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Select Ethical Issues Present in Litigation Funding

Select Ethical Issues Present in Litigation Funding

The following article was contributed by John J. Hanley, Partner at Rimon Law Litigation financing is on the rise in the United States and provides some claimants a valuable means for paying the costs of pursuing a legal claim. Lawyer involvement in litigation financing transactions raises many ethical issues for a lawyer such as competence, duty of loyalty, the potential waiver of privilege and interference by a third party, to name a few. Competence The first rule for lawyers under the New York Rules of Professional Conduct (the “NY RPC”) is competence.[1]  Lawyers and law firms should tread carefully when considering undertaking client engagements in a subject area in which they do not have the requisite knowledge and skill to provide competent representation of their clients. Official Comment 1 to Rule 1.1 provides in part that factors relevant to determining whether a lawyer has the requisite knowledge and skill in a matter include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer’s general experience, the lawyer’s training and experience in the filed in question, and the preparation the lawyer is able to give the matter.[2] This does not mean that lawyers cannot deal with matters in which they are initially unfamiliar.  Indeed, the American Bar Association points out in comments to Rule 1.1 that “[a] lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. The analysis of precedent  . . . and legal drafting are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.”[3] According to the New York City Bar Report to the President by the New York City Bar Association Working Group on Litigation Funding: “[a] lawyer whose client seeks third party funding should determine at the outset whether he or she has the transactional experience and sophistication required to negotiate a beneficial agreement with the funder or whether a specialist in the field should be involved.”[4] Competence in litigation finance includes familiarity with various litigation financing structures and privileges against disclosure, among others.[5]  For example, the structure may involve different types of collateral, different means of financing legal fees and expenses, the manner in which funding is disbursed and the return structure of the financing.  A lawyer concentrating her or his practice on litigation funding may also be better able to determine “market” terms of the financing. Duty of Loyalty and the Lawyer’s Financial Interests Of course, the lawyer is the client’s fiduciary and agent who owes his or her client undivided loyalty and is forbidden from putting her interest above that of the client. The New York State Bar Association, Committee on Professional Ethics reminds lawyers that their financial interests must not interfere with the representation of the client.[6] Ordinarily, there is nothing adverse to a client about a lawyer getting paid for legal services[7] but in a litigation funding transaction the lawyer could have a personal interest in respect of the transaction. For example, the litigation funding agreement may facilitate payment of a portion of the lawyer’s fees or ensure certain expenses borne by the lawyer will be repaid.[8] The American Bar Association posits that if a lawyer has a relationship with a litigation funder that creates a financial interest for the lawyer . . . it may interfere with the lawyer’s obligation to provide impartial, unbiased advice to the client (the “ABA Report”)[9]. The ABA Report goes on to say that a lawyer with a long-term history of working with a particular funder may have an interest in keeping the funder content which would create a conflict even in the absence of an explicit agreement. The NY RPC, specifically Rule 1.7(a)(2), like the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if “there is significant risk that the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of a client will be adversely affected by the lawyer’s own financial, property or other interest.” Additionally, Rule 5.4 of the NY RPC, and its analogous provisions in other jurisdictions, requires that a lawyer maintain independence[10].  Consequently, such lawyer, representing a client in a matter for which litigation funding is sought, in general may be able to represent the client with respect to the litigation funding agreement but should disclose the lawyer’s relationship with the funder and receive the client’s informed written consent. Communication and Confidentiality Rule 1.4 of the NYRP Conduct requires a lawyer to communicate promptly, and provide complete information, to the client regarding the matter, and to reasonably consult with the client about the means to achieve the client’s objectives.[11] Reputable litigation funders are usually careful to provide in the litigation finance documents that the funder will not be involved in discussions between the lawyer and client regarding the matter, and that the funder will not direct or control the litigation. In certain circumstances an inexperienced lawyer may consider involving the funder in discussions about case strategy, but caution is in order. If a party other than client and the attorney is involved in communications involving legal issues or the case, the attorney-client privilege and confidentiality of communications is likely breached and the attorney may be guilty of legal malpractice. Indeed, Rule 1.6 of the NYRPC requires that a lawyer not knowingly reveal confidential information, or use that information to the disadvantage of the client or advantage of the lawyer or a third person, subject to certain exceptions.[12] Conclusion An attorney who represents a client in a matter that is to be funded pursuant to a litigation funding agreement should consider the ethical implications discussed in this Insight, among others, before representing the client in the funding agreement. Counsel would avoid all of the ethical considerations that may arise by referring the client to an outside attorney experienced in litigation finance.
[1] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.1.1.  The California Rules of Professional conduct and the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) also make this the number one rule.  Indeed, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted legal ethics rules based at least in part on the MRPC. [2] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.1.1, Comment [1]. [3] Available here ABA Comment to Rule 1.1 [4] Report to the President by the New York City Bar Association Working Group on Litigation Funding (February 28, 2020). [5] Others includes, without limitation champerty, maintenance, barratry, usury and required disclosures. [6] N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 769 (November 4, 2003). [7] The State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct Formal Opinion No. 2020-204. [8] Id. At 3. [9] American Bar Association, Informational Report to the House of Delegates Commission on Ethics 20/20. [10] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.5.4. [11] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.1.4(a). [12] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.1.6(a). See also the American Bar Association’s Model Rule 1.6.

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Trucking Group Presses Case Against Hidden Funding in Crash Lawsuits

The trucking industry is intensifying its scrutiny of third-party litigation funding, arguing that undisclosed outside capital is distorting the economics of truck-crash lawsuits and driving up the cost of doing business.

As reported by Land Line Media, the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association contends that outside investors — sometimes including foreign entities — are bankrolling crash litigation without transparency, prolonging cases, inflating damages, and leaving plaintiffs with modest returns while funders capture the larger share of any recovery. In some instances, the group warns, foreign government involvement raises national-security questions.

The article frames the issue against a wave of state-level legislation. Ohio has enacted disclosure requirements and barred foreign participation outright, with Rep. Meredith Craig declaring that "foreign actors have profited off Ohio citizens and businesses by investing in our courts." North Carolina has gone further, imposing an outright ban on third-party funding backed by fines of up to $50,000, while New Hampshire has prohibited financing by foreign governments and designated adversarial nations. Michigan has approved disclosure and registration requirements and banned foreign entities and incentive payments to attorneys and medical professionals.

Industry voices echo the theme: Tom Balzer of the Ohio Trucking Association argues that such funding "incentivizes frivolous claims, prolongs litigation, and inflates damages." Together, the measures reflect a coordinated push to bring litigation finance in trucking cases into public view — and a signal that transportation is becoming a central front in the national funding-transparency debate.

Cross-Jurisdictional Analysis Charts Diverging Rules for Litigation Funding

Third-party litigation funding has grown into a multibillion-dollar force across major legal markets, yet the rules governing it remain strikingly inconsistent from one jurisdiction to the next, according to a new cross-jurisdictional analysis.

As reported by JD Supra, the review — authored by Arthur Coviello, Colin Dunn, and Mark Selwyn of WilmerHale — examines third-party funding across the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, China, and the Unified Patent Court. It notes that funders now manage billions in assets, with an estimated 20% committed to patent litigation, and that the U.S. leads but no longer dominates a market with established industries in the U.K., Germany, and China.

The authors highlight a sharp regulatory divergence. The United States has built a patchwork of state and federal measures, including disclosure requirements, while the U.K., Germany, China, and the UPC have largely declined to adopt comprehensive rules despite voicing similar concerns about conflicts of interest, funder control, and foreign influence.

The analysis catalogs recent developments: at least five bills pending in Congress addressing transparency and national-security concerns, the lingering effects of the U.K.'s 2023 PACCAR decision and the Civil Justice Council's call for "light touch" regulation, the European Commission's November 2025 decision not to adopt proposed funding rules, and the International Trade Commission's recent disclosure proposal. Without mandatory disclosure, the authors argue, judges and parties cannot reliably assess who holds a stake in a case or where potential conflicts may lie.

Funding Collapse Ends Musical-Instrument Collective Action, Triggering £1.5M in Costs

A proposed UK collective action against five musical-instrument manufacturers has collapsed after its litigation funding fell through, leaving the proposed class representative facing roughly £1.5 million in costs.

As reported by Legal Futures, the Competition Appeal Tribunal addressed the withdrawal of five collective proceedings brought by proposed class representative Elisabetta Sciallis against Fender, Korg, Roland, Yamaha, and Casio. The claims followed a Competition and Markets Authority finding that the manufacturers had restricted retailers' freedom to set prices online.

Ms Sciallis had initially pointed to a funding agreement with North Wall Capital, first set at £6.5 million and later increased to £18 million as more claims were filed. Negotiations between the funder and her firm, Pogust Goodhead, ceased in early 2023, but the tribunal found that the funder's departure was not clearly disclosed until shortly before a March 2026 case management conference — at which point the firm confirmed the North Wall agreement had never materialised and that some 25 alternative funders had been approached without success.

The tribunal, which was critical of how the funding position had been communicated, ordered indemnity costs from April 2023 onward, including £608,000 summarily assessed for three defendants and interim orders of £850,000 for two others. Ms Sciallis withdrew all five proceedings ahead of a June 2026 hearing that would have examined the funding. The case underscores how quickly a collapse in third-party backing can unwind even a well-advanced collective claim.