr. Bates’ colleagues, allowed the case to be brought forward, a battle which in today’s circumstances the postmaster believes would have certainly been lost.[6]

The sheer scale of the Post Office scandal, and the fact that traditional pricing vehicles for legal services would have negated the claimants access to justice, placed the case near the top of the government’s agenda and called again into question the effect of PACCAR on access to justice. Justice Secertary Alex Chalk MP relied on the example of Mr Bates and the Post Office scandal to affirm that that “for many claimants, litigation funding agreements are not just an important pathway to justice – they are the only route to redress.”[7]In light of this recent statement more radical changes to legislation on litigation funding and the enforceability of LFAs appear to be on the horizon.

Conclusion

Assessing the long-term impact of PACCAR will ultimately need to wait until the dust in the litigation finance market settles. Nonetheless, the immediate impacts of the decision have brought four key considerations to light.

First, the relevance of the litigation funding industry in the UK is substantial and any attempt to regulate it impacts not only those who capture value from the market but also the wider society. Regulation of litigation funding could inadvertently affect wider policy questions such as equal access to justice, consumer rights, protection of the environment and human rights.

Second, there is an undeniable intention of the regulators to oversee the litigation finance market, which could reflect in stability and predictability that would be much welcomed by institutional investors and other stakeholders. However, this conclusion assumes that regulatory efforts will be preceded by robust impact assessment and enforced within clear guardrails, always prioritising stability and ensuring proper access to justice.

Third, PACCAR serves to bring awareness that attempts to regulate a market in piecemeal can lead to detrimental outcomes and high adapting costs, far offsetting any positive systemic effects brought by the new framework. Any attempts to regulate a market so complex and relevant for the social welfare should be well-thought-out with the participation of key stakeholders.

Fourth, despite the recent headwinds, the market and government reaction further prove that the litigation finance market continues its consolidation as an effective vehicle to drive value for claimants and investors. The fundamentals behind the market’s growth are still solid and the asset class is consolidating as a strategy to achieve portfolios’ uncorrelation with normal market cycles. As private credit and equity funds as well as venture capitalists, hedge funds and other institutions compete to increase their footprint in this burgeoning market, it is safe to expect a steady increase of market size and investors’ appetite for the thesis.

In conclusion, despite a first brush view of the PACCAR decision, the reactions to this decision and the subsequent developments have evidenced how litigation finance continues to be a promising investment strategy and an effective tool to drive social good and access to justice.


[1] Ana Carolina Salomao, Micaela Ossio and Sarah Voulaz, Is the Supreme Court ruling in PACCAR really clashing with the Litigation Finance industry? An overview of the PACCAR decision and its potential effects, Litigation Finance Journal, 10 October 2023.

[2] Daniel Williams, Class Action Funding: PACCAR and now Therium – what does it mean for class action litigation?, Dwf, October 25, 2023.

[3] Department for Business and Trade statement on recent Supreme Court decision on litigation funding: A statement from the department in response to the Supreme Court’s Judgement in the case of Paccar Inc. and others vs. Competition Tribunal and others. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/department-for-business-and-trade-statement-on-recent-supreme-court-decision-on-litigation-funding>.

[4] Press release, ‘New law to make justice more accessible for innocent people wronged by powerful companies’ (GOV.UK, 4 March 2024) Available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-law-to-make-justice-more-accessible-for-innocent-people-wronged-by-powerful-companies>.

[5] Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill (Government Bill originated in the House of Lords, Session 2023-24) Available at <https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3702/publications>.

[6] Alan Bates, ‘Alan Bates: Why I wouldn’t beat the Post Office today’ (Financial Times, 12 January 2024) <https://www.ft.com/content/1b11f96d-b96d-4ced-9dee-98c40008b172>.

[7] Alex Chalk, ‘Cases like Mr Bates vs the Post Office must be funded’ (Financial Times, 3 March 2024) <https://www.ft.com/content/39eeb4a6-d5bc-4189-a098-5b55a80876ec?accessToken=zwAGEsgQoGRQkc857rSm1bxBidOgmFtVqAh27A.MEQCIBNfHrXgvuIufYajr8vp1jmn9z9H9Bwl0FC-u96h8f4LAiBumh82Jxp30mqQsGb71VSoAmYWUwo9YBO2kF5wuMP5QA&sharetype=gift&token=7a7fe231-8fea-4a0d-9755-93fc3e3689aa>.

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Community Spotlight: Dr. Detlef A. Huber, Managing Director, AURIGON LRC

By John Freund |

Detlef is a German attorney, former executive of a Swiss reinsurance company and as head of former Carpentum Capital Ltd. one of the pioneers of litigation funding in Latin America. Through his activities as executive in the insurance claims area and litigation funder he gained a wealth of experience in arbitrations/litigations in various businesses. He is certified arbitrator of ARIAS US and ARIAS UK (AIDA Reinsurance and Insurance Arbitration Society) and listed on the arbitrators panel of DIS (German Arbitration Institute).

He studied law in Germany and Spain, obtained a Master in European Law (Autónoma Madrid) and doctorate in insurance law (University of Hamburg).

Detlef speaks German, Spanish, English fluently and some Portuguese.

Company Name and Description:  AURIGON LRC (Litigation Risk Consulting) is at home in two worlds: dispute funding and insurance. They set up the first European litigation fund dedicated to Latin America many years ago and operate as consultants in the re/insurance sector since over a decade.

Both worlds are increasingly overlapping with insurers offering ever more litigation risk transfer products and funders recurring to insurance in order to hedge their risks. Complexity is increasing for what is already a complex product.

Aurigon acts as intermediary in the dispute finance sector and offers consultancy on relevant insurance matters.

Company Website: www.aurigon-lrc.ch

Year Founded: 2011, since 2024 offering litigation risk consulting  

Headquarters: Alte Steinhauserstr. 1, 6330 Cham/Zug Switzerland

Area of Focus:  Litigation funding related to Latin America and re/insurance disputes

Member Quote: “It´s the economy, stupid. Not my words but fits our business well. Dont focus on merits, focus on maths.”

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Manolete Partners Releases Half-Year Results for the Six Months Ended 30 September 2024

By Harry Moran |

Manolete (AIM:MANO), the leading UK-listed insolvency litigation financing company, today announces its unaudited results for the six months ended 30 September 2024. 

Steven Cooklin, Chief Executive Officer, commented: 

“These are a strong set of results, particularly in terms of organic cash generation. In this six-month period, gross cash collected rose 63% to a new record at £14.3m. That strong organic cash generation comfortably covered all cash operating costs, as well as all cash costs of financing the ongoing portfolio of 413 live cases, enabling Manolete to reduce net debt by £1.25m to £11.9m as at 30 September 2024. 

As a consequence of Manolete completing a record number of 137 case completions, realised revenues rose by 60% to a further record high of £15m. That is a strong indicator of further, and similarly high levels, of near-term future cash generation. A record pipeline of 437 new case investment opportunities were received in this latest six month trading period, underpinning the further strong growth prospects for the business. 

The record £14.3.m gross cash was collected from 253 separate completed cases, highlighting the highly granular and diversified profile of Manolete’s income stream. 

Manolete has generated a Compound Average Growth Rate of 39% in gross cash receipts over the last five H1 trading periods: from H1 FY20 up to and including the current H1 FY25. The resilience of the Manolete business model, even after the extraordinary pressures presented by the extended Covid period, is now clear to see. 

This generated net cash income of £7.6m in H1 FY25 (after payment of all legal costs and all payments made to the numerous insolvent estates on those completed cases), an increase of 66% over the comparative six-month period for the prior year. Net cash income not only exceeded by £4.5m all the cash overheads required to run the Company, it also exceeded all the costs of running Manolete’s ongoing 413 cases, including the 126 new case investments made in H1 FY25. 

The Company recorded its highest ever realised revenues for H1 FY25 of £15.0m, exceeding H1 FY24 by 60%. On average, Manolete receives all the cash owed to it by the defendants of completed cases within approximately 12 months of the cases being legally completed. This impressive 60% rise in realised revenues therefore provides good near-term visibility for a continuation of Manolete’s strong, and well-established, track record of organic, operational cash generation. 

New case investment opportunities arise daily from our wide-ranging, proprietary, UK referral network of insolvency practitioner firms and specialist insolvency and restructuring solicitor practices. We are delighted to report that the referrals for H1 FY25 reached a new H1 company record of 437. A 27% higher volume than in H1 FY24, which was itself a new record for the Company this time last year. That points to a very healthy pipeline as we move forward into the second half of the trading year.” 

Financial highlights: 

  • Total revenues increased by 28% to £14.4m from H1 FY24 (£11.2m) as a result of the outstanding delivery of realised revenues generated in the six months to 30th September 2024.
    • Realised revenues achieved a record level of £15.0m in H1 FY25, a notable increase of 60% on H1 FY24 (£9.4m). This provides good visibility of near-term further strong cash generation, as on average Manolete collects all cash on settled cases within approximately 12 months of the legal settlement of those cases
    • Unrealised revenue in H1 FY25 was £(633k) compared to £1.8m for the comparative H1 FY24. This was due to: (1) the record number of 137 case completions in H1 FY25, which resulted in a beneficial movement from Unrealised revenues to Realised revenues; and (2) the current lower average fair value of new case investments made relative to the higher fair value of the completed cases. The latter point also explains the main reason for the marginally lower gross profit reported of £4.4m in this period, H1 FY25, compared to £5.0m in H1 FY24. 
  • EBIT for H1 FY25 was £0.7m compared to H1 FY24 of £1.6m. As well as the reduced Gross profit contribution explained above, staff costs increased by £165k to £2.3m and based on the standard formula used by the Company to calculate Expected Credit Losses, (“ECL”), generated a charge of £140k (H1 3 FY24: £nil) due to trade debtors rising to £26.8m as at 30 September 2024, compared to £21.7m as at 30 September 2023. The trade debtor increase was driven by the outstanding record level of £15.0m Realised revenues achieved in H1 FY25.
  • Loss Before Tax was (£0.2m) compared to a Profit Before Tax of £0.9m in H1 FY24, due to the above factors together with a lower corporation tax charge being largely offset by higher interest costs. 
  • Basic earnings per share (0.5) pence (H1 FY24: 1.4 pence).
  • Gross cash generated from completed cases increased 63% to £14.3m in the 6 months to 30 September 2024 (H1 FY24: £8.7m). 5-year H1 CAGR: 39%.
  • Cash income from completed cases after payments of all legal costs and payments to Insolvent Estates rose by 66% to £7.6m (H1 FY24: £4.6m). 5-year H1 CAGR: 46%.
  • Net cashflow after all operating costs but before new case investments rose by 193% to £4.5m (H1 FY24: £1.5m). 5-year H1 CAGR: 126%.
  • Net assets as at 30 September 2024 were £40.5m (H1 FY24: £39.8m). Net debt was reduced to £11.9m and comprises borrowings of £12.5m, offset by cash balances of £0.6m. (Net debt as 31 March 2024 was £12.3m.)
  • £5m of the £17.5m HSBC Revolving Credit Facility remains available for use, as at 30 September 2024. That figure does not take into account the Company’s available cash balances referred to above.

Operational highlights:

  • Ongoing delivery of record realised returns: 137 case completions in H1 FY25 representing a 18% increase (116 case realisations in H1 FY24), generating gross settlement proceeds receivable of £13.9m for H1 FY25, which is 51% higher than the H1 FY24 figure of £9.2m. This very strong increase in case settlements provides visibility for further high levels of cash income, as it takes the Company, on average, around 12 months to collect in all cash from previously completed cases.
  • The average realised revenue per completed case (“ARRCC”) for H1 FY25 was £109k, compared to the ARRCC of £81k for H1 FY24. That 35% increase in ARRCC is an important and an encouraging Key Performance Indicator for the Company. Before the onset and impact of the Covid pandemic in 2020, the Company was achieving an ARRCC of approximately £200k. Progress back to that ARRCC level, together with the Company maintaining its recent high case acquisition and case completion volumes, would lead to a material transformation of Company profitability.
  • The 137 cases completed in H1 FY25 had an average case duration of 15.7 months. This was higher than the average case duration of 11.5 months for the 118 cases completed in H1 FY24, because in H1 FY25 Manolete was able to complete a relatively higher number of older cases, as evidenced by the Vintages Table below.
  • Average case duration across Manolete’s full lifetime portfolio of 1,064 completed cases, as at 30 September 2024 was 13.3 months (H1 FY24: 12.7 months).
  • Excluding the Barclays Bounce Back Loan (“BBL”) pilot cases, new case investments remained at historically elevated levels of 126 for H1 FY25 (H1 FY24: 146 new case investments).
  • New case enquiries (again excluding just two Barclays BBL pilot cases from the H1 FY24 figure) achieved another new Company record of 437 in H1 FY25, 27% higher than the H1 FY24 figure of 343. This excellent KPI is a strong indicator of future business performance and activity levels.
  • Stable portfolio of live cases: 413 in progress as at 30 September 2024 (417 as at 30 September 2023) which includes 35 live BBLs.
  • Excluding the Truck Cartel cases, all vintages up to and including the 2019 vintage have now been fully, and legally completed. Only one case remains ongoing in the 2020 vintage. 72% of the Company’s live cases have been signed in the last 18 months.
  • The Truck Cartel cases continue to progress well. As previously reported, settlement discussions, to varying degrees of progress, continue with a number of Defendant manufacturers. Further updates will be provided as concrete outcomes emerge.
  • The Company awaits the appointment of the new Labour Government’s Covid Corruption Commissioner and hopes that appointment will set the clear direction of any further potential material involvement for Manolete in the Government’s BBL recovery programme.
  • The Board proposes no interim dividend for H1 FY25 (H1 FY24: £nil).

The full report of Manolete’s half-year results can be read here.

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LegalPay’s CIO Highlights the Opportunities and Challenges for Defense-Side Funding

By Harry Moran |

As the legal funding industry has matured and become a mainstream feature of many jurisdictions’ legal systems, funders are increasingly looking at ways to diversify their activities.

In an article for Insolvency Tracker, Tanya Prasad, CIO of LegalPay, addresses the niche topic of defense-side funding and examines whether there is potential for this type of legal funding to grow in the same way that plaintiff funding has over recent years. Prasad notes that in an environment where “the demand for risk management tools in litigation grows”, large corporations may look to third-party funders to help supplement legal budgets “while potentially achieving favourable outcomes”.

Prasad acknowledges that compared to traditional plaintiff-side funding, defense-side funding “comes with unique challenges”. Whilst claimants may seek to maximise their financial returns in the form of damages and compensation, a defendant will “generally focus on minimizing loss exposure.” As a result of this difference in goals, Prasad suggests that funders would need to not only “employ creative pricing structures”, but would also need to find new metrics to define success.

The latter point is one that Prasad argues is key to creating a viable defense-side funding ecosystem, noting that “establishing a clear definition of success” may have different parameters for different defendants. Examples of this could include structuring funding agreements to incorporate “avoided loss” measures, which would define success based on “achieving a favorable settlement or dismissal at a lower financial cost than anticipated.”

If these difficulties that Prasad highlights can be overcome, she suggests that “defense-side litigation funding has the potential to redefine legal finance, supporting fair representation for both plaintiffs and defendants and expanding access to justice across the board.” Additionally, Prasad points to a handful of examples where defense-side funding has been successfully employed, such as the Gillette v. ShaveLogic case, where Burford Capital provided funding for the defendant to successfully oppose Gillette’s claims of trades secret misappropriation and unfair competition.