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Probate Funding: A Useful Option for So Many (Part 3 of 4)

June 6, 2018

Probate Funding: A Useful Option for So Many (Part 3 of 4)

The following is Part 3 of our 4-Part series on Probate Funding by Steven D. Schroeder, Esq., General Counsel/Sr. Vice President at Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. since 2004. You can find Parts 1 & 2 here and here. Probate Assignments are Adequately Regulated in California In California, it is the exclusive jurisdiction of the Probate Court to determine entitlement for distribution, Cal. Probate Code §§11700-11705. Probate Courts may also apply equitable principles in fashioning remedies and granting relief in proceedings otherwise within its jurisdiction. Estate of Kraus (2010) 184 Cal. App 4th 103, 114, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 760, 768. Thus, even without a specific statute addressing assignments, Probate Courts in California, as well as other jurisdictions, have conducted oversight over the propriety of Assignments in Probate.  See In Re: Michels’s Estate 63 P. 2d 333, 334 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936). For decades, the California Legislature has also regulated Assignments or Transfers by a beneficiary of an estate, see Cal. Probate Code §11604 (formerly Cal. Probate Code §1021.1). The validity of those statutes was well established. Estate of Boyd (1979) 98 Cal. App. 3d 125, 159 Cal. Rptr. 298, and the Courts have recognized the Probate Judge is empowered to give much stricter scrutiny to the fairness of consideration than would be the case under ordinary contract principals. Estate of Freeman (1965) 238 Cal. App., 2d 486, 488-89; 48 Cal. Rptr. 1. The initial purpose of Probate Code Section 1021.1(followed by 11604), was to provide for judicial supervision of proportional assignments given by beneficiaries to so called “heir hunters” (Estate of Wright (2001) 90 Cal. App. 4th 228; Estate of Lund (1944) 65 Cal. App. 2d 151; 110 Cal Rptr. 183.  However, courts have since interpreted that these sections are not limited to that class and can also be applied to Assignees and Transferees generally. Estate of Peterson (1968) 259 Cal. App. 2d. 492, 506; 66 Cal Rptr. 629. Despite the broad interpretation, California adopted additional legislation specifically directed to Probate Advance Companies. In 2006, the California Legislature enacted Probate Code Section 11604.5,[1] to regulate companies (Probate Advance Companies) who are in the business of making cash advances in consideration of a partial Assignment of the heir’s interest. With the enactment of Section 11605.4, the California Legislature also made it abundantly clear that the transactions under this section are not those made in conformity with the California Finance Lenders Law. Cal. Probate Code Section 11604.5 (a) This section applies when distribution from a decedent’s estate is made to a transferee for value who acquires any interest of a beneficiary in exchange for cash or other consideration. (b) For purposes of this section, a transferee for value is a person who satisfies both of the following criteria: (1) He or she purchases the interest from a beneficiary for consideration pursuant to a written agreement. (2) He or she, directly or indirectly, regularly engages in the purchase of beneficial interests in estates for consideration. (c) This section does not apply to any of the following: (1) A transferee who is a beneficiary of the estate or a person who has a claim to distribution from the estate under another instrument or by intestate succession. (2) A transferee who is either the registered domestic partner of the beneficiary, or is related by blood, marriage, or adoption to the beneficiary or the decedent. (3) A transaction made in conformity with the California Finance Lenders Law (Division 9 (commencing with Section 22000) of the Financial Code) and subject to regulation by the Department of Business Oversight. (4) A transferee who is engaged in the business of locating missing or unknown heirs and who acquires an interest from a beneficiary solely in exchange for providing information or services associated with locating the heir or beneficiary…(emphasis added). Although it is not specifically required under Probate Code Section 11604, the Legislature also imposed an affirmative obligation on Probate Assignees to promptly file and serve their Assignments, to ensure full disclosure to the representatives, the Courts and/or other interested parties.[2] Also, the legislature made it clear that unlike loans, Probate Assignments are non-recourse, meaning that the beneficiary faces no further obligation to the Assignee, absent fraud. As stated in 11604.5: (f)“…(4) A provision permitting the transferee for value to have recourse against the beneficiary if the distribution from the estate in satisfaction of the beneficial interest is less than the beneficial interest assigned to the transferee for value, other than recourse for any expense or damage arising out of the material breach of the agreement or fraud by the beneficiary…” …(*emphasis added). Moreover, in enacting PC 11604.5, the legislature specifically gave the Probate Court wide latitude in fashioning relief, when reviewing probate Assignments. “… (g) The court on its own motion, or on the motion of the personal representative or other interested person, may inquire into the circumstances surrounding the execution of, and the consideration for, the written agreement to determine that the requirements of this section have been satisfied. (h) The court may refuse to order distribution under the written agreement, or may order distribution on any terms that the court considers equitable, if the court finds that the transferee for value did not substantially comply with the requirements of this section, or if the court finds that any of the following conditions existed at the time of transfer: (1) The fees, charges, or consideration paid or agreed to be paid by the beneficiary were grossly unreasonable. (2) The transfer of the beneficial interest was obtained by duress, fraud, or undue influence. (i) In addition to any remedy specified in this section, for any willful violation of the requirements of this section found to be committed in bad faith, the court may require the transferee for value to pay to the beneficiary up to twice the value paid for the assignment. An Assignment under 11604.5 is Best Reviewed by the Local Probate Court At present, it does not appear that there has been a reported case interpreting an Assignment under Probate Section 11604.5, including whether the consideration paid was grossly unreasonable. However, there have been a long list of cases interpreting precisely that under Probate Code Section 11604 and Probate Code Section 1021.1) See Estate of Boyd, supra, 159 Cal. Rptr. 301-302; Molino v. Boldt (2008) 165 Cal. App. 4th 913, 81 Cal Rptr 3d. 512. At the same time, it should be noted that there are distinct differences between Assignments given to Heir-Finders and those to Probate Advance Companies. One critical distinction is Probate Advance Companies, such as IFC, provide the Assignor with cash in consideration of a partial Assignment. On the other hand, Heir-Finders, take back a percentage of the Heir’s interest (typically 15% to 40%). Thus, the amount of fees incurred by the Assignee could vary widely depending on the amount the heir recovers. In most instances, the Assignment far exceeds the consideration given to a Probate Advance Company. Moreover, Heir-Finders often receive assignments from multiple heirs in one estate administration even though much of the work would be duplicated. On the other hand, Probate Funding Companies outlay cash consideration for every Assignment they receive. Thus, Probate Funding Companies take on an increased financial risk with every transaction. Also, as in any industry, there are also significant distinctions among the practices of individual Probate Funding Companies including the disclosures they make to the Assignor/Heir. For example, IFC’s contracts, are limited to less than three (3) pages with no hidden fees or other costs tacked on the Assignment post-funding.[3]  The Assignee simply agrees to assign a fixed portion of his/her inheritance for a fixed sum of money.  In other words, a simple $X for $Y purchase.  Thus, it would be a fatal mistake to make a broad-based analysis based on the assumption that one size fits all when it comes to Probate Funding Companies. [4] Moreover, under Probate Code Section 11604.5, the Legislature has placed an affirmative burden on the Transferee (Probate Funding Companies) to file and serve their Assignments shortly after their execution. Hence, the terms are open reviewable by the Courts, Personal Representatives, Attorneys, other interested parties and/or to the public in general. Therefore, there is more than adequate opportunity for objections to be filed or for the Court to question the consideration given for an Assignment, sua sponte. In short, the Legislature left the determination of what amount of fees, charges and other consideration would be deemed “grossly unreasonable” up to the particular Court where administration is ongoing, and to do so on a case by case basis if deemed necessary.   In fact, it is in the best interest for all concerned for the local Court to conduct inquiry if legitimate objections are raised, or on the Court’s own motion. In fact, on many occasions, IFC has responded to questions raised by various courts with regard to the Assignments it has filed and served.[5] Stay tuned for Part 4 of our 4-Part series, where we discuss the risks inherent in Probate Funding, and how those risks should inform the court’s assessment on the validation of an Assignment.  Steven D. Schroeder has been General Counsel/Sr. Vice President at Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. since 2004. Active Attorney in good standing, licensed to practice before all Courts in the State of California since 1985 and a Registered Attorney with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  —- [1] IFC provided substantial input, counsel and proposed legislative language in response to California Senate Bill 390 which was enacted into law as Probate Code Section 11604.5 on January 1, 2006 regulating the Probate Funding industry in California. SB 390.Section 1 2015, Ch. 190 (AB 1517) Section 71 [2] Probate Code 11604 does not have a time limitation filing period reflected. [3] Some Probate Advance Companies have charged interest or other fees post-funding. [4] See Probate Lending, supra, page 130, in which the author makes questionable statistical findings from one county during a limited period of time, with the assumption that each Probate Advance Company has the same terms and business practices. [5] IFC has responded to multiple orders to show cause in California.

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Consumer

Legal Bay Pre-Settlement Funding Announces Registration in New States

By John Freund |

Legal Bay LLC, a leading national pre-settlement funding company, has announced compliance with new regulatory guidelines in California and Georgia effective January 1. The company is now registered and accepting applications in both states as part of its ongoing commitment to transparency, disclosure, and regulatory compliance within the legal funding industry. The announcement comes amid increased scrutiny of lawsuit loans and settlement funding arrangements by courts and lawmakers nationwide.

According to PR Newswire, recent legislation in California and Georgia has highlighted concerns surrounding disclosure practices, contract clarity, and consumer understanding of legal funding agreements. Both states have clarified that litigation finance is not a loan but a non-recourse agreement. Legal Bay maintains internal compliance protocols designed to ensure transparency, consumer protection, and adherence to applicable laws in every state where it operates.

Chris Janish, CEO of Legal Bay, emphasized that "legal funding is not a one-size-fits-all product," noting that state laws change and compliance expectations shift. He stated that the regulatory activity in 2025 has been the most significant in the industry in quite some time. With New York and California both passing bills enabling legal funding in their states, Janish expects more states to follow this national trend of validating legal funding.

Legal Bay through its funding division, LB Capital, has successfully registered to do business in California, Georgia, Missouri, Tennessee, and Oklahoma in 2025. The company's compliance team continues to work on registration in additional states in 2026 where state legislation mandates it. Legal Bay provides non-recourse pre-settlement funding to plaintiffs involved in personal injury, medical malpractice, wrongful termination, and other cases, with clients repaying funds only if they win their case.

Consumer

Joint Liability Proposals Threaten Consumer Legal Funding

By John Freund |

Consumer legal funding has increasingly become a focal point for legislative scrutiny, with some policymakers framing new regulations as necessary consumer protections. A recent commentary argues that one such proposal—imposing joint and several liability on consumer legal funding companies—may do more harm than good, ultimately restricting access to justice for the very consumers these laws are meant to protect.

At its core, the debate centers on whether funders should be held jointly and severally liable alongside plaintiffs for litigation outcomes or related conduct. Proponents of these measures suggest that attaching liability to funders would deter abusive practices and align incentives across the litigation ecosystem. Critics, however, warn that this approach misunderstands the role of consumer legal funding and risks destabilizing a market that many injured or financially vulnerable plaintiffs rely upon to pursue meritorious claims.

An article in National Law Review states that joint and several liability provisions would dramatically alter the risk profile for consumer legal funding companies, forcing them to assume exposure far beyond their contractual role as non-recourse financiers. The piece argues that such liability would likely lead to higher costs of capital, reduced availability of funding, or a wholesale exit of providers from certain jurisdictions. In turn, consumers who lack the means to sustain themselves financially during prolonged litigation could be left without viable alternatives, effectively pressuring them into premature or undervalued settlements.

The article also challenges the notion that consumer legal funding requires punitive regulation, pointing to existing disclosure requirements, contract oversight, and state-level consumer protection laws that already govern the industry. By layering on joint liability, legislators may unintentionally undermine these frameworks and introduce uncertainty that benefits defendants more than consumers. The author further notes that similar liability concepts are generally absent from other forms of non-recourse financing, raising questions about why legal funding is being singled out.

Consumer

What Happens to Consumers When Consumer Legal Funding Disappears

By Eric Schuller |

The following was contributed by Eric K. Schuller, President, The Alliance for Responsible Consumer Legal Funding (ARC).

The Real-World Consequences of Over-Regulation and Misclassification

State lawmakers across the country are increasingly focused on how to regulate third-party financial activity connected to litigation. That attention is appropriate and necessary. However, when Consumer Legal Funding (CLF) is misclassified as a loan, conflicted with commercial litigation finance, or subjected to regulatory structures designed for fundamentally different financial products, the consequences fall not on providers, but on consumers who need it the most.

Consumer Legal Funding, Funding Lives, Not Litigation, exists to help individuals with pending legal claims meet basic household needs while their cases move through the legal system. These consumers are often recovering from serious injuries, unable to work, and facing mounting financial pressure. When CLF disappears due to over-regulation or misclassification, those consumers do not suddenly become financially secure. Instead, they are pushed into worse, more dangerous alternatives, or forced into decisions that undermine both their legal rights and their long-term financial stability.

Who Uses Consumer Legal Funding and Why

Consumers who turn to CLF are not seeking to finance their litigation. They are seeking financial stability. On average, CLF transactions range between $3,000 and $5,000. These monies are used for rent, mortgage payments, utilities, groceries, childcare, transportation, and medical co-pay. In many cases, it is differences between maintaining housing or facing eviction, between keeping a car or losing the ability to get to medical appointments or work.

CLF is non-recourse. If the consumer does not recover in their legal claim, they owe nothing. That structure places all financial risk on the provider, not the consumer. It is precisely this risk allocation that distinguishes CLF from loans and traditional credit products, and it is why courts and legislatures in numerous states have recognized that CLF is not a loan.

When lawmakers impose loan-based frameworks on CLF, including usury caps, amortization requirements, or repayment obligations disconnected from case outcomes, the product becomes economically impossible to offer. The result is not a cheaper product. The result is no product at all.

The Immediate Impact of CLF Disappearing

When CLF exits a state market, the effects are immediate and measurable.

First, consumer access disappears. Providers cannot operate under regulatory structures that ignore the non-recourse nature of the product. Capital exits the market, and consumers lose an option that previously helped them remain financially afloat during litigation.

Second, consumers are forced into inferior alternatives. Without CLF, injured individuals frequently turn to credit cards, payday lenders, installment loans, or borrowing from friends and family. These options often carry guaranteed repayment obligations, compounding interest, collection risk, and damage to credit. Unlike CLF, these products do not adjust based on whether the consumer recovers anything in their legal claim.

Third, financial pressure forces premature settlements. When consumers cannot meet basic living expenses, they are more likely to accept early, undervalued settlements simply to survive. This undermines the fairness of the civil justice system and benefits defendants and insurers, not injured parties or the courts.

Misclassification Harms the Most Vulnerable Consumers

The consumers most harmed by the elimination of CLF are those with the fewest alternatives. These are individuals with limited savings, limited access to traditional credit, and limited ability to absorb income disruption following an injury.

Ironically, regulations intended to protect consumers often end up harming precisely the consumers they sought to help. When CLF is treated as a loan, the regulatory burden drives responsible providers out of the market while doing nothing to improve consumer outcomes. Consumers do not gain safer options. They lose transparent, regulated, non-recourse funding and are pushed toward products with higher risk and fewer protections.

This is not hypothetical. States that have enacted overly restrictive frameworks or applied inappropriate rate caps have seen providers exit, access shrink, and consumer choice vanish. The lesson is clear. When regulation ignores economic reality, consumers pay the price.

CLF Does Not Drive Litigation or Verdict Inflation

A common concern raised in policy debates is whether CLF encourages litigation, prolongs cases, or contributes to so-called nuclear verdicts. The evidence does not support these claims.

CLF is accessed after a legal claim already exists. It does not finance attorneys’ fees, court costs, or litigation strategy. Providers have no control over legal decisions, settlement timing, or trial outcomes. Their only interest is whether a consumer recovers at all.

Moreover, the small size of typical CLF transactions makes it implausible that they influence case strategy or verdict size. A $3,000 to $5,000 transaction used to pay rent or utilities does not drive multi-million-dollar litigation outcomes. Conflating CLF with commercial litigation finance obscures these realities and leads to policy mistakes.

A Better Path Forward for Policymakers

Legislators can protect consumers without eliminating CLF. States that have enacted thoughtful CLF statutes have focused on disclosure, transparency, contract clarity, and consumer choice, rather than imposing loan-based rate structures that do not fit a non-recourse product.

Effective regulation acknowledges three core principles. First, CLF is not a loan and should not be regulated as one. Second, consumers benefit from access to a regulated, transparent product rather than being pushed into worse alternatives. Third, clear rules provide stability for both consumers and providers.

When policymakers get this balance right, consumers retain access to a product that helps them weather one of the most difficult periods of their lives without distorting the justice system or creating unintended harm.

Conclusion

The issue confronting lawmakers is not whether Consumer Legal Funding should be subject to oversight, but whether existing and future frameworks accurately reflect how the product operates and whom it serves. When CLF is swept into regulatory regimes designed for loans or commercial litigation finance, the result is not improved consumer protection. It is the quiet elimination of a non-recourse option that many injured consumers rely on to remain financially stable while their legal claims are resolved.

Careful, informed policymaking requires recognizing that Consumer Legal Funding is distinct, limited in size, non-recourse, and consumer-facing. Regulation that acknowledges those characteristics preserves transparency and accountability without stripping consumers of choice or forcing them into riskier financial alternatives. When rules are tailored to economic reality rather than broad assumptions, consumers are better protected, markets remain stable, and the civil justice system functions as intended.