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Probate Funding: A Useful Option for So Many (Part 4 of 4)

June 18, 2018

Probate Funding: A Useful Option for So Many (Part 4 of 4)

The following is Part 4 of our 4-Part series on Probate Funding by Steven D. Schroeder, Esq., General Counsel/Sr. Vice President at Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. since 2004. Parts 1, 2 & 3 can be found here, here and here. What are the Risks in Probate Funding? Similar to California Probate Code 11604, (formerly Cal. Probate Code 1021.1), the Legislature, in enacting Probate Code 11604.5, has specifically indicated that Assignments relative to Probate Advances will not be set aside unless it is clear that the consideration paid is “grossly unreasonable”, at the time the transaction was executed. In fact, the Probate Court can presume the validity of an Assignment, in the absence of any objection raised or evidence submitted to the contrary. See Lynch v. Cox. (1978) 83 Cal. App. 3rd 296, 147 Cal. Rptr. 861. However, nothing in the Probate Code Sections 11604 or 11604.5 indicates a legislative intent to modify the law concerning the evaluation date to be utilized in appraising the fairness of a contract. In interpreting statutes, courts are required to do so in a manner which will produce a reasonable and not an absurd result. See Freedland v. Greco (1955) 45 Cal. 2d 462, 289 P.2d 463. Thus, in the absence of any evidence that the consideration received by the Assignor was grossly unreasonable, at the time received, the Assignee should be presumed to have had the benefit of all the protection the law provides. See Boyd v. Baker (1979) 98 Cal. App. 3rd 125, 159 Cal. Rptr. 298, 304. Moreover, given that the Probate Funding Company has no assurance of recovery at the time the Assignment is executed, nor any recourse against the Assignor/Heir, it is imperative that the Court consider the many risks a Probate Advance Company assumes during administration.    The following are just a few examples of those risks: *Mismanagement or conversion of Estate funds by the Personal Representative; *Unanticipated claims, such as Medical, Medicaid, Uninsured Medical Hospital or Nursing Bills; *Litigation, including but not limited to Will Contests, Property Disputes, Reimbursement Claims; *Inaction or Delays by the Personal Representative and/or Probate Attorney; *Previously unknown will discovered, disinheriting the Assignor; *Spousal/Domestic Partner Support Claims; *Tax Liability/Litigation; *Partnership Dissolution; *Foreclosure of Estate property; *Child Support Liens; *Unusually high extraordinary personal representative and/or Attorney Fee Claims; *Devaluation of Real Estate Market (i.e. 2008); *Bankruptcy by an heir; *Litigation against the heir. Alienation:  An Heir’s Right. Clearly, the Probate court has the jurisdiction to review an Assignment under Probate Code §11604.5 and consider whether the consideration paid was “grossly unreasonable” at the time it was executed. See Estate of Wright (2001) 90 Cal. App.4th 228, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572.  Yet, it must be remembered that an heir’s right to alienate his/her interest is an important one and should not be infringed upon in a random or desultory manner. See Gold, et. Cal Civil Practice: Probate and Trust Proceedings (2005) §3:86, p. 3-78. Conditions restraining alienation, when repugnant to the interest created are void. See California Civil Code §711. In this vein, Courts should also consider the fact that the lion’s share of heirs who have obtained probate advances have done so out of their own free will, without solicitation and/or direct marketing.[1] Many heirs who research probate advances find that it is a preferred option to loans or other sources of funding, which take substantial time to qualify, require credit checks and extensive documentation and create personal obligations. Therefore, as long as terms of the Assignment are simple, straightforward and unambiguous – and it appears on its face that the Heir was given full disclosure and consented to the transaction – Courts should be hesitant to interfere with the Heirs’ right of alienations. Conclusion It is intellectually dishonest to ignore the obvious legal distinctions between Probate Assignments and Loans. Probate Funding Companies like IFC provide a valuable option for many heirs who would not be able to qualify for a traditional loan and/or do not wish to personally obligate themselves. Probate Funding Companies assume a myriad of risks while administration is pending with no guaranty of absolute repayment. In California, the Legislature has enacted Probate Code Section 11604.5 which governs the transfer of a beneficial interest in the form of an Assignment, and clearly distinguishes these transactions from loans. Further, that section affords the Probate Court all the authority it needs to review Assignments and determine whether, at the time the Assignment was given, the consideration paid was grossly unreasonable. In reviewing its terms, Courts must always consider an Heir’s inherent right of alienability. If fair disclosure was given by the Probate Advance Company, and it is found that the heir understood and consented to the Assignment, the Court should be very cautious in modifying the terms of an Assignment, ex post facto. In part 1 of this series, we cited just one case of many which demonstrates why Probate Funding is a useful option for so many heirs, and a far better option than a recourse loan.  In that case, Ms. Tanner would have likely lost her house to foreclosure if it was not for the availability of the Probate Advance provided by IFC. In hindsight, Helen Tanner made a very good deal for herself – even if she had the ability to qualify for a loan, the cost to her over such a protracted period would have been significantly greater. On the other hand, the return for IFC, some nine (9) years later, was considerably less than ideal. That being said, the end-result in Tanner was far better for IFC than in the numerous other Estates in which it has incurred significant losses through the years. Heirs/beneficiaries are fortunate that there are Companies willing to take risk and pay heirs a sum of money for a fixed Assignment during Probate administration with zero personal recourse against the heir. Steven D. Schroeder has been General Counsel/Sr. Vice President at Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. since 2004. Active Attorney in good standing, licensed to practice before all Courts in the State of California since 1985 and a Registered Attorney with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  — [1] Over 90% of heirs seek funding through IFC’s website, by other heirs who have already contracted with IFC, by lawyers or personal representatives.

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Consumer Legal Funding Is Not a Loan, Courts and Economists Agree

By John Freund |

The debate over whether consumer legal funding should be classified as a loan continues to surface in regulatory and policy circles, but legal doctrine and economic analysis consistently point in the opposite direction. Consumer legal funding is a non-recourse financial transaction tied to the outcome of a legal claim. If the consumer does not recover in their case, they owe nothing. This defining feature alone places the product outside the traditional boundaries of consumer lending, which requires repayment regardless of outcome and typically involves credit underwriting, collateral, and enforceable debt obligations.

An article in the National Law Review explains that courts and legislatures across the United States have repeatedly recognized this distinction. Rather than viewing consumer legal funding as borrowed money, courts have treated these arrangements as the purchase of a contingent interest in a future settlement or judgment. Because repayment is entirely dependent on case success, judges have found that the economic substance of the transaction does not resemble a loan, nor does it fit neatly within existing consumer credit frameworks.

Judicial decisions from multiple jurisdictions underscore this point. Courts have emphasized that consumers face no personal liability, no collection efforts, and no obligation to repay from their own assets. These factors are incompatible with the legal definition of a loan, which presumes a fixed obligation to repay principal and interest. As a result, attempts to recharacterize consumer legal funding as lending have largely failed when scrutinized under established legal standards.

From an economic perspective, consumer legal funding plays a distinct role in the civil justice system. It provides liquidity to plaintiffs who may be facing prolonged litigation and financial pressure, often helping them avoid accepting premature or undervalued settlements. Treating these transactions as loans could impose regulatory requirements that are poorly suited to non-recourse funding and risk limiting consumer access to a product designed to mitigate imbalance between individual plaintiffs and well-resourced defendants.

Consumer

Legal-Bay Hails New York Litigation Funding Act as Industry Milestone

By John Freund |

Legal Bay has praised New York Governor Kathy Hochul for signing the New York Litigation Funding Act into law, describing the legislation as a landmark step that finally provides a clear regulatory framework for consumer litigation funding in the state. The new law represents a significant development for an industry that has operated for years amid legal uncertainty in one of the country’s most active litigation markets.

A Legal Bay press release notes that the legislation establishes a comprehensive set of consumer protections and regulatory standards governing litigation funding transactions in New York. Legal Bay characterized the law as the product of more than two decades of policy development and sustained advocacy efforts by industry participants and consumer access to justice groups. The company emphasized that the statute provides long needed clarity by formally recognizing consumer litigation funding as a non recourse financial transaction rather than a traditional loan.

Under the new framework, funded plaintiffs are only required to repay advances if they obtain a recovery in their legal claims. Supporters of the law argue that this distinction is critical in protecting consumers from additional financial risk while ensuring that individuals with meritorious claims are able to cover basic living expenses during the often lengthy litigation process. Legal Bay highlighted that litigation funding can help plaintiffs avoid accepting early settlements driven by financial pressure rather than the merits of their cases.

Legal Bay also acknowledged the role played by New York lawmakers in advancing the legislation through the state legislature, noting that the law strikes a balance between consumer protection and preserving access to funding. According to the company, the statute promotes transparency, fairness, and stability in a market that continues to grow in both size and sophistication.

Consumer

New York Enacts Consumer Litigation Funding Act Impacting Litigation Finance

By John Freund |

New York has enacted a new Consumer Litigation Funding Act, establishing a formal regulatory framework for third party litigation funding transactions involving consumers. The law, signed by Governor Kathy Hochul in December, introduces new registration requirements, disclosure obligations, and pricing restrictions aimed at increasing transparency and limiting costs for funded claimants.

As reported in Be Insure, litigation funders must register with the state and comply with detailed consumer protection rules. Funding agreements are required to clearly disclose the amount advanced, all fees and charges, and the total amount that may be owed if the case is successful.

Consumers must initial each page of the agreement and are granted a ten day cooling off period during which they may cancel the transaction without penalty. The law also prohibits funders from directing litigation strategy or interfering with the professional judgment of attorneys, preserving claimant and counsel independence.

One of the most significant provisions is a cap on the total charges a funder may collect, which is limited to 25 percent of the gross recovery. Prepayment penalties are unenforceable, and attorneys representing funded plaintiffs are prohibited from holding a financial interest in a litigation funding company. For the first time, consumer litigation funding in New York is brought under the state’s General Business Law, replacing years of relatively limited oversight with a comprehensive statutory regime.

Supporters of the legislation argue that the law addresses concerns about excessive costs and abusive practices while providing clarity for an industry that has operated in a regulatory gray area. Industry critics, however, have raised questions about whether pricing caps could restrict access to funding for higher risk claims.